SUDAN: AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS

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Sudan: Agricultural Problems
Confidential
NESA 82-10501
September 1982
414
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
Sudan: Agricultural Problems
The author of this paper is
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to
the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
This report has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council.
Confidential
NESA 82-10501
September 1982
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Confidential
Overview
Information available
as of I August 1982
was used in this report.
iii Confidential
NESA 82-10501
September 1982
Sudan: Agricultural Problems
The dismal performance of Sudan's agricultural sector has been a major
factor in the pronounced deterioration of that country's economy since
1976 and is one of the most critical problems affecting the stability of
President Nimeiri's regime. As agricultural production has dropped in
recent years, food imports have increased sharply, causing further hard-
ships for the financially strapped regime.
The reasons for the decline in production are many. Among the most
important are:
? Severe foreign exchange shortages that have restricted the purchase of
vital materials and supplies for agriculture.
? Mismanagement of Sudan's large agricultural projects.
? Inadequate transportation and communications infrastructure.
? Insufficient labor pool.
The Sudanese Government itself is to blame for many of these problems,
and only with sustained effort and better planning will the country
eventually be able to exploit fully its promising natural resources and
realize its agricultural potential. Government officials have begun to take
some corrective measures. They have instituted major changes in the
irrigated projects to improve incentives for tenant farmers and increase
production. In coordination with the World Bank, Sudan is attempting to
formulate policies for agricultural and industrial recovery and is giving
particular attention to infrastructure projects such as transport and power
supply.
Far-reaching structural improvements still must be made. A primary
constraint is the lack of sufficient foreign exchange, yet in a "Catch-22"
situation, alleviating the foreign exchange shortage will depend in large
part on increasing agricultural production. Therefore, Sudan's agricultural
problems seem likely to persist into the next century and will constitute yet
another serious challenge for Nimieri's already hard-pressed regime.
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Figure 1
L Desert
Semidesert
Low-Rainfall Savannah Woodland
High-Rainfall Savannah Woodland
LLjf] Montane
flo Flood Region
Major Irrigation Scheme
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Sudan: Agricultural Problems
Agriculture provides a livelihood, directly or indirect-
ly, for 80 percent of Sudan's population of some 20
million and accounts for some 40 percent of the gross
domestic product (GDP) and 95 percent of exports.'
(See figure 2.) GDP fell in the last three years as a
result of a serious decline in agricultural production.
This has led to serious balance-of-payments problems
that further retard economic development (see table
1).
Sudan's natural resources appear to favor the attain-
ment of agricultural self-sufficiency. Some 80 million
hectares out of a total area of approximately 235
million hectares are considered available for cultiva-
tion. At present only 8 million are being farmed.
Three major rivers traverse Sudan and can be tapped
to irrigate additional acreage.
Sudan's hope of achieving agricultural self-sufficiency
has always been just beyond reach. Over the past
decade, Sudan actually moved away from this objec-
tive. Agricultural production has fallen, and expendi-
tures for food imports have increased sharply; in
1981 /82 Sudan's food import bill was twice that in
1977/78. As a result, the foreign trade deficit in 1981
amounted to $1.1 billion compared with $600 million
in 1978
Production of cotton, the major cash and export crop,
was down last year almost 20 percent from 1977/78.
