INDIA S NAVY: CONSOLIDATING ITS REGIONAL PREDOMINANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00854R000200020002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 30, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
M kwrrwz~
A 6 x~ r
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India's Navy: Consolidating
Its Regional Predominance
Secret
NESA 82-10526
SW 82-10077
October 1982
Copy 77/-
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
India's Navy: Consolidating
Its Regional Predominance
the Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis and by
Stan Iorio of the Office of Scientific and Weapons
Research. Comments and queries are welcome and
This paper was prepared by
may be addressed to the Chief, South Asia
Division, NESA,
Operations and the National Intelligence Council.
Secret
NESA 82-10526
SW 82-10077
October 1982
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India's Navy: Consolidating
Its Regional Predominance ~ 25X1
Key Judgments The Indian Navy is the largest navy among those of the Indian Ocean
Information available littoral states and is second in capabilities to Australia. By Western
as of I August 1982 standards, however, it is deficient in weaponry, electronic detection
was used in this report.
systems, and basing and support resources. Pursuit of regional interests is
leading New Delhi to produce and import additional modern warships,
aircraft, and high-technology equipment, and we estimate that the Indian
Navy's rate of development will exceed that of other littoral naval forces.
Because Indian leaders perceive Pakistan as the most immediate threat,
the initial goals of India's naval programs are to deter an improving
Pakistani Navy from attacking or harassing Indian warships and to enable
New Delhi to contain it within the port of Karachi.
As India's naval prowess grows, New Delhi is expected to project a larger
force-featuring improved antisubmarine, antiship, air defense, and sur-
veillance capabilities-into the Indian Ocean. By doing so, we believe New
Delhi hopes eventually to achieve a larger voice in the decisions affecting
the Indian Ocean region and to provide an alternative to great power
sponsorship and protection of smaller countries in the region. In accord
with this goal, New Delhi is demonstrating particular sensitivity to the
increased presence of Soviet and US warships in the Indian Ocean.
Foreign imports and technical assistance will continue to be a major
determinant of India's success in building a more modern and powerful
navy. Indian defense industries alone have been unable to meet the Navy's
requirements. Despite considerable progress in domestic shipbuilding, this
situation is unlikely to change in the near future.
Increasingly wary of the political and military perils of dependence on a
single arms supplier, India is shopping for a more balanced mix of Western
and Soviet arms to modernize its Navy. For advanced naval systems and
technical assistance, New Delhi is looking increasingly to Western nations.
Although the Soviet share of overall Indian military imports is likely to
diminish over time, most naval combatants received by India during the
next several years will be from the USSR.
iii Secret
NESA 82-10526
SW 82-10077
October 1982
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India will remain circumspect about its naval ties with the Soviet Union.
New Delhi probably will continue to rebuff Soviet overtures for special
naval privileges, such as basing rights and joint exercises with the Indian
Navy. Moreover, India is likely to continue to restrict the presence of
Soviet naval personnel to technicians essential for aid projects and
equipment deliveries.
The Indian Navy will not develop into a power capable of seriously
challenging US or Soviet naval contingents in the foreseeable future, but
the increased capability to project naval forces into the Indian Ocean may
affect US fleet operations and contingency planning in the region. Senior
Indian officials could become more vocal in their demands for a withdraw-
al of US forces from the area, and they might also decide to increase
surveillance of US fleet activities or even harass US ships. Although Indian
interference with US naval operations in the Indian Ocean is unlikely at
this time, implementation of a US decision to exercise navigational rights
in Indian-claimed territorial waters (up to 12 nautical miles from land)
without prior notification or permission would complicate bilateral rela-
tions and could lead to an incident.
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Strengths and Vulnerabilities 7
B. Warships of the Indian Navy In pocket
at back of
handbook
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4reret
India's Navy: Consolidating
Its Regional Predominance
India is striving to expand the role of its Navy from
largely coastal defense to a modern open-ocean force,
New Delhi historically
has assigned a relatively low priority to the develop-
ment of its naval forces and has allotted the Navy less
than 10 percent of annual defense expenditures=
The Indian Air
Force and Army have had overriding priorities for
new arms-and we estimate that they probably will
continue to do so-because of New Delhi's preoccupa-
tion with the overland threat from Pakistan and
China. India's Minister of Defense, however, has
publicly stated in recent months that India must
develop a more powerful naval force, with more
balanced growth in surface, underwater, and air
capabilities. We believe that the Indian Navy's rate of
development will exceed that of other littoral navies.
