PROSPECTS FOR POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA

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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2007
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• Publication Date: September 25, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Secret
Central
Intelligence
Prospects for
Post-Tito Yugoslavia
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume I - The Estimate
Secret
NIE 15-79
25 September 1979
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N I E 15-79
PROSPECTS FOR
POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA
Volume I - The Estimate
Information available as of 25 September 1979 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State and Defense, and the National Security Agency.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 1
II. SUCCESSION CONTEXTS ...................................................... 1
A. Tito's Historical Achievements ........................................ 1
B. Institutional and Procedural Flaws in Tito's Legacy .... 2
C. Economic Strains ................................................................ 2
D. Regional and Communal Tensions ................................ 2
E. Soviet Pressures .................................................................. 3
III. SUCCESSION PROSPECTS .................................................... 4
A. Breakdown Possibilities ...................................................... 4
B. More Stable Alternatives .................................................. 4
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1. The early 1980s will probably be a time of
troubles in Yugoslavia. The precipitant will be the
incapacitation or death of President Josip Broz Tito,
whose role in the creation and preservation of contem-
porary Yugoslavia has been so large that one cannot be
confident it will prove dispensable.
2. On balance, our confidence on this score is lower
now than it was at the time of our last estimate in
1973. During the past several years, and especially
since the June 1978 Yugoslav Party Congress, a num-
ber of developments which had seemed conducive to a
relatively smooth and orderly post-Tito succession
have lost momentum. Simultaneously, a number of
countervailing developments have ensued. In particu-
lar, the institutionalization of an effective central
policymaking process has virtually stopped, while
economic "stagflation" has persisted, and Yugoslav-
Soviet relations have further deteriorated.
3. We remain fairly confident that Tito's passing, in
and of itself, will not during the first six months or so
pose a threat to the integrity or independence of the
Yugoslav state. It will, however, reduce the regime's
ability to manage domestic and foreign challenges,
which are likely to be more severe in the post-Tito
period than they have been in the 1970s. Moreover,
the high degree of internal political solidarity that will
probably characterize the immediate post-Tito succes-
sion is unlikely to persist. In consequence, the country
will enter a period, probably prolonged, of great
uncertainty and potential instability.
4. The range of plausible contingencies that will
shape and reshape the sequence of events is very large
and includes the distinct possibility that Yugoslavia
will not weather the 1980s with its integrity and
independence intact. Of crucial importance is the
interplay among a number of central variables, of
which the most critical will be the nature of Soviet
initiatives and reactions, the efficacy of Western assist-
ance, and, above all, the cohesion and adaptability of
Tito's successors. While these variables are potentially
too volatile to permit any confident judgment about
Yugoslavia's future in the 1980s, the odds are at least
marginally in favor of Yugoslavia's continuing as an
integral independent state. Internal instability and
vulnerability to external pressures during a prolonged
transition period, however, could make even an inte-
gral Yugoslavia a recurring source of international
tension.
A. Tito's Historical Achievements
5. At the age of 87, President Tito remains the
unchallenged leader of a regime that he founded over
30 years ago. Under his leadership, Yugoslavia has not
only survived severe domestic and foreign challenges
but has undergone remarkable transformations.
6. Economically, Yugoslavia has changed from a
command to a market-socialist system, while rapidly
industrializing and steadily upgrading the standard of
living of its people. Since 1948, industry's share in the
gross national product has risen from 16 to 42 percent,
while real per capita annual income has climbed from
$650 to slightly over $2,500, and automobiles, refrig-
erators, washing machines, and other consumer dura-
bles are no longer scarce luxury items.
7. Politically, Yugoslavia has moved from a highly
centralized and repressive Soviet-style dictatorship to a
relatively open system with a considerable amount of
authentic individual participation in local affairs. Al-
though the League of Communists is still the country's
only political party, other public organizations are no
longer subject to strict party control, and there have
been experimental multicandidate elections for local
public offices. Similarly, while public political dissent
is still severely punished, literary publications are no
longer subjected to precensorship, and rank-and-file
citizens are free to travel and live abroad.
8. Militarily, the guerrilla partisans of wartime Yu-
goslavia have been transformed into conventional
armed forces, backed by a territorial reserve defense
force, designed to conduct prolonged unconventional
warfare. The regime has simultaneously fostered de-
velopment of the Army as a guarantor of national
unity and as an integrative institution in the country's
domestic political life.
