MEXICAN POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00855R000100190002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Mexican Policy Toward
Central America
State Dept. review completed
Secret
ALA 82-10131
September 1982
Copy 335
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Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
Mexican Policy Toward
Central America
This assessment was prepared b
Central America Working Group, Middle
America/Caribbean Division, Office of African
and Latin American Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Middle America/Caribbean Division, ALA, on
Secret
ALA 82-10131
September 1982
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Secret
Mexican Policy Toward
Central America
Key Judgments Mexico's assistance in toppling the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in mid-
Information available 1979 signaled a new course of providing diplomatic, political, and economic
as of 15 September 1982 aid to leftist governments and revolutionary movements and further
was used in this report.
distancing itself from conservative governments in the region. This shift
marked a significant departure in the level of Mexican activity and extent
of its commitment in Central America. 25X1
The intellectual foundation of Lopez Portillo's policy, which reflects
broadly shared beliefs within the Mexican governing elite, combines a
pragmatic calculation of Mexico's national interest and historically rooted
sympathy for revolutionary movements. The slowing of revolutionary
momentum in Central America in recent months-although causing some
reassessment-has not altered Mexico's contention that sooner or later the
radical left will come to power in much of the region. The fact that the
Mexican Government does not feel threatened by this prospect stems
partly from its view that revolutionary leaders are young, impressionable,
and susceptible over time to moderating influences from abroad.
We believe that Lopez Portillo, in line with his own social democratic 25X1
leanings, would prefer that the less extreme elements in the revolutionary
coalitions dominate. But his confidence in Mexico's ability to reach an
arrangement even with radical governments is reinforced by the longstand-
ing ties Mexico has had with Castro's Cuba.
President-elect de la Madrid is publicly on record that he agrees with the
basic thrust of his predecessor's approach toward Central America. We
expect, therefore, that Mexican policy will remain divergent from that of
the US after he takes office this December. Shades of difference between
the two presidents' policies are likely to emerge over the next few years,
however; and de la Madrid, in our view, probably will temper Lopez
Portillo's activism in some instances. This judgment is based on our belief
that the restraints on Mexican policy will increase during the next
administration. 25X1
Mexico's serious economic difficulties are bound to absorb de la Madrid's
attention for the foreseeable future, and Mexico's growing need for US
economic cooperation should lead to greater caution in undertaking
Secret
ALA 82-10131
September 1982
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initiatives in Central America that would strain bilateral relations. Con-
servative groups at home, especially the private. sector and the military,
increasingly worry that turmoil in the region will affect Mexico's security;
we expect these conservatives to become more assertive-and probably
more influential-under de la Madrid. Other factors are the cool-to-hostile
response in Latin America to Mexico's policy, growing skepticism about
Central American revolutionaries-especially Nicaragua's Sandinistas-
among some West European governments and parties that have cooperated
with Mexico, and the strain on Mexico's foreign assistance programs
caused by its economic crunch.
Prospects for narrowing differences between US and Mexican policy are
least promising, in our view, in regard to Nicaragua. Despite his misgivings
over Sandinista repression and Cuban influence, Lopez Portillo has shown
no inclination to reduce Mexico's political or economic aid to Managua,
which he has labeled a "true cornerstone" of Mexican foreign policy. De la
Madrid has promised to continue the aid, but there are tentative indica-
tions that he may be more inclined to use Mexico's resultant leverage to try
to moderate Sandinista actions. Defense of Nicaragua-like that of
Cuba-is rapidly becoming an integral part of the ruling party's revolu-
tionary tradition
With Guatemala bordering it on the south, Mexico has a less romantic
view of the revolutionary movement there.
Madrid, meanwhile, has signaled his intention to provide a "model of
coexistence" in Mexico's relations with Guatemala,
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Mexico's favorable attitude toward Honduras's restoration of a democratic
process is qualified by concern that Tegucigalpa is aiding the Salvadoran
counterinsurgency effort and harboring anti-Sandinista insurgents that
have been harassing the Nicaraguan Government. We believe that Mexico
probably will remain careful, however, not to line up against Honduras in
its dispute with Nicaragua.
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Recent. Policies Toward the Region 1
Mexican Relations With Key Central American Countries 11
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Mexican Policy Toward
Central America
For the past three years or so, that is, throughout the
second half of the Lopez Portillo administration,
important differences between the United States and
Mexico over Central America have caused friction in
bilateral relations
ese i erences are a product of divergent interpre-
tations of the causes of political instability in the
region, the intentions of revolutionary leaders and
how best to moderate their behavior, the extent and
significance of Cuban and other Communist involve-
ment, and-perhaps most important-the conse-
quences of radical leftist victories for Mexican and,
ultimately, US security. In assessing Mexico's policies
and actions in Central America since the spring of
1979, this paper examines the motives for-and the
limits on-Mexican behavior, discusses the prospects
for Mexico's policy toward Central America after
Miguel de la Madrid takes power as President on
1 December, and analyzes the implications of this
transition for US policy toward the region. The
appendix provides a comprehensive review of the
evolution of Mexico's policy toward four Central
American countries, facin revolutionary unrest,
namely, Nicaragua Guatemala, and
Honduras.
