TANZANIA: NYERERE AND BEYOND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83S00855R000200020006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Tanzania:
Tyerere and Beyond
Secret
ALA 82-10140
November 1982
270
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Tanzania:
Nyerere and Beyond
This assessment was prepared by
a contribution b Office of African
and Latin American Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Southern Africa Division, ALA,
This paper has been coordinated with the
National Intelligence Coucil and the Directorate
of Operations.
Secret
ALA 82-10140
November 1982
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Secret
Key Judgments
Information available
as of 17 August 1982
was used in this report.
Tanzania:
Nyerere and Beyond
of the first two decades following Tanzania's independence in 1961.
President Julius Nyerere's hold on power is slipping, in our judgment,
mainly because he and his government are having increasing difficulty
dealing with Tanzania's numerous and deepening economic problems.
Nyerere also has lost some of the wide popularity he enjoyed during most
be turned around anytime soon.
At the root of the economic muddle is a series of misfortunes and
miscalculations that have buffeted the country since the late 1970s. Global
recession, high oil import prices, Tanzania's military intervention in
Uganda, poor crop years, and frictions with the International Monetary
Fund and other aid donors over ill-conceived domestic policies have
combined to reduce sharply real economic growth and create substantial
current account deficits. There is nothing to suggest that these patterns will
US Embassy officials in Dar es Salaam
report that public criticism of Nyerere has become more wide-
are also rising as economic conditions worsen.
spread as these problems mount. Although we have seen no evidence of any
organized opposition, discontent is growing among government officials,
military personnel, and the general public. Corruption as well as tribal and
regional competition-particularly between the mainland and Zanzibar-
Despite the challenges Nyerere faces, we believe,
that the 60-year-old Tanzanian leader is likely to retain
problems.
power for at least a few more years. We see no other leader around whom
power is likely to coalesce, and the military, although disgruntled, appears
to have little desire to assume responsibility for the country's many
Nyerere does not plan to retire
and nonaligned foreign policy.
anytime soon. At the same time, however, we believe Nyerere may at some
point relinquish the presidency, but retain power as chairman of the ruling
Revolutionary Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi). He would probably select a
pliant new President who would continue his socialist domestic programs
Secret
ALA 82-10140
November 1982
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Although we assign a low probability to Nyerere's removal from power
soon, such an event, in our view, could nonetheless occur in one of the fol-
lowing ways:
? He could be removed by medical problems-even though he appears to
be in good health at present-or by assassination.
? A military coup-perhaps led by disgruntled junior officers-could be
precipitated by a government attempt to use the military to contain either
a local mutiny or civil unrest
The first of these two scenarios would be likely to result in a period of in-
tense jockeying for power among politicians representing various tribal and
regional groups. In such a situation, the likelihood of military intervention
would increase the longer civilian politicians remained unable to reach a
consensus on a successor. Because of the paucity of information on political
attitudes within the military, we cannot at present predict the composition
and policy orientation of a military regime, particularly one led by junior
personnel.
The potential successors to Nyerere whom we have been able to identify
would be likely to continue his officially nonaligned foreign policy. At the
same time, these men share the inclination
Nyerere has shown in recent years to side with the West on most East-
West questions. A successor regime, in our view, would also be likely to
continue Nyerere's cooperative stance toward Western-sponsored negotia-
tions aimed at settling southern African regional issues.
Whether Nyerere remains in power, we believe Tanzania will become a
more inward-looking country as a result of its mounting economic troubles.
These problems will increasingly preoccupy the government and limit its
ability to continue playing an activist role in regional and international
affairs.
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Tanzania:
Nyerere and Beyond
Accumulating evidence from
open sources indicates that Tanzanian
President Julius Nyerere's popularity has declined in
recent years. Although the 60-year-old Nyerere is still
regarded by many foreigners as one of Africa's most
talented and intelligent statesmen, he has become the
focus of bitter criticism at home as a result of
Tanzania's worsening economic troubles.
From the standpoint of the United States, Nyerere,
although not always supportive of US policy, has
played a constructive role on a number of interna-
tional and regional questions in recent years. For
example, he publicly opposed the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and supported Western-sponsored nego-
tiations that led to Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.
We believe that he will continue to support the West
on other key questions such as the Western-led talks
on Namibia. Nonetheless, we expect Nyerere-or a
successor-increasingly to be preoccupied with the
country's domestic problems and less able to continue
Tanzania's active and influential role on southern
African and other Third World issues.
This paper examines the performance of Nyerere's
government and his prospects for remaining in office
during the next few years. It discusses the implica-
tions of his continuation in power-which we consider
the most likely scenario over this period-as well as
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Tanzanian Daily News ? 25X1
The country's economic problems have been
long in the making and reflect Tanzania's limited
resources and poor government management, as well
as external factors beyond the government's control.
the potential impact of his removal.