9. On the international plane, Yugoslavia has
moved from near isolation to intense multilateral
involvement and far-reaching ideological influence,
and has achieved political prestige disproportionate to
its size. Its status has changed from heretical outcast to
that of a recognized variant within the Communist
world. In the West, it has gradually won acceptance
not only as a courageous breakaway Soviet satellite but
as an active interlocutor in East-West and North-South
exchanges. And in the Third World it has established
itself not only as a symbolic European ally but as a
leading force within the nonaligned movement.
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B. Institutional and Procedural Flaws in Tito's
Legacy
10. These are all transformations for which Tito can
claim substantial personal credit. They are also trans-
formations in which large numbers of Yugoslavs take
understandable pride. In consequence, Tito can be
reasonably confident that his successors will not follow
Soviet and Chinese precedents and launch a process of
"de-Titoization." On the contrary, he can probably
rely on his successors both to profess and to feel a
strong loyalty to most of the basic tenets of Titoism.
However, he has recently introduced new decision-
making procedures that will make it extremely diffi-
cult for this loyalty to find expression in effective
leadership.
11. In particular, the emergence of such leadership
will be strongly impeded by the strictly collegial
policymaking procedures that Tito has prescribed both
for the nine-man collective State Presidency and-
since 1978-for the much more important 24-man
Presidium of the League of Communists.' So long as
Tito is alive and well, these procedures do not have
decisive significance. Once Tito leaves the scene,
however, his successors will be left to try to make
timely and coherent decisions in large collegiums with
short-term rotating chairmen and rules of conduct that
require so much consultation and coordination that
they almost entail a paralyzing liberum veto. Such an
enterprise would be highly problematical under the
best of circumstances-let alone the trying circum-
stances that will confront Tito's successors.
new decentralization program that is giving the re-
gions a greater say in national economic decisions.
13. During the 1980s, Yugoslavia is likely to face
persistent foreign trade deficits as well as continued
high domestic inflation and unemployment. Western
demand for Yugoslav exports will probably remain
slack, while competition in Western hard-currency
markets will increase. Domestic energy supplies will
tighten, and jumps in world oil prices (Yugoslavia
currently imports 36 percent of its energy and 75
percent of its oil) will boost external deficits and
domestic prices sharply.
14. Such strains will increase Yugoslav reliance on
Western financing. Belgrade can probably continue to
count on substantial support from official Western
lenders. At present, however, over half of the $10
billion Yugoslav debt is held by private Western banks.
Their loans have periodically fallen short of Yugoslav
needs and could be considerably affected by height-
ened political uncertainty in a time without Tito. If
private foreign lending should be curtailed for a
lengthy period and the difference is not covered from
official Western sources, post-Tito Yugoslavia could
not avoid a significant economic slowdown. This, in
turn, would aggravate the endemic cyclical pattern of
growth and seriously increase the level of unemploy-
ment, which currently amounts to almost 7 percent of
the national work force and about 20 percent of the
urban work force in some of the country's less devel-
oped regions. If the leadership proves incapable of
designing and enforcing an austerity program appro-
priate to such circumstances, there could be a pro-
longed economic crisis with potentially disruptive
political ramifications.'
12. Weakened central leadership will make it more
difficult for the post-Tito regime to manage what are
in any case likely to be increased economic problems.
At a minimum, their lack of charismatic authority will
deprive Tito's successors of an asset that has helped to
prevent economic crisis during the 1970s, when the
effects of high inflation (averaging 17 percent per
annum), large deficits in the balance of payments,
growing regional economic disparities, and fluctu-
ations in growth of consumption, associated with wide
swings in overall growth rates, have threatened to get
out of hand. Moreover, the regional pressures behind
inflation and external deficits will be intensified by a
' For a detailed discussion of party institutional trends and
evolving policymaking arrangements and their likely effect on the
succession, see volume II, annex A, "The League of Communists."
D. Regional and Communal Tensions
15. Economic stringencies seem certain to lead to
sharper conflicts of interest among Yugoslavia's con-
stituent republics and provinces.' Such conflicts, in
turn, could escalate into militant confrontations among
the already antagonistic ethnonational communities
whose "homelands" are competing for scarce material
and financial resources. Such confrontations have been
a recurrent feature of postwar Yugoslav history and
have periodically forced even Tito onto the defensive.
2 For a more detailed assessment of Yugoslavia's economic pros-
pects and the economic issues that will confront Tito's successors, see
volume II, annex B, "The Economy."
9 For an analysis of the role of ethnic divisions in Yugoslav
politics, see volume H. annex C, "Nationalism and Regionalism."