Recent Policies Toward the Region
Mexico's support for the radical left in Central Amer-
ica is most dramatically demonstrated in the Nicara-
guan ases, but the bias is clear in
attitudes toward Guatemala and Honduras as well. F_
Support by the Lopez Portillo government for the
Sandinistas, generous even during the Nicaraguan
insurrection, has not faltered even when Mexico has
found itself out of step with Latin American and other
allies. Mexican leaders characterize their backing as
Mexico has paid relatively less attention to Honduras,
although Lopez Portillo has taken an active interest in
the transition to elected civilian government. His 25X1
basically supportive approach toward the Honduran
Government, however, gives way to overriding con-
cern when Honduran policies affect Nicaragua's San-
dinistas and El Salvador's revolutionary coalition. For
example, Lopez Portillo has on several occasions 25X1
unconditional, and their vocal defense of Nicaragua
tends to rise and fall with the Sandinistas' public
concern over US hostility. Nicaragua's international
respectability is bolstered considerably by Mexico's
stance, especially in Western Europe where many
governments look to Mexico for guidance on Latir.
By meeting with Guatemalan leaders-including for- 25X6
mer President Lucas-Lopez Portillo has made spo-
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called for the disbanding of Nicaraguan "counterrev-
olutionary" groups in Honduras and the US
Mexican Motives and Limitations
The late spring of 1979 represented a watershed in
Mexico's policy toward Central America. Beginning
with Mexico's assistance in toppling former Nicara-
guan President Somoza, the Lopez Portillo adminis-
tration embarked on a course of providing diplomatic,
political, and economic assistance to leftist govern-
ments and revolutionary movements and further dis-
tancing itself from conservative governments in the
region. Although consistent with the Mexican Gov-
ernment's sentiments toward Castro's Cuba and
Allende's Chile, this policy marked a significant
departure in level of activity and extent of commit-
ment. In adopting this approach, which in its broad
contours probably will guide at least the next adminis-
tration, the Lopez Portillo government based its ac-
tions on several deeply held beliefs and on a careful
assessment of Mexico's national interests.
Revolutionary Leftist Victories Are Inevitable. Presi-
dent Lopez Portillo and Foreign Secretary Castaneda
have publicly expressed their conviction that funda-
mental social change is inexorably under way in
Central America. Both men believe that the natural
outcome of the process-if it is permitted to run its
course-will be the emergence of regimes to the left
of anything currently existing in Latin America,
except Castro's Cuba. Guided by their political phi-
losophy-which resembles that of leftwing European
Social Democrats-and their longstanding abhor-
rence of rightwing military rule, Lopez Portillo and
Castaneda have said that they believe most Central
Americans will benefit from revolutionary transfor-
mation.
Mexico's staunch opposition to US intervention to
counteract revolutionary forces is, therefore, in part
morally inspired. It is given special emphasis by
Mexico's own historical experience with the US. It
also stems, however, from pragmatic calculations.
Mexican policymakers publicly have made clear that
they believe such outside intervention only delays the
inevitable and at the same time permits the more
doctrinaire elements in leftist coalitions to dominate.
Thus, they contend, efforts to thwart the revolution- 25X1
ary process, even if immediately successful, will, over
time, only produce eventual outcomes more radical
than those that would otherwise emerge.
Satisfied that the revolutionary tide in the region
cannot be stemmed, we believe Mexican policymakers
almost certainly have looked to their country's more
than 20-year relationship with Castro's Cuba as an
instructive precedent. Mexico's outspoken political 25X1
support, economic and technical cooperation,
has given Cuba a major
stake in maintaining rien - ' es and forgoing subver-
sive activities against the Mexican Government. We
believe Mexican leaders are mindful of the risks in
assisting takeovers in Central America by Cuban-
style governments-especially in Guatemala on their
southern border. From their perspective, however,
attempting to thwart the insurgents-and inevitably 25X1
failing-would needlessly invite externally supported
subversion against Mex1co.F_ 25X1
Revolutionaries Are Susceptible to Moderate
Influence. The willingness of Mexican policymakers
to run this risk partly reflects their benign view of
insurgent forces in Central America. It also stems
from confidence in Mexico's ability to moderate and
even co-opt radical groups-a view that has emerged
from dealings with domestic leftists. Lopez Portillo
and Castaneda have told US officials that they view
most insurgent leaders as, above all, nationalists-
men who will want to avoid repeating Cuba's mistakes
of excessive political dependence on the Soviet Union
and debilitating economic stagnation in favor of poli-
cies more in tune with their own domestic realities.
The Mexicans insist that early US pressure distorted
Castro's original intentions and forced him into the
Soviet camp. They argue, therefore, that a more
flexible strategy this time by Western governments
will moderate the radicalization of the region.
