SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
Director of
Central
Intelligence
Soviet Civil Defense
NI 78-10003
July 1978
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83ROO184ROO2600380004-9
This publication is prepared for the use of U.S. Government
officials. The format, coverage and contents of the publication are
designed to meet the specific requirements of those users. U.S.
Government officials may obtain additional copies of this document
directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Non-U.S. Government users may obtain this along with similar
CIA publications on a subscription basis by addressing inquiries to:
Document Expediting (DOCEX) Project
Exchange and Gift Division
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
Non-U.S. Government users not interested in the DOCEX
Project subscription service may purchase reproductions of specific
publications on an individual basis from:
Photoduplication Service
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83ROO184ROO2600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
Soviet Civil Defense
Director of Central Intelligence
July 1978
Key Findings
Civil defense in the Soviet Union is an ongoing nationwide
program under military control. The Soviets' strategic writings integrate
civil defense into their military strategy. It is part of a general scheme of
the likely origins, course, and consequences of nuclear war. The Soviets'
experience in World War II and their traditional emphasis on homeland
defense reinforce their interest in civil defense. By developing an active
and extensive civil defense, in conjunction with their other defensive
and offensive strategic programs, they hope to convince potential
enemies that they cannot win a war with the USSR. If war should occur,
the Soviets seek through civil defense along with other means to assure
survival of the homeland and to leave the USSR in a stronger postwar
position than its adversaries. Civil defense is meant to contribute to the
maintenance of a functioning logistic base for continuing military
operations, to help limit human and material losses, and to help enable
the Soviets to speed recovery from the effects of nuclear war.
The Soviet civil defense program is not a crash effort, but its pace
increased beginning in the late 1960s. Civil defense activities are
directed by a nationwide civil defense organization consisting of over
100,000 full-time personnel located at all levels of the Soviet
government and economic structure. While improvements have been
made in virtually all facets of the program, it has been marked by wide
variations in implementation from area to area and year to year.
Bureaucratic difficulties and apathy on the part of a large segment of
the population have retarded implementation in the past, though in
wartime such problems would probably diminish. A sustained effort has
been made to provide blast shelters for the leadership and essential
personnel. Programs to protect industry by geographic dispersal have
not been implemented to a significant extent, however, and there is
little evidence of hardening of economic installations.
The Soviets regard the specific objectives of their civil defense
program to be:
- An ability to protect people-the leadership first, the essential
work force second, and the remainder of the population third.
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
- An ability to protect the sources of economic productivity, to
assure the continuity of economic activity in wartime, and to
permit the restoration of production following a nuclear attack.
- An ability to sustain the surviving population in the period
immediately following a nuclear attack, and to prepare for
longer term postattack recovery.
We have assessed the state of Soviet civil defense preparations with
respect to these objectives.
Protection of People:
- Leadership: The Soviets probably have sufficient blast-shelter
space in hardened command posts for virtually all the
leadership elements at all levels (about 110,000 people). Some of
these shelters are harder than those available to the general
population. All fixed leadership shelters which have been
identified are vulnerable to direct attack, but we assume that
alternative arrangements are available to protect at least the top
leadership.
- Essential Work Force: Shelters at key economic installations
could accommodate about 12 to 24 percent of the total work
force. However, Soviet plans do not call for sheltering the entire
work force. In a crisis, nonessential and off-duty workers would
be evacuated. Only those required to maintain essential
production would remain behind to be sheltered. If one-half the
total work force is dispersed, from 24 to 48 percent of the
remainder could be sheltered.
- Population: A minimum of 10 to 20 percent of the total
population in urban areas (including essential workers) could be
accommodated at present in blast-resistant shelters. By 1985, the
percentage of the urban population that could be sheltered
would rise to 15 to 30 percent, assuming no change in the
present rate of shelter construction. Despite the scope and pace
of shelter construction, the absolute number of city dwellers not
afforded such protection by 1985 will increase because of the
expected population growth in urban areas.
The critical decision to be made by the Soviet leaders in
terms of sparing the population would be whether or not to
evacuate cities. Only by evacuating the bulk of the urban
population could they hope to achieve a marked reduction in
the number of urban casualties. An evacuation of urban areas
could probably be accomplished in two or three days, with as
much as a week required for full evacuation of the largest cities.
These times could be extended by shortages in transportation,
other bottlenecks, or adverse weather conditions.
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
Protection of the Economy: Soviet measures to protect the
economy could not prevent massive industrial damage. The Soviet
program for dispersal of industry appears to be offset by a contrary
tendency for investments in new facilities to be inside or near
previously existing installations. The Soviet measures for protecting the
work force, critical equipment, and supplies and for limiting damage
from secondary effects could contribute to maintaining and restoring
production after an attack. We expect some improvements in the level
of protection for the economy, but any radical change in its
vulnerability to nuclear attack is unlikely.
Postattack Recovery: The operating elements of the civil defense
program as well as a substantial number of the civilian population (a
number we cannot estimate with confidence) have received training in
rescue and recovery operations such as administering first aid, clearing
rubble, decontaminating, and providing emergency repair and restora-
tion of power. With at least several weeks to build up reserves and
distribute supplies of food and fuel, the Soviets could probably provide
adequate supplies to sustain the relocated and surviving urban
population in the period immediately following a nuclear attack.
