SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83R00184R001100010012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of * Top Secret
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Intelligence ~3
Soviet Military Forces
in the Far East
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume I-Key Judgments
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NIE 11-14140-81
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N I E 11-14/40-81
SOVIET MILITARY FORCES
IN THE FAR EAST
Volume I-Key Judgments
Information as of 28 August 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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PREFACE
This Estimate describes the development of Soviet general purpose
and theater nuclear forces in the Far East, examines the status of Soviet
and Chinese forces along the Sino-Soviet border, and postulates likely
Soviet strategy in case of war.' The Estimate is being published in two
parts: the Key Judgments, which begin on page 1 of this document
(volume I), and a more detailed supporting analysis (volume II). The
Estimate generally covers a period of five years in its projections. It
treats the following elements of Soviet military forces in the Far East:
- Ground Forces. The ground forces and their organic air
defense and tactical nuclear forces.
Air Forces. Tactical aviation, Military Transport Aviation, and
medium- and long-range bombers.
Air Defense Forces. The air and ground-based systems of the
air defense forces.
Naval Forces. The general purpose submarines, surface ships,
aircraft, auxiliaries, and amphibious forces of the Pacific Ocean
Fleet.
Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missile Forces. Those land-based
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles available for use in
the Far Eastern theater.
Support Functions. Those activities and organizations that
support and integrate Soviet forces in the area, such as
command, control, and communications systems and logistic
services.
Other National Intelligence Estimates and Interagency Intelligence
Memorandums contain comprehensive assessments of some issues that
are given summary treatment in this document:
- NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global
Power Arena, Memorandum to Holders, 1981.
' For this Estimate, Soviet general purpose ground, air, and air defense forces in the Far East are those
located in the USSR's Central Asian, Siberian, Transbaikal, and Far East Military Districts and Mongolia.
Also covered in the Estimate are Soviet general purpose naval forces in the Pacific Ocean Fleet, including
the Indian Ocean Squadron, and Soviet strategic forces that have a peripheral strike role against targets in
the Far East. Mongolian national forces-which currently consist of some 25,000 men, most of whom are in
noncombat units, and two combat brigades-are not considered in this Estimate.
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- NIE 11/13-80, Sino-Soviet Relations in the Early 1980s.
- NIE 11-3/8-80, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear
Conflict Through 1990.
- NI IIM 80-10010JX, The Readiness of Soviet Naval Forces.
- NIE 11-14-81, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Determinants of Soviet Policy in the Far East
1. The Far East is second only to the European theater in
importance for Soviet military policy. Its strategic value, combined with
its remoteness from the heartland of greater Russia, makes regional
security an especially difficult problem in Soviet eyes. In contrast with
Europe, the USSR directly borders its major potential enemy. Further-
more, the long, slender supply line, the Trans-Siberian Railroad, is
dangerously close to a hostile China-hence vulnerable to attack and
interruption.
2. Although the Soviet military position in the Far East is now
reasonably secure, the Soviets probably see growing challenges. They
observe no basic change in China's hostile posture toward the USSR, and
at the same time see intensified US pressure on Japan to assume a
greater security role in Northeast Asia, evolving Sino-Japanese trade and
political ties inimical to Soviet goals, and an evolving US-Chinese
military relationship directed specifically against the USSR. They have
also seen a reaffirmation by the United States of its commitment to
maintain sizable forces in South Korea and to strengthen Seoul's
political, economic, and military structure.
3. To meet these perceived challenges during the coming decade,
the Soviets will continue to depend on superior military power as the
critical instrument of foreign policy. Thus, changes to their military
capabilities will be aimed at:
- Ensuring Soviet territorial security by deterring potential Chi-
nese aggression or containing a Sino-Soviet conflict.
- Developing further Soviet offensive military capabilities and
options in the region to improve their capability to inflict
damage on China's military-industrial capability and seize all
or portions of Manchuria.
- Countering US naval and air forces in the region.
- Preventing China from taking any advantage of Soviet involve-
ment in a war with NATO.
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- Limiting American, Chinese, and Japanese influence in Asia.
- Frustrating and delaying the emergence of a "Washington-
Beijing-Tokyo axis" with links to NATO.
- Encouraging the evolution of a Soviet-sponsored Asian collec-
tive security system.
In the last decade, the Soviets' military policy has led to a much stronger
military posture in the Far East. However, their stationing of a division
on the Japanese-claimed islands, their invasion of Afghanistan, and their
support for Vietnam have all hampered Soviet regional political
objectives.
4. The Soviets believe that the security of the USSR can best be
guaranteed through the development of forces capable of decisive
offensive operations. Thus, although the Soviets have established perma-
nent fortifications in defensive zones along the border with China, they
are not resigned to conducting a static defense. They have developed a
decisive conventional and nuclear military capability to give them the
capacity for major offensive operations beyond their own borders.