Underlying Mexico's perspective is the view that
many of the revolutionary leaders are young, impres-
sionable, even malleable-an interpretation that they
will not easily abandon judging from their continuing
tolerance for Sandinista actions and their lingering
view of Castro. For Mexican policymakers then, the
insurgents' lack of firmly rooted ideological beliefs,
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Mexican Foreign Secretary
Jorge Castaneda
The onset of Mexico's activism in Central America
coincides with the appointment of Jorge Castaneda as
Foreign Secretary in May 1979. He has been a key
force in shifting Mexican policy toward greater sup-
port for the revolutionary left. Disappointed at the
obstacles to more sweeping social transformation in
Mexico, Castaneda has told US officials that he
believes in bringing revolutionary situations in Cen-
tral America to a boil.
together with the support and patience of nonradical
governments, leave open the possibility for the emer-
gence in time in Central America of what Lopez
Portillo has labeled "third alternatives"-regimes less
radical than Cuba but better able in his words to
"implement egalitarian solutions than Mexico."F__
Political and Psychological Payoffs. We judge that,
in the view of the Lopez Portillo administration, the
risks inherent in a generally supportive approach
toward the radical left in Central America are offset
by immediate advantages to the government. At home
the policy has helped deflect potential leftist criticism
of the administration's shortcomings in socioeconomic
areas. It has also strengthened the government's
position in trying to appeal to politicized youth at a
is ess
skeptical than Lopez Portillo of Cuban-and even
Soviet-motives, and he has been instrumental in
promoting closer communications with Havana.
time of growing concern about sustaining public
support. Moreover, by fulfilling the government's
rhetorical commitment to its revolutionary heritage,
we believe that the approach has provided psychologi-
cal satisfaction to members of the Mexican governing
elite by assuring them of a policy that is to the left of
the US. 25X1
Internationally, the policy responds to a frequently
expressed belief by Mexican leaders that the country's
size entitles it to greater influence in shaping events in
the region than it exercised before 1979. In crafting a
strategy of assistance-short of military aid-to the
radical left, Mexican policymakers also hope to in-
crease Mexico's prospects for a leadership role on a
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ly young party activists deliberately failed to coordi-
nate their activities with their counterparts in the
Foreign Ministry, whom they view as "hidebound
diplomats. "
office was significantly expanded, and at least initial
new responsibilities, the staff of its international
as frequently as four times a year. Befitting the PRI ~
ragua's Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) but excluding guerrilla groups-and meets
ber parties-ranging from Social Democrats to Nica~
Lopez Portillo's sensitivity to potential criticism of
official Mexican contacts with the radical left in
Latin America has caused him to grant a new role in
foreign policy to the ruling Institutional Revolution-
ary Party (PRI). As president of the PRI from
February 1980 to March 1981, Gustavo Carvajal
took the lead in cultivating leftists in the region,
arguing that Mexico's objective was to strengthen
democratic elements within the revolutionary coali-
tions. To institutionalize these contacts, PRI spon-
sored the creation of the Permanent Conference on
Latin American Political Parties (COPPPAL) in Oc-
tober 1979. COPPPAL now has more than 29 mem-
broader international stage. By working independent- Limits on Mexican Policy. At the same time, several
ly of the US and Venezuela and challenging their factors have, in our view, restrained Mexican actions
thesis that a centrist alternative can be molded in in Central America
Central America, Mexico has been able to enhance its
image among West European and nonaligned states.'
This sensitivity has increased as the US has emphati-
cally demonstrated its determination to resist radical
leftist gains in the area. (s)
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We continue to believe that events over the past few
years have not caused Mexican leaders to revise their
fundamental assessment of the historical forces at
work in Central America. Nonetheless, the failure of
trends in some important instances to correspond to
their expectations has prompted misgivings. Most
notably, senior Mexican officials have privately ex-
pressed surprise at the massive turnout for elections in
March 1982 in El Salvador and at the inability of the
Salvadoran radical left to broaden its popular base
according to US Embassy sources.
Mexico s lack of success in rallying support
in the hemisphere for its Central American nolicv_ in
The well-publicized peace initiative that Lopez Por-
tillo unveiled last February-advocating direct US-
Nicaraguan talks and offering Mexico's good of-
fices-established the framework for Mexico's policy
toward Central America through 1 December when
he leaves office. In the midst of Mexico's most serious
economic crisis in modern history, Lopez Portillo
continues to be buoyed by the international acclaim
given his prescription for easing tension in the region.