Mismanagement of irrigated projects along with a
myriad of problems ranging from an overvalued ex-
change rate to pest infestation caused the reduced
output. Moreover, a severe shortage of foreign ex-
change has taken a toll on agricultural investment,
maintenance of irrigation systems, and imports of
badly needed agricultural supplies and equipment
Types of Cultivation
Sudan's agricultural sector is characterized by its
duality (see appendix A). Modern capital-intensive
irrigation and mechanized activities coexist with tra-
Table 1
Sudan: Gross Domestic Product, Employment,
and Productivity, by Sector
Gross domestic production
(million 1978 LS a)
1,911.8
2,064.8
2,531.7
Industry
265.3
284.6
342.5
Other
800.5
887.7
1,236.8
Employment
(thousand persons)
7,468.0
8,337.0
9,467.0
Agriculture
Industry
597.0
834.0
947.0
Other
747.0
417.0
1,136.0
Productivity
(GDP 1978 LS a per
worker)
256.0
248.0
267.0
Agriculture
138.0
126.0
129.0
Industry
444.0
341.0
361.0
Other
1,071.0
2,129.0
1,088.0
ditional rain-fed subsistence farming. About 1.7 mil-
lion hectares are covered by irrigated schemes, 2.3
million hectares are under large-scale mechanized
systems, and over 4 million hectares are farmed by
traditional methods. The major irrigated crops are
cotton, peanuts, and wheat. The predominant crops in
the mechanized rain-fed areas include sorghum, sesa-
me, and cotton. Gum arabic, millet, sesame, and
peanuts are grown on the traditional farms (see
figure 3).
Traditional Rainfed Farming
Traditional rainfed farming is the largest subsector in
terms of acreage and farm population, but it provides
only one-third of total agricultural output. An esti-
mated 3 million people or almost 15 percent of the
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nation's population live on traditional farms. Tradi-
tional farms-characterized by their small size of 3 to
5 hectares and cultivation by hand tools-predomi-
nate in the west and are found to a lesser extent in the
south, east, and central regions of Sudan.
Traditional farming is the domain of the private
sector, but the government influences its development
through pricing policy, the level of agricultural serv-
ices provided, and development projects. Although
supply and demand ostensibly determine pricing, the
relevant price for most traditional farmers is the
government's fixed minimum price.
Farmers generally grow grain for their own consump-
tion and one or two cash crops. This subsector ac-
counts for all the millet grown in the country, 40
percent of the sorghum, 70 percent of the sesame, 66
percent of the peanuts, all of the gumarabic, and 5
percent of the cotton. Overall, production in the
traditional sector has stagnated over the past decade
despite a slight increase in the area under cultivation.
Modern Agriculture
The mechanized rainfed sector in conjunction with
the irrigated sector accounts for 65 percent of agricul-
tural production. Although large-scale mechanized
rainfed farming was begun by the government in the
mid-1940s, it is now largely practiced by the private
sector. The increase in world commodity prices after
1972 provided the major stimulus for the private
sector to move into this area. The majority of the
mechanized farms are located in Darfur, Kordofan,
and the Central Region. At present the mechanized
farms are hampered by deteriorating soil fertility and
decreasing yields resulting from years of monocrop-
ping.
The irrigated projects consist of a number of large
consolidated areas owned by the government and
managed by public boards that rely on tenant farmers
to work small individual plots. The approximately
2 million hectares under irrigation are mainly along
the banks of the Nile and its tributaries and are
worked by approximately 100,000 farmers. The larg-
est of the projects is the Gezira, which covers about 1
million hectares (see appendix B).
Historically, these projects were conceived for the
cultivation of cotton as the only cash crop. Two other
crops were grown for subsistence purposes-usually a
crop for fodder to complement cotton in the rotation
of the land and a cereal crop for marginal land. This
changed dramatically in the mid-1970s when the
government mandated new cropping patterns that
encouraged a switch from cotton to wheat.
ing, and the tenants doing the work.
