US AND SOVIET MAJOR SURFACE WARSHIPS, 1964-85: THE PERSPECTIVE OF INVENTORY VALUE

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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
US and Soviet Major
Surface Warships, 1964-85:
The Perspective
of Inventory Value
Secret
SOV 82-10055
April 1982
Copy 312
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p
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
4
25X1
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
US and Soviet Major
Surface Warships, 1964-85:
The Perspective
of Inventory Value
Information available as of 1 January 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This paper was prepared by
Econometric Analysis Division, Office of Soviet
Analysis. It was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council and reviewed by the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Net
Assessment, OP 96-N, Washington, D. C.F--]
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Econometric Analysis
Division,
Secret
SOV 82-10055
April 1982
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The use of military-economic data in comparisons of US and Soviet forces
has in the past emphasized resource flows (in terms of annual defense
expenditures) to the military sector. Such a description of defense activities
is incomplete, however-just as annual income may not adequately
describe an individual's net worth. To determine whether a dollar valuation
of inventories could provide more comprehensive comparisons, a pilot
project to study one type of force was undertaken. This paper presents the
project results-a dollar valuation of the US and Soviet inventories of
major surface warships during the period of 1964-80 (with a projection
through 1985)--and compares trends in such values to trends for two other
strength indicators: number of ships and tonnage. Although the intervening
years for all three measures are shown in charts, the text discussion focuses
on the benchmark years of 1964, 1980, and 1985.
Some of the comparisons in this paper exclude large aircraft carriers (these
cases are clearly noted). Large carriers are unique to the US side and have
a disproportionately large impact on measurements involving cost and size.
Inclusion of carriers more accurately reflects the reality of the US force,
while exclusion permits analysis of forces having a greater degree of
comparability.
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Figure 1
Trends in Inventory Value of US and Soviet
Major Surface Warships
Index: 100=1964 US Including Carriers
r
125
100 US
(Including
Carriers)
75
Us
(Excluding
Carriers)
50
Soviet
25
I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I 1 1
1964 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
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US and Soviet Major
Surface Warships, 1964-85:
The Perspective
of Inventory Value
Key Judgments The inventory value of Soviet major surface warships doubled between
1964 and 1980, while that of the United States-after considerable
fluctuation-returned to the 1964 level. Soviet inventory value, which was
less than one-fourth that of the United States in 1964, reached nearly one-
half the US value by the start of the 1980s. If aircraft carriers are
excluded, Soviet stock value was about one-third that.of the United States
in 1964 and about 60 percent by 1980.F--] 25X1
The steady rise in the inventory value of the Soviet major surface warship
fleet reflects increases in number (from 108 ships to 129), size (the average
tonnage jumped from 4,900 to 6,300 tons '), and complexity. Much of the
stock value growth was due to the acquisition of some two dozen guided-
missile cruisers and two small aircraft carriers.F--] 25X1
The US inventory value rose slightly during the mid-1960s, then fell
drastically between 1968 and 1976 as the Navy deactivated all the
destroyers and frigates and most of the cruisers and aircraft carriers of the
World War II era and all the frigates built during the 1950s. The value of
stocks began to rise again in the late 1970s, with an extensive force
modernization program and the start of a force buildup. Over the entire
1964-80 period the number of ships declined from 308 to 189, but average
tonnage rose from 8,300 to 10,700 tons and overall technological sophistica-
tion increased substantially. If carriers are excluded, fleet size dropped
from 284 units to 176, while average tonnage increased from 4,300 to
Between 1964 and 1980 the US fleet was rejuvenated, with the average
(mean) ship age declining from about 15 years to less than 13. Over 235
units were retired and 118 new ones obtained, and about 35 of the older
ships remaining in service underwent a major conversion or modernization.
