IRAQ: A HANDBOOK

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ) Secret
Iraq:
A Handbook
Secret
NESA 82-10620
December 19 2
Copy
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 Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Iraq:
A Handbook
This paper was prepared by analysts in the Office of
Near East-South Asia Analysis with a contribution by
the Office of Central Reference. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Persian Gulf Division, NESA
of Operations and the National Intelligence Council
Secret
NESA 82-10620
December 1982
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I
Iraq:
A Handbook
Introduction Iraq is potentially one of the most powerful countries in the Middle East
Information available and seeks a major political and military role in the region. It has abundant
as of I November 1982 natural resources, ample water, more than 30 billion barrels in estimated
was used in this report.
oil reserves, a relatively large and skilled population, and great agricultural
potential. Largely landlocked, Iraq sits astride the land bridge from
Central Asia to Africa and shares borders with six other states-Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Jordan. With a population of
about 14 million, it maintains the largest Army in the Middle East.
Since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, relations between Iraq and
the United States have ranged from prickly to nonexistent, constrained by
Iraq's radical ideology and its desire to preserve its revolutionary creden-
tials. Successive Iraqi leaders have urged an Arab collective security
arrangement for the Gulf region that would enhance Iraq's power and
exclude any US military presence. The heavy US involvement in Iran,
Iraq's historical enemy, has left Iraq deeply suspicious of US intentions.
Moreover, continued US support of Israel sustains and strengthens these
suspicions and in view of Iraq's opposition to the existence of the Jewish
state, frustrates accommodation between the United States and Iraq.
The Iraqi military-led revolution in 1958 overthrew the British-supported
monarchy as part of an effort to eradicate the vestiges of Iraq's colonial oc-
cupation, destroy its wealthy landowning class, and create a modern,
independent state. Following a decade of violent political struggle, in which
civilian and military groups indulged in coups, countercoups, and assassi-
nations, the civilian-led Ba'th Party of Iraq gained control in 1968 and
launched an era of major social, economic, and political change. In the last
14 years the Ba'th leadership has attempted to impose a stable government
and secular national institutions on a poor, tradition-minded, heteroge-
neous population.
Most of Iraq's current leaders are veterans of the early political struggles.
Their policies and methods reflect their brand of revolutionary ideology
and their long years in clandestine opposition. Drawing on the vagaries of
Arab unity and nationalism, they stress a secular state and promote
policies that call for rapid economic development and social change. Above
all, Iraq's young leaders-most are in their forties or early fifties-believe
that the revolution still lives and that it must be carefully controlled and di-
rected by a small cadre of leaders at the top.
I
Secret
NESA 82-10620
December 1982
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The regime can claim several notable accomplishments:
? A high degree of institutionalization in both state and party.
? Rapid and widespread economic changes, with minimal corruption,
which have generally benefited previously underprivileged classes.
? Steady progress on social issues such as literacy and health care.
? Effective control of the military by the civilian establishment and the
exclusion of the military from political decisionmaking.
But serious problems remain, some of which are exacerbated by the
regime's continued reliance on repression to maintain control.
? There is no mechanism for the orderly transfer of power. President
Saddam relies on a narrowing circle of relatives and trusted loyalists to
make key decisions, while reportedly deemphasizing the role of the Ba'th
Party.
? Large elements of the population-the Kurds and Shias in particular-
believe they have not benefited proportionately from government pro-
grams and nurse longstanding grievances against the regime.
? Large-scale rural-to-urban migration has produced a considerable popu-
lation of urban poor, much of it crowded into the slums of Baghdad.
? Ambitious economic programs are plagued by short-term cash and labor
shortages and will continue over the long term to suffer from inadequate
diversification and poor productivity.
The Iranian revolution posed an ideological and economic challenge to the
radical, elitist, secular regime in Iraq. It is a Shia revolution, with a
potential to stimulate unrest among the 55 percent of Iraq's population that
is Shia. The religious zeal and Shia doctrines, however, do not appear to
have had widespread appeal inside Iraq. The economic threat appears more
immediate; the precipitate decline in relations between the countries led to
the closing of the Shatt-al-Arab, Iraq's economic lifeline.
Iraq responded to the Iranian challenge with a military threat-the
invasion of Iran in September 1980, propaganda, and repression at home.
The war with Iran-now in its third year-is draining Iraq's economic and
military resources, forcing the imposition of austerity measures and
cutbacks in economic development. It already has forced the regime to
deemphasize the revolutionary nature of its Ba'th ideology to gain the
financial support of moderate Arabs. It has undermined Iraq's bid for
leadership of the Nonaligned Movement and has worsened always tense
Iraqi/Syrian relations. It has also weakened the regime's support among
Iraq's disparate religious and ethnic elements.
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Figure 1
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Introduction iii
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Contents
Geography I
Topography 1
Agriculture and Livestock 4
Population 5
Religion and Ethnic Groups 5
Economy 9
Industry (Nonpetroleum)
9
13
14
14
Transportation and Communication 15
Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments 15
Exchange 15
History and Society 17
Internal Security 18
The Ba'th Party 18
The Role of Ideology 19
Opposition 21
Cooperation Among Opposition Groups 21
The Shia Opposition 21
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Relations With the USSR and Eastern Europe 32
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Secret
Errata Notice to recipients of DDI document: Iraq: A Handbook, NESA 82-10620,
Secret Noforn, December 1982
The attached graphic is to replace the incorrect graphic on page 2.
319
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Figures 2 and 3
Precipitation
Temperature
OF
140
Mosul
Elevation 728 ft. (222 m)
Ar Rutbah
Elevation 2018 ft. (615 m)
Al Basrah
Elevation 7 ft. (2 m)
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Geography
Location and Area
Iraq is located at the head of the Persian Gulf on the
land bridge between Africa and central and southern
Asia. Historically traversed by trade routes between
the Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean, the country
is better irrigated than most in the Middle East and
relatively well endowed with natural resources, partic-
ularly petroleum. It has an area of about 445,500
square kilometers, slightly less than half the size of
Egypt and two-thirds as large as Texas.
Topography
Iraq has three distinct topographic regions-the
northeastern highlands, desert plains in the west and
south, and the Mesopotamian Plain along the Tigris
and Euphrates Rivers south of Baghdad. Elevations
are mostly less than 500 meters but range from near
sea level in the southeast to 3,700 meters along the
Iranian border in the northeast.
The northeastern highlands are composed of rocky
hills and mountains separated by narrow gorges and
valleys. Hill summits range from about 300 meters to
about 2,000 meters above sea level. Open deciduous
forests are common; only scattered shrubs are found
at higher elevations. Most streams are perennial and
swollen in spring by melting snow. Towns are small
and generally concentrated along stream valleys.
Desert plains cover about two-thirds of Iraq. Vegeta-
tion is limited to sparse grasses and shrubs; the
southwestern desert is nearly barren. There are few
permanent settlements and only a sparse transporta-
tion network.
The Mesopotamian Plain is Iraq's chief food produc-
ing area. It is low and crossed by a dense network of
canals and irrigation ditches that carry water from
the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to croplands. Exten-
sive marshes, mudflats, and date groves are located in
the southern part of the delta region, below the port of
Al Basrah. Baghdad is in the northern, more temper-
ate part of the delta. Most of Iraq's population resides
in the delta and along the upper reaches of the Tigris
and Euphrates valleys. Some large cities are located
in the intermediate area between the desert and the
northeastern highlands.
Climate
Iraq has hot, dry, nearly cloudless summers (June
through September) and mild to cool, moderately
cloudy winters (December through March). Winds,
generally from the northwest or west, are strongest in
summer.
Temperatures generally decrease from south to north
and from low to high elevations. Temperatures as high
as 491 C and as low as -71 C have occurred at most
locations.
Precipitation, mostly rainfall, is associated with mi-
gratory lows that move across the country from
October to May. During this period, much of the
country receives less than 5 centimeters of rain a
month, although in the mountains precipitation may
be as high as 25 centimeters in some months. Almost
no precipitation falls during the remainder of the
year. There is occasional light snow except in the
extreme southern desert; heavy snows occur in the
mountains.
Relative humidity is generally highest in the early
morning and lowest in the afternoon, ranging mostly
from 10 to 35 percent in the period June through
August and from 40 to 90 percent in December and
January.
