SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83R00184R001100010013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2007
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: September 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
Intelligence
Soviet Military Forces
in the Far East
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume II-Supporting Analysis
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N I E 11-14/40-81
SOVIET MILITARY FORCES
IN THE FAR EAST
Volume II-Supporting Analysis
Information available as of 28 August 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................ 1
A. Background .............................................................................................. 1
B. Defense Spending .................................................................................... 2
II. TRENDS IN SOVIET THEATER FORCES IN THE FAR EAST .........
A. Ground Forces .........................................................................................
Equipment ...............................................................................................
Border Guards .........................................................................................
B. Air Forces ................................................................................................
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E. Theater Nuclear Forces .......................................................................... 28
Tactical Nuclear Forces ......................................................................... 28
F. Chemical Warfare ................................................................................... 30
G. Biological Warfare .................................................................................. 30
III. SOVIET STRATEGY FOR OPERATIONS IN THE FAR EAST ...........
A. Background ..............................................................................................
B. Conflict With China ...............................................................................
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IV. PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET THEATER FORCES IN THE FAR EAST. 44
A. Ground Forces ......................................................................................... 45
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D. General Purpose Naval Forces .............................................................. 46
E. Theater Nuclear Forces .......................................................................... 46
G. Logistic Support ...................................................................................... 47
PART TWO: COMPARISON OF FORCES ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER 49
1. MILITARY DOCTRINE ............................................................................. 49
II. FORCES ........................................................................................................ 49
A. Quantitative Trends ................................................................................ 49
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PART ONE: SOVIET FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
1. The Far East is second only to the western
theater in importance for Soviet military policy. Soviet
military forces in the area are intended primarily to
protect the territorial integrity of the USSR-to deter
China from taking military action along the Sino-
Soviet frontier-and to discourage military activity
elsewhere in the region, by either China or other
nations, that would be inimical to Soviet interests.
Nonetheless, the hallmark of Soviet military strategy is
decisive offensive action, and the USSR has substan-
tially expanded and improved its military posture in
the Far East during the past 15 years, emerging with a
force capable of effective defense and strong offensive
operations. In addition, Soviet military power in the
region serves as an instrument of a foreign policy
program that seeks to contain or reduce China's
influence, decrease American and Japanese influence
in the region, discourage anti-Soviet policies on the
part of Asian governments, and encourage the evolu-
tion of a Soviet-sponsored Asian collective security
system.'
2. Several unique factors influence the Soviets'
strategy and the development of their forces in the Far
East: they must contend with limited local manpower,
inhospitable terrain, rigorous climatic conditions, great
distances between fronts, poorly developed road and
rail networks, the proximity of developed areas and
lines of communication to the border, an underdevel-
oped support infrastructure, the vast distances separat-
ing the Far East from Moscow and the Soviet industri-
al heartlands, and uncertainty over potential enemies.2
Over the years the Soviets have evolved a structure for
their Far East forces that takes these factors into
' The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that a
better balanced and more comprehensive treatment of the objec-
tives and options of Soviet military forces in the Far East is
contained in volume I (Key Judgments), of this Estimate, para-
graphs 3 and 4.
z See chapter III.
account and reflects a systematic effort to support the
defense of their territory and improve their offensive
capabilities.
A. Background
3. Since the end of World War II the Soviet
military posture in the Far East has evolved through
four general phases. From the end of the war to the
mid-1950s the Soviet Union enjoyed a relatively favor-
able military position in Asia. Soviet troops were
stationed in Manchuria, on Sakhalin Island, and in the
Kurils; the Soviets had a naval base at Port Arthur and
access to the commercial port of Dairen; Japan was
weak militarily; and the Communist takeover in China
in 1949 provided Moscow with an ally to help counter
US influence in the region. This situation allowed
Moscow, even during the height of the Korean war, to
give priority to improving its forces opposite the new
NATO alliance.
4. In the second phase-from about 1955 to the
early 1960s-Soviet perceptions of China as a willing
ally began to change. The Chinese differed sharply
with Moscow on several issues. These included the
extent to which the risk of military confrontation with
the West should be pressed, the level of Moscow's
military and economic support for China, and what
Moscow should receive in exchange for that support.
These concerns, coupled with sharp differences in
perceptions of national interests, were factors in the
withdrawal of Soviet advisers and technicians from
China in 1960 and the subsequent Sino-Soviet break.
By the end of this period, Soviet military planners
were becoming concerned with possible military con-
flict with China.
5. In the third phase-from the early 1960s to the
early 1970s-Soviet security concerns in Asia were
further intensified as US forces became involved in
Southeast Asia. Beijing successfully detonated its first
nuclear device in 1964, and the Sino-Soviet split
widened over ideological and territorial differences.