He underscored this point-while emphasizing that
US cooperation on economic matters will not cause
his government to alter its foreign policy-by giving
prominent treatment in his 1 September 1982 State of
the Nation address to a defense of his policy toward
Central America and Cuba. 25X1
Lopez Portillo's recent success in persuading Venezu-
elan President Herrera Campins to join in trying to
promote a dialogue between Nicaragua and Honduras
presumably has given new impetus to his goal of
acting as a peacemaker in the region. We believe that
Lopez Portillo's desire to build his image as a states-
man and his conviction that history will vindicate his
policies will ensure that his government will push
actively for support of his proposals during the re-
maining weeks of his term. 25X1
Lopez Portillo's nationalization of the domestic banks
on 1 September and his subsequent moves to rally 25X1
support among leftwing groups in the Institutional
ca. The quixotic nature of the Mexican President's 25X1
Revolutionary Party (PRI) have raised concerns that
he will take equally dramatic steps in Central Amer--
recent actions make it difficult to rule out entirely a 25X1
radical new Mexican foreign policy initiative
Lopez Portillo would have to weigh the domestic
benefits of solidifying his credentials with leftists
inside and outside the PRI against the risks of
antagonizing the military at a time when social unrest
is a growing danger. 25X1
Based on de la Madrid's relatively extensive public
and private comments, we do not anticipate a major
overhaul of Mexico's policy toward Central America
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Excerpts from Lopez Portillo's 1 September 1982
State of the Nation speech regarding Central Ameri-
ca and US policy toward the region.
On El Salvador: "Today when it is already evident
that no other solution [than negotiation] is feasible,
our proposal [the Franco-Mexican declaration of
August 1981] grows even more realistic and has
become a call of alarm. "
On Nicaragua: "In good times and in bad, we have
remained at the side of our Nicaraguan brothers.
Their government, supported by their people, has
fulfilled its commitments.... Don't let it be besieged
by economic pressures or threatened with armed
intervention by artificial dissidents. Leave it alone.
To paraphrase Lincoln, I insist that no country is so
good that it can intervene in another without its
consent."
after Lopez Portillo leaves office. We nonetheless
believe that the odds are better than even that over
the next two years or so de la id will temper
somewhat Mexico's approach
We
look for de la Madrid-like Lopez Portillo in the early
stages of his presidency-to pursue initially policies
that emphasize social reconciliation, improved rela-
tions with the US, and relatively less attention to
On Cuba: "We rejected isolation and strengthened
the ties that historically link us to those heroic
people. Since 1980 we have carried out secret efforts
seeking the end of the absurd silence that prevails
between the great nations [the US and Cuba] that are
separated by only 150 kilometers of the Caribbean.
We have also warned, however, that greatness is not
equivalent to either force or size and that the differ-
ences between Cuba and the US make reciprocal
restraint and responsibility obligatory. "
On Lopez Portillo's 21 February peace proposal: "It
is evident to all that the alternative to negotiation
was and is regional war. We assumed our obligation
of doing everything possible to avert the disaster....
No one can ever reproach Mexico for not doing
everything possible to avoid the cataclysm. "
foreign policy. In this framework, we believe it partic-
ularly likely that de la Madrid will eschew splashy
initiatives that promote confrontation with Washing-
ton and heighten political polarization at home,
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Our estimate of de la Madrid's probable stance on
foreign policy issues is based in part on his back-
ground. Although his foreign policy experience is
largely derived from his international economic exper-
tise, de la Madrid has a greater initial familiarity with
the US than Lopez Portillo-a fact underscored by
his fluency in English and his graduate education at
Harvard. Widely viewed as slightly right of center on
political and economic issues, de la Madrid in Sep-
tember 1981 was greeted enthusiastically as the rul-
ing party's presidential candidate by the business
community, whose leaders continue to hold him ir25X1
high esteem. Senior military leaders, many of
In addition-and of special importance-
Mexico's economic difficulties should not only absorb
the bulk of de la Madrid's energy but should, in our
view, reinforce his desire for cordial relations with the
US. ~
whom Shope to
have a greater voice on national security matters,
have also been heartened. US Embassy sources report
that leftists inside and outside the ruling party resent-
ed his selection. During the campaign de la Madrid
succeeded in patching up differences with the party'
left wing-especially with labor leaders, who are
likely to judge de la Madrid far more on his economic
policies than on what he does in Central America..
25X1
Bernardo Sepulveda, who is widely regarded as the
leading candidate to head the Foreign Ministry under
de la Madrid, is a strong Mexican nationalist but-in
the view of the US Embassy-is more moderate than
Castaneda and generally balanced on issues involving
the US and Mexico. Currently serving as Ambassador
to the US-where he was sent to gain additional 25X1
experience-the 40-year-old Sepulveda was de la
Madrid's chief foreign policy adviser during the early
stages of the campaign. He demonstrated in 1975 an
early interest in the US by helping to establish an
American Studies program at a Mexican research
center. 25X1 25X6
Although the new president will want to avoid alienat-
ing the party's left wing by any sharp reversal in
Central America, we judge that his more conservative
instincts, together with his desire to halt growing
political polarization, will make him more open than
Lopez Portillo to calls for moderation from the mili-
tary and the private sector.