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In 1968, for example, there were large riots by the
country's Albanians, who contended that their "home-
land," the province of Kosovo, was an economic and
political colony of the Serbs. And, from 1968 to 1972,
Serbs and Croats engaged in a prolonged confronta-
tion, during which tens of thousands of citizens joined
outspokenly nationalist organizations and participated
in nationalist demonstrations, and almost the entire
Croatian party leadership evinced "national Commu-
nist" proclivities.
16. Despite the relative tranquillity that has reigned
on nationality issues since the so-called Croatian crisis,
the perceptions and passions that fueled these nation-
alist outbursts have not disappeared. Because of their
self-replenishing and mutually reinforcing religious,
cultural, and linguistic roots, these perceptions and
passions could easily be reactivated not only by im-
pending economic stringencies but by a host of other
stimuli. With Tito's departure, moreover, the regime
will lose most of the protection that it has enjoyed as a
result of his unimpeachable reputation as an ethnic
nonpartisan. None of his likely successors have even a
remotely comparable reputation. And some have such
close and exclusive ties with "their own" particular
republics that almost any policy that they initiate or
support is likely to be challenged as ethnocentric.
E. Soviet Pressures
17. The Kremlin will not necessarily attempt to
prevent a smooth and orderly Yugoslav succession.
Under certain circumstances Moscow would see ad-
vantages in a stable, viable Yugoslavia. In any case, the
USSR is likely to adopt a restrained policy in the
immediate post-Tito period. Although it probably
retains a desire to reincorporate Yugoslavia into its
East European empire, Moscow could adopt a hands-
off or even supportive policy in the immediate post-
Tito period. Such a policy could persist for some time
should Belgrade become more responsive to Soviet
policies and more distant from the West. While not
impossible, however, such a long-term change in Yu-
goslav policy is unlikely.
18. Even if developments in Yugoslavia prove less
favorable to Soviet interests, Moscow is unlikely to
subject Yugoslavia to a direct military intervention. A
Soviet resort to force will remain improbable so long as
it continues to entail serious risks of a sustained
Yugoslav resistance and possible Western political and
military support. However, a very sharp escalation of
centrifugal tendencies within Yugoslavia might be
seen by the Soviets as significantly reducing those
risks, particularly if it were perceived as both frag-
menting the Yugoslav will to resist and discouraging
Western readiness to respond.
19. If the temptations created by such a perception
of Yugoslav and Western weakness were combined
with sufficient danger of a radical growth of Western
influence in parts of a disintegrating Yugoslavia, the
otherwise strong Soviet inhibitions against military
intervention in Yugoslavia might be overcome. In such
a case, the Soviets would be enticed by the chance to
reestablish their direct presence on the Adriatic and to
demonstrate a dramatic pro-Soviet shift in the regional
and international correlation of forces.
20. But even if such a combination of circum-
stances does not arise, and Tito's successors do not have
to contend with a serious threat of Soviet military
intervention, they are likely to be subjected to in-
creased Soviet pressure. As in the past, the Kremlin
will attempt to secure freer Soviet access to Yugoslav
naval facilities and regularized Soviet overflight rights.
Along with these military objectives, it will also press
for reduced Yugoslav support for Romanian and other
efforts to establish national autonomy within the
Soviet bloc, less active Yugoslav encouragement of
Eurocommunism, diminished Yugoslav criticism of
Soviet foreign policy, and less vigorous Yugoslav pur-
suit of a China connection.
21. In pursuing these goals, the Soviets may initially
place heavier reliance on incentives than on pressures
or sanctions. Furthermore, in contemplating sanctions,
the Kremlin will doubtless take account of the possibil-
ity that "overkill" could prove counterproductive and
drive Yugoslavia toward the West. In the face of
prolonged Tito-like resistance, however, the Kremlin
will probably exert stronger pressure on Tito's succes-
sors than it dared to exert on Tito, with his long record
of defiance and demonstrated ability to rally domestic
and foreign support. Thus, it will be less hesitant to
protest strongly and, if necessary, to follow its protests
with measured "retaliation" in the form of stronger
Bulgarian demarches on the Macedonian question,
larger and more frequent Warsaw Pact maneuvers on
Yugoslavia's frontiers, and more active and supportive
contacts with antiregime nationalist and pro-Soviet
"Cominformist" groups both within and outside
Yugoslavia.
22. Such pressures or sanctions would be even more
likely if Tito's successors were to display what the
Kremlin viewed as excessively Westernizing tenden-
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cies-for example, by obstructing major Soviet diplo-
matic initiatives, by tolerating the public expression of
anti-Soviet views, or by sanctioning political pluralism
within Yugoslavia. In fact, if it were reasonably confi-
dent that the West was unwilling or unable to com-
pensate, the Kremlin would probably be prepared to
retaliate against such tendencies by withholding or
curtailing scheduled deliveries of arms, petroleum,
and other items of which the Soviet Union is a major
Yugoslav supplier.