As a result of these concerns, the Soviets began to
increase force levels along the Chinese border in 1965,
and by the early 1970s it was apparent from Soviet
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exercises and the major expansion of force levels that
Moscow's defense planning was developing on the
assumption that the USSR might be drawn into a two-
theater war with both China and NATO.
6. In the current phase Soviet military influence in
Asia has been highlighted by renewed growth. In
Southeast Asia, Moscow established access to Vietnam-
ese air and naval facilities following the Chinese attack
on Vietnam in 1979. In addition, the Soviet presence
in Afghanistan and a continuing relationship with
India have flanked China with countries having close
ties to Moscow. The period has also been marked by
an increased presence of Soviet military forces to
assert the USSR's interests in the Indian Ocean littoral.
Despite some gains, however, the USSR has suffered
setbacks. Soviet hopes that tensions with China would
ease after Mao's death in 1976 remain unfulfilled.
Moreover, Moscow's relations with Japan, the ASEAN
countries, and even North Korea have suffered.
7. The Soviets are increasingly concerned about the
future of the overall military balance in the Far East,
an equation in which more than just Chinese forces
are a factor. The Soviets must take into account the
forces of Japan and the United States and the complex
interrelationship of these and other nations' security
interests.
ing the normalization of US-Chinese relations in 1979
are viewed as posing a serious long-term threat to the
security of the Soviet Union which increases the
possibility that it might have to fight all three coun-
tries in a conflict in the Far East. More immediately,
the USSR fears this rapprochement portends active US
and Japanese aid in the modernization of the Chinese
armed forces.
10. The Soviets recognize that the South Koreans
pose no direct threat to the USSR. Moscow probably
would not react militarily against them unless the
North Koreans were in danger of collapse. Another
Korean conflict could lead to increased US presence in
the region and could prompt the Japanese to acceler-
ate their effort to improve military capabilities. Mos-
cow also would be concerned about possible Chinese
reactions and the possibility of escalation to a wider
conflict in the Far East region.
B. Defense Spending
11. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that,
during the period 1966 to 1980, Soviet expenditures
for forces in the Far East grew at an average annual
rate of 9 to 10 percent, as compared with 4 to 5
percent in total defense outlays. Spending levels on
forces opposite NATO, on the other hand, increased
slightly less rapidly than overall defense spending
8. US forces in the region present both a naval and
air threat to the USSR. US naval forces, particularly
ballistic missile submarines and carrier task groups,
could attack the Soviet mainland or disrupt Pacific
Ocean Fleet operations in the area. US aircraft based
in Korea and in Japan, even as far south as Okinawa,
also could pose a threat to the Soviet mainland, to the
Soviet fleet operating in the Sea of Japan, and to naval
reconnaissance and antisubmarine aircraft. Soviet
planners probably do not believe that Japan's Self-
Defense Forces pose any threat to the mainland at
present. Nonetheless, Tokyo's potential to improve the
capabilities of its forces is, in Soviet eyes, a disturbing
factor.
9. The Soviets view China's continuing rapproche-
ment with both the United States and Japan, but
particularly the United States, as the most disturbing
trend. Events such as the conclusion of the Treaty of
Peace and Friendship between China. and Japan in
1978 and the ongoing process of reconciliation follow-
Nonetheless, annual outlays for forces oppo-
site NATO remain more than double those for forces
in the Far East.
12. CIA estimates that about 11 percent of total
Soviet defense spending in 1966-80 was devoted to
investment in and operation of forces in the Far East
Outlays for the Ground Forces and
tactical aviation accounted for over half of the Far
East spending. About two-thirds of this spending was
for forces directly opposite China and can be traced to
the buildup along the border in the late 1960s and
early 1970s.
8 Examination of Soviet defense expenditures on a regional basis
provides an indication of the relative importance that the USSR
attaches to its military forces in the region. While this approach
cannot be used to make judgments about force effectiveness or
capabilities, it does provide a yardstick for assessing shifting percep-
tions of priorities for force development over time.
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II. TRENDS IN SOVIET THEATER FORCES IN
THE FAR EAST
13. The USSR began to augment its forces in the
Far East in the mid-1960s. Most of this buildup was
prompted by increasing concern about the emergence
of China as a major rival. Some improvements, how-
ever, were intended to counter the influence of the
United States and its allies in the region.
14. The buildup of Soviet forces in the region can
be divided into two relatively distinct periods. The
first-from 1965 through the early 1970s-was char-
acterized by rapid growth of air and ground combat
force levels, in large part through the formation of
units using obsolescent, mothballed hardware. The
period since the early 1970s has been marked by
slower growth but with emphasis on the introduction
of new, more capable weapon systems into existing
units. Also evident during this period are improve-
ments in the combat-support infrastructure and, re-
cently, development of new command structures to
better control and use these forces.