As PRI's International Affairs Secretary-a post he
held from soon after de la Madrid's selection until
March-Sepulveda presented a COPPPAL (Perma-
nent Conference on Latin American Political Parties)
declaration in February that sharply criticized US
policy toward Central America. In addition, many of
the deputies he selected to assist him in Washington
are strong supporters of Mexico's present stance
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toward Central America. Sepulveda's first major
speech after becoming Ambassador, however, was
sufficiently pro-US to draw fire from the Mexican
press, and in so doing he
may have damaged his prospects or becoming foreign
secretary. UN Ambassador Porfirio Munoz Ledo is
also known to be seeking the post, but his ties to
former President Echeverria and others in the left
wing of the PRI militate against his selection, in our
judgment.
In his public remarks on foreign policy de la Madrid
has emphasized continuity with Mexican tradition
and with Lopez Portillo. In January 1982 he said that
he wants to maintain an "equilibrium" that will
enable Mexico to have "very cordial" relations with
the US, as well as "excellent friendships" with Cuba
and Nicaragua. Emphasizing that Latin America,
and especially Central America, will be his major
foreign policy priority, he stated in early June that he
would adhere to Mexico's fundamental tenets, name-
ly, self-determination-the right of each country to
choose its form of government, opposition to outside
intervention, and promotion of peaceful solutions. In
March he echoed Mexico's deep-rooted opposition to
US military intervention by stating that "unilateral
actions of the great powers for ideological and nation-
al security reasons create obstacles to real and demo-
cratic solutions."
Mexico's current economic crisis is not likely to have
a major impact on its Central American oil facility
but will reduce other credits that Mexico extends to
the area. In early August-on the eve of its second
devaluation this year-Mexico announced that it was
extending for a third year the same concessional
terms for its most important aid program, the joint oil
facility with Venezuela. By financing 30 percent of its
oil sales to nine countries in the Caribbean Basin in
1981, Mexico granted concessional terms worth an
estimated $190 million. Lopez Portillo cited the ex-
tension of this program in his 1 September speech in
emphasizing that Mexico's financial position would
not keep it from making~a regional aid commitment.
Because the deferred payments represent just 1.3
percent of Mexican oil exports, a change in the
program would not substantially increase revenues.
Moreover, it is unlikely Mexico would risk losing
these customers. On the contrary, recently Mexico
has been improving terms for other customers in an
attempt to boost its share of the world oil market. F
Defense of Nicaragua-like that of Cuba-is rapidly
becoming an integral part of the ruling party's revolu-
tionary tradition, and de la Madrid has been particu-
larly emphatic in stressing support for Nicaragua in
the face of what he perceives as growing US pressure.
In late June he publicly promised to reject foreign
military or political intervention in Nicaragua and to
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continue providing economic assistance.
At the same time, however, tentative evidence sug-
gests that de la Madrid will be more inclined to exert
leverage with the Sandinistas to get them to meet the
standards of a "third alternative."
Mexico has a duty to provide a "model of coexist-
ence" in its relations with Guatemala and that conse-
quently "our friendship and cooperation will in-
crease." A month later he promised not to allow any
trouble against Guatemala to be organized in Mexico.
Since Rios Montt took power in March 1982, de la
Madrid has reiterated these sentiments. Rios's will-
ingness to pursue a dialogue with the COPPPAL 25X1
affiliated Social Democratic Party is likely to rein-
force de la Madrid's desire to strengthen ties and may
lessen resistance from the left wing of the PRI.
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A decision by de ]a Madrid to reduce support for 25X1
revolutionaries in Central America-a decision we
would not expect early in his term-would be a clear
boost to US policy. It would also deal a significant
blow to Cuba and its allies, who since before the fall
of Somoza have counted on Mexico to help discredit
governments hostile to Havana and bolster the inter-
national legitimacy of the radical left.
If de la Madrid follows through with his apparent 25X1
intention to normalize relations with the Rios Montt
government, this would facilitate Guatemala's efforts
to improve its image in the US and Western Europe.
Such a move might thereby reduce opposition from
abroad to providing limited military assistance to
Guatemala and encouraging Spain to restore its Em-
bassy to the ambassadorial level.
It is in his public comments on Guatemala that de la
Madrid has been the most open in suggesting a
probable policy shift. In January he stated that
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Prospects for narrowing differences between US and
Mexican policy are least promising, in our view, in
regard to Nicaragua. On the one hand, Mexico may
become increasingly inclined to reduce its political
and economic support for the Sandinistas if their
pattern continues toward increasing repression of
moderate groups, more open identification with
Marxist-Leninist ideology, and growing reliance on
Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. At the same time, we
expect de la Madrid to fulfill his promise to provide
strong verbal support if he deems that the Sandinistas
are under US-inspired military pressure.
Mexico's stance toward the CBI.