The relationships among the government, the man-
agement board, and the tenants on such projects are
highly complex. For example, in the Gezira project
the management board is responsible for overall coor-
dination, determination of cropping patterns, and
provision of seed, fertilizers, and equipment. More
importantly, the board handles the marketing of the
cotton crop and extends credit to tenant farmers. The
government supervises the operation of the board and
provides irrigation and power services. The tenants
are in charge of field preparation, planting, cultiva-
tion, and harvesting. In theory a partnership, the
system has in fact become a hierarchical arrangement
with the government setting policy, the board manag-
Crop Performance
Production of cotton, the primary cash and export
crop, has dropped sharply in recent years largely
because policy changes have reduced the acreage
under cultivation. At the same time, pest, seed, and
water problems have resulted in yields declining from
52 kilograms per hectare in the beginning of the
1970s to 25 kilograms per hectare now. Consequently,
cotton output over the past three years has been only
about half the 1973/74 level. With a slight increase in
plantings and an expected modest improvement in
yields, this year's (1981/82) crop could be approxi-
mately 800,000 bales. Although this is a substantial
improvement over last year's production-the worst in
20 years-of 445,000 bales, cotton production re-
mains far below the level common in the early 1970s
(see figure 4).
Oilseeds, mainly peanuts and sesame, are the next
most important export crops (see table 2). Since 1978
the area under peanut cultivation has expanded in
both the rainfed areas and in the irrigation projects at
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Table 2
Sudan: Major Agricultural Exports a
a Fiscal year (July-June).
b Projected.
the expense of cotton cultivation. Large increases in
output during the past three seasons in the rainfed
areas caused severe bottlenecks in transportation and
processing, however, and led western farmers to re-
duce the area under peanut cultivation. A shortage of
labor, especially at harvest time, is another factor
limiting increased oilseed production.
Sorghum is a major food crop for Sudan and in recent
years has become an increasingly important export
commodity as a result of Saudi Arabia's willingness to
buy expensive Sudanese sorghum. The 1981/82 crop
is estimated at over 3 million tons, a historic high and
well above the 2.1 million tons reported for 1980/81.
The size of the current crop stems from record high
prices paid to producers last season, which led to an
extremely large number of plantings, as well as from
sufficient rainfall. This level of production means that
Sudan will face the unprecedented problem of dispos-
ing of a surplus of 700,000 to 1 million tons of
sorghum.
Saudi Arabia, Sudan's major purchaser of sorghum,
has agreed to buy some 300,000 tons at approximately
$370 per ton, a price above international levels. The
remainder will probably be put into storage. Sudan
has failed to develop new markets because its sor-
ghum is not competitive in world markets at the price
demanded by Khartoum. The surplus is causing a
downward slide in prices, and, if this trend continues,
plantings for next year's crop are likely to be reduced.
Wheat production has dropped since 1977/78, caus-
ing a critical situation for the country's mills and
forcing some to close. The low production level was
caused by a shortage of fertilizer, which forced a
cutback in the planned wheat acreage on irrigated
land. The shortage of wheat reached crisis proportions
last February, and Khartoum was obliged to request
wheat from Egypt. Cairo agreed to divert wheat it
had purchased from the United States once it was
assured of reimbursement from Sudanese commercial
or PL-480 wheat supplies.
Effect of Government Policies on Production
The government's past and present development strat-
egy has concentrated on the modern sector. Agricul-
tural services, including research activities, extension
services, and crop and fire protection have not been
available to the traditional sector. Most traditional
farmers do not benefit from such government pro-
grams because resources are in short supply and
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Figure 2
Sudan: Agricultural Trade and Share of Exports and Imports'
a Crop year ending 31 May.
b Preliminary.
C Projected.
transportation problems make it impossible to get to
areas of need on a timely basis. Several Sudanese
agricultural experts argue that traditional agriculture
may be a more cost-effective avenue to economic
growth and are advocating that more resources be
allocated to that sector. Ninety percent of Sudan's
export proceeds, however, are derived from the irri-
gated projects, and their success is vitally important to
the economy. These projects have been poorly man-
aged in the past, and major changes are being made in
an effort to combat decreasing yields.
The problems in the irrigated projects began in 1974
when the government, attempting to turn Sudan into
the breadbasket of the Arab world to prevent the
Arabs from being hurt by a possible Western food
boycott, started expanding the acreage devoted to
wheat and sorghum. The shift was also a reaction to
the sharp rise jr world prices for cereals and reflected
a desire to reduce t?:e cotu:ntry's dependence on cotton.