Natural Resources
Petroleum and Minerals. Iraq's oil reserves are esti-
mated at about 36 billion barrels, about 5 percent of
the world total, significantly less than Saudi Arabia's
164 billion but more than the 30 billion estimate for
the United States. It has natural gas reserves of 35
trillion cubic feet. The major fields are located in the
northeastern Kurdish region north of Baghdad and
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Figure 2
Precipitation
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11,
11,
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Figure 4
Land Utilization
Cultivated lands under
major irrigation
Woodland and grazing;
cultivation in valleys
Desert grazing and
marginal agriculture
Desert and semidesert
Ar Ramed
Karbal'' ,,
, 10
\Baghdad
An Na;idyah
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Al 'Amir4h
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Figure 5
Population
Persons per square kilometer
D 1 50 200 700
0 3 130 51B 1813
Persons per square mile
(Census 1965)
the southeastern Al Basrah Province. Iraq's other
mineral resources are limited. Limestone, gypsum,
phosphates, and sulfur are in sufficient supply for
some commercial use. Other mineral deposits include
iron, chromite, copper, lead, and zinc but not in
sufficient quantities to be exploited.
As Sulaym niy
Karkuk.
Agriculture and Livestock. The Tigris and Euphrates
Rivers have more water available for agriculture in
Iraq than is available in most countries in the re-
gion-giving Iraq the potential for greater agricultur-
al output. Agriculture in the north depends on rainfall
and in the south on irrigation. Wheat is Iraq's most
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important crop, and 1.3 million tons were produced in
1980. Barley is replacing wheat in areas troubled by
salinity, and 575,000 tons were grown in 1980. Wheat
and barley account for approximately 80 percent of
Iraq's cultivated area. Iraq is the world's largest
producer of.dates. Other crops include lentils, flax-
seed, beans, rice, sesame, corn, millet, tomatoes,
eggplant, okra, and cotton.
Sheep (9.7 million in 1978) and goats (2.5 million in
1978) are the most important livestock raised. Cattle,
waterbuffalo, asses, camels, horses, and poultry are
also kept.
Human Resources
Population. The population of Iraq was estimated at
14 million as of July 1982, compared to Iran's 41.2
million and Syria's 9.4 million. If growth continues at
the present rate of 3.3 percent, Iraq's population will
approach 19 million by 1990. Baghdad, the largest
city and capital, is estimated to have about 3 million
inhabitants. Like other countries with high fertility
and mortality rates, the population is young-nearly
60 percent are below the age of 20. Population density
varies greatly, with highest concentrations in the
Tigris-Euphrates delta. Although the concentration of
population in the river areas is similar to the pattern
in Egypt, the population density in the delta is only
one-third that of the Nile valley and delta.
Iraq has sufficient arable land and water to support a
much larger population. Both the area of cultivation
and crop yields could be substantially increased. The
government encourages large families and hopes to
increase the size of the population to between 22
million and 24 million by 1995.
Religion and Ethnic Groups. Heterogeneity is the
most striking characteristic of Iraq's population. Over
70 percent share the Arabic language and about 90
percent the Muslim religion, but sectarian, ethnic,
tribal, and denominational differences abound. Iraq's
Muslims are divided primarily into the Sunni and
Shia sects. The Sunnis dominate the government,
even though Shia Muslims constitute about 55 per-
cent of the Iraqi population. The Shias occupy the
lowest social and economic strata. Although the Shi-
as' role in government has increased slightly under
Figure 6
Selected Countries: Urban Population, 1980
Iran
Syria
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Kuwait
Saddam Husayn, their influence remains insignifi-
cant. This discrimination dates from the Ottoman
Empire when the Turks considered the Shias to be
sympathetic to neighboring Shia Persia and excluded
them from positions of responsibility.
A fiercely independent and warlike Kurdish minority
lives in the northern, mountainous region of Iraq. The
Sunni Kurds, 18 percent of the population, have
historically resisted assimilation and domination by
outsiders. Intermittent warfare has existed for
decades between the central government and the
Kurds, who have often been aided by Iran.
The Turkomans (less than 3 percent of the population)
have occasionally fought on the side of the Kurds
against the central government. The nomadic Bedouin
population-about 300,000 in 1971-has been re-
duced to less than 95,000 as a result of government
settlement programs.
Iraqi Christians (about 5 percent of the population)
are generally better educated and more Westernized
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Figure 7
Distribution of Religious and Ethnic Groups
Shia Arab
Sunni Arab and
Sunni Kurd
Sunni Arab and
Shia Arab
0
Yezidi
Turkoman
Iranian
t Christian Christians represent different sects and
ethnic groups.
Q Mandaean Yezidis, Mandaeans, and Jews, although
shown as religious groups, may also be
Jewish considered as separate ethnic entities.
Sunni Kurd
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Figure 8
Selected Countries: Adult Literacy'
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Iran
Syria
Kuwait
Jordan
than the Muslim population. The Christian communi-
ty is centered mainly in northern Iraq and in the big
cities. The community is fragmented among Greek
Orthodox, Nestorian Assyrian, Roman Catholic, and
Uniate Chaldean sects. Other religious sects are the
Yezidis (found interspersed among the Kurds), who
combine elements of paganism, Zoroastrianism,
Christianity, and Islam, and the Mandaeans, a Gnos-
tic sect (found mainly in large cities). The Jews, a
flourishing minority of 125,000 in 1948, now number
less than 3,000. The majority of the Iraqi Jewish
community migrated to Israel.
Education and Health. Estimates of literacy among
the population range from 20 to 40 percent, compared
with an average of 40 percent for Syria and 20
percent for Saudi Arabia. Over 25 percent of the
population was in school in 1980. Education is provid-
ed and controlled by the government and is compul-
sory through grade six. There are six universities and
numerous vocational and training schools. Substantial
resources are being devoted to the expansion of the
educational system at all levels. Private education was
abolished in the mid-1970s. Substantial income from
Table 1
University Enrollment
Total Staff Graduate
Enrollment (1978-79) Students
(1978-79) (1977-78)
Total 91,716 3,741 2,074
Baghdad 32,672 1,714 1,465
Mosul 11,730 699 283
Basra 10,278 486 51
Mustansiriya 10,664 295 118
oil exports since 1973 has enabled Iraq to begin a
large-scale school construction program, in addition to
welfare projects, such as hospitals and housing.
The high incidence of disease in Iraq is the result of
poor diet, inadequate sanitation, ignorance of and
indifference to modern hygienic practices, an inade-
quate medical system, and unhealthy environmental
conditions, particularly in the southern delta region.'
Numerous lakes, marshes, and other areas subject to
seasonal inundation breed mosquitoes. Contamination
of water supplies and the spread of waterborne dis-
eases (such as typhoid) follow seasonal floods.
The Ministry of Health controls almost all medical
facilities; private facilities are subject to government
supervision. There are 177 hospitals and about 4,000
physicians. Shortages of trained personnel and poor
distribution of those available are major problems.
Government-trained physicians are required to spend
four years in public health service.
'The most prevalent communicable diseases are amebiasis, diph-
theria, gonorrhea, helminthiasis, infectious hepatitis, influenza,
malaria, measles, meningococcal meningitis, poliomyelitis, schisto-
somiasis (bilharzia), tuberculosis, typhoid and paratyphoid fevers,
and trachoma.
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Economy
Before the war with Iran broke out in September
1980, Iraq was in the midst of an ambitious develop-
ment program aimed at economic independence. The
war has forced Baghdad to scrap much of its develop-
ment effort and reduce imports. Oil revenues declined
precipitately following destruction of Iraq's oil export
terminals on the Gulf early in the war and the
subsequent closure of Syria's pipeline to Iraqi crude.
Iraq's socialist economy is centrally administered by
the Ba'thist government. It plans, executes, and man-
ages all oil operations as well as most activity in other
sectors of the economy through more than 200 public
corporations and institutions. The main tools for
managing government policy are five-year plans im-
plemented through annual development and import
programs.
Iraq's economic strategy to achieve self-sufficiency
and an improved standard of living stresses both
agricultural and industrial development. Iraq relies on
imports of equipment, material, and technology to
build the base for its domestic capability and has
eagerly sought foreign contractors, favoring turnkey
projects that conserve its own scarce labor supply.
Despite the war with Iran, Iraq announced an eco-
nomic development plan for 1981-85 that initially
carried a price tag of $133 billion. Reconstruction of
war-damaged installations, however, especially the oil
facilities, will take top priority when hostilities end.