Nevertheless, the coordination of requirements with available supplies
and transportation is a complex problem for Soviet planners even in
peacetime, let alone following a large-scale nuclear attack. We have not
evaluated the potential for continuity of the Soviet government or the
USSR's long-term ability to recover from the effects of a nuclear attack.
Costs: While total civil defense costs are unknown, cost estimates
have been made of three major elements of the Soviet program: pay for
full-time civil defense personnel, operation of specialized civil defense
military units, and shelter construction. The cost of these elements in
1976 amounted to about 400 million rubles, less than 1 percent of the
estimated Soviet defense budget. If these three elements of the Soviet
program were to be duplicated in the United States, they would have
cost about $2 billion in 1976, with about three-fourths of this
representing manpower costs. (These estimates should be considered
rough approximations. They are affected by uncertainties both in the
quantitative data on civil defense programs and in estimates of prices.)
Effects of Civil Defense: In analyzing the effects of civil defense
on levels of damage and casualties the Soviets might sustain, we
simulated a hypothetical attack against high-value military and
economic targets. The Soviet population as such was not deliberately
targeted. For the purposes of this simulation we assumed a single
retaliatory attack immediately following a Soviet first strike. Our
analysis in effect tends to present a "worst case" for retaliation. For
example, various times were assumed to be available to the Soviets to
make civil defense preparations, ranging from a few hours to a week or
more, while in each case opposing forces were assumed not to have
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
progressed beyond day-to-day alert. In reality, Soviet efforts to
maximize civil defense preparations could lead a potential opponent to
place its forces at increased levels of readiness.
The effectiveness of civil defense in reducing casualties in the
USSR and in coping with the postattack period would depend primarily
on the time available to make final preparations before an attack. (The
analysis considered only those casualties that occurred during the first
month following an attack and resulted from prompt nuclear effects
and early fallout.) Using the results of the hypothetical attack under the
assumptions referred to above, we estimate that:
- Under worst conditions for the USSR, with only a few hours or
less to make final preparations, Soviet casualties would be well
over 100 million but a large percentage of the leadership
elements would probably survive.
- The critical time for preparation appears to be about two or
three days, because only by evacuating could the Soviets hope to
avert massive losses. With a few days for final preparations,
casualties could be reduced by more than 50 percent; most of
this reduction would be due to evacuation, the remainder to
shelters.
- Under the most favorable conditions for the USSR, including a
week or more to complete urban evacuation and then to protect
the evacuated population, Soviet civil defenses could reduce
casualties to the low tens of millions.
- While many of the essential personnel sheltered at economic
facilities would probably survive an attack, the Soviets could not
prevent massive damage to their economy and the destruction
of many of their most valued material accomplishments.
The casualty levels noted above could be increased if, for example, the
attack came while an evacuation was in progress, if the size of the attack
were larger, if the attack were stretched out over a longer period, if it
were directed against the population as such, or if the evacuation were
less expeditious than planned or impeded by adverse weather or
transportation deficiencies. In assessing the protection afforded by their
civil defenses the Soviets would take account of these uncertainties.
The Soviets almost certainly believe their present civil defenses
would improve their ability to conduct military operations and would
enhance the USSR's chances for survival following a nuclear exchange.
They cannot have confidence, however, in the degree of protection
their civil defenses would afford them, given the many uncertainties
attendant to a nuclear exchange. We do not believe that the Soviets'
present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately to expose the
USSR to a higher risk of nuclear attack.
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
Present evidence does not suggest that in the foreseeable future
there will be any significant change in the Soviet leaders' judgment that
civil defense contributes to war-fighting and war-survival capabilities,
nor that their uncertainties about its actual effectiveness would be
lessened. Thus, we have no reason to believe that the Soviet leaders'
perception of the contribution of civil defense to their capabilities for
strategic nuclear conflict will change significantly.
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
DISCUSSION
1. Civil defense in the Soviet Union is an ongoing
nationwide program under military control. The
Soviets' strategic writings integrate civil defense into
their military strategy. It is part of a general scheme of
the likely origins, course, and consequences of nuclear
war. The Soviets' experiences in World War II and
their traditional emphasis on homeland defense
reinforce their interest in civil defense. By developing
an active and extensive civil defense program, in
conjunction with their other defensive and offensive
strategic programs, they hope to convince any
potential enemy that it cannot win a war with the
USSR. The Soviets seek, through civil defense along
with other means, to assure the survival of the USSR if
a war does occur and to come out of it in a stronger
postwar position than their adversaries. Civil defense is
meant to contribute to the maintenance of a
functioning logistic base of operations by regular
armed forces to win the war, to help limit human and
material losses, and to help enable the USSR to speed
recovery from the consequences of war.
2. This study focuses on the USSR's civil defense
objectives and the progress the Soviets are making
toward achieving them. It assesses some of the effects
of Soviet civil defense preparations in reducing
casualties and damage from a large-scale nuclear
attack. Because we do not know much about the
consequences of a large-scale attack on the functioning
of a modern, industrialized society, the study deals
with that relatively brief period following a strike
during which the most obvious effects of a nuclear
exchange would be apparent. It does not assess the
Soviets' post-nuclear-attack capabilities to conduct
military operations or their longer term prospects for
political cohesion and reconstitution of the economy.