Nyerere Under Fire
Mounting Economic Troubles'
Deteriorating economic conditions are the root cause
of growing dissatisfaction with Nyerere and his doc-
trinaire socialist policies among all levels of Tanzani-
an society,
Barely out of the economic doldrums that beset most
of the Third World in the mid-1970s, Tanzania
incurred a major new expense during 1978-79 when
the government spent some $500 million, mostly in
hard currency, on the military campaign to oust
Ugandan dictator Idi Amin. Nyerere expected that
Western nations would reward his efforts with fresh
economic and military aid, but virtually no added
assistance was forthcoming. Tanzania then incurred
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Tanzania, which is among the world's leading per
capita recipients offoreign aid, is listed by the United
Nations as one of the 29 least developed countries,
with an annual per capita income of $260 last year.
According to US Embassy and open-source reporting,
living standards for most Tanzanians have been
falling since the mid-1970s and now appear to be
lower than at independence in 1961.
Tanzania's dismal economic situation in part reflects
the country's narrow resource base. The main exports
are agricultural commodities, which are subject to
volatile world market conditions and frequent weath-
er extremes of drought and flood. Moreover, as an oil
importer, Tanzania was hard hit by the soaring
international oil prices of the 1970s.
additional costs in maintaining a peacekeeping force
of up to 20,000 troops in Uganda for nearly two
years.
At about the same time, Tanzania suffered from a
second round of international oil price hikes that
helped drive trade and current account deficits to new
highs. Although oil prices have stabilized since the
late 1970s, prolonged recession in developed-country
markets along with Tanzanian mismanagement have
precipitated one financial crisis after another.
Tanzanian agriculture also has performed poorly in
recent years, according to US Embassy and open-
source reporting. Compounding the years of chaos
under ujamaa, the ill-conceived socialist development
program, stringent price controls on food have sup-
pressed output even below the low levels that might
have been expected in the face of continuing drought.
According to US Embassy reporting, disillusionment
with the government's farming schemes has prompted
some Tanzanian farmers to leave their communal
Government policies have aggravated the country's
problems, according to
E::::ppen sources. In 1967 Nyerere launched a devel-
opment program, called ujamaa, which was designed
to mesh socialism and traditional African commu-
nalism. The program included extensive nationaliza-
tions and a radical plan for rural resettlement.
Although ujamaa did bring some benefits-an in-
creased adult literacy rate and improved social ser-
vices-it proved highly disruptive to the economy.
The extensive economic restructuring required man-
agement and planning skills far beyond Tanzania's
capabilities. The creation of some 400 state-con-
trolled enterprises, which soon began to dominate the
entire economy, created new opportunities for the
country's endemic corruption.
plots and return to traditional villages, further dis-
rupting output of cash crops. Others have fled to
urban areas, boosting the urbanization rate to among
the highest in Africa. Deterioration of the transport
and marketing systems, spurred by equipment and
parts shortages and poor management, has intensified
the impact of production shortfalls
As a result of all these factors, shortages of food and
other essentials have become chronic and unemploy-
ment and inflation have risen steadily during the past
few years. Hard currency shortages, moreover, have
recently become acute. Reserves have reached new
lows this year, and Dar es Salaam recently failed for
the first time to pay for oil deliveries. In addition,
most international banks are now refusing to extend
new lines of credit to Tanzania because of its failure
to repay earlier debts.
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Table I
Key Economic Indicators
Real GDP growth rate (percent)
5.8
5.5
3.6
2.9
1-2
Rate of inflation (percent)
11.6
13.8
30.2
25.0
35.0
Current account balance (million US $)
-434.0
Foreign exchange reserves,b yearend
(million US $)
92.0
External debt ~ (million US $)
1,142.0
Debt service ratio (percent)
9.4
a Projected.
b Excluding Zanzibar.
Public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term debt.
Recent negotiations with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) for enough money at least to help pay
Tanzania's short-term debts have been acrimonious,
according to US Embassy reporting. The Fund's
insistence on as much as a 60-percent devaluation, the
dismantling of some state-controlled enterprises, and
other steep cuts in government spending-especially
consumer subsidies-is meeting stubborn resistance.
Traditional major donors-including Sweden, the
Netherlands, and West Germany-are reported by
Embassy sources to be increasingly reluctant to bail
out the Tanzanian Government without an IMF
agreement. Tanzania's severe financial bind and
heavy donor pressure prompted Nyerere grudgingly to
implement a 10-percent devaluation in March 1982.
He has openly stated, however, that IMF prescrip-
tions for Tanzania are counterproductive because they
would worsen shortages of imported producer and
consumer goods alike, thereby thwarting attempts to
raise output for domestic and export sales and to
lower inflation.
recently reinstated cooperative societies, which before
they were disbanded in 1976 had functioned along
free enterprise lines
In our judgment, however, these moves will do little to
slow Tanzania's economic deterioration in the near
term. Real GDP growth in 1982 and 1983 is unlikely
to match last year's 2.9 percent, in our view. Short-
ages of materials and adverse government policies will
offset any benefits from good weather in the agricul-
tural sector. Moreover, the combination of expansion-
ary financing of budget deficits, wage increases, and
insufficient consumer goods already has lifted infla-
tion this year to an annualized 35 percent, and we
believe it will continue to rise.