The plan, typically overly optimistic, emphasizes
across-the-board expansion of the major sectors of the
economy, including highway construction, telecom-
munications, and housing. Iraq also has set a goal of
agricultural independence by 1985.
Although Baghdad was able to keep the plan on track
in 1981, largely by borrowing heavily from its Gulf
state allies, it was forced to cut development spending
in 1982 because of the mounting cost of the war and
reduced oil revenues. New projects were canceled
altogether, and work on many existing ones not
Figure 9
Selected Countries: GDP per Capita, 1982'
Iran
Jordan
Syria
OPEC Average
Iraq
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
essential to the war, petroleum industry, or the Non-
aligned Summit were postponed. Moreover, the loss in
oil revenue from the closure in April 1982 of one of its
two export pipelines compelled Iraq to substantially
draw down foreign exchange reserves to avoid addi-
tional major import cuts.
Main Sectors of the Economy
Petroleum. The petroleum sector is the financial
backbone of Iraq's economy. Oil revenue provides
virtually all of the country's foreign exchange and
revenue for the government budget. Oil output in
1979, the last full year of production before the war
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Figure 10 Figure 11
Iraq: Key Economic Indicators Selected Countries: Real GDP Growths
Note change in scales
Shaded portions indicate range Percent
Real GDP Growth Rate
30
OPEC Average
Percent
15
8 MJL~
1
Foreign Exchange
Reserves, Yearend
Billion US $
Average annual
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Figure 12
Economic Activity
0
I
Oilfield
Oil pipeline
Petroleum refining
Hydroelectric power plant
Dates
Grains
Livestock and
livestock products
with Iran, was about 3.5 million barrels per day (b/d),
making Iraq the world's fourth-largest oil producer.
With oil sales abroad of 3.2 million b/d in 1979, Iraq
was the second-largest exporter after Saudi Arabia.
As a result of the war with Iran, production and
exports have plummeted; for all of 1981 production
averaged only about 1 million b/d. Iranian attacks
almost destroyed Iraq's two oil export terminals on
the Persian Gulf, Khor al Amaya and Mina al Bakr,
which had a combined capacity of 3.2 million b/d.
Reconstruction of these terminals will take about two
years.
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Figure 13
Iraq: Oil Production, Exportsa
1980 1981
a Includes product exports. Data are a daily average for each period.
Oil exports fell even further in April 1982 because
Damascus, in alliance with Iran, denied Iraq use of
the oil pipeline across Syria. Iraqi exports now are
restricted to a pipeline across Turkey, which has been
operating near its capacity of about 700,000 b/d. Iraq
and Turkey are expanding the pipeline's capacity to
about 900,000 b/d, a project that will take about a
year to complete.
When hostilities cease, Baghdad plans to install at
least four temporary single-point mooring systems in
the Gulf. Installation would take about six months
and give Iraq a Persian Gulf export capacity of 1.5-2
million b/d. Once its Persian Gulf terminals are
repaired, Iraq's export facility capacity-including
the pipelines-will be over 5 million b/d.
We believe Baghdad could increase its oil production
capacity to about 4-4.5 million b/d by the late 1980s,
based on prewar development plans.
Figure 14
Iraq: Official Oil Prices
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Figure 15
Iraq: Import and Production of
Selected Crops
Imports
Production
2,500
2,000
1,500
20 for good growing conditions. Modern Iraq has not
16 been able to duplicate the large, efficient irrigation
j system developed by the ancient Mesopotamian
6 J 12 n cultures.
4 8 V
The land reform program, with its emphasis on large-
2 4 scale engineering projects, has failed to provide suffi-
0 1977 78 79 80 0 1977 78 79 80 81 cient financial aid and technical expertise to overcome
the lack of machinery, fertilizers, and modern farm-
ing practices that plague the individual farmer. Col-
a Includes grain sorghum. lectivization also has been slow to provide an efficient
distribution and marketing system staffed by skilled
workers and managers.
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Iraq's goal of agricultural independence depends on
the completion of several massive water resource
projects that Baghdad hopes will nearly double the
acreage under irrigation. To attain this objective, Iraq
has in various stages of construction or on the drawing
board about 36 major irrigation and drainage projects
that probably will cost over $10 billion by the time
they are completed. The agricultural program also
includes the construction of dams and reservoirs for
flood control and water supply along the Tigris and
Euphrates Rivers. Because of the war the pace of
development on these projects has been slowed.
Iraq has not had a significant increase in the amount
UI lallU UllUU1 lr UluVaLlull uc0I/1LG all auUlluauIVG UI
water and potentially usable land. With only about
half the cropped area of 73 million hectares irrigated,
agricultural production still depends heavily on the
vagaries of the weather. In the irrigated areas, rising
Agriculture. The agricultural sector has been the
chronic underachiever in Iraq's economy. It employs
30 to 40 percent of the labor force but produces less
than 7 percent of gross domestic product. Bureaucrat-
ic bungling in connection with the land reform pro-
gram has led to low agricultural productivity. Largely
as a result, Iraq has gone from agricultural self-
sufficiency in the 1960s to net food importer today.
Food imports cost the regime $1.3 billion in 1980 and
probably rose to $2 billion in 1981.
soil salinity-a result of inefficient drainage sys-
tems-has left large areas of once-fertile soil too salty
for farming. Moreover, the Tigris and Euphrates
Rivers crest and flood at times that are not conducive
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Collectivization is hindered by some of the same
problems that have retarded incentives and productiv-
ity in the Soviet Bloc. Mismanagement of the collec-
tivization effort has encouraged peasant migration to
urban areas, resulting in a shortage of skilled labor to
run the new state farms. For example, an irrigation
project at Qadisiya has only enough farmers to use
half the project's current potential. Farmers have
been discouraged by the government's inability to
speedily redistribute expropriated land.
To help make up for labor shortages, Iraq has brought
in agricultural workers from Egypt and Morocco. The
regime also plans to provide easier credit to encourage
its own farmers to return to the land. The additional
strain of the war on the agricultural sector has now
forced the regime to encourage the private sector to
increase productivity.
The government also has faltered in providing ameni-
ties such as education, electrification, and connector
roads to rural areas. Life for the average farmer is
still primitive, and earnings are near the subsistence
level.
Industry (Nonpetroleum). From 1976 to 1980 Iraq
emphasized industrialization, but industrial output
accounted for less than 10 percent of gross domestic
product by the end of 1980, and virtually all of the
goods were consumed domestically. The primary fo-
cus is on heavy industries based on energy resources-
petrochemicals, fertilizers, phosphates, and natural
gas. Iraq also is developing secondary industries for
import substitution. The government's industrializa-
tion program is intended to reduce dependence on
imports and on oil exports for revenue.
A sharp reduction in oil exports because of the war
has caused a slowdown in the overall rate of industri-
alization. Strapped for vital foreign exchange by
1982, the regime was forced to cancel most new
contracts and even postpone construction of many
projects not related to petroleum or the war. The war
has affected major industrial subsectors in varying
degrees:
? About half of Iraq's installed refinery capacity of
300,000 b/d has been shut down, forcing the regime
to increase imports of oil products to avoid serious
fuel shortages.
? Interruptions in the supply of electricity have been
due more to fuel shortages and maintenance prob-
lems than to direct war damage to electrical power
plants.
? The construction sector is nearly at a standstill
because of the slowdown in the development pro-
gram. Nearly all new projects have been suspended,
and even construction on some nonessential projects
has been postponed.
Military manpower demands have exacerbated the
already serious shortage of skilled labor. Even before
the war the government had to adjust the speed of
development to the availability of labor. Since the
war, Iraq has had difficulty retaining foreign workers
who are jittery about staying with projects in the war
zone.
Income and Inflation
Real per capita income in Iraq fell from about $2,600
in 1980 to about $1,900 in 1981 primarily because of
the precipitous drop in oil earnings. Because of its
deteriorating financial situation, the regime may not
be able to prevent a further loss in individual income
in 1982. Incomes are much higher among workers in
the industrial sector as compared to those in
agriculture.
Rapidly rising wage rates for unskilled workers in the
industrial sector have contributed to urbanization in
Iraq and an annual inflation rate approaching 50
percent. Because the government operates an exten-
sive system of price controls, especially for food,
which is the most important item in the price index,
the true rate of inflation is probably much higher.