15. Soviet theater forces have emerged from this
two-phase development process with a more balanced
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structure for conventional war and with greatly en-
hanced conventional and nuclear firepower:
- In the ground forces roughly a threefold increase
in the number of divisions has been accompanied
by an expansion of support forces and substantial
augmentation in the number of tanks, artillery,
armed helicopters, and air defenses.
- There has been about a fivefold increase in the
number of fixed-wing combat aircraft in tactical
aviation, and the Soviets have equipped their air
forces with aircraft capable of better perfor-
mance and possessing increased load-carrying
capacity.
- The Pacific Ocean Fleet, which has grown mod-
estly, has been improved by the acquisition of
more capable surface combatants, submarines,
amphibious ships, replenishment ships, and
aircraft.
- There has been substantial growth in the number
of theater and strategic nuclear delivery systems
available for use in the region.
A. Ground Forces
17. About 25 to 30 percent of the Soviet Ground
Forces' total strength, currently some 435,000 men, is
located in the Far East. Most of the forces are
garrisoned along the Sino-Soviet border, with a few
formations defending the seaward approaches to the
Soviet Union An additional 75,000 men
are assigned to KGB Border Guard units in the region.
mid-1960s the number of such divisions in the Far
East has almost tripled. Most of this growth took place
between 1965 and 1972; the number of active divi-
sions increased from 20 to 42. Since then nine new
active divisions have been established,
The establish-
ment of virtually all of these divisions was prompted
by Soviet concerns about China, but by late 1979 the
Soviets had established a coastal division on the islands
immediately north of Japan to signal Moscow's deter-
mination to maintain control of these "northern terri-
tories" lost by Japan after World War II.
he Soviets
a so have 19 tank and motorized rifle ivisions in the
central USSR-in the Moscow, Volga, Ural, and Tur-
kestan Military Districts-that could be deployed to
the Far East.'
19. In peacetime, the Soviet Ground Forces are
maintained in varying states of preparedness. About
45 percent of the divisions in the Far East are manned
at over half their wartime strength, have a full
complement of combat equipment, and can be
brought up to strength and ready to move within one
or two days. Other active divisions have lower man-
power and equipment levels
20. In addition to active divisions, the Soviets have
five mobilization divisions in the region (see figure 3).
These inactive divisions have a small number of
personnel to maintain combat equipment in storage.
Because they require extensive mobilization of reserv-
ists and materiel and a period of training, we estimate
that, once activated, these divisions would take a
month or more to become effective fighting units.
21. Although tank and motorized rifle divisions
comprise the bulk of the Soviet Ground Forces' com-
' At present, Soviet forces in the Turkestan Military District are
committed to support operations in Afghanistan and would be
18. Tank and motorized rifle divisions are the basic
tactical units of the Soviet Ground Forces. Since the
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structure for conventional war and with greatly en-
hanced conventional and nuclear firepower:
- In the ground forces roughly a threefold increase
in the number of divisions has been accompanied
by an expansion of support forces and substantial
augmentation in the number of tanks, artillery,
armed helicopters, and air defenses.
- There has been about a fivefold increase in the
number of fixed-wing combat aircraft in tactical
aviation, and the Soviets have equipped their air
forces with aircraft capable of better perfor-
mance and possessing increased load-carrying
capacity.
- The Pacific Ocean Fleet, which has grown mod-
estly, has been improved by the acquisition of
more capable surface combatants, submarines,
amphibious ships, replenishment ships, and
aircraft.
- There has been substantial growth in the number
of theater and strategic nuclear delivery systems
available for use in the region.
A. Ground Forces
17. About 25 to 30 percent of the Soviet Ground
Forces' total strength, currently some 435,000 men, is
located in the Far East. Most of the forces are
garrisoned along the Sino-Soviet border, with a few
formations defending the seaward approaches to the
Soviet Union An additional 75,000 men
are assigned to KGB Border Guard units in the region.
mid-1960s the number of such divisions in the Far
East has almost tripled. Most of this growth took place
between 1965 and 1972; the number of active divi-
sions increased from 20 to 42. Since then nine new
active divisions have been established,
The establish-
ment of virtually all of these divisions was prompted
by Soviet concerns about China, but by late 1979 the
Soviets had established a coastal division on the islands
immediately north of Japan to signal Moscow's deter-
mination to maintain control of these "northern terri-
tories" lost by Japan after World War II.
he Soviets
a so have 19 tank and motorized rifle ivisions in the
central USSR-in the Moscow, Volga, Ural, and Tur-
kestan Military Districts-that could be deployed to
the Far East.'
19. In peacetime, the Soviet Ground Forces are
maintained in varying states of preparedness. About
45 percent of the divisions in the Far East are manned
at over half their wartime strength, have a full
complement of combat equipment, and can be
brought up to strength and ready to move within one
or two days. Other active divisions have lower man-
power and equipment levels
20. In addition to active divisions, the Soviets have
five mobilization divisions in the region (see figure 3).
