US THEATER INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS AT ECHELON ABOVE CORPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R003000090019-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: January 20, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, DA
THRU DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY STAFF
20 January 1982
SUBJECT: US Theater Intelligence Structure Requirements at Echelon
Atave Corps (U)
1. (U) This is to acvise you of my belief that Army arrangements for
management of wartime intelligence operations at the theater level are
deficient and that remedial actions currently underway are insufficiently
focused or coordinated to resolve the problems. In my opinion-the funda-
mental difficulty is a general lack of appreciation for operational matters
at theater echelons above corps (EAC) and a concomitant absence of doctrine
for dealing with them.*
2. (U) The focus of most Army doctrinal development effort has been
at corps level and below, with theater level studies largely confined to
matters of support. While some analyses, such as Total Army Analysis
(TAA), provide insights into the relative effectiveness of Army program
options in comparison with others, there has been insufficient illumination
of operational design deficiencies or opportunities for improvement in the
effectiveness of the total Allied campaign.
3. (U) Intelligence is a policy and combat support function which should
operate in context of the situation, the terrain and the basic mission of
the forces with which it is associated. It is a direct contributor to the
land battle and, not infrequently, a significant factr' in the success or
defeat of participants. Our emphasis upon operations at corps and below-
has provided ample basis for assessment of immediate intelligence require-
ments at those levels, but we have not had an equivalent exploration of
the larger issues of total force requirements and the many special factors
connected with a coalition. We overlook these matters at our peril.
4. (S) An example of an important factor which has been overlooked in
most studies of EAC. intelligence organization is the likelihood of inter-
mingling of US divisions and separate brigades with equivalent allied
This memorandum is based upon four years' experience and observation, both
as Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, HQ USAREUR, and as Commander, US
Army Concepts Analysis Agency. While it focuses on problems in Europe, I
believe that similar problems are extant, or are likely to develop, else-
where. Notable among efforts to develop EAC intelligence doctrine have
been two versions of draft FM 100-16, the 1979-S0 TRADOC EAC study (Woerner ;.
Study), a 1979 contract study commissioned by HQ INSCOM, and the current
INSCOM in-house effort (Weinstein Study). ODCSI HQ USAREUR conducted a
LL
related study in 1980 of requirements for intelligence support to the Central
Region. Few common threads- link the various studies.
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SUBJECT: US Theater Intelligence Structure Requirements at Echelon
Above Corps (U)
units across the entirety of the Central Front in a European war. TAA-88
indicates that US forces are likely to be assigned to other than US corps
sectors very soon after the onset of hostilities. (See Figure No. 1 below)
TAA-38 US FORCE COMMITMENTS IN
First Netherlands Corps
49th US Armored Division
First German Corps
1 US armored division equivalent
First Belgian Corps
1st US Cavalry Division
Third US Corps 1
2nd US Armored Division
4th US 1,1--chenized Division
Seventh US Corps 3.
3rd US Mechanized Division
25th US Infantry Division
1 US armored division equivalent
1 US mechanized division equivalent
Notes: 1. The US III Corps also has the 16th Belgian Division attached.
2. The US V Corps also has the 6th, 7th and 10th French Divisions
in Corps reserve.
3. The US 'III Corps also has the 12th German Panzer Division
attached.
Figure No. 1
5. (S) TA/\-38 also indicates that as the US force commitment to the Central
Region matures, additional corps sectors will be established and the inter-
mingling of US with Allied forces will continue. By D+92 US divisions are
likely to he found deployed in twelve different corps sectors, more than
half of which may be commanded by other than US commanders. The issue at
hand is that our doctrinal concept of corps level support to US divisions and
brigades is likely rapidly to become unsorted. Rather than finding a neat
echelonntent of responsibilities according to the depth of commander?s interest
EUROPEAN CENTRAL REGION AT D + 32
Third German Corps
1 US mechanized division equivalent
First French Army
7th US infantry Division
Fifth US Corps 2.