Import cuts imposed by the government in 1982
probably have exacerbated upward price pressures.
Because shortages are serious for most nonessential
consumer items, the government is letting prices rise
above mandated levels in an attempt to temper do-
mestic demand.
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Transportation and Communication.
Although Iraq's 20,800-kilometer highway network is
the major means of transportation, it is barely able to
cope with present traffic. Only about one-third of the
system is paved, distribution is poor, and the roads
require frequent maintenance in some areas. Iraq's
1,700 kilometers of railroad consist of two lines
oriented to long-haul traffic. Iraq has 3,800 kilome-
ters of pipeline to move crude oil to refineries and
export terminals. It can ship oil from either the south
or the north through the strategic pipeline connecting
Iraq's two major oil-producing regions.
Iraq has two major ports for handling general cargo,
one at Al Basrah on the Shatt Al Arab and the other
at Umm Qasr to the west on the Persian Gulf. The
ports have a combined capacity of some 7 million tons
per year. A smaller port at Al Faw is used primarily
as an oil terminal.
All Iraq's ports have been closed by the war, and the
principal road link to Kuwait's ports is vulnerable to
Iranian attack. The principal port at Al Basrah has so
far suffered little physical damage, but its approaches
are blocked by sunken merchant vessels and by heavy
silting in the absence of dredging. Harbor facilities at
Umm Qasr are largely unscathed, although this port
is also closed because of its proximity to the war zone.
Jordan, Kuwait, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.
we estimate
Iraq will transship roughly 12 million tons of cargo
through the ports of these countries in 1982, com-
pared with about 2 million tons in 1980.
Iraq is pressing ahead with the expansion of most of
its overland import routes despite the cost and the
war. To give its overland transportation system added
flexibility, Iraq is building a $3 billion, 1,200-km
expressway that will connect Baghdad with the bor-
ders of Kuwait, Jordan, and Syria. Always uneasy
about the bottleneck on the Persian Gulf, Iraq began
design work on the expressway route in 1979.
urban areas. Baghdad is the primary telecommunica-
tions center for Iraq and handles all international
traffic. Iraq is constructing a microwave network to
improve and expand telephone service in the country.
In 1977, the latest year for which data are available,
Iraq had about 320,000 telephones (about 2.5 per 100
population).
Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments
Prewar oil earnings-accounting for virtually all of
Iraq's foreign exchange-were more than enough to
cover spending abroad. The rash of contracts signed
mostly with the West made the OECD countries-
principally West Germany, Japan, and France-
Iraq's largest source of imports. Purchases from
OECD countries rose from about $9.7 billion in 1980
to $13.5 billion in 1981. Imports from the USSR in
the same period increased only about $500 million to
$1.4 billion, largely reflecting Iraq's dissatisfaction
with Soviet technology.
Iraq's oil income jumped from $11 billion in 1978 to
$25 billion by 1980, largely on the strength of dra-
matic price increases. Because of the war, oil export
earnings dropped to about $11 billion in 1981. Bagh-
dad has tried to maintain a business as usual attitude
despite the war by drawing down reserves and, more
importantly, borrowing heavily from its Gulf state
allies-more than $20 billion from Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar by the end of 1982.
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Iraq, however, recently was forced to adopt austerity 25X1
measures and cut back imports. Reserves as of late
1982 were less than $15 billion compared with the
prewar level of nearly $35 billion. Over half these
funds are in highly liquid bank deposits and govern-
ment securities and are thus readily available to meet
Iraq's foreign exchange needs. The remaining reserves
are held as gold, corporate securities, and other assets
that probably could be sold only at a loss.
Exchange
Iraq maintains a comprehensive system of trade and
foreign exchange controls to allocate earnings from
abroad according to economic and social priorities.
Iraq's telecommunications network, owned and oper-
ated by the state, is largely restricted to the major
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The Central Bank is responsible for implementing
exchange regulations, and state trading organizations
oversee imports. The official exchange rate is $3.20 to
the Iraqi dinar. Iraq's tightening foreign exchange
position forced it to devalue the dinar 5 percent last
October to trim import spending.
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I
History and Society
Iraq's history is marked by extended periods of for-
eign domination. Persians, Greeks, Romans, Mongols,
Turks, and British have ruled at times over Mesopota-
mia, and each has contributed to the cultural com-
plexity of a civilization that has flourished for more
than 5,000 years.
The Turks gained control of Iraq in 1534 and lost it
after World War I, when the Ottoman Empire was
dissolved. The San Remo Conference of 1920 as-
signed the mandate over Iraq to Great Britain. With
British support, an Iraqi monarchy was established
under King Faysal I in 1921. Iraq obtained formal
independence from Britain in 1932, and King Faysal
died the following year. Under the incompetent rule
of Faysal's son, Ghazi, who died in 1939, the Iraqi
military began to emerge as a significant force. The
military coup in 1958, led by Abd al-Karim Qasim,
during which King Faysal II was killed, virtually
eliminated the Iraqi upper class "old guard" from
politics and inaugurated the domination of Iraq by a
radical officer corps drawn primarily from the lower
middle class.
Qasim was overthrown in February 1963 by an
alliance of moderate officers and the Ba'th Party of
Iraq, which advocated Iraqi nationalism. Ba'thists
quickly outmaneuvered their moderate allies and in-
stituted one-party rule. The Ba'th Party was soon
seriously weakened by a split between its moderate
and militant factions.
The Ba'thists were ousted in an Army coup led by
Abd al-Salam Arif in November 1963. The regimes of
Abd al-Salam and of his brother, Abd al-Rahman
Arif constituted a period of relative stability, although
decisions increasingly were made by small cliques of
advisers. Many military elements felt excluded from
power, and the Army mounted another coup in July
1968. A Ba'th Party countercoup two weeks later
ousted the military leaders and consolidated the Ba'th
position under Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. During the late
1970s Bakr gradually was forced to yield power to his
deputy, Saddam Husayn al-Tikriti, who formally
replaced Bakr as President in July 1979.
The development of a stable national political and
social structure in Iraq is hampered by the country's
divergent ethnic and class groups, with different
backgrounds, deep-seated suspicions of each other,
and longstanding resentments. The most serious eth-
nic split is between the majority Arabs and the 18
percent of the population that is Kurdish. The Kurds
have been in a state of rebellion, punctuated by
occasional cease-fires, for decades. The country is also
split along religious lines between the Sunni (ortho-
dox) and Shia (schismatic) Muslims. The Shia major-
ity (55 percent) has always been dominated by the
Sunni minority, who control the government, Army,
and economy.
Family and class groupings also divide Iraqi society.
Many old values and habits undermine national unity
and political authority. Even in urban areas, the lower
class majority sees loyalty more in terms of the
extended family than of any political entity. Families
often seek arbitration of disputes from tribal leaders
while avenging real or believed wrongs without re-
course to the apparatus of governmental justice.
Power and Authority in Iraq
Party and government structures overlap in Iraq, with
the same individuals holding the top posts in each
structure. At the top of the government is the presi-
dent, who is also chairman of the nine-member Revo-
lutionary Command Council (RCC), which exercises
legislative and executive power by decree. The presi-
dent also heads the Ba'th Party, Iraq's only significant
political party, which he rules through the Regional
Command, a Soviet-style presidium. Separating the
organs of policy formulation, decisionmaking, and
execution is difficult. Adding to the difficulty is the
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Secret I
secretiveness of the Iraqi system. Decisionmaking is a
closely held and highly personal process, and the state
apparatus is authoritarian.
Structure of the Government
A complicated political and legal structure exists on
paper but bears little resemblance to reality. In
theory, supreme legislative and executive authority in
Iraq resides in the Revolutionary Command Council,
which elects the president, who then becomes RCC
chairman. It appoints the cabinet and ratifies laws
and treaties. It establishes the highest judicial bodies
in the land, supervises the affairs of the republic, and
issues binding decisions. The RCC has evolved since
its establishment in 1968; originally akin to a military
junta, it is now overwhelmingly civilian.
Theoretically sharing executive authority under the
constitution with the RCC is the president, who is also
the commander in chief of the armed forces. The
president has appointment powers and issues decrees
on matters of generally less import than those handled
by the RCC. Individual cabinet ministers are respon-
sible to the president as are several senior advisers
called presidential deputies. They appear primarily to
be technocrats and administrative officials. There is a
vice president who has mostly nonpolicymaking duties
and who does not automatically succeed to the presi-
dency. The National Assembly, Iraq's formal legisla-
tive body, plays no major role.