These inactive divisions have a small number of
personnel to maintain combat equipment in storage.
Because they require extensive mobilization of reserv-
ists and materiel and a period of training, we estimate
that, once activated, these divisions would take a
month or more to become effective fighting units.
21. Although tank and motorized rifle divisions
comprise the bulk of the Soviet Ground Forces' com-
' At present, Soviet forces in the Turkestan Military District are
committed to support operations in Afghanistan and would be
18. Tank and motorized rifle divisions are the basic
tactical units of the Soviet Ground Forces. Since the
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bat power, they are supported by substantial firepower
in front- and army-level combat support units.
22. The Soviets also have a series of fortified zones
along the Sino-Soviet border These
zones, which consist of a combination o static defenses
and mobile troops, are intended to protect Soviet lines
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of communication and population centers in the Far
East. They include bunkered installations equipped
with artillery, machineguns, tanks, and defensive ob-
stacles and are occupied by assigned Ground Forces
units. They have been established at particularly
vulnerable areas to provide for a sustained defense in
cooperation with field forces. The zones are designed
to limit an invader's freedom of movement while
providing time for the Ground Forces' maneuver
divisions to mobilize and deploy to their defensive
positions.
Equipment
23. The Soviet Ground Forces are not as well
equipped in the Far East as in Central Europe.
Equipment inventories are being continually modern-
ized through the introduction of improved combat
vehicles, support equipment, and weapons designed to
increase mobility and provide greater, more accurate
firepower. These programs move slowly, however, and
many major replacement items are not the newest
models. The generally lower priority of ground force
modernization programs in the Far East is due, in
part, to the low technological level of Chinese forces.
24. At the same time, the Soviet units in the Far
East have on occasion been the first to receive new
weapon systems and to exhibit new organizational
structures.
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31. In addition to troops of the regular armed
forces, the Soviets have some 75,000 men assigned to
Border Guard units in the Far East. Over 80 percent
are in units located along the Sino-Soviet border ID
These troops, selected for their political
reliability, are regarded as an elite force within the
Soviet Union.
32. The Border Guard is subordinate to the Com-
mittee for State Security (KGB) and is not part of the
regular armed forces in peacetime. Its peacetime
missions are to control movement across the borders of
the Soviet Union and maintain order in the border
areas. In time of war, Border Guard units would be
subordinated to the military district commander and
would be expected to secure and screen the borders of
the USSR in conjunction with the Ground Forces. F-1
33. The overall size and capabilities of Soviet Air
Forces in the Far East have grown substantially over'
the past 15 years:
34. The Soviet air and air defense forces throughout
the USSR are undergoing major organizational changes
mand and control structure for conducting unified
operations in a theater of war. The restructuring of
command of these forces will permit some administra-
tive economies in peacetime and will enable wartime
commanders to make more flexible use of the forces to
support theater offensive operations and to conduct
territorial air defense.
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apparently aimed at improving the com-
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47. Most of the Pacific Ocean Fleet's assets clearly
are directed primarily against US naval forces in the
western Pacific and Indian Oceans. Soviet naval plan-
ners must also be concerned with the naval forces of
China and Japan as well as, to a lesser extent, those of
Australia, Taiwan, and South Korea. None of these
other forces, however, represent nearly the same
degree of threat as those of the United States.
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D. General Purpose Naval Forces
45. The Pacific Ocean Fleet is the
largest of the four Soviet fleets in terms o tota assets,
probably because it must be prepared to carry out a
wide range of naval missions without assistance from
the other fleets.
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47. Most of the Pacific Ocean Fleet's assets clearly
are directed primarily against US naval forces in the
western Pacific and Indian Oceans. Soviet naval plan-
ners must also be concerned with the naval forces of
China and Japan as well as, to a lesser extent, those of
Australia, Taiwan, and South Korea. None of these
other forces, however, represent nearly the same
degree of threat as those of the United States.
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D. General Purpose Naval Forces
45. The Pacific Ocean Fleet is the
largest of the four Soviet fleets in terms o tota assets,
probably because it must be prepared to carry out a
wide range of naval missions without assistance from
the other fleets.
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56. Since the mid-1960s the Soviets have main-
tained growing theater nuclear forces in the Far East.
These include tactical weapons in the hands of the
general purpose forces and strategic nuclear weapons.
57. Tactical nuclear forces in the Far East consist of
aircraft, tactical missiles, and nuclear-capable artillery
of the Ground Forces, and elements of the general
purpose naval forces Through the
period, these forces have experienced important
changes in both size and capabilities, including growth
in the inventory of delivery systems and increases in
the yields and accuracy of tactical surface-to-surface
missiles.