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the US buildup on
Diego Garcia, Indian leaders have publicly stated
their concern that the superpowers are vying for
dominance in the Indian Ocean area-a competition
they regard as threatening both Indian aspirations for
regional preeminence and overall stability in South
Asia.
New Delhi is particularly sensitive to the presence of
Soviet and US warships-as well as those of other
foreign powers-in the Indian Ocean and, in our view,
regards Diego Garcia as a base from which the
United States can launch forces throughout the re-
gion. New Delhi's protests against what it regards as
intrusions by nonregional navies and its support for
the establishment of an Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace-in which foreign warships, nuclear weapons,
and military bases would be banned-have so far
failed to curtail the foreign presence in the region.
Motives for Naval Expansion
We estimate that India will project a larger naval
presence into the Indian Ocean during the 1980s, a
force with improved seagoing and airborne capabili-
ties that can provide increased surveillance of naval
activities of foreign powers operating there.
this is to be achieved
through the acquisition of additional destroyers, frig-
ates, attack submarines, reconnaisance aircraft, and
possibly a second aircraft carrier. As India's naval
prowess grows, we believe New Delhi hopes to
achieve:
? A larger voice in decisions affecting the Indian
Ocean region.
? An alternative to major power sponsorship and
protection of smaller countries in the region.
? Deterrence of a quantitatively and qualitatively
enhanced Pakistani Navy from attacking or harass-
ing Indian warships.
? A capability to contain the Pakistani Navy within
the port of Karachi
In our view, New Delhi's emphasis on upgrading its
Navy has received added impetus from the changed
environment in South Asia since 1979. With the
Indian efforts
have even failed to win significant support from
littoral countries.
Indian officials have publicly stated on several occa-
sions that they consider acquisitions of modern war-
ships and missiles by the Pakistani Navy as escalating
the naval threat in the region.
Islamabad has recently taken delivery of a
British destroyer and is seeking additional destroyers,
frigates, corvettes, submarines, and antiship missiles
from the West. Pakistan also wants to improve its
long-range antisubmarine reconnaissance capabilities.
Currently, the Pakistani Navy is equipped largely
with obsolescent ships and has a minimal open-seas
capability.
Foreign Naval Presence
The USSR. We believe that the Soviet Union's inter-
est in the Indian Ocean is indicated by its efforts to
obtain naval privileges in such countries as Mozam-
bique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Sri Lanka and by
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Figure 1
Soviet Ship Days in the Indian Ocean,
by Type, 1974-82
^ Combatants
^ Auxiliaries
Figure 2
Comparison of US and Soviet Ship Days
in the Indian Ocean, by Type, 1981
^ Combatants
?^ Auxiliaries
its increased naval presence in response to US naval
deployments to the region. Our analysis of Soviet
operations in the Indian Ocean
indicates that Soviet naval operations focus
on the Persian Gulf and Red Sea areas and include
monitoring the activities of US and Western naval
forces. Most often, however, the bulk of the Soviet
Indian Ocean Squadron is in anchorage
According to our analysis, the size of the Soviets'
permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean fluctu-
ates with the level of regional tensions and variations
in Western naval commitments to the area (see figures
1 and 2). The Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron averaged
about 20 ships during most of the 1970s. It increased
to an average of 32 ships in 1980-largely in response
to the US naval buildup following the seizure of the
US Embassy in Tehran-but has declined somewhat
in the past year and a half. The Soviets deploy
proportionately far more support ships in the Indian
Ocean than do Western navies. Warships make up
only about 45 percent of the squadron; the other 55
percent are naval auxiliaries or hydrographic research
and space event ships.
Major Western Powers. Western powers also have
increased their naval presence in the Indian Ocean
since 1979. The US buildup was linked specifically to
the Iranian crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan. According to US Navy data, the only continuous
US naval presence in the Indian Ocean until 1979 was
a command ship and two destroyers, although three
times a year carrier or cruiser task groups operated
there for periods of up to two months. Since then,
however, one or two US carrier task groups and an
1,800-man Marine Amphibious Unit have operated in
the region.