As a result of the change in government policy, the
VV
80
1 Exports
60
40
20
I
i
I
{
Imports
area of land in the Gezira project planted in cotton
fell by about one-fourth between the 1974/75 and
1978/79 cropping seasons.
The change in the cropping pattern, however, was not
accompanied by necessary adjustments in the finan-
cial relationship between the management boards and
the tenants. The projects, therefore, have been ham-
pered by financial disincentives to tenants and a
deteriorating capital and managerial structure. The
accounting system established in most projects aver-
aged out costs of production (for example, land prepa-
ration, plowing, fertilizing, spraying, and irrigating)
and profits in such a manner that tenants with higher-
than-average cotton yields bore a disproportionate
share of fixed costs and paid a disproportionate share
of profits to the government. On the other hand,
tenants who cultivated alternative crops paid smaller
fixed costs and reaped the entire proceeds of crop
sales.
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Figure 3
Sudan: Basic Food Productiona
Wheat
Sesame
The disincentives against cotton cultivation were com-
pounded by the exemption of other crops from any
charges for water delivery, administration, and return
on capital investment. In addition, until 1981 cotton
export proceeds were converted at the official ex-
change rate of 50 piastres to the dollar, while other
export crops benefited from the free market rate of 80
piastres to the dollar.
The decline in cotton acreage diminished the revenue
base for the management boards and, together with
steadily rising costs, led to operating deficits that were
financed by government borrowing. Moreover, be-
cause Sudan's international competitive advantage
remains with cotton, the shift from cotton production
resulted in an inefficient use of resources and reduced
the country's economic potential.
The diversification strained the capacity of the water
delivery system. A larger amount of water was re-
quired from existing systems, necessitating greater
control and more careful use of resources. Peanuts
and wheat, for example, must be irrigated at the same
time as cotton during the period from November to
January. The intensive cropping pattern also meant
almost virtual year-round use of canals. Silt buildup
and weed infestation in some canals have seriously
limited water flow, and production has suffered ac-
cordingly. Maintenance is insufficient because the
foreign exchange shortage limits the government's
ability to acquire spare parts. The situation should
improve somewhat as pumps and other parts are
repaired and replaced using World Bank funding.
Beginning in 1978/79, the authorities moved to cor-
rect cost/price distortions. The export tax on cotton
was lowered, aid the exchange rate applicable to
cotton export proceeds was adjusted to place cotton on
a par with other exports. Land and water charges for
crops other than cotton were finally introduced in
early 1980 after delays caused by strong tenant
opposition
In 1981 the government began transferring receipts
for cotton exports from the then official rate (50
piastres to the dollar) to the free market rate (80
piastres to the dollar). This gave farmers an immedi-
ate 60-percent rise in income. For the first time
farmers were paid immediately for their crops rather
than having to wait for earnings to be collected from
international cotton sales (previously they sometimes
received their shares six months to a year after their
cotton had been delivered to the gins).
Starting with the 1981/82 agricultural season, the
accounting system was adjusted so that each farmer
bears his share of the cost of production and reaps full
benefit from his effort. The previous profit-sharing
system has been replaced by a system of cost recovery
from each crop through the imposition of charges for
water delivery and land, project administration, and a
return on capital investment. The level of these
charges, which has been imposed on all crops, is based
on the different watering requirements of each crop.
The net effect of these measures will be to increase
tenant returns from cotton cultivation as well as to
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raise the cost of production of noncotton crops, there-
by rationalizing the relative cost structure of alterna-
tive crops and the incentive patterns facing the tenant.
with better record keeping and control. At present the
project board does not have the technical capacity to
assess which tenants have received specific services,
and costs are calculated on a rough basis only.
Moreover, the additional manpower and bureaucracy
Sudan's main experience to date with the individual necessary to run an individual account system will be
account system has been at the Rahad project. If very costly.