Whether the Far East would be a defensive theater for the Soviets or
whether they would attempt to seize and hold major portions of Chinese
territory would depend on factors such as their political objectives, the
degree of their superiority over Chinese forces, and the military
situation in other theaters. In a strictly Sino-Soviet war, the Chinese
should expect an offensive to seize portions of North China and
establish new buffer zones along the frontier. In a NATO-Warsaw Pact
war the United States would be faced with operations designed to deny
maritime areas adjacent to the USSR and prevent the use of Japanese
bases.
Force Trends
5. The buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East has proceeded
through two relatively distinct phases. The first, from 1965 through the
early 1970s, was characterized by rapid growth of ground and air
combat force levels. The second, since the early 1970s, has been marked
by slower growth and emphasis on enhancing existing forces through
weapon modernization, improvements in the combat support infra-
structure, and the development of new command structures to better
control and employ the forces. The Soviet military has emerged from
this 15-year process with a substantial portion of its general purpose
forces committed in the Far East. The Soviets have established a
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balanced force structure for theater warfare and are capable of an
effective defense and strong offensive operations:
- Roughly a threefold increase in the number of ground force
divisions and a fivefold increase in fixed-wing aircraft have
been accompanied by an expansion of support forces and
substantial increases in the numbers of tanks, artillery, armed
helicopters, and air defenses. About a quarter of the total Soviet
ground and tactical air forces are now located in the Far East.
- The Pacific Ocean Fleet (the largest of the four Soviet fleets)
has grown modestly and has acquired more capable surface
combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, replenishment
ships, and aircraft.
- There has been substantial growth and modernization of the
theater and strategic nuclear delivery systems available for use
against targets in the region. More than half of the SS-20 IRBM
force, for example, can be targeted against China.2
Soviet Strategy and Capabilities
6. Defense planners in Moscow must consider several potential
conflicts in the Far East, including, for example, a direct confrontation
with China; actions against US air and naval forces only; and a
simultaneous two-front war with NATO and China.
7. Conflict With China. Soviet options in a strictly Sino-Soviet
conflict-which would be primarily a land and air campaign-could
range from large-scale raids with limited objectives to a full-scale
invasion of western and northeastern China supported by nuclear strikes
(see map). Soviet objectives under any option would be conditioned in
part by historical national aspirations, the international political envi-
ronment, the military situation in other theaters, and the causes of the
conflict. We believe, however, that military as well as political consider-
ations probably would discourage the Soviets from pursuing the total
defeat and surrender of China or attempting the long-term military
occupation of the Chinese heartland.
2 The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that over the past 15 years the Soviets have in-
creased the size of their forces in the Far East more than necessary for a successful defense against China.
The Soviets have sufficient units, equipment, and supplies in the region to undertake major offensive op-
erations. Despite the Soviet advantages in conventional war-fighting capabilities, Soviet exercises and
overall force capabilities suggest that Soviet war planning against China envisions the first use of both
tactical and strategic nuclear forces.
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Soviet Wartime Operating Areas
Boundary repre entation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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8. We credit the Soviets with the following capabilities:
- They could stop a Chinese general ground offensive-a contin-
gency we judge as highly unlikely-and could quickly mount a
punishing counterattack.
- They could mount ground incursions, supported by tactical air
forces, into northern China with a good chance of initial
success. They would have to consider, however, that anything
beyond shallow penetrations could lead to protracted guerrilla
warfare.
- They could overrun and hold Manchuria (the Shenyang Mili-
tary Region and the northernmost portion of the .Beijing
Military Region) if provided substantial reinforcements from
elsewhere in the USSR or with the extensive use of nuclear
weapons.
- In most circumstances, however, it is unlikely Moscow would
draw down its strategic reserves substantially because of its
preoccupation with NATO. Moreover, once deep into China,
Soviet forces would have to fight a well-entrenched enemy in
inhospitable terrain at the end of long and tenuous supply lines.
- The Soviets have a substantial advantage over China in chemi-
cal warfare capabilities which, in the absence of a substantial
Chinese chemical or tactical nuclear retaliatory capability and
because of general Chinese vulnerabilities, provides the Soviets
with a credible option to initiate chemical warfare if the
situation requires it.
9. The Soviets have a vast nuclear superiority and could conduct
nuclear strikes throughout China. Nonetheless, we believe that, in a
Soviet counterforce attack, sufficient Chinese ballistic missiles would
survive (because of their concealed and dispersed deployment as well as
mobility and hardness) to deliver a small but destructive retaliatory
strike. We believe this constitutes a constraint to an unprovoked Soviet
nuclear attack.
10. Operations Against US Forces. Moscow perceives a direct
threat to its security from US naval and air forces in the Far East, and
the modernization of the Pacific Ocean Fleet represents an attempt to
counter the US Navy. In a NATO-Pact war, the most pressing tasks of
the Pacific Ocean Fleet's general purpose forces would be to establish
sea control in waters contiguous to the USSR and in Soviet ballistic
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missile submarine patrol areas and to conduct sea denial operations out
to about 1,500 nautical miles. Soviet air force elements would have
missions against US bases in the region.