3rd US Armored Division
8th US Mechanized Division
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SUBJECT: US Theater Intelligence Structure Requirements at Echelon
Above Corps (U)
on the battlefield, as our doctrine implies, we find a complex mixture
of different national units with widely varying reconnaissance capabilities,
with little overall coherence. While the problem may be serious in several
operational and support areas, it is critical in intelligence because of
the magnitude of differences between US and Allied intelligence capabilities
and concepts.
6. (U) An unfortunate trap we seem to have fallen into is the consideration
of intelligence force requirements in context of a single dimension: the
theoretical depth of vision required by each level of command on the battle-
field. While such an approach may have utility at tactical levels up
through division or corps, there is a fundamental shift of sort - not just
of scale - as we consider the theater. At that level matters become multi-
dimensional and much more complex. Even if all US forces were to be grouped
into corps packages in accordance with our doctrine, we would still encounter
other factors impacting upon the intelligence tasks to be accomplished, and
hence upon the force development process. Of particular importance are the
geography and the political realities of the theater.
7. (U) The most important aspect of the geography in Europe is the location
of NATO's most powerful continental partner on the forward edge of the
potential battle area. This means that the plan for the defense must be
designed for maximum effectiveness well forward. The Alliance cannot
expect to trade space for time or to fall very far back upon a major water
course if it is to sustain that partner or to realize the value of its
contribution. The loss of the forward economic and demographic support base
in Germany would be a disaster.
8. (U) Another important aspect is the nature of the terrain in Germany
itself, and the location of the centers of mass of both friendly and potentially
hostile forces. While Bavaria enjoys relatively favorable defensive country
along its eastern border, the terrain to the north tends toward plains. Yet
American forces, with .heir sophisticated reconnaissance systems, are con-
centrated in the south while the north is expected to be defended, at least
initially, by less powerful armies with more rudimentary intelligence support.
Conversely, Soviet forces are centrally located and can strike in either
direction.
9. (S) The distribution of West German forces is also an important matter,
and one which impacts upon and greatly complicates the achievement of a
coherent defense. For political reasons German forces are distributed
across the length of the front, with other allies assuming sectors in between.
While this demonstrates a German willingness to defend their homeland, it
practically assures them no two adjacent corps will be of the same nationality.
(Even in the exceptional case of the US V and VII Corps, we find the German
12th Panzer Division sandwiched in between.)
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SUBJECT: US Theater Intelligence Structure Requirements at Echelon
Above Corps (U)
10. (5) The implications of these geographic and political factors for
intelligence are many and varied. First, they translate into a heavy
emphasis in peacetime on early warning of possible attack by forces of the
Warsaw Pact. This requires a broad application of all intelligence disciplines,
and manifests itself in substantial investment in installations and activities
optimized for that function. In the SIGINT area we require an elaborate
network of field stations, remote listening posts and communication links.
In HUMINT we rely heavily upon the US Military Liaison Mission accredited
to the Soviet High Command, and upon interrogation of knowledgeable border
crossers at refugee centers. Overhead imagery is provided through close
liaison with Air Force acitivities flying the Berlin corridors and from
national sources.
11. (S) It should be noted that most of these activities may not be
available to provide continued support in wartime. SIGINT field stations
are not survivable, the Military Liaison Mission will be withdrawn or placed
under arrest, air corridors will be closed, and cloud cover is likely to
obscure important intelligence targets at critical times. Nevertheless, the
need for hard intelligence will not diminish, rather it will become even
more time critical. The tasks must be assumed by other assets capable of
surviving in war and of fulfilling the special requirements of large land-
mass armies engaged in active operations. It follows, therefore, that
whatever the intelligence structure may be in peacetime, it must be capable
of rapid transformation to a wartime configuration.