France's continuing large military presence in the
region stems from longstanding political and econom-
ic ties to African and Arab states and from depend-
ence on Persian Gulf oil. The French maintain some
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25 to 30 naval ships in the Indian Ocean, most of
which are combatants, according to data from the US
Navy. Additional French warships occasionally aug-
ment this force on a temporary basis. Despite the
French Socialist Party's preelection support for de-
militarizing the Indian Ocean, we believe the
Mitterrand government will continue to maintain a
large naval presence there.
Although British influence in the Indian Ocean de-
clined markedly during the 1970s, Prime Minister
Thatcher has placed increased emphasis on maintain-
ing naval ships there, according to British officials.
Beginning in 1980, the British Government decided to
keep at least two warships continually in the Persian
Gulf area, with one or two other combatants normally
operating in the Indian Ocean. Prior to that time, the
British naval presence in the Indian Ocean consisted
only of ships in transit or operating there for brief
periods.
Others. Other foreign navies-including those of East
and West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and New
Zealand-operate in the Indian Ocean on an inter-
mittent basis, according to data from the US Navy.
Australia has maintained a small continual naval
presence in the Indian Ocean region during the past
year, although its Navy is still oriented primarily
toward the Pacific Ocean. China's Navy does not
operate in the Indian Ocean, but we believe that
Chinese combatants may transit the region within the
next two to three years to show the flag at foreign
leadership dropped, and morale fell. Despite the de-
cline, we believe that the Iranian Navy will remain
the dominant force in the Gulf, but there is no
evidence that it will project its warships beyond the
Gulf of Oman in the near future.
India's Navy
Organization and Mission. The Indian Navy is the
largest naval force among the Indian Ocean littoral
states, a position we believe New Delhi is intent on
maintaining through imports and indigenous produc-
tion of modern combatants, aircraft, and high-
technology equipment. The 46,000-man Navy, head-
quartered in New Delhi, has some 90 combatants and
support ships and about 85 aircraft assigned to three
major commands-the Western Naval Command at
Bombay, the Eastern Naval Command at Vishakha-
patnam, and the Southern Naval Command at Co-
chin (see figure 3).
The Western and Eastern Commands each have an
operational fleet, while ships under the Southern
Command currently serve only in a training role.
Imagery indicates that nearly 65 percent of Indian
warships are assigned to the Western Fleet at Bom-
bay, which in our view is to counter the perceived
threat from Pakistan. The Eastern Fleet, although
considerably smaller because it is in a lower threat
area, is growing in importance and received an addi-
tional squadron of frigates from the Western Com-
ports, including possibly Karachi.
Iran is the only country among the Persian Gulf states
with a Navy of meaningful size or capability, but its
warships do not operate in the Indian Ocean. In the
late 1970s the Iranian Navy consisted of 117 ships-
including 11 major combatants and nine missile at-
tack boats equipped with Harpoon antiship missiles-
and we assessed it to be the most powerful of the Gulf
The Indian Navy is responsible for the traditional
naval missions of ensuring the security of the nation's
more than 6,000 kilometers of coastline, safeguarding
the country's maritime interests, and conducting
naval warfare in the interest of national security.
Until the mid-1970s, however, it was largely a coastal
patrol force with little capability to project itself into
the Indian Ocean. Since then, the Navy has stepped
up efforts to extend its power beyond Indian coastal
waters with the goals, in our analysis, of expanding
its combat readiness plummeted after the revolution
as ships and equipment deteriorated, the quality of
navies.
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the country's influence in the region, protecting its
maritime economic interests, and monitoring the ac-
tivities of other navies. The creation of an independent
Coast Guard in August 1978 has freed the Navy of
many of its routine missions-safeguarding offshore
oil installations, protecting fishing grounds from for-
eign fishing fleets, policing against poaching and
smuggling, and providing search and rescue services.
Moreover, the Navy's program for importing and
producing new open-ocean combatants with sophisti-
cated equipment will gradually give it the viable
offensive and deterrent capability it desires
Naval Combatants. India's 51 warships-43 surface
combatants and eight submarines-make it the most
capable force, except for Australia's, among the litto-
ral states.(see table 1). Similarly, its naval air arm is
superior to any other in South Asia, despite its small
size and limited antisubmarine, maritime reconnais-
sance, and strike capabilities. About half of India's
surface combatants are comparatively modern war-
ships, including Soviet-built destroyers, small frigates,
and guided-missile boats as well as British-designed
frigates several
older ships, notably the aircraft carrier and two
Whitby-class frigates, recently have undergone major
refitting or have been modified to upgrade capabilities
and extend their service life through the 1980s.