Who Rules Iraq?
In reality, a small handful of decisionmakers rules
Iraq, despite the elaborate formal structure of the
government and party. President Saddam Husayn and
a few close relatives and friends, aided by a ubiquitous
internal security apparatus, maintain a near monopoly
on power by holding all the key positions in the RCC
and Ba'th Party as well as such key ministries as
Interior and Defense. Saddam occasionally purges
and reorganizes the civilian and military leadership to
prevent potential rivals from developing independent
bases of support. RCC members frequently sit on
special courts to try persons charged with offenses
against the state.
Saddam's talent for survival has helped him climb to
a position of authority and remain there for 14 years
in a country notorious for its conspiratorial politics
and violent change. His whole political experience has
been grounded in secrecy and intrigue. Saddam's life
as a member of the underground in the 1950s and
1960s was interrupted by periods of imprisonment and
exile. Saddam's leadership style reflects lessons
learned during these formative years: be ruthless and
preemptive; get "them" before they get you; trust few
people-family, tribesmen, and Tikritis, plus a few
selected, but expendable, outsiders.
The dominance of the Ba'th Party by Saddam's
Tikriti clan goes far in explaining Iraqi political
dynamics. Institutions such as the Ba'th Party and the
military, which touch all levels of Iraqi society, play
important roles in legitimizing the exercise of power.
Nonetheless, individual and group loyalty based on
common family, tribal, and religious ties is still the
key to understanding politics in Iraq.
Internal Security
The Mukhabarat, the intelligence directorate headed
by Saddam's half brother Barzan Ibrahim, may be
one of the largest civilian government bodies, with
perhaps as many as 10,000 members. It has superviso-
ry authority over all other security mechanisms in
Iraq, including the directorates of military intelli-
gence and general security, as well as extensive
gional directorates of the Mukh-a6a--rat-northern,
central, and southern-are responsible for internal
opposition, particularly Shia dissidence and-Commu-
nist party activity. Another elite directorate, which
reports directly to Barzan, monitors the loyalty of
Mukhabarat officers. The organization also runs its
own staff college in Baghdad.
The Ba'th Party
The Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (Ba'th) is a
secular political party organized in 1943 by two
Syrians, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar. The
Ba'th split in 1966 when a leftwing faction of the
Ba'th seized power in Syria and forced moderate
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Secret
Ba'th elements to move to Beirut, where they stayed
until the Ba'th Party seized power in Baghdad in July
1968. The Ba'th Party of Iraq has dominated politics
in Iraq since then. The rival Iraqi and Syrian groups
coexist, officially ignoring each other and espousing a
similar, somewhat vague, leftwing philosophy based
on their own brand of socialism and Arab
nationalism.
The Ba'th Party has a history of clandestine activity
and, like the Communist party, is highly compartmen-
talized. The cell is the basic unit. Three to seven cells
make up a section. Above the sections are divisions
and then branches. The entire party structure in the
country (defined in party terms as a "region" of the
Arab "nation") is directed by a regional command in
which each branch is directly represented.
The Role of Ideology
Since coming to power in 1968, Ba'th leaders have
made skillful use of mass organizational techniques
and the media to secure public acquiescence to gov-
ernment policies. The government has stressed party
ideology to overcome the country's serious sectarian
and ethnic differences. Senior Iraqi leaders operate
within a powerful ideological framework, embodied in
the Ba'th Party motto, "Unity, Freedom, Socialism":
? A commitment to the eventual unity of the Arab
nation.
? A commitment to national independence, particu-
larly from superpower interference.
? A commitment to control the private economic
sector, particularly large industries, to prevent accu-
mulation of large profits.
These goals are buttressed by a,commitment to the
material and social progress of Iraq and all Arab
countries based on secular Arab nationalism.
In most cases the regime's claim to correct adherence
to Ba'th doctrine bolsters its authority in Iraq. The
political value of Ba'th doctrine has been undermined
in recent years, however, as Saddam has increasingly
concentrated power in his own hands and Iraq has
suffered the destabilizing effects of the war with Iran.
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Opposition
To combat possible subversion and contain opposition,
the Ba'th regime under Saddam Husayn uses unre-
mitting terror against real and suspected opponents.
Over the past two years, for example, security forces
have jailed, executed, or expelled from the country
more than 40,000 Iraqis-most of them Iranian-
origin Shias-Communists, and suspected members
of the Shia Dawa Party. The policy of repression has
succeeded in limiting serious opposition activity inside
Iraq. It has not prevented urban terrorism directed
against the Ba'th Party and government officials or a
modest upsurge of guerrilla activity in Iraqi
Kurdistan.
Both middle class and lower class Iraqis remain
potential sources of opposition to the regime, despite
major economic growth since the Ba'th came to power
in 1968. Many middle class Iraqis-particularly civil
servants and those who think of themselves as the
intelligentsia-remain dissatisfied with limited occu-
pational opportunities and low pay. Businessmen and
merchants are uncertain about the government's so-
cialist economic goals and have little confidence in the
regime's economic policies. The predominantly Shia
lower classes are volatile elements in Iraqi society.
Many have migrated to the large population centers
but have had difficulty finding employment and are
crowded into some of the worst slums in the Middle
East.
Cooperation Among Opposition Groups
Iraq's opposition groups are a diverse lot-renegade
Ba'thists and Communists, Sunnis and Shias, Arabs
and Kurds-but many share similar goals. These
include the opening up of the political process as well
as the overthrow of the government. They talk about
free elections, an open press, and representative insti-
tutions and profess to support Kurdish self-determina-
tion as well as equal rights for minority groups. Yet
they are unable to cooperate on the most elemental
level or to agree on a basic political program. None of
the opposition groups can overthrow the government
by itself, but together they would pose a formidable
threat, particularly the Kurds and the Shias, who 25X1
comprise about 75 percent of Iraq's population.
The Shia Opposition
Iraq's Shia community has long viewed itself as
politically disfranchised and economically disadvan-
taged. It has been excluded from power partly by
choice-Shias have opposed every Iraqi government
since the first one created by the British in 1920. The
Shias have been influenced by a small number of
religious leaders and itinerant divines, many of Irani-
an origin, who have lived in Iraq's holy cities of Najaf,
Karbala, Sammara, and Baghdad for generations.
The largest and most influential Shia opposition
group is the Dawa Party. It was founded in the 1960s
by young Shia activists unhappy with the continuing
pattern of discrimination and political repression.
Heavily supported by Iran, Dawa has balked at
working closely with other dissident elements.
Shia dissident activities in Iraq have increased since
early 1982 but remain episodic and more an irritant
than a threat. The operations appear to be limited to
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hit-and-run attacks on police p o s t s shoot-
ings in Baghdad and Al Basrah.
The Kurds
Iraq's Kurdish rebels have the greatest number of
armed supporters of all the dissident groups, perhaps
as many as 15,000. Their effectiveness, however, is
hampered by deep-seated enmity between leaders,
tribal differences, chronic infighting among factions,
and constant realignment.
Two factions dominate Iraqi Kurdish politics-the
Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patri-
otic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Their goals are
similar; both would accept an accommodation with
Baghdad in exchange for meaningful political and
economic autonomy and recognition of their party's
hegemony over the Kurdish community. Differences
between the two factions mostly concern rivalry for
leadership of Iraq's Kurds and competition for local
support. These have kept their leaders at odds for the
past decade and seem to preclude their cooperating
now.
Iraq's Kurdish dissidents have increased operations in
northern Iraq since the start of the Iran-Iraq war in
the hope of extracting political concessions from
Iraq's Kurds draw support from Iran and
Syria, as well as the Iraqi Communist Party.
Iraq's Communists
The Communist Party of Iraq (CPI), one of Iraq's
oldest political parties, is divided into several factions.
Most CPI factions are located outside Iraq except for
small bands of guerrillas who operate in the north
alongside the Kurdish groups, and a very small Shia
group possibly centered around Al Basrah.
Arrests, executions, defections, and factional infight-
ing since 1979 have decimated Communist ranks in
Iraq, but the party survives, especially in the Kurdish
north. The CPI has taken advantage of Baghdad's
preoccupation with its war with Iran to infiltrate
small groups for eventual guerrilla activities and is
trying to rebuild its domestic organization. Its leaders
meanwhile are in exile, discredited by the failure of
the party's Moscow-directed policy of the early 1970s
that called for cooperation with Ba'thists in a Nation-
al Front government.