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F. Chemical Warfare
66. The Soviets are clearly planning for the contin-
gency that toxic chemical agents might be used in a
war in the Far East.6 We estimate that the Chinese
have only a limited chemical defense capability and
would be vulnerable to chemical attack. The use of
chemical weapons would allow the Soviets to neutral-
ize entrenched Chinese defenses more quickly than if
they were to rely solely on conventional artillery
barrages. The Soviets have produced a variety of
modern nerve agents and have the delivery systems,
training, and tactics necessary for the large-scale of-
fensive use of these agents,
6 See NIE 11-14-81, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, for a
general description of Soviet chemical warfare capabilities.
67. The Soviets are signatories of the 1925 Geneva
Protocol which prohibits the use of chemical weapons,
although they, like the Chinese and most other signa-
tories, have reserved the right to retaliate against any
state or ally of that state which does not observe the
provisions of the Protocol.
The Soviets categorize these weap-
ons-as they do nuclear and biological weapons-as
"weapons of mass destruction" whose initial use must
be authorized at the highest political level. F
The Soviets have a
substantial advantage over China in chemical warfare
capabilities which, in the absence of a substantial
Chinese chemical or tactical nuclear retaliatory capa-
bility and because of general Chinese vulnerabilities,
provides the Soviets with a credible option to initiate
chemical warfare if they were to conclude that the
situation required it.
G. Biological Warfare
68. The 1925 Geneva Protocol to which the USSR is
a party also prohibits the first use of biological weap-
ons in war. In addition, the Soviets have ratified the
Biological Weapons Convention, in which the partici-
pating states "undertake never in any circumstances to
develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or
retain" biological or toxic weapons. The Biological
Weapons Convention permits defensively oriented
BW programs.
69. We believe the Soviets have had an active
biological warfare research and development program
since the 1930s and that Soviet R&D on BW has
continued since the BW Convention was ratified by
the USSR.
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1. Logistics
73. The Soviets have a long supply line from the
western USSR to the Far East and only a modest
capability within the region to manufacture military
hardware and munitions. Thus, they are heavily de-
pendent on pre-positioned stocks. We judge that stocks
of major combat consumables in the area-POL and
ammunition-are sufficient to support intense ground
force operations for one to two months. Naval fuel and
ammunitions stores are believed to be sufficient to
meet most Pacific Ocean Fleet contingencies. Stock-
piles of aviation fuels probably equal or exceed a 90-
day supply, but air force requirements for specialized
ammunition, including missiles, could create shortfalls
in less time, depending on combat roles.
III. SOVIET STRATEGY FOR OPERATIONS IN
THE FAR EAST
A. Background
79. This section summarizes our understanding of
how Soviet forces would organize and prosecute initial
military operations in a conflict in the Far East.
Defense of the homeland is the most basic tenet of
Soviet military policy.' Nonetheless, the hallmark of
Soviet military strategy is decisive offensive action.
These concepts explain the emphasis in Soviet military
planning on maintaining high combat preparedness,
seizing the initiative, and achieving substantial nu-
merical superiority in the main battle areas, backed by
strong reserves.
80. In the Far East, as in the west, we expect the
Soviets to rely on offensive operations that combine
force superiority, combined-arms operations, decep-
tion, and tactical surprise to achieve their military
objectives.
concepts, see NIE 11-14-81.
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82. Defense planners in Moscow must take into
account several potential conflicts in the Far East,
including, for example, a direct confrontation with
China; a two-front war with NATO and China simul-
taneously; and actions against US air and naval forces
only. The nature and scope of hostilities would greatly
influence which Soviet force elements would conduct
operations. Conflict solely with China would be pri-
marily a land campaign and would involve the Soviet
Ground Forces and the bulk of the air forces. The
Soviet Navy probably would not play a major role.
Operations against US forces in the region, on the
other hand, would take place mainly at sea and would
involve the Pacific Ocean Fleet and, to a lesser extent,
the air forces. In addition, the course and pace of
Soviet operations in the region would be influenced by
whether the USSR was fighting only China or was
simultaneously at war with NATO.
B. Conflict With China0
83. The potential for armed conflict with China has
long been a serious issue for planners in Moscow. Much
of the buildup along the border has been aimed at
ensuring Soviet superiority over the full spectrum of
possible conflict situations. We believe Soviet forces
would respond forcefully and successfully to any
Chinese aggression such as border raids, limited puni-
tive attacks, or attempts to interdict Soviet lines of
communication. We cannot be certain of Soviet inten-
tions but, in view of their capabilities, initiation of
hostilities by the Soviets cannot be ruled out.