3. We have attempted to describe the Soviet
program in a way that would allow for an assessment
of the confidence that the Soviet leaders place in the
program-the degree to which their civil defense
makes them feel more able to withstand the conse-
quences of a strategic nuclear exchange. A principal
effort has been to analyze what the effect of an attack
on the Soviet Union would be-to assess the degree of
protection provided for the leadership, for the
economy, and for the population.
Objectives, Priorities, and Pace
4. The Soviets regard the specific objectives of their
civil defense program to be:
- An ability to protect people-the leadership first,
the essential work force second, and the remain-
der of the population third.
- An ability to protect the sources of economic
productivity, to assure the continuity of eco-
nomic activity in wartime, and to permit the
restoration of production following a nuclear
attack.
- An ability to sustain the surviving population in
the period immediately following a nuclear
attack and to prepare for longer term postattack
recovery. (See the tabulation below.)
5. In terms of actual priorities, the Soviet program
appears to hew closely to what its organizers have
declared their intentions to be. The first priority is to
protect people. In support of this part of the program,
the Soviets have built blast shelters, established
relocation sites, and developed evacuation plans. The
Objectives and Priorities of Soviet Civil Defense
Program Objectives Priority Tasks
Protection of Human Sheltering and relocation of the
leadership
Sheltering and dispersal of essential
workers
Sheltering and evacuation of the ur-
ban population
Stockpiling food and medical supplies
Continuity of Economic Integration of civil defense and eco-
Activity in Wartime nomic mobilization plans
Rapid shutdown of industrial facilities
Permanent and hasty hardening of
installations and equipment
Crisis relocation of economic enter-
prises
Stockpiling reserves of materials
Geographic dispersal of industry
"Liquidation of Conse- Preparation of military and civil de-
quences of Enemy At- fense formations
tack" Training in rescue and recovery
Preparations for distribution of food
and essential supplies
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
second priority is to maintain the continuity of
economic activity in wartime. Much of the action on
this part of the program appears to have been directed
toward providing protection for the work force. The
third priority, "liquidation of the consequences of an
enemy attack," involves the training of a substantial
number of the civilian population in postattack
operations such as administering first aid, clearing
rubble, decontaminating, and providing emergency
repair and restoration of power.
6. The pace of the Soviet civil defense program is
affected on the one hand by commitments of the
leadership to realize progress in peacetime prepara-
tions, and on the other by the reluctance of some
ministries, industrial managers, and local officials to
dedicate scarce resources to what they regard as a
secondary requirement and by apathy toward civil
defense among a large segment of the public. While it
is not a crash effort, the pace of the program increased
in the late 1960s. Civil defense preparations are
continuing, but the extent of implementation of civil
defense measures varies from area to area.
ent in this large organization. But the fact that the
organization exists, despite its problems, and the fact
that progress is being made toward fulfillment of the
objectives of the civil defense program give Soviet civil
defense leaders some confidence in their ability to
function as required. On the whole, the Soviets' view
of their civil defense organizational structure probably
is a favorable one-overall, better than it was before
the military assumed control of it in the early 1970s.
10. The Soviet leaders' emphasis on civil defense
also offers the potential to foster favorable popular
attitudes toward the Soviet system, to demonstrate
leadership concern for the people, and to lend
credibility to calls for vigilance against potential
enemies. Nearly every Soviet citizen receives civil
defense instruction either in school or through training
courses, lectures, and exercises at places of work.
Public attitudes about surviving a nuclear war remain
skeptical, however, and there is evidence that many
people do not take the program seriously. Neverthe-
less, the Soviet people would respond to directions
from civil defense authorities.
Organization
7. A publicly recognized, highly structured, mili-
tary-controlled civil defense organization exists at all
levels of the Soviet government and economy, with the
head of every organization designated "chief of civil
defense." The national organization is led by General
of the Army A. T. Altunin, a Deputy Minister of
Defense. Full-time civil defense staffs exist at each
echelon of the Soviet administrative structure: na-
tional, republic, oblast, city, and rayon, as well as at all
significant economic institutions and enterprises.
8. The operating elements of the Soviet civil
defense program-those that would carry out post-
attack recovery-consist of a large number of military
civil defense units, communications elements, and
civilian civil defense formations. We estimate the
number of full-time civil defense personnel to be more
than 100,000. Counting all civilian units and forma-
tions according to guidelines issued by General Altunin
in 1975, the total number of people in the program
would be upwards of 16 million-a number that
includes many perfunctory participants.
9. The peacetime effectiveness of the civil defense
organization suffers at times from the reluctance of
industrial officials to spare labor and other resources
for civil defense and from misunderstandings between
civil defense officers and Soviet civilians. In wartime,
increased centralization of authority would probably
reduce many of the bureaucratic inefficiencies inher-
Protection of People
11. Leadership. When we speak of measures for
the protection of the leadership, we refer not only to
the top national leadership but also to some 5,000
party and government officials at the national and
republic level; 63,000 party and government leaders at
kray, oblast, city, and urban rayon level; 2,000
managers of key installations; and about 40,000
members of civil defense staffs-about 110,000 people
in all.