We believe that domestic producer disincentives and
low world prices for Tanzania's major exports will
cause export volume and earnings to fall again this
year and next. As a result, Tanzania will not have
enough foreign exchange to simultaneously import
needed foodstuffs and the raw materials and other
Despite Nyerere's statement, according to US Embas-
sy reporting, the country's economic troubles have led
the government recently to reconsider the austerity
measures required by the IMF. The government has
also narrowed the responsibilities of the state-con-
trolled companies, according to the US Embassy, and
goods vital to maintaining production.
Political and Social Impact
The political and social effects of the deteriorating
economy are increasingly evident. US Embassy
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Table 2
Tanzania: Foreign Economic Aid
Million US$ Tanzania: Economic Comparisons
526.3 743.6
402.2 591.5
Netherlands 63.4 94.4
West Germany 63.3 87.3
38.1 50.1
-5.8 27.3
22.0
78:0
have criticized Nyerere openly at party or other
meetings he has attended. The National Executive
GDP per Capita, 1981
Us $
Non-OPEC
LDC Average
Zimbabwe
Zambia
Kenya
Tanzania
Zaire
Adult Literacy, 1977
Percent
Zimbabwe
Tanzania
Committee 2 and the Cabinet have recently become Kenya
the scenes of acrimonious debate over Nyerere's
policies on economic and other issues.
According to US Embassy reporting, many of the
government's socialist policies have also begun to
receive unprecedented scrutiny in Tanzania's 111-
man Parliament, which until recently was a rubber-
stamp body. Embassy sources report that this stems in
part from the fear of many legislators that they will
be turned out of office by their constituents during the
next round of,legislative elections, scheduled for 1985.
(In Tanzanian elections voters choose between two
candidates from the country's sole political party.)
Many members of Parliament were elected for the
first time in 1980 on promises to challenge the
regime's socialist policies.
2 The National Executive Committee is the party's chief executive
organ and is responsible for overseeing all defense, security, and
Non-OPEC
LDC Average
Real GDP Growth, 1977-81 a
Percent
Kenya
Non-OPEC
LDC Average
Tanzania
Zimbabwe
Zaire
Zambia -3.0
Urban Population, 1980
Percent
Non-OPEC
LDC Average
Zimbabwe
Kenya
Tanzania
Debt Service as a Share
Agriculture as a Share
of Exports b, 1982
of GDP, 1980
3Z;G
Tanzania
Non-OPEC
20
0
Kenya
LDC Average
.
Zambia
19.0
Zaire
Tanzania
15.4
Non-OPEC
LDC Average
Kenya
13.0
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe
a Average annual.
b Excluding arrears.
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An atmosphere of pessimism about the country's
future is also spreading outside party and government
circles, according to US Embassy reporting. Tanzani-
ans in rural areas have been hurt by a sharp deteriora-
tion in social services in recent years, and severe food
shortages have occurred in some locations. Discontent
with the government was so severe in one area of
the Tanzanian
northern Tanzania last year,
that Nyerere had to use paramilitary
forces to put down a secession movement there.
The US Embassy has also detected growing disgrun-
tlement among urban residents. Many urban Tanza-
nians are said to believe that Nyerere should step
down and give someone else a chance to tackle the
country's problems. Dissatisfaction among wage earn-
ers is especially high, according to the US Embassy,
in part because Tanzania's few factories are operating
at an average of only 20 to 30 percent of capacity as a
result of restrictions on imports.
armed forces over the state of the economy and
Nyerere's handling of it is increasing. So far, however,
Intelligence and Security Service (TISS) has also been
affected by the economic crunch. Security personnel
are especially disturbed over a recent government
decision to reduce expenditures through cutbacks in
TISS personnel
competition among
tribal and regional groupings has been intensified by
the worsening economic conditions.' The powerful
"Musoma group"-which includes a number of key
officials from Nyerere's home region in northern
Tanzania-has been trying to strengthen its position
by moving its members into key positions in the
government and party against the day when Nyerere
is no longer in office. The group centers around
Joseph Butiko, Nyerere's nephew and chief adviser
(see appendix), and includes the commander of the
armed forces, Lt. Gen. David Musuguri, and a num-
ber of influential civilian officials. Other tribally and
regionally based groups, such as the Hehes from the
south and the Chagga from the northeast, are also
working to protect their interests
ognize that they enjoy job security, status, and perqui-
sites not available to most Tanzanians and therefore
remain loyal to the regime.