India's obsolescent Soviet-built submarines, however,
are in generally poor condition, which has resulted in
diving operations being restricted to about 100 me-
ters, according to a US defense attache report. Still,
as new submarines, destroyers, other combatants, and
naval aircraft now on order arrive during the next
several years, we judge that the Indian Navy will
become an even more formidable force. (For a de-
tailed look at current Indian warships and their
armament, see appendixes A and B.)
Basing and Support. India has three principal naval
bases-at Bombay, Vishakhapatnam, and Cochin. As
the home port for most of India's warships, the
Bombay Naval Base and Ship Repair Yard is the
largest and most important and is where all major
ship construction and most naval ship repairs occur.
Vishakhapatnam Naval Base and Training Center is
the Navy's primary facility for technical training and
for repair of India's Soviet-built submarines.
Table I
Warship Comparisons of Selected Indian Ocean
Littoral States, July 1982
Missile patrol 17 4 11 0
combatants
naval base, having undergone considerable expansion
with Soviet assistance, is becoming increasingly im-
portant as a major repair facility. The construction of
a large, new drydock capable of handling all Indian
combatants has been completed, although we believe
that the narrowness of the inner channel might pre-
clude its use by the 213-meter aircraft carrier. The
third major naval base at Cochin is the principal
advanced training base and the home port for the
Indian Training Squadron.
Other, less important naval facilities include Marma-
gao and Goa/Dabolim on the west coast and Port
Blair on South Andaman Island in the eastern Bay of
Bengal. Marmagao is used largely by merchant ships,
and nearby Goa/Dabolim is the primary base for the
The port also is important because it is close to
the northern approaches of the Strait of Malacca.
the shipyard at
Port Blair is being enlarged to accommodate combat-
ants up to Leander-class frigates, which leads us to
believe that the Navy may be considering a longer
term stationing of warships there.
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Figure 3
Indian Naval Commands, Warships, Bases, and Operating Areas
Turkey
Syria
Iraq-Saudi Arabia
Neutral Zone
Gulf
Saudi
Arabia
Red,
Sea
10
Aw~outi Gulf of Aden
Somalia
Ethiopia
rl-,-~-,
Caspian
Sea
Iran
Soviet Union
Afghanistan
Pakistan
!tar
Gulf of
Oman
Arabian
Oman ,.4 Sea
Western Naval Command
8 Frigates
1 Cruiser
Southern Naval Command
4 Frigates
C/AN
Seychelles
India
L~Ni) 4> 6 (5
Bombay
'Pune
Laccadive
Sea
OCEAN
,Diego Garcia
British Indian
Ocean Territory
(United Kingdom)
Eastern Naval Command
10 Frigates
4 Submarines`
*Two of India's eight submarines are in the
Soviet Union undergoing repair and refitting.
China
Vishakhapatnam O Bay of
- Naval headquarters
I1 Command headquarters
? Major naval base
Naval station
4 Airbase
Repair yard
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Strengths and Vulnerabilities
The Indian Navy, in our view, is capable of defending
India's contiguous waters and safeguarding its mari-
time interests against any threat from neighboring
countries. The Navy's capability to conduct naval
warfare continues to improve through import and
production of modern warships, aircraft, and equip-
ment. We believe that the Navy is changing from
essentially a coastal defense force into a fleet of
seagoing combatants with greater antisubmarine, air
defense, and antiship capabilities than those of India's
neighbors. Nonetheless, India's enhanced naval capa-
bilities remain technologically inferior to those of the
major foreign powers that operate in the region, and
deficiencies in weaponry, electronic detection systems,
and basing and support resources would, in our view,
preclude sustained open-ocean operations against
them.
Antisubmarine Warfare. India's antisubmarine capa-
bilities are best suited for coastal operations or for
convoy escort duty in the open ocean. The Navy's
ships, submarines, and aircraft possess a variety of
antisubmarine sensors and armaments, but range
limitations of the equipment constrain Indian antisub-
marine warfare efforts to relatively small areas. Once
an enemy submarine is detected, the Indians can
employ a number of short-range antisubmarine
weapons-mortars, rockets, depth charges, and ship-
and air-launched torpedoes.