The Lopez Portillo administration has maintained a 25X1
generally reserved attitude toward the US-sponsored
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Mexican officials
have praised US efforts to use economic assistance to
alleviate what they consider the underlying cause of
political instability but criticize the US for excluding
Cuba and Nicaragua as recipients. Mexico also points
to its major financial commitment to the Mexican-
Venezuelan oil facility to justify lack of interest in
contributing to the CBI. This reasoning, along with
Mexico's traditional desire to pursue policies toward
the region that are independent of the US, make it 25X1
unlikely, in our view, that de la Madrid will alter
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Appendix
Mexican Relations With
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Key Central American
Countries During the
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Lopez Portillo Administration
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Nicaragua The effort by Mexico and Costa Rica to persuade
Mexico's approach toward the Sandinistas represents other Latin American governments to cut their diplo-
the first test of Lopez Portillo's concept of supporting matic ties to Somoza succeeded when four other Latin
revolutionary movements as a "third alternative" in American governments did so. The Mexicans also
Latin Americaf took the lead in the Organization of American States
(OAS) on 23 June 1979 to defeat a US-supported
_]By offering an alternative pole of attraction,
we believe that Mexico is trying to encourage the
Sandinistas to avoid exclusive reliance on Cuba and
the Soviet Bloc. In our view, it also hopes over time to
persuade the Sandinistas to reach an accommodation
with their domestic opponents-although on FSLN
terms. Toward this end Mexic
has repeatedly counseled the Sandinistas
against eliminating political pluralism but has been
slow to use its leverage on this and other issues.
in recent months Mexi-
can leaders have been disquieted by the preeminent
influence Cuba has established in Nicaragua and the
Sandinista evolution toward totalitarianism. But we
judge that the prestige the Lopez Portillo government
has invested, coupled with its analysis of trends in the
region, will continue to prevent it from seriously
reexamining its present policy.
The Lopez Portillo
government's success in helping to topple Somoza
bolstered its confidence in pursuing an active policy in
Central America and set guidelines for support that it
subsequently has given to other Central American
revolutionaries. (c)
The Lopez Portillo administration's decision to break
relations with Somoza on 20 May 1979-at a time
when only Costa Rica had taken such a step-was a
major benchmark in Mexico's policy in the region.
peacekeeping presence in Nicaragua.
Courting the Sandinistas. After the Sandinistas took
power on 19 July 1979, Lopez Portillo quickly sent
Foreign Secretary Castaneda and party chief Carva-
jal to Nicaragua to determine the new government's
reconstruction needs. On 24 January 1980 the Mexi-
can President visited Nicaragua to firm up offers of
economic aid and to articulate publicly the basis of
Mexico's policy of "unconditional support." He un-
derscored his desire that Nicaragua represent a new
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nationalist revolutionary model independent of Cuba
and the US by publicly telling the Sandinistas that
they could be the "protagonists" of a new Latin
American future-a "third turning point." To accom-
plish this, he urged them-in what was to become a
recurring message-to avoid the "failings of the
Mexican and Cuban revolutions" by maintaining
liberty and pluralism along with justice, equality, and
security.
By implicitly linking Mexican assistance to the pres-
ervation of pluralism, Lopez Portillo doubtlessly
hoped to discourage the Sandinistas from establishing
an orthodox Communist regime.
Differences between Mexican and Venezuelan policy
toward Nicaragua help illuminate the kind of political
system the two regional powers have tried to promote.
Unlike Venezuela, whose diplomats have played a
major role in unifying and assisting moderate groups
in Nicaragua, Mexican
officials until recently have shied away from contacts
with regime opponents and continue to limit their
backing exclusively to the Sandinistas.
These differences highlight the fact that Mexican
policymakers do expect competitive democracy to
emerge in Nicaragua but, reflecting Mexico's own
domestic experience, would be content with a one-
party state where some marginal concessions, but no
real powersharing, were granted to opponents. Thus,
even those moves that the Mexican Government has
been willing to take in defense of political pluralism
have not been aimed at diluting Sandinista domina-
tion.
threatened by the US
co has supplied psychological comfort to the Sandinis-
tas by offering vocal public backing when they feel
Mexican officials have explained their efforts to de-
velop party-to-party links with the FSLN-bilaterally
and through the Permanent Conference of Latin
American Political Parties (COPPPAL}-as an im-
portant aspect of their strategy to try to moderate the
Sandinistas. By including, the FSLN in COPPPAL, a
largely social democratic grouping, the Mexicans
have provided the Sandinistas with an alternative to
alignment with Cuba and other Soviet allies. They
have been reluctant to use their influence in this
organization to pressure the Sandinistas, however,
even in the wake of a speech by National Directorate
member Humberto Ortega in August 1981, which
acknowledged that the Sandinistas rely on Marxist-
Leninism as their guide.
mains in power.