Tribal-regional frictions also appear to be increasing
in the military,
Many have not
received promotions or bonuses promised after their
return from Uganda. They also miss the lucrative
black-marketeering opportunities that were available
to them in Uganda. We believe this disenchantment
has been aggravated by reductions the government
has made in recent years in military spending and in
the size of the armed forces. These moves are partly a
result of budget cuts made since the end of the
military's involvement in Uganda; they are also de-
signed to strengthen government control over the
military.
Junior officers from the south reportedly
resent the fact that northerners are getting more than
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their share of promotions and other benefits. Indeed, 25X1
home region, dominate the Army.
' There are some 120 ethnic groups in Tanzania, of which 12
account for about half the population. The largest group, the
Sukuma, constitutes about 15 percent of the population. The
primary language for interethnic communication is Swahili, the
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 L.A. [
\'ur.esh,x
Tanzania
Ethnic Groups
PARE Selected tribe
Lake
Natron
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-114
Lake Monduli C fAGGA
I
V Lake Many- MERU
Shinyanga Eyasi
gP R~QW
~? ~
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~Q -v .e P
Iringa
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
ZARAMO
Marui
INDIAN
OCEAN
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Underlying all of the country's divisions are the
endemic tensions between the mainland and the pre-
dominantly Arab, Muslim, politically semiautomo-
mous, and-above all-economically healthier islands
of Zanzibar and Pemba. Talk of outright secession
has increased recently on the islands, according to US
Embassy reporting, and Nyerere's choices-a further
loosening of ties or repression-are equally unattrac-
tive and risky.
Even though he is blamed for many of Tanzania's
problems he still is
widely regarded as the only leader able to hold the
Corruption. In our view, however, Tanzania's mounting problems
corruption has reached epidemic propor- are reinforcing Nyerere's frequently voiced desire to
tions in both civilian and military circles and is step down from the presidency while retaining power
increasingly resented by ordinary Tanzanians who do as chairman of the party.' Nyerere has taken a
not share in its benefits and who see it as making a number of steps during the past year or so that
mockery of Nyerere's Christian socialism. Specific suggest to us that he may carry out this move some
data are lacking, however, as clear evidence of corrup- time before the next national elections, scheduled for
tion tends to be hidden from the view of foreign 1985. Last year he began grooming Edward Sokoine,
observers. In Tanzania, it seems to stem both from a prominent Tanzanian with many years of govern-
economic necessity and from opportunities arising ment and party service, as a successor. Nyerere, an
from the large inflow of foreign aid, a constant source intellectual who greatly respects academic training,
of temptation for government officials. With govern- sent Sokoine to Yugoslavia to complete a master's
ment salaries low and perquisites meager, many Tan- degree and to give him the opportunity to see first-
zanian officials view embezzlement, misappropriation hand how a successful socialist system works.
of funds, forgery of checks, and property theft as
necessary to support themselves and their families.
senior mili-
tary officers and civilian officials also smuggle
diamonds or coffee to neighboring countries or simply
divert government funds for personal use. A govern-
ment anticorruption campaign last year did little to
discourage such activity, according to US Embassy
Despite the seemingly insurmountable problems
Nyerere faces and his periodic hints that he may
retire, we do not expect him to do so in the near term.
Nor are we aware of any politician or grouping
actively engaged in schemes to force him from power.
Nyerere also began last year to explore ways to
strengthen the role of the party vis-a-vis the govern-
ment, probably to ensure that the party chairman
would retain considerable authority.
he is seeking to transfer key respon-
sibilities, such as administrative control of the armed
forces and the Tanzanian security service, from the
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government to the party. Such changes would require 25X1
Committee and the Parliament
amending both the party and national constitutions
and must be approved by both the National Executive
Nyerere has introduced these proposals at various
high-level meetings, where they met with considerable
opposition, Not surpris-
ingly, government officials oppose the transfer of state
' There is a precedent for such a move. Nyerere relinquished the
post of prime minister in 1962 and spent most of that year serving
only as party chairman. His overwhelming victory in national
elections in December 1962 led him to return to the government as
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functions to the party. Party officials are also said to
harbor doubts; they believe that the proposed changes
would keep all essential power in Nyerere's hands
without substantially increasing the influence of the
party itself.
Because of the opposition Nyerere's proposals have
encountered, we believe he has temporarily shelved
them. He has also stopped promoting Sokoine's for-
tunes. US Embassy officials now believe that Nyerere
will delay any decision on stepping down from the
presidency for at least a few more months. We believe
he hopes Tanzania by then will have negotiated a loan
agreement with the IMF that would begin to ease the
country's economic troubles.
If Nyerere does relinquish the presidency, we believe
he would choose a pliant successor. The strong-willed
Nyerere would be unwilling, in our view, to share
power with an independent-minded official, especially
one who might want to dismantle many of his socialist
programs. He would be likely to select a replacement
who has a solid background in government and party
affairs but lacks an independent power base, thereby
The Place
Zanzibar consists of the two coral islands-Zanzi-
bar, 1,657 square kilometers, and Pemba, 984 km'.