12. Throughout the Soviet Union there is a pattern
of shelter construction for this leadership. It consists of
hardened underground shelters near places of work
and relocation sites outside the cities. Hardened
command posts have been constructed near Moscow
and at other sites. Some of these shelters are harder
than those available to the general population. The
pattern of local shelter and relocation sites extends
from government ministries to party headquarters and
oblast and city governments and includes sites for
major industrial enterprises as well. While we do not
know much about exact amounts, it is probable that
these shelters generally have some stockpiles of food,
medicine, protective equipment, communications, and
other supplies for their prospective occupants.
13. The Soviets probably have sufficient command
post shelter space for virtually all the leadership
elements as defined in this paper (that is, about
110,000 people). This estimate takes into account
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
space required for supplies, communications, and
work area. All fixed leadership shelters which have
been identified would be vulnerable to direct attack,
but we assume that alternative arrangements are
available to protect at least the top leadership.
14. Essential Personnel. Soviet plans for protec-
tion of essential personnel include sheltering at their
places of work and rotation of off-shift personnel
outside of likely target areas. The Soviets could
probably shelter about 12 to 24 percent of the total
work force at key industrial installations. This assumes
shelter occupancy factors of 1 square meter or 0.5
square meter per person-factors that are mentioned
in Soviet civil defense manuals. The actual percentage
of on-duty workers that could be sheltered during a
crisis would be considerably higher. Only those
required to maintain essential production would
remain behind to be sheltered. If one-half the total
work force is dispersed, from 24 to 48 percent of the
remainder could be sheltered.
15. Population. Soviet plans call for moving people
to in-place blast shelters as well as for the evacuation
of population from urban target areas. Assessments of
the effectiveness of this part of the Soviet program are
highly dependent on the scenario chosen, but tentative
evaluations are possible. Nationwide the Soviets have
probably constructed more than 15,000 blast-resistant
shelters (including those at economic facilities) that
can protect 10 million to 20 million people, depending
on whether the shelter occupancy factor is 1 or 0.5
square meter per person. This is roughly 10 to 20
percent of the total population in cities of more than
100,000 people. We are confident that more extensive
analysis would result in an upward, not downward,
adjustment of this figure, but we are unable to say by
how much.
16. Some additional protection would be available
to the Soviet population in the form of subway tunnels
and stations. The Moscow subway, for example, has 92
underground stations and more than 150 kilometers of
tunnels. We estimate that between 240,000 and
480,000 persons could be sheltered in the station areas
and four times that number in the track tunnels, for a
total of 17 to 34 percent of the population of the city.
This total is in addition to the number that could be
sheltered in the previously discussed shelters. The five
other operating subway systems in the USSR could
provide an additional increase in the total sheltered
population. However, we have not included subways
in our estimate of total shelter capacity because the
subways could be intended for evacuation and because
of our uncertainty about the existence of life-support
systems in the subways.
17. We estimate that 75 to 90 percent of the people
in urban shelters would be adequately protected from
the blast and other prompt effects of a nuclear attack
that was intended to maximize damage to industrial
and military targets. On the other hand, evacuation of
the bulk of the urban population would be necessary
in order to achieve a marked reduction in the total
number of urban casualties.
18. Soviet writings state that the order to evacuate
cities would be given during the "special period"-a
period of high tension and increased risk of war. This
order would be disseminated to the public via the mass
media. Individual installations would use available
means to notify personnel of the time and place for
staging their evacuation. Factories, offices, schools, or
bus and train stations would serve as embarkation
points. According to Soviet planners, the population
would have only a few hours to prepare for an
evacuation following the order to do so. On their
arrival at assembly points, people would board buses
or trains, or would begin walking toward their
previously assigned relocation areas. Those persons
destined for remote areas would be evacuated first to
intermediate points, where they would rest and be fed
by local authorities. There is no evidence that
evacuation exercises in large cities involving the actual
movement of people have been practiced. There is
evidence of small-scale evacuations and numerous
exercises primarily involving civil defense staffs.
19. Theoretical studies indicate a range of times
necessary to accomplish evacuation, depending pri-
marily on the availability of transportation. For
evacuation employing motorized transport-buses,
trucks, trains, and cars-one to four days would be
required for the last group of evacuees to reach their
relocation area. If the evacuation were carried out on
foot, a week or more would be required to evacuate
the larger cities. Using some combination of motorized
and foot transport would reduce the required time to
less than a week. Unusually severe weather could slow
the pace of evacuation and affect a local decision to
evacuate. On an average, two or three days would
probably be required to evacuate the major portion of
the Soviet urban population.
20. Soviet planning recognizes that the evacuated
portion of the population must be provided fallout
protection. Plans and some materials exist for upgrad-
ing existing structures and constructing hasty shelters
in rural and exurban areas. However, as a practical
matter, the bulk of the evacuated population would
initially have about the level of protection afforded by
upgraded basements and interior rooms of standard
Soviet rural structures. Under ideal circumstances,
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
with a week or so to evacuate urban areas and to
modify existing structures and construct hasty shelters,
the evacuated population could be afforded high levels
of protection.