III. SUCCESSION PROSPECTS
23. To cope with the combined effects of increased
economic stringencies, heightened ethnonational ten-
sions, and intensified Soviet pressures, Tito's successors
will have to overcome the constraints on effective and
timely decisionmaking that inhere in a strictly colle-
gial leadership system. Initially, they will probably not
encounter inordinate difficulties. The great bulk of the
population will react to Tito's departure by rallying
around the regime, and the ruling elite will display a
high degree of collective solidarity. Before long, how-
ever, these shock effects can be expected to dissipate.
Public support for the regime will then become much
more contingent on policy outputs and outcomes, and
Tito's successors will find it much harder to submerge
their internal differences. Although the preceding
period will not necessarily be free of significant
challenges, this will be the point at which the transi-
tion to the post-Tito era really begins and Tito's
achievements undergo their first really strenuous post-
humous test of endurance.
A. Breakdown Possibilities
24. The chances of passing this test have been
diminished by the recent (February 1979) death of
Edvard Kardelj, who was the one Tito aide who
enjoyed broad popular respect and the general trust
and deference of his colleagues. Without such a man
to serve as arbiter and peacemaker, Tito's successors
will find it extremely difficult to compromise their
policy differences and rise above their personal and
factional antagonisms and animosities. In conse-
quence, it is easy to envision a post-Tito recurrence of
the political degeneration which took place during the
late 1960s and early 1970s, when Tito allowed his then
lieutenants a fairly free hand in domestic policy.
25. By the time Tito belatedly terminated this
experiment in late 1971, virtually the entire domestic
policy process had succumbed to paralysis, and per-
sonal and factional relations within the ruling elite had
deteriorated to the point where Yugoslavia faced
incipient violence. To restore political efficacy and
order, moreover, Tito had to draw on every ounce of
his immense personal authority. And, when it ap-
peared that even this would not suffice, he took the
extreme step of threatening to call in the military.
26. In the event of a similar impasse among Tito's
heirs, the military might well intervene on its own
initiative if it were not invited to do so by elements
within the leadership. Tito's designation of the armed
forces as the ultimate guarantor of Yugoslav unity
could be cited as justification of such an intervention
and could mitigate reluctance in the officer corps to
interfere in political matters.
27. With their considerable internal discipline and
cohesion and close connection with the country's
security forces, the armed forces could probably im-
pose a degree of stability in an otherwise shaky
situation. In the process, they would probably tend to
favor a greater reliance on administrative and central-
ist methods of control and a substantial increase in the
discretionary authority of party professionals.
28. However, the Yugoslav military is not political-
ly monolithic, and a political demarche or coup would
almost certainly deepen its internal divisions. Further-
more, any expansion in the military's political role
would undoubtedly alienate Croats, Slovenes, Alba-
nians, and other non-Serbs. Although the regime has
made substantial efforts to dilute the historic Serbian
dominance of the officer corps, non-Serbs still view
the military as a predominantly Serbian institution
with a centralist bias that threatens their national
interests and identities.'
29. Accordingly, while a military intervention
might temporarily stabilize a crisis situation, the longer
term prospect would remain one of potential instabil-
ity and unrest, with an appreciable chance of ultimate
civil war.
B. More Stable Alternatives
30. This readily apparent prospect of such a disas-
trous outcome provides the best hope that Tito's
successors will do everything possible to avert it. This
hope is strengthened by the fact that all of Tito's
present top lieutenants played important supportive
' For a discussion of the Yugoslav military establishment and
ethnic attitudes toward its role, see volume II, annex D, "The
Yugoslav Military." '
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roles in the eventual resolution of the leadership
deadlock of 1968-72. Furthermore, some of the per-
sonal and factional antagonisms that have arisen with-
in the present party Presidium are likely to be muted
by future changes in membership, including a number
of changes that are scheduled for the immediate
future and others that could well occur before Tito's
departure. In consequence, it is possible that the
post-Tito Presidium will adopt less strictly collegial
decisionmaking procedures and that a majority of its
members can be organized into a more or less stable
ruling coalition.
addition, such a coalition might be less congenitally
suspicious of Soviet intentions than a coalition domi-
nated by men with more vivid personal memories of
the original Tito-Stalin split. Nonetheless, mistrust of
the Soviet Union will remain endemic and a signifi-
cant Eastward tilt in Yugoslav policy is unlikely unless
Soviet pressures on Belgrade fail to elicit effective
Western support. In fact, such a coalition might
eventually be more willing than its old Titoist counter-
part to permit a gradual Westward tilt in Yugoslav
policy in return for economic benefits and credible
security reassurances.