Zanzibar is 35 km and Pemba some 56 km from the
mainland. There are about 570,000 islanders-3
percent of Tanzania's some 19 million people. Most
residents of Zanzibar and Pemba are Muslims.
Once a dominion of Oman, Zanzibar came under
British control in 1890. Although most inhabitants
were Africans or Shirazis-descendants of Middle
Eastern traders who had married Africans-or a mix
of the two, Arabs dominated local politics until
independence in 1963. One month after independence,
a bloody revolution brought to power an Afro-Shirazi
leader, Abeid Karume, who agreed to a political
union with mainland Tanganyika in 1964. Karume
was assassinated in 1972. His killers were appre-
hended, but their motives have remained unclear.
Aboud Jumbe, another Afro-Shirazi, succeeded Kar-
ume as Zanzibari President, at the same time becom-
ing Vice President of Tanzania.
In Zanzibar-as on the mainland-the sole political
party is the Revolutionary Party. Despite governmen-
tal and political bonds with the mainland, the islands
retain considerable autonomy in practice. Local af-
fairs are handled by the islands' government under
the Zanzibari Revolutionary Council-a 33-man
cabinet appointed by Zanzibar's President.
Like the mainland, Zanzibar has a mixed economy,
with a substantial nationalized sector as well as
considerable private enterprise. The islands' major
export crop is cloves, three-fourths of which are
grown on Pemba. Cloves account for approximately
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90 percent of Zanzibar's export income, with Indone-
sia and Singapore the chief customers. Foreign ex-
change reserves currently amount to about $60
million.
Some 4,000 Tanzanian military personnel-of whom
only 175 are mainlanders-are stationed on Zanzi-
bar. An unknown number of Soviet advisers are
present at an SA-3 missile site on Zanzibar Island,
The Problem
Tanzania's economic woes have complicated the al-
ways uneasy relationship between the mainland and
Zanzibar. The Tanzanian Government over the years
has attempted to bring Zanzibari financial institu-
tions under its control in order to gain access to the
Zanzibaris' comparatively healthy foreign exchange
reserves. These efforts have been successfully resisted
by the islanders, however, and have helped spur them
to seek greater autonomy from Dar es Salaam,
he islanders also
resent Dar es Salaam's, control over foreign aid to
the islands, and they object to commercial restric-
tions that often force Zanzibaris to give priority to
trade with the mainland.
Zanzibari efforts to loosen ties with Dar es Salaam
stem from longstanding cultural differences as well.
Many Zanzibaris, particularly those of Arab descent,
pride themselves on being better educated and more
sophisticated than the mainlanders. Although almost
all Zanzibaris are Muslims, a majority of the main-
landers are Christians-Nyerere is a practicing Ro-
man Catholic-or animists.
The US Embassy reports that the islanders also
resent Dar es Salaam's political dominance. Zanzi-
baris generally believe that President Jumbe compro-
mised their interests in 1977 by agreeing to integrate
their formerly autonomous political party into the
mainland's ruling party. According to Embassy re-
porting, many Zanzibari officials also fear that Nyer-
ere's proposed changes to the national and party
constitutions will further consolidate the mainland's
political control.
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Zanzibaris have actively discussed seeking independ-
ence from the mainland, although they have stopped
short of making any concerted move toward seces-
sion. Several prominent Zanzibari politicians recent-
ly have taken a number of steps to dramatize their
desire to loosen ties.
they have drawn up alternative constitutions that
would provide for greater autonomy-which appears
to be gaining popular support among the Zanzibaris,
according to US Embassy
autonomy campaign has embarrassed the economi-
cally beleaguered Nyerere, he has so far moved
cautiously to avoid aggravating the traditionally
volatile Zanzibaris. We believe, on the basis of US
Embassy reporting, that he would like to reach a
compromise with the islanders before they press for a
complete break with the mainland. Unless he can
work out an accord, we believe he will be forced
eventually to choose between allowing the island to
secede or sending in troops to put down a separatist
movement. Either course would seriously tarnish his
image both at home and abroad.
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ensuring his dependence on Nyerere and adherence to
Nyerere's socialist economic programs and non-
aligned foreign policy. The most likely candidates, in
our view, include Sokoine, Army chief Musuguri, and
Minister of State Khigoma Malima (see appendix).
Death or Decline?
In the unlikely event that medical problems force
Nyerere-now in good health, according to US Em-
bassy reporting-to relinquish power, or if he is
assassinated, we would anticipate an intense period of
political maneuvering, primarily because he has failed
to groom a ready successor. We doubt that the Vice
President-who, under the constitution, must be a
Zanzibari if the President is a mainlander-would
assume the presidency other than on an interim basis;
mainlanders, who dominate both the party and gov-
ernment, would be unlikely to accept a permanent
Zanzibari leader. Although the constitution calls for a
single presidential candidate to be selected by the
party's National Executive Committee, we believe
that a small group of potential candidates would
emerge before the Committee convened. These pro-
spective candidates would probably lobby for the
support of other influential party officials on the
Committee.