In contrast, the Soviet fleet grew older-from less than 1 I years to over 15
years on the average. The Soviets retired only 50 ships while adding 71,
and fewer than 20 of the older ships completed a major conversion or
modernization= 25X1
Secret
SOV 82-10055
April / 982
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During the first half of the 1980s, the United States plans to expand its
major surface warship force greatly, with the bulk of new unit? to be
missile frigates. The Navy will probably acquire a new nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier, as well as new classes of highly sophisticated missile
cruisers-equipped with the Aegis air defense system-and missile/de-
stroyers. The Soviet Union is expected to modernize but not to expand its
force. The total number of ships is likely to decline slightly by 1985 as few-
er but generally larger and more advanced ships replace a greater number
of smaller, obsolescent units. The Soviet Union is expected to deploy its
first two nuclear-powered surface warships (the first unit became oper-
ational in 1981), but the appearance of a large aircraft carrier is not
expected until after mid-decade. As a result, the inventory values of both
sides will rise substantially, but the United States will greatly increase its
lead in numbers of ships and will probably somewhat increase its lead in in-
ventory value
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Preface iii
Key Judgments v
Introduction 1
Transformation of the Soviet Fleet 1
Types of Ships: A Closer Look 4
Age of the Forces 9
Methodology for Costing Soviet Ships 13
1. Trends in Inventory Value of US and Soviet Major Surface iv
Warships
2. Composition of Soviet Major Surface Warship Fleet
3. Composition of US Major Surface Warship Fleet
4. Trends in Tonnage of US and Soviet Major Surface Warships 4
5. Trends in Inventory Value, Force Size, and Tonnage of US and 5
Soviet Major Surface Warships
6. Percentage Composition of Inventory Value of US and Soviet Major 6
Surface Warships, 1964 and 1980
7. Trends in Indicators of US and Soviet Carrier Strength 7
8. Trends in Indicators of US and Soviet Cruiser Strength 7
9. Trends in Indicators of US and Soviet Destroyer Strength 8
10. Trends in Indicators of US and Soviet Frigate Strength 8
11. Inventory Value of US and Soviet Major Surface Warships and 9
Small Soviet Frigates, 1980
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12.
Projected Force Levels of US and Soviet Major Surface Warships
10
13.
Projected Trends in Inventory Value of US and Soviet Major
Surface Warships
10
14.
Percentage Composition of Inventory Value of US and Soviet Major
Surface Warships, 1980 and 1985
11
1.
Order of Battle: US and Soviet Major Surface Warships
3
2.
Average Age of US and Soviet Major Surface Warships
9
3.
Projected Average Age of US and Soviet Major Surface Warships
12
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US and Soviet Major
Surface Warships, 1964-85:
The Perspective
of Inventory Value
Introduction
This paper looks at the force levels and the inventory
value (measured in constant 1980 dollars) of US and
Soviet aircraft carriers and surface combatants of
more than 3,000 tons full-load displacement.' The
discussion focuses on the Brezhnev era from 1964
through 1980, and presents a near-term outlook
through 1985. The values were calculated using mid-
year order-of-battle data that exclude reserve ships
and US Coast Guard vessels and include ships under-
going conversion or modernization. US ship values are
based on the prices paid for the ships by the US Navy
and converted to 1980 dollars by means of price
indexes. A parametric model, described in the appen-
dix, was used to estimate the dollar costs of Soviet
ships as if they had been built in US shipyards in the
years when they were actually built in the Soviet
Union. On both sides the costs of converted or
otherwise substantially upgraded ships were adjusted
to reflect the changes in weapons and sensors. All
costs are averages for specific classes of ships. Costs of
aircraft and ordnance are excluded.'
Value is expressed in constant dollars so that the
magnitudes and trends described reflect real changes
in inventory size, composition, and sophistication and
not the effects of inflation. Values are not depreciated
for age-ships carry their initial cost, adjusted only
for upgrading, throughout their useful lives. These
inventory values represent what it would have cost in
1980 at US dollar prices for labor, materials, and
other inputs to buy a force of the same size and with
the same characteristics as those ships in active
service at any given time during the period.F__-]
2 It also includes some three dozen US ships displacing between
1,000 and 3,000 tons, which were in active service at the start of the
period and were considered at that time as open-ocean major
surface combatants. All but two were retired by the mid-1970s.
' A detailed treatment of ship size, value per ton, and unit value of
US and Soviet major surface warships is available upon request.
In this study, all ships on both sides carry their
present US ship type designators consistently over the
entire time period of 1964-85. This means, for ex-
ample, that if ships now regarded as destroyers were
formerly classified as frigates, they are treated here as
if they were always classified as destroyers. 25X1
Inventory value is not an adequate basis for judging
the ultimate effectiveness of US or Soviet naval
forces. Such judgments are highly dependent on
scenarios and involve many other considerations, such
as force composition, tactical concepts, military doc-
trine, readiness, morale, command and control capa-
bilities, and weapons and sensors capabilities in light
of developments in naval warfare on the opposing side.
I 25X1'
Transformation of the Soviet Fleet
During the period of 1964-80, the Soviet surface fleet
was transformed from what had been basically a
coastal defense force into a force with increased "blue
water" or open-ocean capabilities. This transforma-25X1
tion grew from the effort to develop what Adm. S. G.
Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy,
has termed a "balanced navy." In the mid-1960s, the
major surface warship fleet numbered 108 cruisers
and destroyers, augmented by a large force of minor
surface combatants. The Soviet Navy had no aircraft
carriers and no significant amphibious capabilities,
and it had conducted only limited surface operations
outside home waters. Its chief mission was to protect
the Soviet Union against nuclear strikes by Western
ballistic missile submarines and aircraft carriers. See-
ondary missions included denying the sea to enemy25X1
naval forces in the maritime approaches to the Soviet
Union, cutting enemy sea lanes of communication,
and supporting the seaward flanks of ground forc25X1
The principal instruments for carrying out these
missions were attack submarines and shore-based
aviation-not the surface fleet.
25X1
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Figure 2
Composition of Soviet Major Surface
Warship Fleeta
TO-0
11
585931 1-82
Between 1964 and 1980, the Soviet Navy acquired 71
new major surface warships, resulting in a net in-
crease of 21 units. The emphasis was on missile-
armed combatants, especially cruisers. During this
period the Soviet Union introduced its first aviation
ships (helicopter cruisers and small aircraft carriers),
built a force of open-ocean missile frigates, and had
its first nuclear-powered surface warship almost ready
to deploy. The Soviet major surface warship force was
much more technologically advanced in 1980 than in
1964, and its composition had changed substantially
(see figure 2). Average tonnage increased, jumping
from 4,900 to 6,300 tons, because new units tended to
be bigger than the ships they replaced, and several
large obsolescent cruisers were kept in service.
As a result of these developments, the Soviet Navy
has shifted its emphasis to forward deployment as it
pursues its missions. To the traditional missions it has
added the peacetime role of projecting the Soviet
presence overseas, both showing the flag with port
calls and deploying units to potential crisis areas in
times of heightened tension. Nevertheless, the surface
fleet is still less important to the Soviets than naval
aviation and attack submarines.
The US Fleet
In contrast, the United States in the mid-1960s was
already an established naval power, emphasizing car-
rier battle groups and other surface forces capable of
sustained operations in distant ocean areas. The Navy
had 308 major surface warships-some nuclear
powered-most of which were destroyers designed to
escort the 24 large aircraft carriers. The wartime
missions of the surface fleet, then as now, included
destruction of Soviet cruise missile and ballistic mis-
sile submarines, projection of air power and amphibi-
ous forces overseas, control of the seas in areas of
importance to the United States, and securing sea
lanes of communication. In peacetime it has the
mission of naval presence overseas.
In 1964, many US major surface warships completed
during or shortly after World War II were approach-
ing obsolescence. As part of a major modernization 25X1
effort, during the period of 1969-80 the Navy deacti-
vated all of the World War II-vintage destroyers and
frigates, most of the cruisers and carriers built during
the war, and all frigates built during the 1950s-a
total of more than 235 ships. At the same time, it
began a major shipbuilding program that is still
continuing. Between 1964 and 1980 the US Navy
obtained 118 new major surface warships, half of
which were nonmissile frigates acquired during the
late 1960s and early 1970s. The new ships also
included four large aircraft carriers-underscoring
the Navy's continuing orientation toward attack
carriers-as well as over a dozen missile cruisers, a
large new class of nonmissile destroyers, and the first
units of a large new class of missile frigates. Figure 3
shows the overall change in composition. A number of
the new aircraft carriers and cruisers are nuclear
powered.
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Figure 3
Composition of US Major Surface
Warship Fleet'
Overall, the US fleet in 1980 stood at 189 ships-119
ships below the 1964 level-including 13 aircraft
carriers, and its numerical advantage over the Soviet
force was cut by more than half (see table 1). The
modernized US force, however, had technology
greatly superior to that of 1964 and was substantially
changed in composition. As in the Soviet fleet, the
larger average size of US ships-up from 8,300 tons
to 10,700 tons-reflected acquisition policies favoring
the replacement of retired ships with larger units. The
US surface fleet continues to rely on carrier-based
attack aircraft as its primary offensive instrument,
while the Soviet Union, lacking such capabilities, has
emphasized cruisers and antiship missiles carried on a
variety of surface warships.
Inventory Value
The inventory value of Soviet major surface warships
doubled between 1964 and 1980, while that of the
United States-after considerable fluctuation-was
the same in 1980 as in 1964 (see figure 1). As a result,
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Cruisers
Order of Battle:
US and Soviet Major Surface Warships a
0 2 b 24 13
14 36 24 27
94 63 224 79
0 28 36 70
a As of midyear.
b These small Soviet carriers operate only vertical takeoff and
landing (VTOL) aircraft.