12. (U) By and large, the EAC intelligence structures for peace and war
are quite different and require substantially different organization, methods
of operation and command and control arrangements. While it may be
convenient to characterize most Army activities as "designed for war and
adjusted for peace," the phrase is not particularly apt for theater intelligence.
A clear understanding of the functions and capabilities of EAC intelligence
and the means for rapidly transitioning from peace to war is more germane.
13. (S) Another important implication of-the characteristics of the
theater is the need for full intelligence coverage of the potential front.
While virtually all members of the Western Alliance conduct intelligence
activities, most of their efforts are designed to support the particular
concerns of the countries, none of which have the weal th of techni cal
collection means available to the United States. Typical of the dominance
of US intelligence, the Alliance indications and warning system is a replica
of the US Warning Indications System, Europe (WISE), and almost wholly
dependent upon it. With minor exceptions, it would make little sense to
confine US intelligence operations to one sector and to rely upon the Allies
for coverage of others. With respect to technical means of intelligence
collection, within NATO, the US is a giant among midgets.
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SUBJECT: US Theater Intelligence Structure Requirements at Echelon
Above Corps (U)
14. (S) The likelihood of widespread deployments of US ground forces in
a European war indicates that the breadth of US intelligence coverage
should be continued in wartime as well as in peace, even if we consider
only the requirements of our own forces. While it might be argued that
a real battle manager could group the American forces differently than
the TAA war simulation model, it should be recognized that the model seeks
to optimize the effectiveness of the defense, and that any other arrange-
ment would be less effective, given the same assumptions regarding enemy
force strength, dispositions, timing, etc..
15. (U) Still another implication is the necessity for a common perception
of the threat among all Allies participating in the defense structure,
and among the various international headquarters.* While much coordination
and exchange of information can take place by lengthy messages and in
conferences on a bilateral or multilateral basis in peacetime, these
methods are not well suited for the purpose in a high stress, dynamic
environment. In wartime we cannot incur the risk that a US division commander
might sense one threat, his (Allied) corps commander another, and commanders
at NATO echelons yet a third.
16. (S) Finally, there is the matter of intelligence priorities. While
it may make sense for the US Theater or Theater Army Commander to direct
the American theater intelligence effort in peacetime, the situation is
fundamentally different in war. SACEUR and subordinate NATO commanders are
charged with the prosecution of the war at the theater level. If these
officers are to fulfill their responsibilities in an efficient way, they
must be able to establish priorities and to switch them rapidly as the
situation dictates. This leads one to conclude that in wartime these
commanders should probably exercise operational control of most theater
intelligence assets, or at least enjoy the close relationship of a supported
commander with a direct support unit. For the Central Region, CINCENT is
the logical authority to give direction to most US Army EAC intelligence
assets.*
17. (U) The design of the wartime intelligence structure should be based upon
the functions to be performed. These may be summarized as follows:
1. Operational direction of theater level intelligence activities.
2. Data base management and technical analysis.
"it is r~ecojnized that this is valid for other Allied EAC intelligence
assets as well as US, but the US has much more to contribute. In 1979
CINC USAREUR (GEN Blanchard) approved the "chop" of EAC intelligence
structure to AFCEN!T control. In 1980 GEN Kroesen expressed a preference
for the direct support relationship.
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SUBJECT: US Theater Intelligence Structure Requirements at Echelon
Above Corps (U)
3. National/tactical interface for support by national systems.
4. Liaison with supported international headquarters and other US
theater level headquarters and activities.
5. Liaison with host nation intelligence and security organizations
and other special activities.
6. Exploitation of knowledgeable persons, documents and captured
equl pment.
7. Theater level HF/DF SIGINT operations.
8. Army airborne reconnaissance and surveillance in sectors not
otherwise covered by US Corps assets.