Protection of the Economy
21. Plans for protecting the Soviet economy include
a number of complementary measures, not all of
which are to be taken at any individual site but which
could apply selectively depending on a site's impor-
tance to a wartime economy. These measures include:
- Sheltering personnel at installations in the event
of attack.
- Dispersal of a portion of the work force during a
period of crisis.
- Emergency relocation of certain installations.
- Geographic dispersal of new installations.
- Hardening of physical structures.
- Hasty hardening measures when an attack is
imminent, such as sandbagging of equipment
and mounding of earth around structures.
- Rapid shutdown of equipment.
22. In their programs to protect the economy, the
Soviets have given first priority to protection of
personnel at economic facilities. Their plans for
protecting the work force are related directly to the
importance of the place of work both in terms of its
output and its contribution to postattack recovery.
Some industries and other enterprises will continue to
function on a two-shift basis, with one shift dispersed
outside of urban areas and the other protected in blast
shelters at or near its installation. Some enterprises are
considered nonessential and will stop operations, and
others will be relocated in time of crisis.
23. The Soviet program for geographic dispersal of
industry is, as far as we can tell, not being
implemented to a significant extent:
- New plants have often been built adjacent to
major existing plants.
- Existing plants and complexes have been ex-
panded in place.
- No effort has been made to expand the distance
between buildings or to locate additions in such a
way as to minimize fire and other hazards in the
event of a nuclear attack.
- Previously open spaces at fuel storage sites have
been filled in with new storage tanks and
processing units.
The value of overall productive capacity has been.
increased proportionately more in previously located.
sites than in new areas, raising even more the
vulnerability of industry to attack.
24. Little evidence exists that would suggest a
comprehensive program for hardening economic
installations. Published Soviet civil defense guidelines
acknowledge the high cost of such measures and
explicitly state that they are to be carried out only
when economically feasible. The Soviets appear to
have given greater emphasis to rapid shutdown of
equipment. The emphasis in this scheme seems to be
on protecting vital equipment and installations from
secondary damage triggered by prompt effects of a
nuclear attack, such as ignition of combustibles, and on
facilitating longer term recovery of installations after
an attack.
25. Overall, the measures the Soviets have taken to
protect their economy would not prevent massive
damage from an attack designed to destroy Soviet
economic facilities. At best, Soviet leaders and civil
defense planners are probably confident that, through
rapid shutdown and emergency repairs by the
surviving work force, limited production at slightly or
moderately damaged sites could be restored soon after
an attack. We have not assessed the Soviets' long-terns
ability to reconstruct their economy.
Postattack Recovery
26. The Soviets characterize recovery activities in
the postattack period as measures for the "liquidation
of the consequences of an enemy attack." We are
uncertain how effective Soviet civil defense would be
in such postattack operations as rescue and recovery,
sustaining the surviving population, and maintaining
government control. There is evidence, however, of
Soviet preparations for the postattack period.
27. Soviet plans require that rural civil defense
staffs and formations prepare for protection of
livestock and growing areas from fallout, with
emphasis on safeguarding the current harvest. In the
USSR, food storage and food processing are activities
performed outside urban areas of greater than 50,000
population. In addition to the normal peacetime levels
of food supplies stored above ground, there are buried
or semiburied food storage facilities outside urban
areas. Also, food storage in the USSR varies seasonally.
We are uncertain how long the surviving population
could be sustained on the undamaged food stores after
an attack.
28. Supplies of petroleum products and coal in the
USSR would last for perhaps a month at prestrike
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
consumption levels. Reduction of these supplies by
nuclear attack and the disruption of local distribution
could be offset by energy conservation measures,
alternate fuel sources, and a decrease in industrial
demand. Sufficient stocks of fuel would therefore
probably be available in the near-term postattack
period to sustain the needs of the surviving population.
29. In the immediate postattack period, treatment
of trauma (wounds and broken bones) and burns
would create the greatest burden on those who possess
specialized medical skills. Treatment for radiation
sickness and relatively minor injuries could be
provided by those who have received civil defense
first-aid training. Nevertheless, Soviet civil defense
medical preparations would be unable to cope with
the levels of casualties which large-scale nuclear attack
would inflict on the civilian population.
30. The Soviets' capacity to continue production in
the postattack period depends not only on how much
of the critical production equipment and essential
work force survive, but also on the on-hand inventories
of raw and processed materials. Attacks against
industry in general would reduce the overall level of
supplies on hand, but it is likely that supplies would be
available at undamaged industrial facilities to allow
production to continue for several weeks following an
attack. The adequacy of strategic reserves for continu-
ing production over a longer period, however, would
depend on the survivability and restoration of
transportation and electric power systems.
31. The distribution of essential supplies in a
postattack period would be a difficult problem for the
Soviets. They have made some effort to ensure
survival of the transportation system through such
measures as preparations to disperse equipment and to
establish stockpiles of rolling stock. They have also
organized civil defense services and formations in
transportation enterprises and have constructed blast
shelters at critical points in the road and rail
transportation systems. Nevertheless, the coordination
of requirements with available supplies and transpor-
tation is a complex problem for Soviet planners even
in peacetime, let alone following a large-scale nuclear
attack on the USSR.