Rahad is taken as a model, the system will only work
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To strengthen the administration of the projects, the
Public Agricultural Production Corporation, which
managed nine irrigated projects, was dissolved and its
components reconstituted as independent corporations
during the 1980/81 agricultural season. This move,
whose full effects will be manifested during the
1981/82 season, was taken in order to decentralize
management and increase responsiveness to individual
project requirements.
The realignment of the cost and price structure and
the reorientation of the farmer's incentive pattern
toward cotton will not by themselves result in dramat-
ic increases in cotton production. Rather, the full
effects must await the completion of the physical
rehabilitation of the agricultural projects and the
restoration of their ability to deliver proper services to
the farmer. In addition, he
farmers have developed a psychological arrier
against cotton since the crop was traditionally used by
the government as a tax collection and debt recovery
instrument. This attitude cannot be reversed abruptly.
Further Constraints on Production
Severe constraints on increased agricultural produc-
tion include poor seeds, pre- and post-harvest pests,
soil depletion, inadequate labor, insufficient irriga-
tion, desert encroachment, and inadequate transporta-
tion and communication. Improved and treated seeds
have not been introduced for most crops in over a
decade. As a result, farmers find it uneconomical to
plant some crops for commercial sale because poor
seeds produce unacceptable yields. Traditional farm-
ers, for example, no longer plant millet for other than
personal use.
Some research has recently begun to improve seed
quality. The Agricultural Research Corporation has
been conducting research on sorghum seeds, and a Labor shortages during peak demand periods are
4-hectare seed propagation farm to develop better common, and in some cases crops have spoiled before
millet seeds began operation in 1981. Seed propaga- they could be harvested. Labor shortages exist mainly
tion units in the Ministry of Agriculture do not because the needs are enormous-a half million la-
produce sufficient quantities to meet national require- borers are needed on the Gezira project alone-and
ments. better opportunities in neighboring states have led to
Sudan's transportation problems are formidable.
Shortages of vehicles, fuel, and spare parts are wide-
spread and constant. With only 2,400 kilometers of
paved roads and an inadequate rail system, Sudan
faces the task of bridging the immense distance
between production centers and consumption and
export points. Without the elimination or alleviation
of the country's severe transport bottlenecks, other
improvements may be in vain (see figure 5).
Desert encroachment and cropland degradation are
serious problems as well. Because much of the country
is semidesert, it is susceptible to pressures from
overgrazing and deforestation. The Sahelian drought
of the early 1970s was disastrous, and, since then,
population and livestock numbers have exceeded the
carrying capacity of the land. It is estimated that in
some regions the desert is advancing by about 6 to 7
kilometers per year. Some sections in northern Darfur
and northern Kordofan are now wasteland.
Overgrazing, the cutting of trees for firewood, and
overcultivation in marginal lands make it difficult to
reverse desert encroachment. The Sudanese Govern-
ment is aware of the need to check further encroach-
ment, but this goal conflicts with the immediate
objective of increasing production of major export
crops. Future increases in agricultural production,
however, will be even more difficult if there are
serious losses of crop and rangeland through desert
encroachment.
Both pre- and post-harvest pests substantially reduce
production of many crops. A senior agricultural offi-
cial estimated that 25 percent of the sorghum and
sesame crop in the traditional sector is lost because of
the ravages of pests. Losses can be kept to a minimum
when officials of the Crop Protection Department
reach the endangered areas, but the transportation
problems noted above prevent the effective use of
their services.
mass migration. At least one irrigation project has
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Figure 5. Camels are used to
transport bags of cotton.
purchased mechanical cottonpickers in hopes of allevi-
ating such labor problems. The switch to machines is
hindered by the shortage of funds to purchase equip-
ment, fuel, and spare parts.