CPI's apparent strategy is to cooperate with any and
all dissident factions while trying to unify them in a
common front against the government. The CPI has
partly succeeded in its first objective; it has made
common cause with Kurdish dissidents and may be
supplying them with arms and funds.
The second objective-unification of the anti-
Baghdad factions-has proved far more elusive. Jalal
Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,
has rejected Communist attempts to ally him or the
National Democratic and Patriotic Front (NDPF)
with the Barzanis, leaders of the Kurdish Democratic
Party. Shia religious leaders adamantly refuse to
consider joining forces with either the Communists or
the various, vaguely defined Arab leftists.
Moscow is sheltering much of the Iraqi Communist
Party leadership and facilitating communication be-
tween party leaders in exile and cadre still in the
region. The Soviets seem reluctant to intervene in the
party's leadership crisis. Moscow would probably
prefer a new leadership that would combine elements
of the Kurdish and Shia groups still active in Iraq.
Foreign Involvement
Iraq's dissidents are vying for support from the same
principal sources-Iran, Syria, and Libya. The com-
petition for foreign money and arms is not only
between factions but from within the same movement
as well:
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The Soviets provide safehaven in Moscow and Eastern
Europe for Communist party exiles and Kurdish
leftists but do not appear to be directly aiding or
arming Iraqi opposition groups. The Kurds as well as
the Communists and the Shia factions have Soviet-
made weapons, but these are supplied for the most
part by Syria, Libya, and pro-Soviet Palestinian
groups or stolen from Iraqi units. Nevertheless, Bagh-
dad suspects that the Soviet and East European
assistance flowing to the dissidents comes with Mos-
cow's blessing and instructions.
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Iraq's longest war, which began with its invasion of
Iran in September 1980, has provided a severe test of
the loyalty and combat capability of all elements of
the Iraqi armed forces. After initial success against an
ill-prepared enemy, Iraqi weaknesses in command,
troop morale, and tactical planning negated Iraqi
superiority in weapons and equipment, permitting the
Iranians to seize the initiative and drive Iraqi forces
back to the border.
At the same time, Iraq's armed forces have remained
loyal to the regime even under difficult circumstances
and have retained their organizational integrity and
fighting capability. To some extent this is a product of
Saddam Husayn's purges of officers and the presence
in the military of politically reliable officers and
personnel from the military Directorates of Political
Guidance and Intelligence.
Iraq's Air Force has played only a minor role in the
evolution of the war and has been more effective in
attacking soft, high-profile, strategic targets such as
population centers. The Air Force has been ineffective
in supporting ground force operations, blunting moves
by Iranian forces, or cutting supply lines. For its part,
the Iraqi Navy demonstrated weakness relative to the
Iranian Navy. Its poor performance underscored the
need to significantly expand Iraq's fleet.
Although influenced for many years by British train-
ing and military equipment, Iraq immediately after
the revolution in 1958 turned to the Soviet Union for
assistance. Since then, Iraqi forces have taken on
many of the characteristics of the Soviet armed forces
in the areas of command and control, training proce-
dures, tactical planning, and battlefield execution.
Because of political disagreements with the Soviets
and concerns about Soviet reliability, the Iraqi regime
in the late 1970s began to diversify its sources of
military supply by turning to Western Europe-
particularly France-for new weapon systems (for
example, Mirage F-1 fighter aircraft, Roland surface-
to-air missiles, and naval ships). The Soviet Union's
arms embargo imposed at the beginning of the war
encouraged Baghdad to diversify its sources of arms
further. Substantial arms contracts were signed with
China in the spring of 1981. The Soviet Union
resumed arms deliveries in the spring of 1981 but had
to share the Iraqi market with Western Europe and
China.
Army
Iraq's regular Army of some 350,000 men is the
largest army in the Middle East. Most of these are
normally positioned to defend the border with Iran,
The Army also is responsible for defending the
country's border with Syria. Internally, Kurdish dissi-
dents, assisted by Iran and other foreign countries,
continue to tie down some Iraqi units in the north.
The Army is divided into four corps, each with a
primary geographic area of responsibility-the first
corps in the north, the second in the central border
area, and the third and fourth in the south. Most units
have deployed during the war to defend those fronts
most seriously threatened. Their permanent location
will
war.
During the war with Iran, the Army has had a mixed
record, performing poorly inside Iran as the war has
dragged on, but defending Iraqi territory well in the
face of determined Iranian attacks.
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I
Air Force
Iraq boasts an Air Force of more than 400 fighter-
bombers, most of them Soviet made, and some 400
jet-qualified pilots. Iraq has the full range of Soviet
combat aircraft in its inventory, including helicopters
and 16 bombers. Recently, the Air Force has been
strengthened by the addition of French-built helicop-
ters and Mirage F-1 interceptors.
In the war with Iran, the Air Force has demonstrated
a limited capability to defend Iraqi airspace against a
greatly weakened Iranian Air Force and a marginal
ability to carry out offensive strikes against strategic
military and economic targets inside Iran. Its capabil-
ity to support tactical ground operations is negligible.
Iraq has lost more than 100 aircraft in the war.
Fighter aircraft pilots are handicapped by Soviet
doctrine, which does not encourage pilot flexibility
and initiative. In recent years, however, a significant
number of pilots have received training in Western
Europe, Egypt, Pakistan, and India.
The Air Force became more effective during the
second year of the war. Pilots gained more confidence
in their abilities as their operations over Iran were less
effectively countered by the deteriorating Iranian Air
Force.
Air defense forces have been equipped with Soviet
SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-6s and, more recently, with
French Roland surface-to-air missiles. Their primary
mission is to provide a thorough defense for Baghdad,
point defense of airfields and other selected strategic
installations, and some area coverage along the south-
ern portion of the Iran-Iraq border. Despite Iraq's
elaborate air defense network, Iranian fighter-bomb-
ers were able to penetrate Iraqi airspace to attack
targets well inside the country, including Baghdad.
Iraqi air defense units have appeared to improve
marginally as the war has gone on, successfully
engaging Iranian aircraft over Baghdad.
Navy
Iraq's small Navy is unable to challenge even Iran's
weakened fleet for control of the Gulf. Its patrol boats
are capable only of small-scale raids and coastal
Iraq plans to substantially upgrade its fleet.
Most of the Navy has been trained by the Soviets
either in the Soviet Union or in Iraq. Pakistani,
Indian, and East European
academy at Al Basrah.
Paramilitary Organization
Iraq's mobile police force of some 20,000 personnel is
responsible for maintaining internal security. It is
equipped with small arms and a mixture of Soviet and
European light armored vehicles.
The Border Guard Force of some 50,000 men in 11
brigades is responsible for helping the Army provide
security in the border areas. Border Guard units have
been active in the Kurdish areas and have assisted the
Army in operating against Iran during the war. They
too are equipped primarily with small arms and light
armored vehicles.
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The People's Army, formed in 1970 as an instrument
of the Ba'th Party to protect the regime, has evolved
into a reserve military force currently composed of
several hundred thousand men and women. Iraq
claims that the force will eventually include some half
million recruits. Most training is given by regular
small unit tactics.
Army personnel at their facilities and emphasizes
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Secret
Foreign Relations
t
Iraq's foreign policy is driven by Iraqi efforts to
extricate itself from its war with Iran and regain a
position of leadership in the Arab world. Saddam
Husayn will also continue expanding relations with
Western countries, including the United States, and
lobby for a larger Iraqi role in the Nonaligned
Movement.
Baghdad's foreign policy has moved away from a
radical, isolationist, and left-leaning line since the late
1970s to a more pragmatic and nonaligned course.
Economic development goals have led Baghdad to
turn more to the West and to the richer, moderate
Arab states. This trend has been reinforced by the
costly war with Iran. The Soviet Union and radical
Arab states have not proved dependable in Baghdad's
eyes, while the West Europeans and moderate Arabs
have been supportive politically and financially. Iraq's
leadership ambitions in the Arab and nonaligned
worlds, however, will continue to foster policies irri-
tating to Western and moderate Arab interests, espe-
cially once the war with Iran ends.