Tribal and regional loyalties, would, in our view,
figure importantly in such maneuvering. The Musoma
and other key groups probably would select "favorite
sons" and seek support from various smaller tribal or
We believe that possible successors to Nyerere if he
disappeared suddenly from the scene-as opposed to
those Nyerere himself might choose in a personally
orchestrated succession-include Tanzanian Ambas-
sador to the United States Paul Bomani, Prime
Minister Cleopa Msuya, or Ambassador to Canada
Benjamin Mkapa (see appendix). US Embassy report-
ing indicates that these men, like most Tanzanian
officials, support the country's nonaligned foreign
policy and share Nyerere's emphasis on supporting
the quest for black majority rule in Namibia and
South Africa.
A Military Takeover?
US Embassy officials believe that a military coup
against Nyerere is unlikely. Several factors so far
have dissuaded military men from attempting such a
move.
Although military personnel have begun to feel the
economic pinch that is demoralizing civilians, they
continue to enjoy a better standard of living than most
civilians. Moreover, as a result of the military's
involvement in civilian affairs-all officers are party
members and some serve on rotation in government
positions-we believe many of them are sensitive to
the serious problems facing the country and would
hesitate to take on the task of tackling them.
regional groupings.
We believe that ideological differences would play a
less significant role than tribal-regional factors in any
succession maneuvering.
a number of Tanzania's leading politicians now advo-
cate dismantling many of Nyerere's socialist pro-
grams. At the same time, we suspect that most
politicians would be unwilling to move rapidly in this
direction for fear of provoking a backlash from the
small but vocal group of government officials who
Although we agree that a military coup against
Nyerere is improbable, we do not entirely rule it out.
Given the dismal economic situation in Tanzania, we
can envision a situation in which the military leader-
ship, called upon to put down antigovernment demon-
strations or a mutiny by one of its own units, might
decide instead to remove Nyerere. That is, military
leaders might choose to move against the government
have benefited politically from these programs
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rather than risk generating wider unrest by interven-
A coup by junior officers is also possible. They enjoy
relatively few perquisites and have fewer opportunities
than senior and middle-grade officers to engage in
illegal moneymaking schemes. Their salaries, more-
over, are not much higher than those of enlisted men.
Junior officers also have meager prospects for ad-
vancement in view of the government's current efforts
to reduce the military's size and expenditures.F-
Implications for the United States
Whether Nyerere remains in power, we believe Tan-
zania will become a more inward-looking country as a
result of its mounting economic problems. While
Nyerere-or almost any successor-is likely to con-
tinue Dar es Salaam's nonaligned foreign policy, we
believe Tanzania's severe domestic problems will in-
creasingly preoccupy the government.
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If Nyerere were to leave the scene suddenly, a
military takeover would become a much greater possi-
bility, in our view. His departure might coincide with
economically inspired civil unrest of such proportions
that the military would feel compelled to take over
simply to restore order. Even if the situation remained
calm, we believe the military might not have enough
faith in the constitutional provisions for electing a
successor to give the system a chance to function.
In addition, we believe that many officers-especially
those at senior levels-might lose patience if civilian
politicians were unable quickly to reach a consensus
on a successor. A coup would be almost a certainty if
senior military officers were dissatisfied with the
civilians' choice.
Even if the military refrained from intervening before
a new president were elected, we believe it might seize
power later on. Its leaders might feel compelled to
take over if civil unrest increased under a new presi-
dent. We doubt that the post-Nyerere leadership
would have the ability to contain such unrest without
turning to the armed forces-which might ultimately
lead to a military takeover. Lack of information on
politicial attitudes within the military makes it impos-
sible at present to predict the exact composition and
policy orientation of a military regime, particularly
one led by junior officers or enlisted men.
We believe that Nyerere will seek to maintain cordial,
although not particularly close, ties with the United
States. At various times in the past-during the US
involvement in Vietnam, for instance-he has been
one of Washington's most acerbic critics. Yet, he has 25X1
frequently expressed admiration for the United States
and suspicion of the USSR, according to US Embassy
reporting. More concretely, in our judgment Nyerere
is likely to continue supporting the West on many key
issues. Examples of such cooperation in recent years
have included his condemnation at the UN General
Assembly of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan
and his support for the British position during the
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Nyerere also played a generally constructive role
during Western-led negotiations that resulted in Zim-
babwe's independence in 1980. More recently, he has
tried to be helpful in the Western-sponsored negotia-
tions on independence for Namibia. His longstanding
strong support for black nationalist groups together
with the force of his personality and intellect have
enabled him to wield considerable influence among
the Frontline presidents on both the Zimbabwe and
Namibia questions.
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We believe, however, that Nyerere's influence in the
Namibia negotiations is likely to wane if the issue
drags on much longer. Domestic troubles almost
certainly will occupy an increasing amount of his time
and energy and reduce his ability to focus on Namib-
ia. If Nyerere were removed from power, we believe
that any successor would be unlikely to play as active
and influential a role on Namibia as he has.