32. The operating elements of the civil defense
program as well as a substantial number of the civilian
population (a number we cannot estimate with
confidence) have received training in rescue and
recovery operations such as administering first aid,
clearing rubble, decontaminating, and providing
emergency repair and restoration of power. With at
least several weeks to build up reserves and distribute
food and fuel, the Soviets could probably provide
adequate supplies to sustain the relocated and
surviving urban population in the period immediately
following a nuclear attack. We have not evaluated the
potential for continuity of the Soviet government or
the Soviets' long-term ability to recover from the
effects of a nuclear attack.
Costs
33. We are unable to estimate the total annual costs
of Soviet civil defense, but we have made a tentative
estimate of the costs of three elements of the program:
full-time civil defense personnel, operation of military
civil defense units, and blast shelter construction.
These three elements cost 400 million rubles in 1976.
This ruble figure, which indicates the burden of these
three elements on the Soviet economy, represents less
than 1 percent of our estimate of Soviet defense
spending. If incurred in the United States, the costs of
these three elements would have been about $2 billion
in 1976. While this dollar figure conveys the
magnitude of the program in familiar terms, it does
not reflect the economic burden to the Soviets. The
higher dollar estimate results primarily from the
greater costs of manpower in the United States than in
the USSR. Manpower represents about 70 percent of
the total dollar costs-that is, about $1.4 billion of the
$2 billion-but only about 40 percent of the ruble
costs. (These estimates should be considered rough
approximations. They are affected by uncertainties
both in the quantitative data on civil defense programs
and in estimates of prices.)
Overall Effectiveness
34. We have analyzed the effects of civil defense on
the levels of damage and casualties the Soviets might
sustain from a nuclear exchange. We have deliberately
chosen to analyze important and sensitive variables-
economic damage and casualties-that can be evalu-
ated quantitatively, and have made arbitrary assump-
tions to deal with the inevitable uncertainties regard-
ing preparations for and conduct of an actual nuclear
exchange. This type of analysis involved trading on the
realism of the war scenario adopted to gain detail in
calculating the consequences-the more detailed our
analysis for purposes of calculations, the less likely the
calculations would apply to another scenario.
35. For purpose of these calculations we have
assumed, for example, that various times ranging from
a few hours to a week or more would be available to
the Soviets to make civil defense preparations, while in
each case opposition forces were assumed to be on no
more than day-to-day alert. In reality, Soviet efforts to
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
maximize civil defense preparations could lead a
potential opponent to place its forces at increased
levels of readiness. We have also assumed that a
retaliatory strike would not deliberately target the
Soviet population but would attack high-value military
and economic targets. This approach tends to establish
a lower limit for the level of casualties such an attack
would inflict on the Soviet Union. In effect, it tends to
present a "worst case" for retaliation, especially if
Soviet population casualties are a major criterion.
36. Protection of People. The extent of losses to
the leadership would be less sensitive to final
preparation time than would be the level of casualties
among essential personnel and the remaining popula-
tion. Casualties among the latter would depend
primarily on the time the Soviets had to prepare for an
attack and whether or not they chose to evacuate their
urban population. The findings of our analysis, based
on the results of the hypothetical retaliatory attack
under the assumptions given above, were as follows:
- With several hours to make final preparations, a
large percentage of leaders and communications
facilities would probably survive.
- A large percentage of the essential work force in
shelters would survive an attack designed to
maximize damage to economic facilities.
- With a minimal period to make final prepara-
tions (a few hours or less), Soviet casualties from
prompt nuclear effects and fallout would be well
over 100 million. More than half the casualties
would be fatalities.
- With a moderate period of preparation (two to
three days) during which the Soviet civil defense
authorities implemented plans for evacuation of
urban areas, the level of casualties and fatalities
could be reduced by more than 50 percent. Most
of this reduction would be due to evacuation, the
remainder to shelters.
- Extended preparation (a week or more) could
further reduce the level of Soviet casualties and
fatalities. With time to complete urban evacua-
tion and to protect the evacuated population,
casualties from prompt nuclear effects and
fallout could be reduced to the low tens of
millions, about half of which would be fatalities.
37. The findings of our analysis serve to point out
the important fact that, in the preparations for an
attack, the critical decision to be made by the Soviet
leaders in terms of sparing the population would be
whether or not to evacuate cities. The cost of not
evacuating could be in the neighborhood of 100
million casualties. There are, of course, many combi-
nations of preparation times and assumptions about
hypothetical retaliatory attacks which would increase
the calculated levels of casualties over those shown
above-for example, a larger attack directed at more
targets (perhaps as a consequence of the opposing
forces' having been placed on increased levels of
readiness), an attack directed against the population,
one which was carried out over an extended period, or
an attack which came while the Soviets were in the
process of evacuating their cities.
38. Protection of the Economy. Those measures
we have described for protection of the economy
could not prevent massive damage. Even with a week
or so of preparations, there would be little reduction in
the amount of prompt damage to facilities inflicted by
blast. The Soviet measures for protecting the work
force, critical equipment, and supplies and for limiting
damage from secondary effects could contribute to
maintaining and restoring production after an attack.