84. Over the past 15 years, the Soviets have substan-
tially increased the size of their forces in the Far
East-more than we believe would be necessary for a
successful defense against China. Soviet Ground
Forces units in the region generally are better
equipped than Chinese main force units, and they
have a substantial advantage in mobility, firepower,
and command and control. Soviet tactical aircraft are
more capable than those of the Chinese, and the
Soviets probably could establish local air superiority
early in a conflict.
85. The Soviets have sufficient units, equipment,
and supplies in the region to undertake major offen-
sive operations. Initially, Soviet forces would face only
token resistance from lightly armed Chinese border
defense units; most regular Chinese forces are located
150 to 300 km back from the border. The large
number of Chinese main force troops deep in China
would necessitate significant reinforcement of Soviet
forces to achieve desired force ratios for extended
operations. These reinforcements would have to come
from the Soviet strategic reserve, but in most circum-
stances it is unlikely, because of Soviet preoccupation
with NATO, that Moscow would draw down these
forces substantially. Moreover, once deep into China,
Soviet forces would have to fight a well-entrenched
enemy in inhospitable terrain from the end of long
and tenuous land lines of communication and resup-
ply. These lines would be subject to disruption by
Chinese regular and guerrilla forces.
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IV. PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET THEATER
FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
121. We foresee no development over the next
several years that would diminish overall Soviet mili-
tary capabilities in the Far East. On the contrary, we
believe that the Soviet effort to maintain and improve
the capabilities of the large standing forces in the
region will continue, as will the effort to expand
logistic support elements. Soviet concerns with the
growing Sino-American rapprochement and with the
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potential upgrading of Japan's Self-Defense Forces
will further prompt these efforts. The USSR might be
receptive to an opportunity to slacken the pace of its
military buildup that has been under way in the Far
East since the mid-1960s, if only because of the
current slowdown in Soviet economic growth. But,
there is no evidence that Moscow feels constrained to
scale down its military forces to free resources for the
civilian economy.
122. The Kremlin may, at the same time, be more
willing than it has in the past to seek accommodation
with Beijing. The Soviets would be particularly inter-
ested in counterbalancing growing US-Chinese cooper-
ation, and they may believe that the Chinese are also
interested in assuaging the Sino-Soviet border dispute,
although in our view the Chinese position remains as
firm as ever. Even if negotiations resume, however,
they would take considerable time under the best of
circumstances, and a thaw in the Sino-Soviet dispute as
a factor in reducing Soviet forces in the Far East does
not appear likely in the near term.
123. A major Chinese force improvement program
focused on introducing advanced weapons technology
into Chinese forces-an unlikely prospect even if
supported by the United States-could spark unantici-
pated changes in the Soviet posture in the region. The
Soviets initially would most likely respond to even a
modest level of Sino-US military cooperation by a
combination of diplomatic protest and observable
military moves to demonstrate their resolve to counter
such a program. The longer term response probably
would involve some acceleration of improvement pro-
grams already planned.
124. Given current Chinese modernization priori-
ties, we judge that there is little likelihood of a
fundamental shift toward military modernization or a
substantial Western-supported program to import
high-technology weapon systems in the next five years.
Consequently, we expect the Soviets to continue their
program of gradual but steady force growth and
modernization in the Far East.
A. Ground Forces
125. We expect the number of Soviet Ground
Forces divisions in the Far East to continue to increase
through at least 1985. Evidence suggests that the
number of active, low-strength divisions will increase
by about one per year, and there could be as many as
two per year. We also expect the number of un-
manned mobilization divisions to increase at the same
rate. The relocation of some divisions closer to the
border and the activation of new divisions to replace
them at their old garrisons-coupled with divisional
reorganizations and the formation of new nondivi-
sional units-will account for moderate increases in
manpower and equipment. Other improvements in
the Ground Forces will be aimed at redressing remain-
ing shortcomings in command and control, mobility,
air defense, firepower, and logistic support.
127. Soviet interest in increasing conventional fire-
power will result in continued increases in the num-
bers of artillery pieces as well as improvements in
weapons, target acquisition capabilities, and ammuni-
tion. The Soviets will continue the gradual replace-
ment of towed artillery pieces with self-propelled
models.
128. Soviet ground force units in the region will
continue to improve their air defense capabilities.
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130. We believe the Soviets will continue to mod-
ernize and upgrade their territorial air defense capa-
bilities by deploying new surface-to-air missiles and
more capable interceptor aircraft. We also expect
them to introduce improved radars having better
capabilities for target information handling and data
transmission and greater resistance to electronic
countermeasures.
D. General Purpose Naval Forces
131. During the next decade, most agencies believe
that developments in the Soviet Navy will produce a
force with generally improved capabilities to perform
its peacetime and wartime tasks, particularly antiship
warfare and antiaircraft warfare. Serious deficiencies,
however, will continue in other areas, especially anti-
submarine warfare. The Soviets also will press forward
with programs to attempt to correct shortcomings in
other areas, such as submarine detection, reduction of
submarine noise levels, comprehensive fleet air de-
fense against cruise missiles, and sustained logistic
support for deployed operations. A modest decline is
expected in the overall number of Soviet general
purpose naval ships and submarines, as newer and
more capable units will be replacing older and less
effective ones on a less than one-for-one basis.