With or without Nyerere, we believe that the govern-
ment's willingness to provide military aid to its neigh-
bors is likely to decrease as Tanzania's domestic
Nyerere in the past a een
willing to overlook the financial costs in granting
military aid to various African and Indian Ocean
countries because he attaches great value to his
regional and international role.'
Just as Tanzania's role as a non-Communist source of
military aid is likely to diminish as Nyerere-or a
successor-becomes increasingly preoccupied with
problems at home, so too, in our view, may its broader
efforts to curtail Soviet influence in southern and
eastern Africa. Nyerere up to now has made an active
effort to prevent an increased Soviet Bloc presence in
the region. he has
cautioned such leaders as Mozambican President
Machel and Seychelles President Rene against ex-
panding their ties with Moscow.
' Tanzania in the past has provided military advisers, combat
troops, or materiel to Zimbabwe, Uganda, Mozambique, Sey-
chelles, and Comoros. African leaders have turned to Nyerere for
military aid because his 45,000-man Army is widely viewed as the
best military force in black Africa. Comprised largely of troops
from northern tribal groups that are known for their military
prowess, the Tanzanian military is tightly organized and well
Finally, we believe that if Nyerere's hold on power
slips further or if he departs the scene suddenly and
unrest ensues, this could have a destabilizing impact
on neighboring countries. For Zambia and Burundi,
for example, instability in Tanzania could disrupt
economically important transportation links through
Tanzania that connect these two landlocked countries
with the Indian Ocean. Finally, a military takeover in
Tanzania could have a "demonstration effect" in
other countries-particularly in Kenya and Sey-
chelles, both the scene of recent military coup at-
tempts, and in Mozambique, where the government
has been unable to defeat South African-backed
insurgents.
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Appendix
Potential Successors to Nyerere 6
Edward Sokoine Former Prime Minister. Although often mentioned by senior government officials
as the most likely successor if Nyerere relinquished the presidency,
Consequently, we believe he would be unlikely to
stand as a presidential candidate unless Nyerere were still on the scene and backed
him.
If he became president, Sokoine probably would continue Nyerere's main domestic
and foreign policies. As a result of his country upbringing in north-central
Tanzania, he maintains a strong interest in promoting the welfare of rural
Tanzanians. He also appears favorably disposed toward the United States and is
openly friendly to US officials.
Sokoine, 43, was born in Monduli, Arusha Region. He is a member of the nomadic
Masai ethnic group and received most of his education in Tanzania. He has held a
variety of senior government and party posts. He became Minister of Defense in
1972 and held that position until he was named Prime Minister in 1977. Sokoine
resigned as Prime Minister in 1980 because of a diabetic condition, which now ap-
pears to be under control.
Lt. Gen. David Musuguri Commander of the Tanzanian People's Defense Force. Musuguri enjoys close ties
to Nyerere-he is a distant relative of the President-and is popular among the
troops. According to US Embassy officials, he has little formal education, lacks
strong political views or ambitions, and is generally regarded as a poor administra-
tor. Although we believe Musuguri would be unlikely to initiate a coup against the
President, he might take such action to preempt a similar move by other elements
in the military. Nyerere might select Musuguri to assume the presidency if he
believed it necessary to appease disgruntled military officers.
If Musuguri came to power, we believe that in foreign and domestic policy
questions he probably would rely heavily on the advice of civilian officials from the
Musoma group-of which he is a member. These officials would probably favor an
increased emphasis on free enterprise and a continuation of Tanzania's nonaligned
foreign policy line.
Musuguri, 57, is from Musoma and-like Nyerere-is a member of the Zanaki
ethnic group. He has a primary school education and has received some military
training prior to independence in the King's African Rifles.
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Kighoma Malima Minister of State in the Vice President's Office for Planning and Economic
Affairs. A leading radical and a principal theoretician of Tanzanian socialism,
Malima has worked closely with Nyerere for years. Well educated and bright, he
harbors leadership ambitions and is close to many influential party members,
according to the US Embassy. These links, along with his ideological orientation,
could lead Nyerere to begin grooming him to assume the presidency.
As an ardent advocate of ujamaa socialism, Malima has consistently urged
Nyerere to strengthen rather than reduce the government's role in the economy. If
he took office as president, we believe he would pursue Nyerere's socialist policies
even at the cost of antagonizing the International Monetary Fund and other
Western aid donors. Malima probably would maintain a nonaligned foreign policy,
although he might adopt a less friendly stance than Nyerere has toward the West.
