MEMORANDUMS IN SUPPORT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83R00184R002600590002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 193
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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afFf National / Top Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Memorandums in Support
Of the Vice President's
Trip to China
ON FILE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
Top Secret
N1 M 79-10006f
August
Copy
3 8 25X1
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A. China: Domestic Political Overview
B. China's Foreign Policy: An Overview
C. China: The Economic Outlook
D. China's Foreign Economic Relations: Policies
and Prospects
E. China's Military Posture and Modernization
F. Science and Technology in China
G. Water Control Projects in China
H. Expansion and Modernization of China's
Civil Air Service
I. Beijing and the Provinces
Beijing and the Northeast Provinces
Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia
Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan
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People's Republic of China: New Pinyin Romanization
U.S.S.R.
Alma-Ata
.Kashi
(Kaahgarl
Chengdu
r^.. Y
Names and boundary rep,,. entat,on
are not necessarily authoritative
rt4_I
1~ tFv.".~QZ
Xi'an
(Sip-
Province-level Names
Conventional Characters Pinyin Pronunciation Conventional Characters Pinyin
Anhwei
Chekiang
Fukien
Heilungkiang
Honan
Hopeh
Hunan
Hupeh
Inner Mongolia
Kansu
Kiangsi
Kiangsu
? Kirin
Kwangsi
Kwangtung
,l& Anhui ahn - way
WI Zhejiang juh - jee ong
all Fujian foo - jee en
MAUI Heilongjiang hay - loong - jee ong
7PN Henan huh - non
milt Hebei huh - bay
MA Hunan hoo - nan
MAI: Hubei hoo - bay
1;40ti Nei Monggol nay - mung - goo
#* Gansu gahn - soo
an Jiangxi jee ong - she
t-C3K Jiangsu jee ong - su
Afk Jilin jee - lynn
f ~4 Guangxi g wong - she
f`*x Guangdong g wong - doong
Kweichow
Guizhou
Liaoning
ill,
Liaoning
Ningsia
Tx
Ningxia
Peking
ltvc
Beijing
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shansi
Wry
Shanxi
Shantung
Wyn
Shandong
Shensi
mpg
Shaanxi
Sinkiang
A11111
Xinjiang
Szechwan
RBIq
Sichuan
Tibet
RIK
Xizang
Tientsin
Tianjin
Tsinghai
#t~
Qinghai
Yunnan
Yunnan
sea
P'YO///N N NO
..aG. SEOUL
v'F?hlSou h
g way - joe
lee ow - ping
ping - she ah
bay - ling
shong - hi
shahn - she
shahn -doong
shun - she
shin - jee ong
ssu - chwan
she - dzong
to en - jin
ching - hi
yu oon - nan
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CHINA: DOMESTIC POLITICAL OVERVIEW
Executive Summary
0
The post-Mao era in Chinese politics has seen a
major change in the way Chinese leaders handle their
personal and political rivalries and the effect these
political problems have on the country at large.
Gone is the extreme polarization of the late 1960s and
early 1970s when leftists, whose primary concern was
political struggle, and rightists, whose preoccupation
was the problem of nation building, clashed repeatedly.
In this earlier period, policies were put into prac-
tice with great fanfare and then suddenly shelved;
political leaders wielded enormous power and then lost
their jobs.
Today, there are several leading officials who
together form the decisionmaking core. While they differ
sharply over how to carry out some policies, they are
in general agreement on the broad outlines of China's
priorities and policies. Consequently, a basic policy
to embark on economic modernization remains fixed de-
spite disputes over concrete measures to take. Poli-
cies have been scaled down, redirected, or otherwise
modified but not reversed. This is true of even such
contentious policies as the desanctification of Ma
Zedong and the promotion of "democratic" activity.
Many officials in the leadership do not work well
together, but the emphasis is on limiting an opponent's
influence rather than removing him from office. Leaders
This memorandum was prepared by the East Asia - Pacific Division of
the Office of Political Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center,
in response to a National Security Council request. The memorandum
has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for
China. Questions and comments may be addressed to
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SECRET
who rose to power during the disruptive Cultural Revolu-
tion--as well as Deng Xiaoping, a chief victim of that
era--are all potential troublemakers who have suffered
some reduction in their status.
Deng has weathered severe criticism that has
diminished somewhat his once-preeminent influence.
Other leaders, who have assumed larger roles, have moved
to adjust the more controversial aspects of his poli-
cies. This process has actually made his policies more
durable because they are now more acceptable to a wider
constituency.
The diffusion of influence within the leadership
has resulted in greater political power for leading
economic specialists who are responsible for the less
ambitious modernization program. Senior victims of
the Cultural Revolution other than Deng have also seen
their fortunes rise, as has party Chairman Hua Guofeng.