As noted above, however, we have not analyzed the
Soviets' long-term potential for economic recovery.
39. Postattack Recovery. We are unable to make a
confident assessment of how effective Soviet civil
defense would be in rescue and recovery operations
following an attack. Our tentative estimate is that,
given a week or more to make preparations, the
Soviets could accumulate stocks of essential supplies
adequate to sustain the surviving population in the
period immediately following a nuclear attack, but the
distribution of these supplies would be a critical
problem. Under worst conditions with only a few
hours to prepare, the chances would be poor that the
Soviets could effectively support the surviving popula-
tion with supplies and services.
40. The Soviets almost certainly believe their
present civil defenses will improve their ability to
conduct military operations and will enhance the
USSR's chances for survival following a nuclear
exchange. They cannot have confidence, however, in
the degree of protection their civil defense would
afford them, given the many uncertainties attendant
to a nuclear exchange. We do not believe that the
Soviets' present civil defenses would embolden them
deliberately to expose the USSR to a higher risk of
nuclear attack.
Future Trends
41. Programs for protection of the leadership are
solidly established and well advanced. We are
confident that this aspect of the program will continue
to receive attention, with better protection for leaders
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
at all levels. The continued growth in the numbers of
leadership facilities will increase the prospects of
survival for a large number of Soviet leaders.
42. The Soviets will probably continue their em-
phasis on construction of blast shelters in urban areas.
If this results in a pace of construction matching that
since 1968, they would, by 1985, increase the
minimum percentage of population sheltered in urban
areas to an estimated 15 to 30 percent. This increase
takes into account the projected growth in urban
population.
43. Over the next 10 years, the percentage of
population which can be sheltered will increase, but
the absolute number of people that would have to be
evacuated will also increase because of growth in the
urban population. To avoid an increase in the number
of people to be evacuated, the rate of shelter
construction would have to be higher than the rate
currently indicated. Thus, the Soviet leaders' critical
problem of deciding whether to evacuate, and when to
do so, will not change substantially over this period.
They may, however, be able to achieve some
reduction in the time required to evacuate by
increasing the available transportation.
44. Prospects for improvement in measures to
protect the economy against attack are mixed. The
increase in the number of blast shelters at economic
facilities will probably enable the Soviets to shelter a
larger proportion of the work force. But the continuing
concentration of economic investment in previously
existing plant sites, together with an absence of
construction-hardening techniques, suggests that a
future retaliatory attack would be about as destructive
as at present. The protective measures the Soviets are
likely to undertake during the next 10 years would
probably not significantly reduce damage from a
large-scale attack designed to maximize destruction of
economic targets.
45. Present evidence does not suggest that in the
foreseeable future there will be any significant change
in the Soviet leaders' judgment that civil defense
contributes to war-fighting and war-survival capabili-
ties, nor that their uncertainties about its actual
effectiveness would be lessened. Thus, we have no
reason to believe that the Soviet leaders' perception of
the contribution of civil defense to their capabilities
for strategic nuclear conflict will change significantly.
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
BIBLIOGRAPHY
This paper is based on a more lengthy and detailed
memorandum on the same subject, the product of
several thousand hours of research and analysis. The
longer document contains extensive documentation
involving sensitive sources and methods, and therefore
cannot be released for reasons of national security.
There is, however, a substantial body of open-source
literature on Soviet civil defense and related war-
survival subjects. The following bibliography presents
a selection from open sources based on the following
criteria:
- Published in the USSR during the period 1968-
77.
- Intrinsic value of each document's contents.
- Coverage of representative subjects within the
broad field of civil defense.
Not all of the documents included in this bibliography
have been translated into English. Significant sources
in the Russian language are included so that those
readers interested in conducting in-depth research on
Soviet disaster preparedness have an appropriate,
initial, open source of data. The books are arranged by
date of publication, beginning with the oldest:
Belyavskiy, V.A. Civil Defense Is Everyone's Job
(Grazhdanskaya oborona-Vsenarodnoye delo),
Moscow: Atomizdat, 1968.
Chuykov, V.I. Civil Defense in Nuclear-Missile
Warfare (Grazhdanskaya oborona v raketno-yader-
noy voyne), Moscow: Atomizdat, 1968.
Tsivilev, M. What One Must Know About Carrying
Out Rescue and Emergency Repair Work in Area
of Nuclear Destruction (Chto nado znat' o vedenii
spasatel'nykh i neotlozhnykh avariyno-vosstanovi-
tel'nykh rabot v ochage yadernogo porazheniya),
Moscow: DOSAAF, 1968.
Malinin, G.A. From MPVO to Civil Defense (Ot
MPVO k grazhdanskoy oborone), Moscow: Atomiz-
dat, 1969.
Sudakov, A.K. Protection of the Population from
Radioactive Fallout (Zashchita naseleniya of ra-
dioaktivnykh osadkov), Moscow: Atomizdat, 1969.