9. Clandestine HUMINT operations.
10. Counterintelligence operations.
11. Administrative command and control of the intelligence apparatus.
18. (S) The first two functions, operational direction and data base
mangement, can best be accomplished through institution of a survivable
intelligence center employing persons with a wide range of skills and all
intelligence disciplines. The center needs to be equipped with appropriate
automatic data handling equipment and secure communications to all information
sources, other services and Allied nations, and supported headquarters and
agencies. HQ USAREUR began in March 1979 to deploy such a center on annual
NATO "WINTER" exercises. The center (initially entitled "USAREUR Theater
Intelligence Center," or "UTIC") is composed of assets from ODCSI USAREUR,
66th MI Group, the US Army Special Security Group, US Army Cryptologic
Support Group, US Army Reserve strategic intelligence detachments. US Air
Force intelligence and weather detachments, plus attached communications,
military police and support personnel. The bunker complex at Massweiler has
been designated as the wartime location of the Center.
19. (S) Particularly important in the Center is a SIGINT coordination and
data base management entity known as the Primary Control and Analysis Center
(PCAC). Each US Corps has a Forward Control and Analysis Center (FCAC). The
PCAC is designed to coordinate all US Army SIGINT collection efforts in the
theater in wartime and to interface with similar activities by Allies.
Little mobile equipment is now available, and much work is presently done
manually when the unit deploys from its garrison location.
20. (S) The third function, national/tactical interface is in addition to
the like interface found at US Corps headquarters. The theater intelligence
apparatus must have access to US national systems to express the desired
priorities of NATO battle managers, to place specific requests and to receive
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SUBJECT: US Theater Intelligence Structure Requirements at Echelon
Above Corps (U)
information collected. Various ground systems (ITEP, TACIES, etc.) are
required for these purposes.
21. (S) The fourth function, liaison with supported headquarters, has been
accomplished in Europe through the formation of small intelligence support
elements (ISE's). ISE's, headed by field grade officers and equipped with
secure communications, are routinely attached to HQ AFCENT, CENTAG, NORTHAG
and the USAFE Combat Operations Intelligence Center (COIC) at Ramstein.*
In time, ISE's should be extended to LANDJUT and LANDSOUTH and to other
NATO headquarters as the need is identified. The senior officer in each
ISE is the principal representative of US all-source ground intelligence
to the commander and G-2 of the headquarters to which he is accredited. He
advises on the capabilities of US intelligence support and conveys the
priorities and requests of the supported commanders back to the Intelligence
Center. He maintains certain US NOFORN and compartmented information
within his element for the eyes of cleared US officers serving in the inter-
national headquarters field locations (e.g.; COMCENTAG).
22. (S) Liaison with host nation intelligence and security agencies is
similar in organization and operation to the ISE's, but the emphasis is
more heavily upon collection and exchange of information. Within Germany,
the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the Agency for Protection of the
Constitution (BI.V), the Criminal Office (BKA), the Federal Border Guard
(BGS), and similar activities within the Ministry of Defense and at the
state level, all acquire sensitive information of security value in peace-
time. In wartime these activities may be expected to continue to be of
high importance as intelligence sources. Good raport and good communi-
cations with these and similar agencies in other friendly countries where
troops are deployed must be maintained and expanded in order to insure
that the US effort is conducted in context with its Allies and that all
threats to US interests are identified early. A wartime requirement
of upwards of fiftysuch liaison elements for the theater would not be
surprising.
23. (S) Interrogation of particularly knowledgeable prisoners and other
persons, document translation and exploitation, and technical intelligence
support are vital functions which must be available at the outset of
hostilities. In Europe today, certain elements of the 66th MI Group and
DARCOM technical information gathering offices have wartime missions
requiring establishment of a theater exploitation center. The three
functions of human, document and technical equipment exploitation are
*The COIL is the US Air Force counterpart of the Army Intelligence Center.
Each has representation within the other, and, ideally, would be able to
serve for a limited time as a backup for the other.
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SUBJECT: US Theater Intelligence Structure Requirements at Echelon
Above Corps (U)
interrelated and synergistic. All functions operate best in context with
one another. We may anticipate that wartime requirements would be heavy.