11. In a war with NATO we would expect the Soviets to take
actions against US naval forces in the Pacific and believe the Soviets
probably would not consider such attacks as directly risking wider
hostilities with China or Japan. We believe neither of those countries
poses much of an offensive threat and neither is likely to enter a major
war with the USSR unprovoked. Additionally, the Soviets probably
would pressure the Japanese to deny the United States the use of naval
and air facilities. Failing this, however, the Soviets probably would
attack these facilities.
12. We believe Soviet forces would have the following capabilities:
- The Soviets would pose a substantial threat to any surface force
that penetrated their sea denial area. On the other hand, we do
not believe that Soviet ASW forces can effectively detect US
submarines in the open ocean. In the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk
and the approaches to Petropavlovsk, favorable geography and
extensive ASW forces would alleviate some of the impact of the
limitations of Soviet open-ocean detection capability. Major
operations outside these sea control and sea denial areas
probably would be deferred as long as the Soviets perceived a
serious maritime threat to their homeland or ballistic missile
submarine force.
- The Soviets probably would expect to make limited use of bases
in Vietnam, but we do not anticipate large-scale operations,
because of Vietnam's distance from the USSR. We are uncer-
tain about the degree of support the Vietnamese would offer.
- The Soviets could not mount large-scale ground force attacks in
the Aleutians or on the Alaskan mainland, but US facilities in
Alaska could be targets for airstrikes or commando teams.
Moscow might anticipate that limited airstrikes or nuisance
raids on US territory could pin down US forces needed
elsewhere.
13. Simultaneous Wars With NATO and China. Simultaneous
wars with China and NATO would represent an extreme situation for
the Soviets, and Soviet planners have been increasingly occupied with
this contingency in the last decade. In such a contingency, the Soviet
priority of effort would be against NATO, and we judge that Moscow
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would avoid operations in the Far East that would prevent a Quick
victory in Europe.
14. We do not believe the risk of precipitating simultaneous
hostilities with China would preclude a decision by the Soviets to go to
war with NATO. Although they would prefer not to fight wars in
Europe and Asia at the same time, we believe they could sustain
concurrent, large-scale combat in both theaters for a number of months.
If a war in both theaters were prolonged, however, Soviet capabilities to
support major offensive operations in Asia would be severely strained
by logistic, personnel, and materiel constraints. The Soviets also would
consider that an attack on China could develop into a long-term, large-
scale commitment of manpower and materiel which would compete
with and ultimately could weaken their European war effort.
15. Other Contingencies. A renewal of fighting between China
and Vietnam would lead to increased Soviet support of an important
ally. We would expect the Soviet reaction to be similar to that after the
Chinese attack in 1979: an initial propaganda campaign and a substan-
tial increase in material aid to Vietnam. If the conflict were. prolonged
or were going badly for Vietnam, limited Soviet military actions against
China would be possible.
16. The Soviet response to a renewal of conflict between North
and South Korea would depend heavily on the Chinese reaction and the
level of US involvement. The Soviets would perceive a rapid cessation
of hostilities to be in their best interest. The Soviets probably would pro-
vide some materiel support to the North but probably would conclude
that the risks attending direct combat support would far outweigh the
possible benefits unless the North were in danger of total collapse.
Future Prospects
17. We foresee no development over the next several years that
would appreciably alter the current Soviet military strategy in the Far
East or modify the USSR's effort to maintain and improve the
capabilities of its large standing forces in the region. We expect that
Moscow's concerns over China's rapprochement with the United States
and Japan will prompt the Soviets to continue to expand some service
elements to maintain their military advantage in the region.
18. The initiation of a major Chinese force improvement program
focused on introducing advanced weapons technology into Chinese
forces-an unlikely prospect even if supported by the United States-
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could spark unanticipated changes in the Soviet posture in the region.
The Soviets initially would most likely respond to even a modest level of
Sino-US military cooperation by a combination of diplomatic protest
and observable military moves to demonstrate their resolve to counter
such a program. The longer term response probably would involve some
acceleration of improvement programs already planned.
19. Given current Chinese modernization priorities, we judge that
there is little likelihood of a fundamental shift toward military modern-
ization or of a substantial Western-supported program to import high-
technology weapon systems in the next five years. Consequently, we
expect the Soviets to continue their program of gradual but steady force
growth and modernization in the Far East:
- We expect the number of Soviet ground force divisions in the
Far East to increase by perhaps one to two new active divisions
per year in the next five years. The number of fixed-wing
combat aircraft also will increase slightly.
- We believe the Pacific Ocean Fleet will continue to be
structured primarily to oppose US naval forces, although the
Navy also may have to devote more attention and resources to
offset the gradual growth in Japanese naval capabilities.
20. Over the next five years, we expect the Soviets' policy in the
Far East will continue to focus on the containment of China. They will
avoid military or political extremes, and short-term force improvements
will be modest. Over the longer term, however, the Soviet effort will
provide Moscow with improved defensive capabilities against not only
Chinese forces but also against US forces in Asia in a large-scale conflict
with the West. Additionally, it will provide the USSR with increased ca-
pability for offensive operations against China.3
' The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that the Soviets are likely to avoid political and
military extremes and crash military buildups, but Soviet force improvements will follow at least the same
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