The Navy is acquiring more submarines and aircraft
equipped for antisubmarine warfare that will help
modernize the force but, in our judgment, will not
significantly increase broad-area search capabilities.
The Type 209 diesel-powered submarines purchased
from West Germany, which are scheduled to begin
arriving in the mid-1980s, are designed for coastal
rather than for long-range operations. Similarly, addi-
tional Sea King antisubmarine helicopters being ac-
quired for use on various Indian combatants, as well
as Soviet Hormone helicopters used on the Navy's
Kashin destroyers, are equipped with short-range
active sonars that are designed for close-in ship
defense rather than for searching extensive areas for
submarines. (Use of such a sonar is shown in figure 4.)
Figure 4
Indian Hormone Helicopter
With Antisubmarine Sonar
Indian ASW helicopter prepares to dip its sonar during a submarine search
exercise with a Leander frigate in the background.
naissance aircraft.
Air Defense. Our analysis indicates that the Indian
Navy's ability to defend the fleet against air attack is'
weak but improving; it remains extremely vulnerable
to sea-skimming cruise missiles. The Soviet SA-N-1
on India's newly acquired Kashin destroyers is the
country's first medium-range naval surface-to-air
missile system. Until its arrival, such missile defenses
were limited to the shorter range UK Seacat and
Soviet SA-N-4 missiles deployed aboard India's
Leander frigates and Nanuchka guided-missile patrol
combatants, respectively. (Indian naval missile sys-
tems are listed in table 2.) Close-in air defense is
provided by shipboard antiaircraft guns. To intercept
hostile aircraft beyond the range of these missiles or
guns, depending on fleet deployments, the Navy must
rely on maritime strike aircraft from Pune Airfield or
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Table 2
Indian Navy Missile Systems
Ship Missile Role Maximum Range
(By Class) in Kilometers
(Approximate)
Surface-to-air 3 to guns, rockets, and ordinary bombs. The Navy has
capabilities of these combatants are adversely affect-
ed in moderate-to-high seas because of their small size
and because their fixed missile launchers limit the
ships' flexibility of attack. We believe that the Navy's
antiship capabilities will be enhanced during the next
several years with the acquisition of additional seago-
ing combatants and shipborne antiship missiles from
the USSR and Western Europe.
Antiship weapons on Indian naval aircraft are limited
Whitby SS-N-2 Surface-to-surface 45 no air-delivered, precision-guided munitions, a defi-
SS-N-2c Surface-to-surface 85
SA-N-4 Surface-to-air 12
ciency the Indians are attempting to correct. We
expect that naval leaders, impressed with Argentina's
success against British warships, will seek new air-
launched antiship missiles.
on carrier-based Sea Hawks, which offer only a thin
line of defense for the fleet. Indian air defense
capabilities will be enhanced somewhat when the
more capable British Sea Harriers are introduced into
service next year.
The lack of early warning aircraft severely reduces
India's capability to defend its warships. The impor-
tance of having such aircraft was demonstrated by the
Argentine Air Force's success in penetrating British
naval defenses in the Falklands with Exocet
missiles-a missile that has recently entered the
Pakistani inventory.
We estimate that an effective
defense against modern air- and sea-launched cruise
missiles is beyond India's reach for the next several
years because of the time it takes Indian military
leaders to select, purchase, and integrate new systems
into the armed forces.
Antiship Warfare. We believe that India's modest
capability to conduct naval warfare has grown with
the acquisition of Kashin destroyers. These ships are
the only seagoing Indian combatants that carry the
improved Styx surface-to-surface missile. Whitby-
class frigates and Osa patrol craft carry an older,
shorter range version of the missile. India's
Nanuchkas carry the improved missile, but-like the
Osas-are confined to coastal operations. The combat
Amphibious Warfare. The Navy's capability to con-
duct amphibious warfare is the best of any of the
Indian Ocean littoral states but is still extremely
limited by Western standards. The Navy has six
modern, Soviet-built assault landing ships-all of
which are assigned to the Eastern Fleet-and four
indigenously produced utility landing craft, of which
two are operating in the east and two are fitting out
on the west coast. Although acquisition of these ships
improves India's ability to launch an amphibious
assault-the Navy successfully conducted a small
amphibious landing in Bangladesh during the 1971
war-we believe there is a strong need for more
personnel, equipment, air cover, and training
Mine Warfare. In our analysis, India's modest mine
warfare assets are useful mainly for operations
against Pakistan. The Navy's small minesweeping
force,
consists of three Ham-class and six Natya-class ships.