The War With Iran
The Iraq-Iran war is only the most recent manifesta-
tion of a historical enmity and competition for region-
al dominance. When the war ends, it will be followed
by a fragile peace that probably will leave one of the
parties bitter and intent on altering the outcome at
the first opportunity.
Nonetheless, Baghdad and Tehran have enjoyed peri-
ods of relative calm and accommodation in their
relations. Such a period began in 1975 with the
signing of the Algiers Accord, which effectively ended
the latest round of Kurdish rebellion. The calm was
broken with the revolution in Iran, which rekindled
efforts by each side to undermine the other. Fearing
the effects of the revolution on its own Shia popula-
tion, Iraq began aiding Iranian exiles and dissidents in
Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980 in the hope of
precipitating the overthrow of the Khomeini regime.
Publicly, it declared three less ambitious goals: Irani-
an recognition of Iraqi claims to disputed border
territories and the Shatt al Arab waterway, an Irani-
an pledge to refrain from interfering in Arab affairs,
and the return to Arab control of three Gulf islands
that the Shah had occupied in 1971. As the war has
dragged on, even these goals have proved unattain-
able, and Iraq is now faced with substantial Iranian
demands, including war reparations, the return of tens
of thousands of Iranian-origin Iraqis exiled to Iran,
and at times even a new government in Baghdad. Iran
retains the initiative in the war and will determine
when it ends.
Relations With the West
Iraq began restoring contacts with the West in the
mid-1970s in order to establish more balanced rela-
tions between East and West. Substantial economic
ties with France began with an agreement to sell Iraq
a nuclear reactor and fighter aircraft. Strong com-
mercial ties have since been established with Japan,
West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, and
firms from these nations participate in an array of
industrial, agricultural, and social development proj-
ects. Italy also has become a key source of arms and
nuclear assistance.
The Iraqis cite relations with France as a model for
other Western industrial states. Saddam views Paris
as a reliable and politically acceptable partner; in
contrast to the USSR, France expedited arms ship-
ments and sent technicians to maintain French equip-
ment at the outset of the war with Iran. Paris, for its
part, would like to ensure access to Iraqi oil and
establish a long-term market for military equipment.
their activities against the Khomeini regime.
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Relations With the USSR and Eastern Europe
Iraq's close relationship with the USSR began in 1958
when Moscow hurried to recognize and support the
revolutionary Qasim regime and establish a major
presence in Iraq. Relations started to sour in the mid-
1970s despite a formal friendship treaty and strong
Soviet economic and military aid programs. Tradi-
tionally suspicious of Soviet motives, Iraq was uneasy
about Soviet activity in Afghanistan, South Yemen,
and the Horn of Africa and suspected Soviet med-
dling in Iran. Moscow was angered by Iraqi repression
of the Soviet-supported Iraqi Communist Party.
Growing economic independence during this period
gave Baghdad the opportunity to follow a more
nationalistic course. The USSR's six-month arms
.embargo after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in
September 1980 and its close relations with Iraq's
archenemy Syria brought Iraqi-Soviet relations to a
new low. Relations only superficially improved follow-
ing Moscow's lifting of its arms ban in the spring of
1981.
Iraq's estrangement from the USSR is likely to
endure after the war. Baghdad wants to reduce Soviet
political leverage by diversifying Baghdad's arms
suppliers. The Iraqis remain worried about Soviet
expansionism in the region, particularly in the wake of
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They resent Mos-
cow's support for rebellious Iraqi Communists and
have been dissatisfied with the quality of civilian
goods and services provided by the USSR and its East
European clients.
Baghdad has made a special effort, however, to
maintain good ties with energy-poor East European
states such as Yugoslavia and Romania. They are
attractive political partners and sources of arms and
spare parts for the largely Soviet-equipped Iraqi
military.
Relations With the Arab States
The Iraq-Iran war forced Baghdad to be more accom-
modating to the moderate Arabs. These states, led by
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait, have provided
Iraq with more than $25 billion in financial aid, as
well as logistic and political support. Iraq has respond-
ed by muting traditional hardline views on regional
issues, including the Fahd peace plan, Jordan-PLO
relations, and US military ties. Relations with Egypt,
which hit a low poini after Egypt's signing of the
Camp David accords, have improved steadily in 1982,
largely as a result of Iraq's appeal for Arab support in
the war with Iran.
Iraq's major Arab rivalry is with Syria. Political
competition since the Ba'th Party split in 1966 has
bred deep distrust, with each claiming to be the
legitimate representative of pan-Arab Ba'thism. In
pursuit of these claims, each has sponsored coup plots
and assassinations against the other. Differing atti-
tudes on negotiations with Israel, disputes over Eu-
phrates River water resources, and religious sectari-
anism also create discord.
Attitude Toward Israel
Despite deep Iraqi opposition to Zionist activities in
Palestine since the 1930s, Iraq has played only a
minor military role in Arab-Israeli wars. Iraq has
maintained a firm rejectionist foreign policy-depict-
ing Israel as the ultimate enemy of the Arabs and a
tool of the United States-and has not accepted UN
Resolution 242 or the Camp David accords. Iraq has
also provided financial and political support to radical
elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Growing Iraqi ties with the moderate Arabs, particu-
larly Jordan, may account for recent Iraqi willingness
to support more moderate elements in the PLO and to
support Jordanian efforts to seek a negotiated settle-
ment to the Arab/Israeli conflict. Deep mutual hostil-
ity between Israel and Iraq remains, however, and
was exacerbated by Israel's bombing of the Iraqi
nuclear reactor in June 1981. Iraq will continue to
seek ways to assuage its humiliation and try to deepen
Israel's isolation in the United Nations and other
international organizations.
Relations With the Third World
Iraq has attempted to project itself as a leading
nonaligned state. Deeply suspicious of the United
States and the USSR, Saddam continues to see
nonaligned forums as useful vehicles for condemning
superpower interventions throughout the Third World
and to lobby for economic and political independence,
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11
including the nationalization of foreign-owned enter-
prises in Third World countries. Having lost the
opportunity to act as host to the Nonaligned Summit
in 1982 and fill the chairmanship of the movement for
the next three years, Baghdad will lobby hard to hold
the next summit meeting in 1985.
In 1980 Iraq disbursed nearly $1 billion in foreign aid
to Third World countries in an effort to enhance its
own position. The drop in oil revenues because of the
war probably has reduced Baghdad's disbursements,
even though Iraq apparently has tried to maintain
them using aid it receives from the Gulf states.
r
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Secret
The United States has not had formal diplomatic
relations with Iraq since 5 June 1967, the beginning of
the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War. Iraq not only severed
diplomatic relations with Washington but suspended
oil shipments to the United States as part of the
OPEC oil embargo, refused permission for US com-
mercial aircraft to overfly Iraq, and established a
boycott of US goods.
Relations have improved slowly as Iraq has sought to
reduce its economic and military dependence on the
Soviet Union and increase Western financing of Iraq's
economic development. Since 19 September 1972 the
United States has maintained an Interests Section in
the Belgian Embassy in Baghdad. This section has a
staff of 15 and includes an American Commercial
Office and a Consular Office, which offer support to
American businessmen. Approximately 250 Ameri-
cans-mostly businessmen-live in Iraq, and 24
American firms have branches or offices there.
Expanding US-Iraqi ties are limited largely to com-
mercial and economic areas. In 1973 the Iraqi Gov-
ernment revoked its six-year ban on US imports. US
firms have received large contracts for petrochemical
plants, oilfield development, and offshore tanker ter-
minals. In 1981 the Iraqis further expanded opportu-
nities for US businesses in Iraq by allowing participa-
tion in the annual Baghdad International Trade Fair.
Baghdad purchases large quantities of American agri-
cultural products and has a growing appetite for
sophisticated industrial goods and technology. US
firms will probably play a significant role in recon-
struction of the oil sector severely damaged by the
war. Still, Japanese and European firms continue to
have more success than Americans in Iraq. In 1981
US exports to Iraq totaled $914 million. Japan's
exports to Iraq during the same period totaled $3
billion, those from West Germany were $2.9 billion,
and from France $1.5 billion.
Iraq has shown interest in improving diplomatic rela-
tions with the United States since mid-1980. In April
1981 the US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Middle
East Affairs was the first senior US official to pay an
official visit to Iraq since the rupture of Iraqi-US
relations in 1967. As a result of that visit the Iraqi
Government now deals with the head of the US
Interests Section as though he were a fully accredited
Ambassador.