A group-sized structure would probably be necessary for the effective
discharge of all three functions.*
24. (S) Theater 'level SIGINT collection efforts are particularly important
in the high frequency direction finding (HF/DF) and VHF airborne intercept
areas. HF/DF stations located across the breadth of the front would
provide a broad base for accurate direction finding deep in the enemy rear.
Airborne platforms, such as GUARD RAIL AND QUICK LOOK systems, provide more
shallow support to US units not otherwise supported by US corps collectors
and afford a rapid reaction capability for bolstering any sector of the
front at critical times. The shorter range systems include tactical consoles,
through which the supported unit can receive intelligence relayed by the
aircraft. Transmission time from the intercept operator to the front line
consumer can thus be reduced to a minimum,even though the systems are
managed at a higher echelon of command.
25. (S) Clandestine HUMINT, operations are important to supplement other
types of collection. These operations should take several forms. First,
any peacetime agents who might be able to continue reporting in wartime
should be equipped with long range clandestine radio equipment. Additional
agents may be infiltrated as circumstances permit. Military HUMINT sources
may infiltrate via stay-behind, surface or airborne techniques. These
troops should not be confused with dedicated Special Forces currently desig-
nated for a variety of other theater missions. HUMINT assets avoid contact
with the enemy and are not tasked to perform combat or interdictive functions
which might draw attention to themselves. Requirements exist for establish-
ment of clandestine communications and training and support bases for these
activities at the theater level.
26. (U) Counterintelligence units are necessary for the internal security
of all Army EAC headquarters and forces in the theater and for assessment
and warning of rear area threats in the foreign environment. In addition,
reinforcing units from CONUS, arriving in staging of marshalling areas, are
particularly vulnerable to hostile intelligence and small unit or guerrilla
hit-and-run attacks before they are fully organized for their own security.
In Vietnam the Combined Document Exploitation Center was processing 1,400
pounds of reports a day in 1967, with multilith press running off 6,000 pages
of translations per hour. Interrogation intelligence reports were running at
a rate in excess of 1,000 per month. "Go" teams from the Combined Materiel
Exploitation Center traveled the length of the country to rapidly identify
and exploit new enemy equipment coming under allied control. (See "The Role
of Military Intelligence 1965-67" Vietnam Studies, DA. 1974 pp. 37-44.)
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Above Corps (U)
EAC counterintelligence can offer regional OPSEC support, orientation on
surrounding conditions, contacts with appropriate host government agencies,
and guidance to organic intelligence units to facilitate assumption of
their own security responsibilities and missions.
27. (U) Finally, there must be an overall administrative and command
and control mechanism for the entire EAC intelligence apparatus. A
sensible approach, and the one which has been employed in Europe, is the
establishment of a Theater Army Intelligence Command (TAIL) under the
Theater Army. The TALC has a small "G" staff, with necessary sections
for communications, transport and support. In time of war the DCSI, with
most of his office, is detached from USAREUR HQ, and provides leader-
ship for the TAIC. I' small intelligence office remains with USAREUR HQ
to manage residual intelligence and security functions of that headquarters.*
The general organization of the TAIC is shown in Figure 2.
28. (S) To facilitate coordination, control and administrative efficiency,
the various field operating units may be grouped either regionally or
functionally under MI group headquarters. The group headquarters should
be primarily administrative in nature, reporting to the TAIC HQ, with
operational control being exercised directly from the intelligence Center
to insure maximum speed in tasking and operational reporting. The TAIC
headquarters, and one or more of the group headquarters, should have some
operational directive capacity in order to provide additional back-up for
the Intelligence Center, should it be disabled and the COIC unable to
assume the mission.**
29. (S) It is important to ensure that the Army EAC intelligence structure
is fully compatible with the joint and combined structure of the particular
theater. In Europe, HQ's AFCENT and AAFCE are served by a US all-source
entity in their wartime location called the Tactical Fusion Center (TFC).
