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December 20, 2016
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December 6, 2007
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August 1, 1979
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Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600590002-8 afFf National / Top Secret Foreign Assessment Center Memorandums in Support Of the Vice President's Trip to China ON FILE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY Top Secret N1 M 79-10006f August Copy 3 8 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600590002-8 Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600590002-8 Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600590002-8 Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600590002-8 ? 0 A. China: Domestic Political Overview B. China's Foreign Policy: An Overview C. China: The Economic Outlook D. China's Foreign Economic Relations: Policies and Prospects E. China's Military Posture and Modernization F. Science and Technology in China G. Water Control Projects in China H. Expansion and Modernization of China's Civil Air Service I. Beijing and the Provinces Beijing and the Northeast Provinces Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600590002-8 Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600590002-8 0 People's Republic of China: New Pinyin Romanization U.S.S.R. Alma-Ata .Kashi (Kaahgarl Chengdu r^.. Y Names and boundary rep,,. entat,on are not necessarily authoritative rt4_I 1~ tFv.".~QZ Xi'an (Sip- Province-level Names Conventional Characters Pinyin Pronunciation Conventional Characters Pinyin Anhwei Chekiang Fukien Heilungkiang Honan Hopeh Hunan Hupeh Inner Mongolia Kansu Kiangsi Kiangsu ? Kirin Kwangsi Kwangtung ,l& Anhui ahn - way WI Zhejiang juh - jee ong all Fujian foo - jee en MAUI Heilongjiang hay - loong - jee ong 7PN Henan huh - non milt Hebei huh - bay MA Hunan hoo - nan MAI: Hubei hoo - bay 1;40ti Nei Monggol nay - mung - goo #* Gansu gahn - soo an Jiangxi jee ong - she t-C3K Jiangsu jee ong - su Afk Jilin jee - lynn f ~4 Guangxi g wong - she f`*x Guangdong g wong - doong Kweichow Guizhou Liaoning ill, Liaoning Ningsia Tx Ningxia Peking ltvc Beijing Shanghai Shanghai Shansi Wry Shanxi Shantung Wyn Shandong Shensi mpg Shaanxi Sinkiang A11111 Xinjiang Szechwan RBIq Sichuan Tibet RIK Xizang Tientsin Tianjin Tsinghai #t~ Qinghai Yunnan Yunnan sea P'YO///N N NO ..aG. SEOUL v'F?hlSou h g way - joe lee ow - ping ping - she ah bay - ling shong - hi shahn - she shahn -doong shun - she shin - jee ong ssu - chwan she - dzong to en - jin ching - hi yu oon - nan Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600590002-8 Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600590002-8 ? CHINA: DOMESTIC POLITICAL OVERVIEW Executive Summary 0 The post-Mao era in Chinese politics has seen a major change in the way Chinese leaders handle their personal and political rivalries and the effect these political problems have on the country at large. Gone is the extreme polarization of the late 1960s and early 1970s when leftists, whose primary concern was political struggle, and rightists, whose preoccupation was the problem of nation building, clashed repeatedly. In this earlier period, policies were put into prac- tice with great fanfare and then suddenly shelved; political leaders wielded enormous power and then lost their jobs. Today, there are several leading officials who together form the decisionmaking core. While they differ sharply over how to carry out some policies, they are in general agreement on the broad outlines of China's priorities and policies. Consequently, a basic policy to embark on economic modernization remains fixed de- spite disputes over concrete measures to take. Poli- cies have been scaled down, redirected, or otherwise modified but not reversed. This is true of even such contentious policies as the desanctification of Ma Zedong and the promotion of "democratic" activity. Many officials in the leadership do not work well together, but the emphasis is on limiting an opponent's influence rather than removing him from office. Leaders This memorandum was prepared by the East Asia - Pacific Division of the Office of Political Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center, in response to a National Security Council request. The memorandum has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for China. Questions and comments may be addressed to 25X1 25X11 0 Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600590002-8 Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600590002-8 SECRET who rose to power during the disruptive Cultural Revolu- tion--as well as Deng Xiaoping, a chief victim of that era--are all potential troublemakers who have suffered some reduction in their status. Deng has weathered severe criticism that has diminished somewhat his once-preeminent influence. Other leaders, who have assumed larger roles, have moved to adjust the more controversial aspects of his poli- cies. This process has actually made his policies more durable because they are now more acceptable to a wider constituency. The diffusion of influence within the leadership has resulted in greater political power for leading economic specialists who are responsible for the less ambitious modernization program. Senior victims of the Cultural Revolution other than Deng have also seen their fortunes rise, as has party Chairman Hua Guofeng. Introduction Political life in China has undergone a major trans- formation since the deaths in 1976 of China's two politi- cal giants, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Although the loss of these men was neither sudden nor surprising, Chinese political leaders were ill prepared for the consequences. Zhou's death was followed by