Credit practices constitute another constraint on in-
creased agricultural production. Many traditional
farmers earn insufficient cash to cover requirements
during the winter and planting costs the following
season. As a result, they must obtain credit from a
village merchant who takes a portion of the crops in
repayment. This can lead to permanent indebtedness
to the merchant. Even if other credit sources were
available and the farmer held title to his entire crop,
he still would lack a means of getting it to market.
Transport is generally provided by a wholesaler who
seldom pays above the government floor price. The
result is a small return to the farmer and limited
incentive to cultivate.
The credit practices of the large projects are equally
onerous for the government. The prevailing pattern
has been for tenant farmers to obtain advances
against cotton and peanut crops but not to repay
them, because such advances are often greater than
tenant earnings. This, in turn, has caused severe cash
flow difficulties for the project management boards.
Agricultural Assistance
In March 1980 the World Bank approved an Agricul-
tural Rehabilitation Program for Sudan. The program
involves an International Development Association
credit of $65 million and a European Community
Special Action Fund credit of $11 million. Disburse-
ment of the two credits was not started until late
1981. The funds were used mainly to buy tractors,
harvesters, pumps, and spare parts for the major
irrigation projects. The aid is mainly stopgap assist-
ance and not developmental in nature. In January
1981 Sudan and the Bank also agreed on the outline
of a three-year investment program.
The World Bank sponsored an aid donors' meeting in
May 1982 to discuss details of the 1981 program
committing Sudan to policies necessary for agricultur-
al and industrial recovery. Particular importance was
attached to infrastructure projects including commu-
nications, transport, and power supply.
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Sudan has been a major benefactor of agricultural
assistance from the Arab world. In 1977 the Kuwait-
based Arab Fund for Economic and Social Develop-
ment set up a special agency, the Arab Authority for
Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID),
to direct funds for the development projects. It was
envisaged that approximately $6 billion would be
spent during 1976-85. The aim was to develop large-
scale plantations, mechanization, and infrastructure
in such a way that by 1985 Sudan could provide the
Arab world with 15 percent of its wheat requirements,
42 percent of its vegetable oil, and 20 percent of its
sugar. These ambitious plans have fallen victim to
Sudan's infrastructural bottlenecks and severe eco-
nomic problems, however, and AAAID has launched
only four out of 100 proposed projects.
Some wealthy Arabs also have been impressed by
Sudan's agricultural potential. One, Saudi Prince
Muhammad Al Faisal, became the patron of a major
project that opened in 1981, 15 years after its incep-
tion. Despite Al Faisal's interest and his commitment
to extend approximately $3 million in aid, the project
is plagued by severe difficulties, and no profits are
anticipated before 1983/84.
Sudan is also receiving considerable PL-480 food aid
from the United States-$25 million is planned for
FY 1982, and $30 million is proposed for FY 1983.
This aid, however, has proved to be a two-edged
sword. Sudan sells the wheat at below cost, which
results in distorted consumption and growing patterns,
domestic budget problems, and higher imports. Low
prices for imported products have dampened domestic
production incentives for these commodities. Mean-
while, subsidies cost Sudan an estimated $325 million
in fiscal 1981. In an effort to eliminate these problems
and to fulfill an International Monetary Fund re-
quirement imposed under its economic reform pro-
gram, Sudan raised wheat prices 33 percent in April.
They were increased an additional 15 percent in July,
and the government is planning further price hikes to
totally eliminate the subsidies. The final reduction in
subsidies was scheduled for the end of August.
Outlook
President Nimeiri's moderate, pro-Western regime is
confronted by a formidable array of problems that
threaten the stability of the government. These in-
clude persistent tensions between the northern and
southern regions of the country, a Libyan-supported
subversive campaign aimed at toppling Nimeiri's gov-
ernment, and a deeply troubled economy. One of the
most serious aspects of the latter problem is the sharp
drop in agricultural production over the past several
years. Government mismanagement is largely to
blame, but even with more prudent and realistic
planning, significant improvements will take time and
patience.