132. An alternative view " is that, although overall
improvements are likely in the Soviet Navy, relative
Soviet naval capabilities in some key areas may actual-
ly decline because of the increasing complexity of the
Western threat. Soviet capability to conduct ASW
operations against Western SSBNs, for example, is
likely to decline because any improvements in ASW
systems probably will be more than offset by the need
to conduct such operations in more extensive ocean
areas, particularly in view of the imminent deploy-
ment of the Trident system. The overall Soviet capa-
bility to provide air defense may also decline because
the primary requirement will be protection against
" The holder of this view is the Deputy Director, Central
Intelligence Agency.
Western cruise missiles rather than against manned
aircraft. Not only is the effectiveness of even
thenewest naval SAM systems against such missiles
open to question, but during the period of this Esti-
mate most Soviet surface units will be armed with
either older SAMs or none at all. Soviet capability for
underway logistic support is also unlikely to improve
significantly in view of the low priority assigned this
task-for example, no underway replenishment ships
have been delivered since 1979 and none are under
construction. The continuing lack of any significant
capability to transfer munitions under way is of
particular importance for sustained wartime opera-
tions.
133. In the Pacific Ocean Fleet the capabilities of
Soviet general purpose naval ships and submarines will
grow as newer and more capable units replace older,
less effective ones. We believe the Pacific Ocean Fleet
will continue to be structured primarily to oppose US
naval forces in the region, although the Soviet Navy
also may have to devote increasing attention and
resources to offset the gradual growth of the Japanese
Maritime Self-Defense Forces. The Chinese Navy,
although improving in terms of both operational capa-
bilities and materiel developments, will remain largely
a coastal force with little capability to challenge the
Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet in the open ocean.
E. Theater Nuclear Forces
135. Tactical Nuclear Forces. The Soviet Ground
Forces will continue to improve the quality of their
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tactical nuclear forces by deploying new missiles, by
introducing improved guidance systems, and by in-
creasing the number of weapons in tactical units.F
136. In the tactical air forces the capability for
nuclear delivery is expected to increase through mod-
ernization and the addition of new units over the next
few years. In addition, the availability of low-yield
warheads and improved air-to-surface missile guid-
ance systems could lead to the fielding of an air-
delivered tactical missile with a nuclear capability in
the next few years.
137. Strategic Forces. The Soviets will continue to
rely heavily on land-based ballistic missiles to conduct
nuclear strikes in the Far East region. Some intercon-
tinental missiles may continue to have peripheral
missions,
G. Logistic Support
140. Improvements in the logistic support field are
also likely.
ere
pro a y wi l be increased mechanization of material-
handling procedures, including the computerization of
supply depots and automated inventory and requisi-
tion control systems. There may also be improvements
in transportation, including greater containerization of
supplies and equipment, as well as increases in the
capacities of cargo carriers, particularly in the area of
tactical motor transport. Despite these improvements,
however, logistic support will remain a major problem
for Soviet forces in the Far East.
I
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PART TWO: COMPARISON OF FORCES ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER
142. This part of the Estimate evaluates Soviet and
Chinese ground and air forces along the Sino-Soviet
border. It provides a comparison of doctrine and
strategy as well as quantitative and qualitative com-
parisons of the forces. The force elements compared in
this section include Soviet forces in the USSR's four
easternmost military districts and similar Chinese
forces in China's four northernmost military regions
143. Defense of the homeland is basic to the mili-
tary doctrine of both the Soviet Union and China,12
but the war-fighting strategies of the two nations differ
greatly. Soviet strategy is predicated on taking the
battle to the enemy. Chinese strategy, on the other
hand, is aimed at defeating an invader inside China.
144. Moscow's military policy dictates that the So-
viet homeland and lines of communication be de-
fended well forward and that Soviet forces be capable
of rapidly mounting an offensive or counteroffensive.
The peacetime deployment of Soviet forces in the Far
East is dictated not only by this policy but also by the
terrain and by the fact that developed areas and lines
of communication in the region are generally located
close to the frontier. As a result, Soviet forces are
clustered in the coastal areas and along the rail lines,
which in several areas run within a few kilometers of
the Sino-Soviet border.
145. Soviet doctrine for a conventional offensive
calls for creating an overwhelming advantage at the
point of attack. Planning for attacks against well-
prepared defenses, such as those the Soviets would
encounter in China, prescribes advantages of at least 3
to 1 in men and artillery and up to 6 to 1 in tanks at
the point of attack. The Soviets undoubtedly would
seek to exploit the vastly superior mobility of their
forces to achieve concentrations that would provide
the desired ratios to rapidly penetrate Chinese de-
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25
fenses and to bypass and isolate strongpoints manned
by Chinese garrison divisions.