31. In broad terms, two such coalitions, with poten-
tially overlapping memberships, seem feasible in the
light of current and emergent Yugoslav political reali-
ties. One, more likely in the event of an early succes-
sion, might be headed by old Titoists such as Vladimir
Bakaric, Milos Minic, and Nikola Ljubicic, and would
be characterized by a strong commitment to the
perpetuation of the status quo ante. It would do
everything possible to preserve the present distribution
of authority between the center and the republics, to
maintain a "self-managing" socialist-market economy,
to foster the growth of independent Communist and
nonaligned forces in world affairs, and to guard
against too Westward a tilt in Yugoslav domestic and
foreign policy. The other grouping, more likely in the
event of a delayed succession, would include more
recently appointed members of the present Presidium
(such as Stane Dolanc) as well as top republic party
bureaucrats from whose ranks replacements for in-
cumbent old Titoists are likely to be drawn.
32. Although Titoist in crucial respects, a coalition
of the latter sort would be far less status quo oriented
than its "old Titoist" counterpart and might be ready
to introduce a significant amount of incremental
change. With respect to the division of authority
between the center and the republics, for example, it
might be not only willing but eager to sponsor a return
to the more decentralized pattern that obtained during
the late 1960s, especially in matters of day-to-day
administration and management. At the same time, in
intrarepublic matters it might be ready to sacrifice
significant features of workers' self-management and
self-government in the interest of managerial efficien-
cy and political discipline.
33. Along with these changes in domestic policies, a
coalition in which old Titoists played a less dominant
role might be prepared to curtail Yugoslavia's role in
an increasingly fragmented nonaligned movement. In
34. Even the transformations of one of these poten-
tial coalitions into a more or less stable ruling group
would not guarantee the sort of post-Tito leadership
that might be needed to deal with a severe crisis.
However, it would ensure at least a measure of
leadership and would provide some safeguards against
the kinds of erratic or diluted policy choices that
could inadvertently invite foreign encroachments and
wholesale withdrawals of domestic support. And it
would make it possible and worthwhile for interested
foreign governments to support Tito's successors in
their efforts to preserve Yugoslavia's integrity and
independence.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST
35. The amounts and kinds of support that Tito's
successors request from the West will vary with time
and circumstances. Except under great duress, even a
Westward-inclined post-Tito leadership is unlikely to
request explicitly or to welcome conspicuous "pro-Yu-
goslav" changes in Western security policy. During the
immediate transition, the chief international concern
of Tito's successors will be to deprive Moscow of any
plausible excuse to intervene in Yugoslav affairs. In
consequence, they will probably desire and expect
nothing more than a prompt declaration of continued
US and West European interest in the preservation of
Yugoslavia's independence and integrity, coupled with
every possible effort to prevent an escalation of hostile
emigre activities. Although there is little reason to
suppose that emigre activities alone pose a real threat
to the regime, Tito's successors view them as such and
will certainly exaggerate their potential impact and
treat Western behavior toward them as a test of
Western intentions.
36. If they are faced with escalating Soviet pressure,
Tito's successors could request and/or welcome West-
ern representations to Moscow on their behalf. Within
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relatively short order, moreover, they are likely to seek
active help in preserving and extending their financial
relations with the West, including not only bilateral
relations but relations with the Common Market. In
addition, they could turn to the West for larger
supplies' of arms, especially in areas of high technol-
ogy. And, under extreme Soviet pressure, they could
appeal to the United States and NATO to exert
economic and political pressure on Moscow, to bolster
and alert the 6th Fleet and other forces on NATO's
southern flank, and, if need be, to provide direct
military support.'
37. No amount or kind of Western support can stop
Tito's successors from engaging in a self-destructive
succession struggle or prevent Yugoslavia's constituent
nationalities from embarking on a civil war, if they are
determined to do so. However, skillfully timed and
carefully designed and orchestrated Western support
could make a very large difference to the consolida-
tion and survival of a potentially viable post-Tito
leadership and thereby to the preservation of a stable
regional, continental, and global balance of power.
5 For a more extensive discussion of Tito's foreign policy legacy
and the ways in which post-Tito policies toward East and West may
interact, see volume II, annex E, "Foreign Policy."
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