Sudan has neither a large pool of labor nor the
resources for capital-intensive farming, either of
which is essential for large-scale agricultural produc-
tion. It is relatively thinly populated and loses many
workers because of the greater opportunities and
higher wages available in neighboring oil-producing
states. Sudan's ability to turn to increased mechaniza-
tion is limited by a serious foreign exchange shortage
and massive foreign debt.
The foreign exchange shortage holds both the cause
and the solution to most problems in the agricultural
sector. It has fostered a resort to "crisis manage-
ment"-tackling emergencies as they arise and ne-
glecting development of a long-term strategy. Until
the shortage is overcome, efforts to improve agricul-
tural performance almost certainly will be only spo-
radic. But improvements in the foreign exchange
situation will depend in large part on increasing
agricultural production.
The slogan touted in the past that "Sudan will become
the breadbasket of the Arab world" is unrealistic.
Government leaders clearly appreciate the importance
of the agricultural sector to the economy and will
strive to make improvements within the constraints
imposed by limited resources. With proper planning
and luck the country could become a major producer
and exporter of many agricultural products, but this
potential will not be realized before the 21st century.
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Appendix A
Sudan: Physical Setting and
Agricultural Potential
Climate and Topography
Most of Sudan is an immense, sparsely populated
plain, with plateaus or mountainous areas near the
borders in the west, the southwest, and along the Red
Sea coast in the northeast. The most prevalent land-
scape is semiarid savanna-a mixture of short grasses,
scattered brush, and short trees. Daytime tempera-
tures are high throughout the year, and the dry season
ranges from three months in the relatively humid
south to nine months in Khartoum.
The southern provinces of Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal,
and Upper Nile receive 30 to 50 inches of rain during
the six- to nine-month wet season and produce a rich
variety of tall grasses, shrubs, and trees. Permanent
swamps in these provinces cover about 130,000 hec-
tares, and there is an excess of water for most of the
year. The lush vegetation in the south contrasts
sharply with the deserts of the Northern Region,
where the occasional rains vanish in the parched sand,
and broad areas are devoid of either vegetation or
people.
Narrow belts of irrigated cropland, no more than a
few miles wide, bisect the northern savanna and
desert along the main Nile River and along the White
Nile, Blue Nile, and Atbara Rivers. They contrast
sharply with the and savanna or barren desert just
beyond the limits of irrigation (see figure 6).
Soils
The soils are composed mainly of clay, much of which
is impermeable and difficult to cultivate, or sand that
contains little clay or humus. Tropical clay soils cover
most of east-central and southeast Sudan, from Khar-
toum southward. In the south, clay soils also stretch
west beyond the Nuba mountains to include the
western portion of the Sudd or swamps and adjacent
plains. From Khartoum westward is a broad zone
known as the qoz, an east-west belt of sandy mixed
soil. North of the qoz there is a vast area of stony and
sandy thin desert soils. The more important agricul-
tural areas are the riverine deposits along the Nile,
the clays of central Sudan, and the qoz. These soils
were originally deposited by wind or water.
Hydrology
There are strong contrasts in the hydrology of the
northern and southern parts of Sudan, but the Nile
links the drainage of both regions. The Nile is formed
by the combination of the White Nile, the Blue Nile,
and, further downstream, the Atbara. In the southern
Sudan about half of the Nile water that enters the
vast swamps of the Sudd is lost through transpiration
and evaporation. This in part explains why the annual
flow of the White Nile into the upper Nile at
Khartoum is only one-fifth that of the Blue Nile, but
the White Nile is important because much of its water
arrives during the months when the flow from the
Blue Nile is very low. North of Khartoum, the Nile
flows through a desert region for about 1,700 kilome-
ters to the Aswan Dam in Egypt, fed only by the
Atbara. The Atbara is shorter and more erratic than
the Blue Nile, with heavy floods in summer. During
arid periods it is likely to dry out before it reaches the
Nile.