146. China's military strategy is based on a "de-
fense in depth" to contain and defeat an attacker
inside China before key industrial and population
centers could be reached or before the political objec-
tives of an attacker could be attained. The Chinese
plan to trade space for time to bring their significant
.demographic and geographic assets to bear: a popula- 25
tion easily mobilized and larger than the combined
populations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the
world's largest standing army, and extensive and
defensible terrain.
147. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is de-
ployed to confront the Soviets with successively larger
and better equipped units. Lightly armed, dispersed
border defense units would meet an enemy in forward
areas, develop intelligence on the hostile forces, and
inflict casualties to the degree possible. Better armed
regional forces-located 150 to 300 kilometers back
from the border-would fight from well-prepared,
defendable positions along likely invasion routes, at-
tempting further to channel the enemy into terrain
favoring defense. Well-armed main forces would rein-
force regional troops on the enemy's main axes of
advance, meet any breakthroughs, and delay or de-
stroy enemy forces as they were able. The Chinese
plan guerrilla resistance within occupied areas to
weaken the enemy-inflicting casualties, hindering
supply efforts, and further channeling enemy
movements.
A. Quantitative Trends
148. Over the past 10 years the development of
Soviet and Chinese military forces in the border region
has differed. The Soviets have increased the number
of military units in the region, augmented existing
units with additional weapon systems, and carried out
extensive weapon modernization programs. The Chi- 25
nese also have increased the number of military units
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III. CONCLUSIONS
166. We believe the balance along the Sino-Soviet
border continues increasingly to favor the USSR and is
so perceived by the Soviets. Although Chinese man-
power in main and local forces in the four northern
military regions outnumbers the Soviets
tithe Soviet forces are superior in weaponry, mobility,
and command, control, and communications. The
Soviets' ground force equipment is more modern, and
they have more tanks, superior artillery firepower, and
a monopoly of tactical SAMs and tactical nuclear
weapons. Both offensively and defensively, Soviet
aircraft are far superior to China's.
167. We believe currently deployed Soviet forces
have the following capabilities:
- The Soviets could stop a Chinese general offen-
sive, and are capable of incursions into China
with a good chance of initial success.
- The Soviets would require substantial reinforce-
ments, or the use of nuclear weapons, to permit
overrunning and seizing Manchuria (the Shen-
yang MR and the northernmost portion of the
Beijing MR).
- In the air, the Soviets should be able to gain local
air superiority. The Soviets could blunt Chinese
air attacks against Soviet or Mongolian installa-
tions and, using relatively secure Soviet airbases,
could strike targets throughout China.
- The Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet, with overwhelm-
ing superiority, would predominate at sea and
could prevent any significant Chinese naval
actions.
- Using strategic air and missile forces, the Soviets
could conduct nuclear strikes against any target
in China. They also have a substantial advantage
in chemical warfare capabilities.
- The Soviets could seize and hold major portions
of the Urumqi MR opposite Soviet Central Asia.
168. Chinese military advantages lie in the vast
expanse of northern China, where much of the terrain
favors the defender; a large standing ground force
which is deployed, ready, and equipped to fight a
conventional defense in dept ; and large reserves and
a vast supportive population.
169. Perhaps China's greatest asset is an ability to
absorb punishment and make the duration and cost of
a large-scale invasion potentially prohibitive for the
Soviets. China's key installations and lines of commu-
nication are well back from the border, allowing the
Chinese to choose and prepare the battlefields that
most effectively use the defender's advantage. Most of
China's tactical airfields are more than 300 kilometers
from the Soviet and Mongolian borders, and would get
some early warning of attack. Furthermore, China's
large inventory of aircraft and hardened underground
storage facilities would help the Chinese Air Force
survive for an extended period, even if faced with
sustained conventional attacks.
170. We believe Chinese forces have the following
capabilities:
- The Chinese have perhaps an even chance of
stalemating a major Soviet conventional offensive
aimed at seizing Beijing and advancing into the
North China Plain. Even so, large portions of the
Beijing and Shenyang MRs could be overrun and
held by Soviet forces, but at great cost.
- The Chinese have only limited offensive capa-
?bilities, but could conduct local counteroffensives
and extensive guerrilla operations within China.
They also could attempt limited, perhaps uncon-
ventional, operations against the Trans-Siberian
Railroad to disrupt Soviet resupply-
- China's strategic nuclear forces, though relatively
small, have a secure retaliatory capability. The
Soviets could not be sure of destroying all of
China's missile force without suffering retali-
atory attacks against Soviet urban /industrial and
military complexes, possibly even Moscow.
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