The US Embassy has described his attitude toward the United States as
ambivalent; he is highly critical of many aspects of the US social and economic
system but favorably impressed by the US academic system
Malima, 43, is believed to be a member of the Zaramo ethnic group. He is from
Marui, just south of Dar es Salaam. Malima attended Dartmouth and Yale, and
earned a Ph.D. in economics at Princeton. He has served in the UN Development
Program and has headed the Economics Department at the University of Dar es
Salaam. He was appointed to his current position in 1980
Paul Bomani Ambassador to the United States. Of the men usually mentioned as possible
successors to Nyerere, Bomani is the only one with a solid political base of his own.
He enjoys strong backing from various tribes in and near his home region of
Musoma. At the same time, he apparently is viewed by many Tanzanians as a man
who would transcend tribal lines if he came to power.
Bomani is a competent administrator and wealthy businessman who helped
finance Nyerere's preindependence political activities. He remains one of the
President's closest friends and allies. His absence from Tanzania since 1972,
however, could make it difficult for him to come to power.
A conservative capitalist, Bomani almost certainly would introduce policies
favoring free enterprise if he came to power. He probably would also encourage a
special relationship with the United States.
Bomani, 57, is a member of the Sukuma, Tanzania's largest ethnic group. He was
educated in Tanzania before earning an M.A. in International Public Policy in
1976 at Johns Hopkins University. Before his assignment to the United States,
Bomani had served in every cabinet since independence. He has held the portfolios
of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Finance, Economic Affairs and Development
Planning, and Commerce and Industry
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Secret
Cleopa Msuya Prime Minister. When he was appointed Prime Minister in 1980, Msuya was
widely believed to have little political backbone and was expected to toe Nyerere's
line. According to US Embassy sources, the capable and hard-working Msuya
subsequently surprised many Cabinet members-and irritated Nyerere-by his
independent and sometimes abrasive attitude toward the President. Msuya,
according to these sources, retains the respect of most bureaucrats and civil
servants who admire his commitment to getting things done
Msuya has told US Embassy officials that he believes both the state and the
private sector have a role to play in Tanzania's economy, but that private
investment should be emphasized. He has also expressed these views to Nyerere,
according to US Embassy officials, and we believe that if he assumed power he
would take steps to soften Tanzania's socialist system. It is our view that Msuya
would generally follow Nyerere's nonaligned foreign policy and that he would
probably work to strengthen ties with the West.
Msuya, 51, is from Kilimanjaro Region in northern Tanzania. He is a member of
the Meru ethnic group. Msuya graduated from Makerere University before
joining the government in 1956. He served in various positions in the civil service
before being named Finance Minister in 1972. He subsequently served as Minister
of Industries and as Director of the National Bank of Commerce before becoming
Prime Minister.
Benjamin Mkapa Ambassador to Canada. Mkapa is an articulate diplomat whose strongest asset in
any post-Nyerere struggle, according to reporting from US Embassy sources,
would be the considerable respect and popularity he enjoys among senior
government and party officials because of his candid criticism of Nyerere's
socialist policies. He lacks an independent power base, however, and might have
difficulty gaining the necessary support to run for president.
Mkapa has been a leader among moderate government and party officials in
debates against hardline socialists, such as Kighoma Malima, on the regime's
economic policy line. If he became president, we believe he would try to undo
many of Nyerere's economic programs and seek greater Western trade and
investment.
Although critical of some US policies, Mkapa has been described by US Embassy
officials in the past as one of the most pro-US members of the Cabinet. We believe
he would maintain Nyerere's nonaligned foreign policy and might try to emulate
Nyerere's leadership role in regional issues. Mkapa was involved in the negotia-
tions leading to independence for Zimbabwe.
Mkapa, 43, is from Masasi, Mtwara Region, in southeastern Tanzania and is a
member of the Makua tribe. He attended college in Tanzania and subsequently
studied at Columbia University's Institute of International Relations (1962-63).
He studied journalism in the United Kingdom during 1965-66. Mkapa has served
as editor of several of Tanzania's newspapers and has been Nyerere's press
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secretary. He has also served as High Commissioner to Nigeria and Ghana and
was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1977 to 1980. He then was Minister of
Information and Culture until his appointment as Ambassador to Canada earlier
this year.
Joseph Butiko Personal Assistant to the President. Widely viewed as the second most powerful
man in Tanzania, Butiko is believed to have the complete confidence of President
Nyerere, his uncle. Although we believe that Butiko would be unlikely to be a con-
tender for the presidency he is in a position
to play an influential role in any succession to Nyerere. He has close links with the
security service and the military He
is clever and ambitious yet aware of his shortcomings. We believe Butiko could be
especially helpful to any politician seeking power from his home region of
Musoma; he is a key member of the Musoma Group.
In the unlikely event Butiko did take power, we believe he would dismantle many
of Nyerere's socialist economic programs and introduce measures to promote a
capitalist economy. Although he has indicated to US officials that he was
favorably impressed by the United States during a visit in 1977, he is described by
some US Embassy officials as no friend of Washington. We believe he probably
would pursue a nonaligned foreign policy line.
Butiko, 44, is a member of Nyerere's Zanaki ethnic group and has received some
security training in Israel.
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