Pressures on Mexico To Reassess Its Policy. Growing
concern about Nicaraguan developments among im-
portant political forces in Mexico and West European
governments and parties has not caused any diminu-
tion in Mexican support to the Sandinistas, nor, in our
view, is it likely to at least as long as Lopez Portillo re-
Having developed close ties to their counterparts in
Nicaragua, Mexican business leaders reacted sharply
to the arrest of three senior Nicaraguan private-sector
officials in October 1981. According to US Embassy
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sources, senior business leaders privately expressed
their dismay to Lopez Portillo, and local employee
associations sent messages urging the Mexican Presi-
dent to seek the release of the Nicaraguan business-
men. Moreover, by taking out newspaper ads con-
demning the arrests, the Businessmen's Coordinating
Council-Mexico's most prestigious private-sector
group-took the unusual step of implicitly criticizing
the government's continued backing of the Sandinis-
tas. Lopez Portillo's subsequent successful effort to
secure the release of the Nicaraguan business lead-
ers-although not entirely attributable to Mexican
private-sector entreaties-suggests that the President
is not immune to such pressure.
Lopez Portillo made
a halt to the Sandinista military buildup an integral
part of his peace initiative announced on 21 February.
The Mexicans have also found themselves increasing-
ly out of step with erstwhile foreign supporters of the
regime in Managua-including the governments of
Panama and Costa Rica and several West European
social democratic parties. Nevertheless, Mexico's
backing of the Sandinistas has not faltered.
Despite grumbling at the COPPPAL conference in
November 1981 over Sandinista repression, the orga-
nization-with Mexican backing-decided to hold its
February meeting in Managua. Of even greater sym-
bolic importance was Lopez Portillo's decision to
make his third visit to Nicaragua immediately after
the COPPPAL meeting. The growing differences over
Nicaragua between Mexico and most members of the
Socialist International were accentuated when, at
about the same time as Lopez Portillo's visit to
Managua, the SI had to cancel its meeting scheduled
for Caracas because of refusal by the host Democratic
Action Party to permit the Sandinistas to attend.
We believe that Lopez Portillo's trip to Managua 25X1
demonstrates that his government will continue its 25X1
strong support until it leaves office in December,
barring a decisive shift leftward by the FSLN. His
decision to make the visit contingent on the release of
the three Nicaraguan business leaders was an encour-
aging indication of Mexico's willingness to begin to
use its considerable leverage. At the same time, 25X1
however, Lopez Portillo made it all the more difficult
to retrench by labeling assistance for Nicaragua a
"true cornerstone" of Mexican policy. His emphasis
on the external threat to Nicaragua, moreover, sug-
gests that his fear of US-backed pressure will contin-
ue to outweigh his uneasiness with Sandinista repres-
sion. 25X1
Lopez Portillo's Peace Initiative. The importance the
Mexicans give to the peace initiative that Lopez
Portillo announced in Managua has been reflected in
their aggressive efforts to implement his proposals. To
accommodate US concerns, Castaneda publicly 25X1
agreed on 14 March that the agenda for possible
discussions between the US and Nicaragua should be
broadened to include a halt to Sandinista arms ship-
ments to the Salvadoran insurgents.) 25X1
Presumably to increase pressure on the US, Mexico's
UN Ambassador announced in late March that the
US and Nicaragua would soon begin talks in Mexico
City. At the same time, however, Castaneda under-
scored his government's desire for an easing of ten-
sions when he told a French journalist that the 25X1
Sandinistas had made "an error of youth" in not
accepting the proposal offered by the US in Augu 25X1
1981.
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In his State of the Nation address on 1 September
Lopez Portillo reaffirmed the importance of his peace
proposal, arguing that the alternative to negotiations
is regional war. By Joining Venezuelan President
Herrera Campins in urging Nicaragua and Honduras
to hold discussions, the Mexican President signaled
that he intends to continue actively pressing for
diplomatic solutions until he leaves office.
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Guatemala
Geopolitical realities have caused Mexico to pursue
what we regard as a more hardheaded approach
toward Guatemala than it has elsewhere in Central
America. Although Mexico's distaste for rightwing
military regimes ensured distant relations with the
Lucas administration until it was deposed in March
1982, an appreciation for the stability that that
government brought to Mexico's southern border
prevented Mexico
government continues to react cautiously to Rios
the Mexicans have been discouraged by the
failure of past efforts to coax the Guatemalans toward
greater moderation, however, and the Lopez Portillo
supplying petroleum to Guatemala.
Government-to-Government Relations. Lopez Portillo
signaled his intention to use personal diplomacy and
promises of closer ties to try to encourage a moderate
evolution in Guatemala by meeting with former Presi-
dent Lucas near Tapachula, Mexico, on 18 September
1979. Lopez Portillo promised that he would soon
travel to Guatemala, and both governments agreed to
establish working groups to deal with major bilateral
issues. Foreshadowing the later inclusion of Guatema-
la in the Mexican-Venezuelan oil facility, Mexican
officials also raised at the meeting the possibility of
Mexican leftists sharply criticized the decision to 25X1
meet with Lucas and intensified pressure on the
government to break relations, especially after an
incident at the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City
in January 1980 in which local security forces killed a
group of peasants and radical leftists who had occu-
pied the mission. Although the proposed presidential
visit was postponed indefinitely, Mexico resisted left-
ist calls for withdrawing its Ambassador. A Mexican
Foreign Ministry official told US diplomats that his
government still hoped Lucas would take steps to
foster domestic pluralism and that Mexico was trying '25X1
through such moves as encouraging Spain to reestab-
lish ties, to avoid exacerbating the Guatemalan Go-?