Developed by the Air Force, the TFC is primarily air intelligence oriented.
By agreement between HQ's USAREUR and USAFE, the TAI Intelligence Support
Element is located in the TFC, and the ISE Chief is accredited in CINCCENT
An important point is the fundamental difference between ODCSI and other
principal sections of HQ USAREUR, ODCSI has elements capable of providing
vital intelligence support to battle managers. The other principal staff
sections are designed primarily to fulfill the administrative functions of
a theater army headquarters. In its wartime supporting role, HQ USAREUR has
little requirement for the type and size of intelligence staff it maintains
in peacetime.
The total TAIC wartime manpower requirement may be expected to approach 10,000.
EAC intelligence personnel in Vietnam in 1969 exceeded that figure, but these
included all in theater assigned to the Army Security Agency, including direct
support units. The percentage of intelligence personnel in the total force
has increased in each of the last three wars: World War II-1.04%, Korea-1.63%
Vietnam-2.79Z. (Office of Military history)
 Approved For Release 20
THEATER
INTELLIGENCE
CENTER
TYPE THEATER ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
HUMAN, DOCUMENT
& TECHNICAL EXPLOITATION
N~ CENTER
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNITS
AVIATION
SIGINT & IMINT UNITS
Maint & Supply
MP Transportation
Medical
-Signal
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Above Corps (U)
US EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE
FOR SUPPORT OF AFCENT/AAFCE
ARMY
CENTER
Coordination and Support
Note: The Army Intelligence Center works through the Army Intelligence
Support Element (ISE) at each headquarters it serves.
Figure 3
and his staff, particularly the Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence (ACSI).
The close relationship among the TFC, the Air Force COIC and the Army Intelligence
Center is shown in figure 3. This figure also highlights the direct relation-
ships between the COIL and the Allied Tactical Air Forces, on the one hand,
and the Army Intelligence Center and the Army Groups, on the other.
30. (U) There are other aspects of EAC intelligence organization and
operations which merit attention. Since the establishment of INSCOM, a
variety of views have been ventilated on the subject and some temporary agree-
ments achieved. However, few such agreements have been able to stand any
serious test of time.
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Above Corps (U)
The principal issues relate to:
1. MACOM subordination and control of EAC assets in theater in peace
and war.
2. The wartime responsibilities of HQ INSCOM.
3. Divergencies between doctrinal concepts and theater imperatives
affecting actual employment of intelligence assets.
31. (U) A full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this
memorandum. My observation is that most participants in the debate assume
unsurprising stands related to narrowly drawn interests of the organizations
to which they are assigned. I have dealt with this phenomenon in an article
published in ARMY (see "When Turfs Overlap," incl.).
32. (U) I recommend that a fresh approach be taken toward the Army EAC
intelligence problem. I believe we need to develop definitive concepts
for intelligence organization and operations on a theater-by-theater
basis with the theater commanders taking the lead. This is the normal
procedure for force development, and I see no reason to do otherwise in
this case. As the foregoing discussion illustrates, many peculiarities of
European Theater come into play in identifying the requirements for that
region. We may expect that the same pertains to northeast and southwest
Asia. We should not wait for the development of abstract doctrine to
determine our theater requirements. The utility of generic doctrine varies
inversely with the level of command under examination.
33. (U) Further, I recommend that INSCOM, and TRADOC participate in and
support the development effort. ACSI, DA should referee the process and
insure that all interests are represented. Failure to fulfill legitimate
command concerns, particularly those of the theater involved is likely to
reproduce the truncated documents extant on the subject. I would be happy
to assist in such an effort in any way I can.
Tsv`;i3~ fem.. "3~ bd'cs~''~t uavtl~ r
$` tDWARD B. ATKESON ~.e.
Major General , USA
Commanding
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