a marked upsurge in disruptive political maneuvering by the so- called Gang of Four, extremists headed by Mao's wife who had little interest in the nuts and bolts of running a country but enormous concern with the political re- liability of people in all walks of life. Zhou's chosen successor as Premier, the abrasive but able and popular Deng Xiaoping, was ousted from the leadership in early 1976 and his many supporters were in danger of losing their political lives. This period of heightened political tension came to an abrupt end with Mao's death in September 1976 and the summary arrest a month later of the Gang of Four. The arrest brought to a close more than 10 years of extreme polarization in the leadership and was greeted with national euphoria. It left the remaining leaders, however, somewhat uncertain about how to apportion power among themselves, what to do first to repair the damage Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600590002-8 Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600590002-8 0 ? 0 of more than a decade of instability, and what longer term goals to set. Mao's successor, Hua Guofeng, had been moved into position during Mao's lifetime, and his promotion was perhaps the easiest decision of the im- mediate post-Mao period. But the 56-year-old Hua was an unknown quantity to most older leaders and to the nation at large; no one else in the leadership was vigorous enough or prestigious enough to seize the reins, and there was a growing feeling that China needed the firm and familiar hand of Deng Xiaoping at the Deng's return in July 1977 had significant politi- cal consequences. It marked the end of this "collective"- leadership-by-default as Deng worked, ultimately with mixed success, to become the dominant force. It halted the drift in decisionmaking as the determined and de- cisive Deng quickly outlined sweeping policy changes aimed at vaulting China into the modern industrialized world by the end of the century. Moreover, it ushered in a new kind of political struggle among leaders who are not necessarily on opposite ends of the political spectrum and do not disagree significantly over what China's general goals should be, but who have major differences over how to achieve them. of the disastrous Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s, and of the xenophobic, often impractical and highly politicized-decisions of the past. It would also in- volve the removal of many officials--possibly including The Combatants There are roughly two main lines of argument over how to build the nation. One, advocated by Deng and his followers, demands a detailed and lengthy indictment of past policies and political officials associated with them. This would entail a thorough condemnation of Mao, Hua himself--who made their names during that time. Deng's group believes that this approach is the only way to ensure that his pragmatic policies are not waylaid in the future by those who remain committed to the principles of the Cultural Revolution--the su- premacy of political reliability over technical exper- tise, the corrosive effect of material rather than ideological incentives, a distrust of foreigners and foreign practices and of intellectuals and any other Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600590002-8 9 Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600590002-8 group not necessarily wedded to the tenets of Commu- nist ideology. Deng seems to believe that only by con- demning the past can an atmosphere be created in which people will feel free to experiment boldly with new techniques and policies in order to further the primary goal of modernizing the economy. Deng's opponents, including but by no means re- stricted to Hua, fear the disruptive effects of so sharp a break with the past. They put a premium on political stability now as the only hope for creating an environ- ment conducive to steady economic growth. A purge of the few top officials and the many middle and lower level officials who were promoted during the Cultural Revolution, they believe, would paralyze people with fear and prevent them from taking any initiatives in the economic sphere. A denunciation of Mao and of the recent past would have a destabilizing effect, casting doubt on the legitimacy of all of the late Chairman's policies, including his selection of Hua as his suc- cessor, and creating confusion about the legitimacy of This group recognizes, as Deng does, the residual influence of the Cultural Revolution and all it repre- sented. Unlike Deng, it wants to enlist the support of the true believers of the Cultural Revolution by allowing them another chance, by not calling into ques- tion everything they believe in, and indeed by acknowledg- in policy changes or the ouster of individual leaders, it has caused modifications of policies and the reduc- The shifts in policy in the two years since Deng's return have occurred when one or the other group held sway. Significantly, these were not the sharp twists and turns of the last decade, when leaders were in funda- mental disagreement over the direction of policies, but were modifications, adjustments, matters of degree. The wisdom of trying to modernize the economy has not been at issue, nor has a greater involvement of the outside world in order to achieve modernization. But even over the relatively narrow issue of how to implement a par- ticular policy, or how far to push it, the Chinese lead- ership, with its penchant for internecine struggle, has found much to argue over. If this has not resulted ing that some policies of that era were correct. tion of the political power of several leaders. A-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83RO0184R002600590002-8 Approved For Release 2007/12/06: CIA-RDP83R00184R002600590002-8 OL' %_L