Shuvyrin, D.I. Protection of the Population Is the
Principal Task of Civil Defense (Zashchita naselen-
iya-Glavnaya zadacha grazhdanskoy oborony),
Moscow: Press Committee, 1970.
Yegorov, P.T. Civil Defense (Grazhdanskaya obo-
rona), Moscow: Vysshaya Shkola, 1970.
Chugasov, A.A. Protection Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Zashchita of oruzhiya massovogo po-
razheniya), Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1971.
Lysenko, A.N. Civil Defense Exercises for the Fifth
Grade (Zanyatiya po grazhdanskoy oborone v
pyatom klasse), Moscow: Prosveshcheniye, 1971.
Kammerer, Yu.Yu. Emergency Work on Public
Service Networks in Area of Nuclear Destruction
(Avariynyye raboty na kommunal'nykh setyakh v
ochage yadernogo porazheniya), Moscow: Stroyiz-
dat, 1972.
Krechetnikov, N.P. Civil Defense at Machine-Tool
Plants (Grazhdanskaya oborona na mashinostroitel'-
nykh predpriyatiyakh), Moscow: Mashinostroyiz-
dat, 1972.
Molodyka, V.I. Radiation Shelters in Rural Areas
(Protivoradiatsionnyye ukrytiya v sel'skoy mest-
nosti), Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1972.
Akimov, N.I. Civil Defense at Agricultural Facilities
(Grazhdanskaya oborona na ob'yektakh sel'skokho-
zyaystvennogo proizvodstva), Moscow: Kolos, 1973.
Balayev, A.S. Firefighting at National Economic
Installations in a Nuclear Environment (Bor'ba s
pozharami na ob'yektakh narodnogo khozyaystva v
usloviyakh yadernogo porazheniya), Moscow:
Voyenizdat, 1973.
Atyunin, N.R. The Use of National Economic
Equipment for Decontamination Purposes (Ispol'zo-
vaniye tekhniki narodnogo khozyaystva dlya tseley
obezoruzhivaniya), Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1974.
Dorofeyev, Yu.P. Engineering Approaches to Protec-
tion Against Modern Means of Destruction (Inzhe-
nernyye meropriyatiya zashchita of sovremyennykh
sredstv porazheniya), Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1974.
Goryelov, L.I. Medical Assistance and Protection of
the Population in Areas of Massive Destruction
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
(Meditsinskaya pomoshch' i zashchita naseleniya v
ochagakh massovogo porazheniya), Moscow: Voyen-
izdat, 1974.
Kondratyuk, K.A. People and Affairs of Civil De-
fense (Lyudi i dela grazhdanskoy oborony), Mos-
cow: Voyenizdat, 1974.
Koz'min, N.D. Protection of the Population From
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Zashchita naseleniya
of oruzhiya massovogo porazheniya), Tashkent:
"Uzbekistan," 1974.
Mikhno, Ye. P. Restoration of Destroyed Facilities
(Vosstanovleniye razrushennykh sooruzheniy), Mos-
cow: Voyenizdat, 1974.
Garanov, V. Cooperation of DOSAAF Committees
With Civil Defense Staffs (Sodeystviye komitetov
DOSAAF shtabam grazhdanskoy oborony), Moscow:
DOSAAF, 1975.
Gromov, A.A. Civil Defense at an Industrial Installa-
tion (Grazhdanskaya oborona promyshlennogo
ob'yekta), Moscow: Atomizdat, 1975.
Kozachok, YA.YA. Civil Defense Yesterday and
Today (Grazhdanskaya oborona vchera i segodnya),
Moscow: Atomizdat, 1975.
Krotkov, F.G. The Medical Service of Civil Defense
(Meditsinskaya sluzhba grazhdanskoy oborony),
Moscow: Meditsina, 1975.
Unknown Author. What Everyone Should Know and
Be Able To Do (Eto dolzhen znat' i umet' kazhdiy),
Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1975.
Zelensky, K.P. Instruction to the Rural Populace on
Protecting Animals From Weapons of Mass De-
struction (Pamyatka sel'skomu naselyeniyu po za-
shchite zhivotnykh of oruzhiya massovogo pora-
zheniya), Moscow: Voyenizdat 1975.
Altunin, A.T. Civil Defense Formations in Action
Against National Disasters (Formirovaniya grazh-
danskoy oborony v bor'be so stikhiynymi bedst-
viyami), Moscow: Stroyizdat, 1976.
Kotlukov, K.G. Civil Defense (Grazhdanskaya obo-
rona), Moscow: Prosveshcheniye, 1976.
Yegorov, P.T. Civil Defense (Grazhdanskaya obo-
rona), Moscow: Vysshaya Shkola, 1977.
Newspapers in Russian:
Izvestiya
Literary Gazette
Pravda
Red Star
Socialist Industry
Soviet Patriot'
Trud
Soviet Journals:
Communist of the Armed Forces
Military Historical Journal
Military Knowledge
New Times
Soviet Military Review
Soviet encyclopedias:
Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. I and II, 1976.
The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Annual Yearbook,
1976.
Other reports covering Soviet news media:
Foreign Broadcast Information Service translations
Joint Publications Research Service translations
Radio Liberty reports
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600380004-9
 Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9
Approved For Release 2007/07/09: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600380004-9