Of these, only the Natyas are modern seagoing
minesweepers; the Hams are limited to inshore or
coastal operations. The only Indian combatants de-
signed for minelaying are the Petya-class frigates,
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although other warships could easily be modified for
such use. We believe that the Navy probably has a
variety of Soviet mines in its inventory.
Logistic Support. As mission requirements expand,
we believe that the Navy's current logistic system and
support ships will be hard pressed to satisfy the needs
of a large task force for fuel, water, and minor repairs,
and additional support ships will be required. To
extend the operating range of the fleet and to give it
increased time-on-station, the Navy has only two
replenishment ships, a submarine tender, and a sub-
marine rescue ship for support operations at sea. In
addition, repairs-frequently needed because of a
combatant's age or the rapid aging of ships and
equipment operating in tropical waters
the Navy is still too reliant on Bombay for supplies
and repairs-a dependence that would seriously
hinder extended combat operations if the fleet were
denied access to that base. If this occurred, it proba-
bly would be forced to use the less capable civilian
ship facilities farther south.
We believe that maintaining adequate stocks for a
diverse naval inventory also is a problem for the Navy
avy might experience a curtailment of supplies. The
Indians, however, are steadily increasing the output of
locally manufactured spare parts which could extend
the period that India could sustain naval combat
operations.
Naval Modernization
Foreign Sources. India will continue to seek modern
combatants, advanced naval systems, and technical
assistance from abroad, despite substantial progress in
domestic naval production programs. In contrast with
the 1970s, Prime Minister Gandhi is striving for a
more balanced mix of Western and Soviet arms to
modernize India's Navy and other services and to
prevent them from becoming overly dependent on a
single source of supply.
Although the Soviet share of overall Indian military
imports is likely to be reduced in the future, New
Delhi continues to preserve its military ties with
Moscow. We believe that the bulk of Indian naval
combatants likely to be received during the next
several years will be from the USSR
Another factor that will continue to inhibit a sharp
shift by India away from the Soviet Union is Prime
Minister Gandhi's concern with the reliability of
supply and with the acquisition of modern technology
for Indian defense industries. We believe that she still
considers the Soviet Union a more reliable friend than
Western nations on both counts.
Still, we judge that senior Indian military leaders
have convinced Gandhi of the need for high-technol-
ogy Western arms and equipment
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INew Delhi signed a 25X1
contract in December 1981 for West German diesel 25X1
attack submarines. The first two will be manufac-
tured in West Germany, and the next two will be
assembled in Bombay with German assistance. The
contract also contains an option clause for the indige- 25X1
nous construction of two additional submarines, an M
option we believe likely to be exercised.~ 25X1
New Delhi also is looking increasingly-but not ex-
clusively-to the West for advanced naval systems,
Such systems include
antisubmarine helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft,
missiles, acoustic sensors, and a submarine communi-
cation system.
In addition, India signed a
memorandum of understanding with France in Janu-
ary 1982 for Atlantique antisubmarine reconnais-
sance aircraft. The Navy also is reevaluating its
requirements for new surface-to-air missiles, and we
believe that the Indians will acquire an improved
version of the short-range UK Seacat for their Lean-
der-class frigates as well as additional Soviet SA-N-4s
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for the new frigates now under construction. Although
recent deliveries of Soviet Styx missiles probably
indicate the continued use of this system as the
Navy's principal shipborne antiship weapon, India's
1982 memorandum of understanding with France
includes new air-to-surface missiles, including the
Exocet. In addition, naval leaders have expressed
interest in new air- and surface-launched antisubma-
rine torpedoes
India's search for more modern equipment for under-
sea warfare includes an improved British sonar for its
Leanders and sonobuoys for its fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraf Requirements
for other high-technology sonars-variable depth,
dipping, and mine hunting-as well as improved
radars also are likely to be met largely through
imports from the West in our judgment.