Introduction
Political life in China has undergone a major trans-
formation since the deaths in 1976 of China's two politi-
cal giants, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Although the
loss of these men was neither sudden nor surprising,
Chinese political leaders were ill prepared for the
consequences. Zhou's death was followed by a marked
upsurge in disruptive political maneuvering by the so-
called Gang of Four, extremists headed by Mao's wife
who had little interest in the nuts and bolts of running
a country but enormous concern with the political re-
liability of people in all walks of life. Zhou's
chosen successor as Premier, the abrasive but able and
popular Deng Xiaoping, was ousted from the leadership
in early 1976 and his many supporters were in danger
of losing their political lives.
This period of heightened political tension came
to an abrupt end with Mao's death in September 1976 and
the summary arrest a month later of the Gang of Four.
The arrest brought to a close more than 10 years of
extreme polarization in the leadership and was greeted
with national euphoria. It left the remaining leaders,
however, somewhat uncertain about how to apportion power
among themselves, what to do first to repair the damage
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of more than a decade of instability, and what longer
term goals to set. Mao's successor, Hua Guofeng, had
been moved into position during Mao's lifetime, and his
promotion was perhaps the easiest decision of the im-
mediate post-Mao period. But the 56-year-old Hua was
an unknown quantity to most older leaders and to the
nation at large; no one else in the leadership was
vigorous enough or prestigious enough to seize the
reins, and there was a growing feeling that China needed
the firm and familiar hand of Deng Xiaoping at the
Deng's return in July 1977 had significant politi-
cal consequences. It marked the end of this "collective"-
leadership-by-default as Deng worked, ultimately with
mixed success, to become the dominant force. It halted
the drift in decisionmaking as the determined and de-
cisive Deng quickly outlined sweeping policy changes
aimed at vaulting China into the modern industrialized
world by the end of the century. Moreover, it ushered
in a new kind of political struggle among leaders who
are not necessarily on opposite ends of the political
spectrum and do not disagree significantly over what
China's general goals should be, but who have major
differences over how to achieve them.
of the disastrous Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s,
and of the xenophobic, often impractical and highly
politicized-decisions of the past. It would also in-
volve the removal of many officials--possibly including
The Combatants
There are roughly two main lines of argument over
how to build the nation. One, advocated by Deng and
his followers, demands a detailed and lengthy indictment
of past policies and political officials associated with
them. This would entail a thorough condemnation of Mao,
Hua himself--who made their names during that time.
Deng's group believes that this approach is the
only way to ensure that his pragmatic policies are not
waylaid in the future by those who remain committed
to the principles of the Cultural Revolution--the su-
premacy of political reliability over technical exper-
tise, the corrosive effect of material rather than
ideological incentives, a distrust of foreigners and
foreign practices and of intellectuals and any other
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group not necessarily wedded to the tenets of Commu-
nist ideology. Deng seems to believe that only by con-
demning the past can an atmosphere be created in which
people will feel free to experiment boldly with new
techniques and policies in order to further the primary
goal of modernizing the economy.
Deng's opponents, including but by no means re-
stricted to Hua, fear the disruptive effects of so sharp
a break with the past. They put a premium on political
stability now as the only hope for creating an environ-
ment conducive to steady economic growth. A purge of
the few top officials and the many middle and lower
level officials who were promoted during the Cultural
Revolution, they believe, would paralyze people with
fear and prevent them from taking any initiatives in
the economic sphere. A denunciation of Mao and of the
recent past would have a destabilizing effect, casting
doubt on the legitimacy of all of the late Chairman's
policies, including his selection of Hua as his suc-
cessor, and creating confusion about the legitimacy of
This group recognizes, as Deng does, the residual
influence of the Cultural Revolution and all it repre-
sented. Unlike Deng, it wants to enlist the support
of the true believers of the Cultural Revolution by
allowing them another chance, by not calling into ques-
tion everything they believe in, and indeed by acknowledg-
in policy changes or the ouster of individual leaders,
it has caused modifications of policies and the reduc-
The shifts in policy in the two years since Deng's
return have occurred when one or the other group held
sway. Significantly, these were not the sharp twists
and turns of the last decade, when leaders were in funda-
mental disagreement over the direction of policies, but
were modifications, adjustments, matters of degree. The
wisdom of trying to modernize the economy has not been
at issue, nor has a greater involvement of the outside
world in order to achieve modernization. But even over
the relatively narrow issue of how to implement a par-
ticular policy, or how far to push it, the Chinese lead-
ership, with its penchant for internecine struggle,
has found much to argue over. If this has not resulted
ing that some policies of that era were correct.
tion of the political power of several leaders.
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