Potential of the Regions
Despite the poor soil in many areas, there is thought
to be sufficient good soil to permit large-scale produc-
tion of a wide range of crops. In most regions of the
country the main factor limiting agricultural expan-
sion is water rather than land. In a few regions,
accumulations of silt from streams create especially
good conditions for intensified production of diversi-
fied crops. By far the greatest potential for expansion,
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however, is offered by the vast expanse of central clay
plains adjacent to the Blue Nile and White Nile
extending nearly 1,000 kilometers from east to west.
Rainfall in this area ranges between 5 and 10 inches a
year in the northern portion to 15 or 20 inches a year
in the southern part. The growing season is short, but
the land can be exploited with mechanization and
improved quick-growing varieties of sorghum or mil-
let. The best regions for agricultural development are
the irrigated areas in the Nile Valley. These areas
contain Sudan's large projects such as the Gezira.
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Appendix B
The Gezira Project
The Gezira project is located between the White and
Blue Niles in the Gezira District of the Central
Province. The project was conceived as early as 1904.
Work on the Sanar Dam was started in 1913, inter-
rupted by World War I, and resumed in 1921.
Agricultural production finally began in 1925 when
British authorities planted about 400,000 hectares in
the Gezira area with cotton. The raw cotton was then
exported to England.
In the first decade the project suffered from the
effects of the-worldwide depression in cotton prices.
This coincided with a catastrophic decline in yields
because of erratic rainfall, pests, and disease. Before
long, however, prices and yields increased, and the
choice of cotton as the crop most likely to repay the
cost of investment was justified.
In 1951 the Gezira project was nationalized by Su-
dan, and an administrative body was set up composed
of the government, the farmers, and the council for
the project. It was agreed that the profits would be
divided among several groups, with 49 percent going
to the farmers, 36 percent to the government, 10
percent to the council, and the remaining 5 percent to
other government bodies.
During the 1950s the project flourished, and in 1959 a
further 400,000 hectares were prepared for cultivation
and an irrigation canal dug to supply water to the new
areas. Encouraged by the success of the project, it was
decided that new intensive methods of farming would
be used and output diversified to include peanuts and
wheat. By the mid-1970s more than 800,000 hectares
were under cultivation, with cotton accounting for less
than half. Peanuts and wheat each were planted on
about 200,000 hectares, and another 120,000 hectares
were planted with corn.
Figure 7. Farmers working in
the fields in the Gezira region.
One of the largest agricultural undertakings in the
world, Gezira became the inspiration, if not the
model, for a number of projects in other developing
countries as well as for subsequent projects in Sudan
itself. In recent years, however, the shortage of for-
eign exchange and poor management have combined
to blight the promise of the projects. Irrigation canals
are choked with weeds and silt; pumps need repairing
or replacing; telephones-essential to coordinate irri-
gation-no longer work, and cottonpickers are scarce
in the harvest season (see figure 7). Cotton yields have
fallen from 47 kilograms per hectare in 1974/75 to 25
kilograms per hectare in 1980/81. Peanut and wheat
yields have dropped as well (see table 3).
Faced with this situation the government took radical
action in 1981 and reorganized the project so that it
would be run on a more competitive basis. It was
decided that each farmer would be charged individ-
ually for the amount of water he used on the crops
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Table 3
Crop Output in the Gezira Project
1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81a 1981/82b
a Preliminary.
b Projected.
that he planted and the area of land that he farmed.
Previously, the water and land had been given to the
farmer by the government in return for a percentage
of his cotton harvest. In addition, greater attention
was paid to the problem of insect and pest control, and
irrigation canals were cleared and maintained more
vigorously.
Plans for reviving Gezira include two five-year phases
that began in late 1981. In the first phase, the project
will be put back on its feet. Tractors, pumps, and
other agricultural equipment will be purchased. The
second phase will focus on modernization to intensify
production and improve marketing. This program is
being carried out with the assistance of the World
Bank.
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