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IIn 1981 India
successfully completed a 15-year program of building
six Leander-class frigates, reducing the construction
time per ship from five and a half to three and a half
years. Although design and technical assistance for
the first four ships were provided by the British, most
equipment on the last two Leanders-including the
main boilers, turbine generators, radar, and fire
control equipment-was manufactured in India
ndia has now embarked on
a follow-on program to build at least three Godavari-
class frigates.
We believe all three will have joined the fleet by
capabilities.
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Despite appreciable progress over the past 15 years,
we believe that Indian capabilities to produce combat-
ants and advanced naval systems are limited. Design
capabilities, while improving, are still weak-almost
all Indian-designed items are still heavily influenced
by foreign models. We judge that India also is
deficient in many aspects of submarine technology,
which in large part accounts for New Delhi's decision
to acquire West German submarines. India still must
rely on the USSR for major overhaul work on its
Soviet Foxtrots, although submarine repair and over-
haul capabilities at Vishakhapatnam have been con-
siderably improved.
Outlook
The Indian Navy's modernization programs are de-
signed to enable New Delhi to project military
influence beyond its territorial waters. Its growing
ability to do so was demonstrated in January 1982,
when the Navy deployed an Indian carrier task force
to the Arabian Sea. Indian Navy port calls by major
combatants to Southeast Asian and African coun-
tries-including Vietnam, Madagascar, and Tanza-
nia-also have increased. We believe that acquisition
of additional seagoing warships and long-range sur-
veillance aircraft will permit India to establish an
even more visible force in the Indian Ocean in the
future and will provide the Navy with a greater
capability to monitor the activities of foreign navies in
the area
The Indian Navy will not develop into a power
capable of seriously challenging US, Soviet, or French
naval contingents in the foreseeable future, but the
increased capability to project naval forces into the
Indian Ocean may affect US fleet operations and
contingency planning in the region. Senior Indian
officials could become more vocal in their demands
for a withdrawal of US forces from the area, if they
deemed it necessary, and they might also decide to
increase surveillance of US fleet activities or even
harass US ships. For example, in November 1980 an
Indian frigate closed to within 150 meters of a US
supply ship in the Indian Ocean and trained its
forward guns on the US ship. We believe that such
harassment is unlikely at this time, however, because
of improving Indo-US relations. Still, if the United
States decides to exercise its navigational rights with-
in Indian territorial waters (that is, 12 nautical miles)
without prior notification or permission, such an
action, in our judgment, would evoke a strong protest
by India and would complicate current efforts by the
United States to develop mutual confidence and in-
creased cooperation between the two countries. One
aspect of these efforts includes port calls to India by
the US Navy. Moreover, we cannot dismiss the
possibility that Indian naval forces might also react
against US combatants.
We believe that New Delhi's naval cooperation with
Moscow will remain limited. India probably will
continue to rebuff Soviet overtures for special naval 25X1
privileges-including access to Indian naval facilities
for basing, repairs, and provisioning of its ships-and
to limit Soviet warships to periodic routine visits. In
our view, New Delhi also probably will refuse Soviet
offers for joint naval exercises, in large part because
of a growing concern that its close ties with Moscow
are weakening India's leadership role among the
nonaligned states. Moreover, we judge that New
Delhi will continue to restrict the presence of Soviet
naval personnel to technicians essential to the con-
struction of Indian naval facilities, ship production,
and equipment deliveries.
The Indian Navy will remain the dominant indige-
nous force in South Asia by increasing its present
military superiority over India's neighbors through
the purchase, local manufacture, and licensed produc- 25X1
tion of modern warships, aircraft, and high-technol-
ogy naval equipment. No other navy in the region is
likely to make the improvements needed to challenge
India's position in the foreseeable future, and even
Pakistan's acquisition of new combatants and antiship
missiles will still leave that country's Navy markedly
inferior to that of India.
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Appendix A
Status of Indian Warships and Naval Air
Surface Combatants
The aircraft carrier Vikrant is India's most prestig-
ious naval combatant and serves to extend the Navy's
limited strike and antisubmarine capabilities. The
carrier's aircraft include one squadron each of West-
land Sea King antisubmarine helicopters and obsolete
British Sea Hawk attack and French turboprop Alize
antisubmarine aircraft. The Sea Hawks are scheduled
to be replaced by a squadron of British Sea Harriers
electronic equipment, coupled with the recent acquisi-
tion of newer warships from the Soviet Union and
from indigenous production, make it a likely candi-
date for scrapping.