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We believe that concern by the Mexican armed forces
that the Guatemalan insurgency would spill over into
the Mexican border region has been an important
factor in shaping Mexico's policy toward Guatemala.
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At the same time, however, the maneuvers aggravated
Mexico's relations with Guatemala by raising unreal-
istic expectations on the part of the Lucas government
regarding military cooperation.
agreed to cancel the meeting.
In September 1981 Lopez Portillo resumed efforts to
reduce tensions by scheduling a meeting with Lucas.
The Mexican President, we suspect, sought conces-
sions on two issues of importance to Mexico. Heart-
ened by Guatemala's willingness to compromise in its
territorial dispute with Belize, he hoped to ensure that
Lucas would not oppose Belize's move to independ-
ence. Lopez Portillo evidently also wanted to solicit
Lucas's help in dealing with the growing exodus of
Guatemalan refugees. The announcement of the
Franco-Mexican declaration on El Salvador, coupled
with Lopez Portillo's public endorsement of Belizean
independence soured the atmosphere, however, and-
yielding to domestic pressure-both governments
Thereafter, the Mexicans, we believe, abandoned any
hope of improving ties so long as Lucas held power. In
line with its commitments under the oil facility with
Venezuela, Mexico continued to supply oil to Guate-
mala; however, in 1981 Mexico financed $22.5 million
of its about $75 million in oil deliveries with conces-
sional credits. Moreover, to avoid further straining
relations, Mexican officials responded in relatively
measured tones to public charges last fall by senior
Guatemalan military leaders that the Mexican Gov-
ernment was assisting Guatemalan insurgents.
Since the coup on 23 March, President Rios Montt's
government has made an effort to improve relations
with Mexico. Encouraged by Rios's judicious han-
dling of the seizure of the Brazilian Embassy as well
as by his initial steps to curb official violence and 25X1 5X1
implement social welfare programs, the Mexicans
have given cautious indications of wanting to mend
fences. Castenada's recent characterization of rela-
tions with Guatemala as "cordial" was one signal.)
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Honduras
Mexico has given far less attention to Honduras than
to other countries in Central America. We believe
that Lopez Portillo, nevertheless, sees in the Hondu-
ran experience an opportunity to spotlight a possible
reformist alternative to the revolutionary violence
sweeping the area. Consequently, he has made sup-
port for the transition from military to civilian rule
the main focus of his government's policy toward that
country. 25X1
September 1981-some two months before elections
to choose a civilian successor to Paz-Lopez Portillo
gave the Honduran leader a red carpet welcome. With
an obvious eye to Guatemala, he publicly praised the
Honduran process as worthy of emulation. Secretary
of Government Olivares-Mexico's highest ranking
cabinet member-represented Lopez Portillo at the
inauguration of President Suazo in January. And
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COPPPAL, which has no Honduran member parties,
soon thereafter echoed the official Mexican position
by referring to the "hope generated by the Honduran
election."
Tempering Mexico's enthusiasm for developments in
Honduras, however, has been the Lopez Portillo gov-
ernment's concern about growing Nicaraguan-Hon-
duran hostility. Worried that continuing border skir-
mishes may escalate and lead to US involvement, the
Mexicans have urged Honduras not to harbor anti-
Sandinista insurgents. Lopez Portillo addressed this
issue publicly in his Managua speech on 21 February
by calling for the disarming of former Nicaraguan
National Guard members who use Honduras as a
base for cross-border raids. The declaration issued by
COPPPAL at its February meeting in Managua was
even more explicit in urging Honduras to adopt a
position of neutrality toward Nicaragua.
Mexico has been careful, however, not to line up
against Honduras in its dispute with Nicaragua.
Toward this end Castaneda has publicly praised the
Honduran peace plan that was presented to the OAS
on 23 March as consistent with Lopez Portillo's peace
initiative, and Mexico has supported it in internation-
al forums. Lopez Portillo's meeting with Honduran
Foreign Minister Paz Barnica on 2 April presumably
was also intended to demonstrate Mexico's evenhand-
ed position.
The Mexicans are also increasingly worried about
Honduran military collaboration with El Salvador. In
late June a Mexican Foreign Ministry official, citing
reports of a Honduran blocking operation in the
Salvadoran border region, told the US Embassy that
he was concerned that such action could lead to an
"internationalization" of the conflict. Reflecting what
may become a recurring theme among Mexican lead-
ers, the official also expressed unease regarding grow-
ing military dominance in Honduran foreign policy
decisionmaking. By September Lopez Portillo was
sufficiently concerned about the dangers of "regional
war" that he made that subject a major topic in his
State of the Nation address. Several days later he
joined Venezuelan President Herrera in offering to
facilitate talks between Honduras and Nicaragua. 7
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