Despite the revived Iraqi interest in normal relations
and shared concerns over the course of the Iranian
revolution, a resumption of full diplomatic ties with
the United States is not likely in the near future. Iraq
is still suspicious of US intentions in the Persian Gulf
and remains committed to eliminating superpower
influence in the area and in the Arab world. It is
sensitive to Iranian charges that Iraq has become a
US "tool" in the region. The major stumblingblock to
normalization is the Arab-Israeli dispute. Iraq contin-
ues to view US support for Israel as inimical to the
interests of Iraq and the Arab world.
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Husayn, Saddam In July 1979 Saddam Husayn formalized his de facto position as Iraq's strongman
by ousting Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and replacing him as President, chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council, and secretary general of the Ba'th Party. The
primary architect of Iraq's authoritarian political system, he is the dominant force
directing Iraqi domestic and-foreign policy. His control of the ruthless and
effective security network developed during his rise to power and his intolerance of
opposition have concentrated power in the hands of a small inner circle of loyalists
and kinsmen. Saddam, 45, is a Sunni Muslim.
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Chronology
647 Arabs establish caliphate in Baghdad.
1253 Mongol invasions launch prolonged, political chaos, economic depression, and
social disintegration.
1509 Persian Shia Safavids conquer Iraq.
1534-1918 Ottoman rule.
1918 British establish control over all Iraq.
1920 Mandate for Iraq is awarded to United Kingdom at the San Remo Conference.
1921 Hashemite monarchy is established by British under King Faysal.
1930 Treaty with Britain provides for 25-year alliance.
1932 Iraq achieves independence and membership in the League of Nations.
1953 King Faysal II crowned.
1955 Iraq becomes a signatory to Baghdad Pact.
February 1958 Iraq and Jordan federate into new state called the Arab Union; Faysal II of Iraq is
titular head of state.
Small group of Army officers, led by Abd al-Karim Qasim, revolt and assassinate
the King; new Iraqi Republic dissolves the Arab Union, withdraws from the
Baghdad Pact, and concludes defense treaty with United Arab Republic (union of
Egypt and Syria).
June 1961 Qasim claims Kuwait as an integral part of Iraq.
August 1961 Kurds under the leadership of Mulla Mustafa Barzani begin an armed revolt
against the central government.
February 1963 Qasim is killed in military coup led by the Ba'th Party; Abd al-Salam Muhammad
Arif is appointed President.
April 1963 Unity agreement (Cairo Charter) is signed, calling for an enlarged United Arab
Republic made up of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.
June 1963 UAR President Nasir announces his refusal to implement the Cairo Charter
because of Ba'th Party control of the Syrian Government.
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November 1963
July 1964
September 1965
April 1966
June 1966
January 1970
April 1972
March 1975
1977
October 1978
July 1979
August 1979
22 Septemer 1980
April 1981
Iraq renounces claim laid to Kuwait by Qasim; Kuwait grants loan to Iraq.
Following internal conflict within the Ba'th Party, Army seizes control and
dissolves National Guard; Arif remains President.
All banking and insurance operations, the three major trading companies, and all
important industrial firms, except the Iraq Petroleum Company, are nationalized.
Attempted coup by pro-Nasirist Prime Minister Arif Abd al-Razzaq fails; Razzaq
flees to Cairo.
President Abd al-Salam Arif is killed in helicopter crash; his brother Abd al-
Rahman Arif succeeds him as President.
Cease-fire reached between rebellious Kurds and government forces.
Iraqi airfields attacked and some Iraqi planes destroyed during Arab-Israeli war.
Iraqi troops enter Jordan but do not engage in battle. Relations with the United
States are broken because of Arab charges of US aid to Israel.
Young officers collaborate with the moderate wing of the Ba'th Party to overthrow
the Arif government; officers are ousted in turn by the Ba'th, whose leader,
Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, becomes President.
Iranian-backed coup attempt fails.
Iraq-USSR Friendship Treaty signed.
Iran-Iraq Treaty settling border disputes signed in Algiers.
Iraq and Kuwait reach tentative border agreement.
Syria and Iraq sign "charter for joint national action" against Egyptian/ Israeli
peace efforts.
Unification talks with Syria begin.
Saddam Husayn replaces Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr as President and Chairman of
RCC.
Saddam launches major purge of government leadership, arresting 67 senior
officials and executing 21 for treason.
Iraq invades Iran, and full-scale war begins.
US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Middle East Affairs makes official visit to
Baghdad-the first senior US official to do so since 1967.
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7 June 1981
15 September 1981
June 1982
Israeli planes attack and destroy Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor.
Iraq's Ismat Kittani chosen president of the 36th UN General Assembly.
Iranian troops force Iraq to withdraw from Iranian territory.
1
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Statistical Summary
Land 445,480 km;2 18 percent cultivated, 68 percent desert, waste, or urban, 10 percent
seasonal and other grazing land, 4 percent forest and woodland.
Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 nm.
Population: 14,034,000 (July 1982).
Average annual growth rate: 3.3 percent.
Ethnic divisions: 70.9 percent Arabs
18.3 percent Kurds
2.4 percent Turkomans
0.7 percent Assyrians
7.7 percent other
Religion: 55 percent Shia Muslim
40 percent Sunni Muslim
5 percent Christian or other
Language: Arabic, Kurdish
Literacy: 20 to 40 percent
Labor force: 3.1 million (1977)
30-percent Agriculture
27-percent Industry
21-percent Government
22-percent Other
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Government Legal name: Republic of Iraq
Capital: Baghdad
Type: Republic. National Front government consisting of Ba'th Party and pro-
administration Kurds; Communists play no role in government.
Political subdivisions: 18 provinces under centrally appointed officials.
Legal system: based on Islamic law in special religious courts, civil law system
elsewhere; provisional constitution adopted in 1968.
Government leaders: President Saddam Husayn Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti; Deputy
Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri.
Suffrage: universal.
Communists: estimate 2,000 hardcore members.
Political or pressure groups: political parties banned, some opposition to regime
from disaffected members of the regime, Army officers, and religious and ethnic
dissidents.
Member of: Arab League, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, IFC, ILO,
IMF, ITU, NAM, OAPEC, OPEC, UN, UNESCO, UPU, WFTU, WHO,
WIPO, WMO, WSG, WTO
GNP: $31.3 billion (1981 estimate), $2,300 per capita.
Agriculture: dates, wheat, barley, rice, and livestock.
Major industry: crude petroleum; 1 million b/d (1981); petroleum revenues for
1981, $10.6 billion.2
Electric power: 3,450,000-kW capacity (1979); 9.4 billion kWh produced (1979),
715 kWh per capita.
Exports including oil: $10.8 billion (f.o.b., 1981 estimate); nonoil receipts, $200
million (estimate).
Imports: $20.7 billion (f.o.b., 1982 estimate); 14 percent from Communist
countries (1980).
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Major trade partners: exports-France, Italy, Brazil, Japan, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, USSR, other Communist countries; imports-West Germany, Japan,
the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, other Communist countries
(1977).
Budget: public revenue $17 billion, current expenditures $8.9 billion, development
expenditures $11.1 billion.
Monetary conversion rate: 0.31 Iraqi dinar = US $1.00 October 1982).
Communications Railroads: 1,700-km total; 1,123-km standard gauge, 575-km meter gauge.
Highways: 20,800-km total; 6,500-km paved, 4,650-km improved earth, 9,650-km
unimproved earth.
Inland waterways: 1,015 km; Shatt al Arab (when dredged) navigable by maritime
traffic for about 100 km; Tigris and Euphrates Rivers navigable by shallow-draft
steamers.
Ports: three major (Al Basrah, Umm Qasr, Al Faw).
Pipelines: 3,820 km crude oil; 585 km refined products; 1,360 km natural gas.
Civil air: 30 major transport aircraft.
Airfields: 79 total, 69 usable; 27 with permanent-surface runways; 36 with
runways 2,440 to 3,659 meters, 17 with runways 1,220 to 2,439 meters.
Telecommunications: good network consists of coaxial cables, radio relay links,
and radiocommunication stations, 320,000 telephones (2.5 per 100 population.);
nine AM radiostations, 13 TV stations; one satellite station with Atlantic Ocean
and Indian Ocean antennas.
Defense Forces Military manpower: males 15 to 49, 2,981,000; 1,659,000 fit for military service;
about 146,000 reach military age (18) annually.
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