A significant addition to the Indian Navy is the
specially modified Soviet Kashin-class guided-missile
destroyer. The first of three Kashins purchased in
we estimate that the Alizes will eventually be dropped
from the inventory in favor of additional Sea King
helicopters. the
Navy also is interested in acquiring a second aircraft
carrier, although there appears to be no immediate
prospect for such a purchase.
As the flagship of the Western Fleet, the 37-year-old
Vikrant rejoined the fleet in January 1982 after
undergoing a two-and-a-half-year major refitting to
extend the ship's service life into the early 1990s.
modernization, scheduled for the end of 1982, will be
oriented toward upgrading the ship's aviation capabil-
ities in anticipation of the delivery of the Sea
Harriers. Plans for the removal of the ship's catapult
system and installation of a ski jump ramp-an
inclined surface designed to permit the Sea Harrier to
take off with a heavier payload-originally scheduled
for this phase have been dropped for now, according
to US defense attache reports.
India's other major combatants, largely of Soviet and
British design, are primarily destroyers and frigates.
The ex-British cruiser Mysore, the only remaining
cruiser in the inventory, probably will be decommis-
sioned in the near future. The Mysore's age (it was
launched in 1939) and lack of modern weapons and
e estimate that the third.Kashin,
currently undergoing initial sea trials, will be deliv-
Each destroyer is equipped with surface-to-surface
and surface-to-air missiles, various short-range anti-
submarine weapons and sensors, and a Soviet antisub-
marine helicopter.
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India has a large number of frigates, including indige-
produced Leanders, modified ex-British
nously I
Whitbys, and Soviet Petya IIs. Additional ex-British 25X1
frigates (that is, Blackwood and Leopard classes) have
been transferred to the Coast Guard and the Training
Squadron
The Navy has six British-designed Leander-class frig-
ates, the first major surface combatants to have been
built in India. In our view, these frigates now serve as
the Navy's main antisubmarine combatants because
the state of readiness of India's submarines is poor. 25X1
The first four Leanders each carry a French Alouette
III antisubmarine helicopter (built in India), a three-
barrel antisubmarine mortar, and-excluding the
fourth ship-a variable depth sonar on the aft deck.
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India has 10 export versions of the Soviet Petya II-
class frigates. Acquired during the 1970s to upgrade
Indian antisubmarine capabilities, the Petya's weap-
ons include two 16-barrel rocket launchers, depth
charges, and mines.
India's defensive forces also include smaller class
missile combatants-three Nanuchkas and 14 Osas.
Both classes are equipped with surface-to-surface
missiles; the Nanuchkas also have a surface-to-air
missile capability.
Submarines
For defense of its territorial waters, the Navy has
eight F-class (Foxtrot) diesel attack submarines, two
of which are currently in the Soviet Union undergoing
major overhaul. The Foxtrots are obsolescent in de-
sign and are plagued with such major maintenance
problems that we believe that no more than four are
fully combat ready at any one time. The Indians have
Foxtrots.
purchased West German attack submarines to aug-
ment their submarine fleet, which, in our view, will
allow them to plan for the eventual replacement of the
modern aircraft and electronic detection gear.
Air Arm
India's naval air arm is a small force of some 85 fixed-
and rotary-wing aircraft which perform maritime
reconnaissance, protect surface combatants against
enemy air and submarine attacks, and extend the
striking power of the Indian fleet. Despite its small
size, the force is the most substantial naval air
element in South Asia, and we believe that its region-
al importance will increase as the Navy acquires more
the role of the
naval air arm, and we believe that its capabilities may
be curtailed by the outcome of a Navy-Air Force
struggle for control of maritime strike and patrol
missions. The Air Force, which we estimate has some
40 aircraft (MIG-21s and Canberras based at Pune
Airfield on the west coast) already dedicated to naval
missions, appears to have secured the strike role and,
in our view, is now focusing on obtaining responsibil-
ity for maritime patrol. Still, we believe that the Navy
will continue fighting for control of both missions.
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