Soviet inventory value, which had been less than one-
fourth that of the United States in 1964, reached
nearly one-half by the start of the 1980s. Since cost is
highly correlated with weight, a great US advantage
in tonnage contributed in large part to the substantial-
ly higher US inventory value. Most of the tonnage
differential was due to aircraft carriers (see figure 4);
if carriers on both sides are excluded, Soviet inventory
value rose from roughly one-third that of the United
States in 1964 to about 60 percent in 1980.F---] 25X1
For both sides, the trends in inventory value shown in
figure 5 reflected the trends in numbers of ships, total
tonnage, and the cost impact of technology change.
The Soviet inventory value rose because the USSR
had more and, on the whole, larger ships with a
generally more advanced technology. The US inven-
tory value in 1980 was roughly the same as it had
been in 1964, despite sharp declines in both tonnage
and force size, because the fewer ships were generally
larger and embodied a much higher level of ad-
vanced-and costly-technologyF--] 25X1
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Figure 4
Trends in Tonnage of US and Soviet
Major Surface Warships
us
(Including
Carriers)
us
(Excluding
Carriers)
1964 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
Both sides experienced a similar shift in composition
of inventory value, with cruisers and frigates gaining
at the expense of destroyers (see figure 6). The
composition of Soviet inventory value was more like
that of the United States in 1980 than it was in 1964,
reflecting the Soviet fleet's relatively recent acquisi-
tion of open-ocean frigates and small aircraft carriers.
The outstanding difference was the much larger share
of carriers on the US side.
Types of Ships: A Closer Look
Aircrq/t Carriers. Much of the continuing US lead in
overall inventory value is attributable to the great
disparity in the inventory value of the carrier forces of
the two countries-US carrier inventory value in
1980 was nine times that of the Soviet Union (see
figure 7). This disparity is due to the difference in
carrier force size and ship characteristics.
In 1964 the United States maintained a force of 24
aircraft carriers, many of which had been built during
World War II. By 1980 the force had been reduced to
13, including three nuclear-powered units. The
United States had retired from service 15 carriers of
World War II vintage and added four new ones,
including two with nuclear power. The new carriers
are twice the size of those they replaced and the cost
per ton is much higher, particularly for the nuclear-
powered Nimitz class. The two oldest units-over 30
years of age-were extensively modernized, with a
corresponding increase in inventory value. The United
States now has a smaller force of bigger, greatly
improved individual units to fulfill the carrier-based
airstrike mission. As a result, despite the force reduc-
tion, US carrier inventory value in 1980 about
equaled that in 1964. All US carriers operate conven-
tional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft, including
the latest high-performance naval interceptor and
attack aircraft. 25X1
The Soviet Union had no aircraft carriers in 1964.
The first, the conventionally powered Kiev, did not
appear until 1976, and by 1980 only two such ships
were in service. This class represents the second
generation of Soviet aviation ships, following the
helicopter-carrying Moskva class of cruisers, which
appeared during the 1960s. Kiev-class ships operate
only vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) fighter
aircraft. Although the US Navy designates them as
carriers, their capabilities do not approach those of
modern US carriers. Kiev-class ships are much
smaller-only about half as large as the newer US
ships-and lack the specialized equipment needed to
operate advanced CTOL fighter and attack aircraft.
Unlike US carriers, they are also heavily armed
combatants. There are indications the Soviets are
developing a large CTOL-capable carrier, although it
is not expected to be operational until the second half
of the 1980s.
Cruisers. The United States enjoyed a 2-to-1 advan-
tage in cruiser inventory value in 1964, but that lead
was cut sharply by 1980; by then, Soviet cruiser inven-
tory value had risen about 150 percent and that of the
25X1
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Figure 5
Trends in Inventory Value, Force Size, and Tonnage
of US and Soviet Major Surface Warships
50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1964 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Ships
1964 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
Number of
Ships
United States had risen just over 30 percent (see
figure 8). While the number of US cruisers increased
from 24 to 27, the Soviet cruiser force jumped from
14 to 36 units. At the same time, US cruiser tonnage
fell 20 percent (new US cruisers were generally
smaller than those that were retired), while Soviet
cruiser tonnage doubled. The Soviet Union surpassed
the United States in number of cruisers and cruiser
tonnage in the early 1970s and by 1980 had opened a
considerable lead in both force size and tonnage.
Most of the Soviet lead in cruiser tonnage and force
size is accounted for by obsolescent ships. Unlike the
United States, the Soviet Union has retained a
number of older cruisers-mainly large, armored, big-
gun platforms-to serve as gunfire support or com-
mand units. The United States remained ahead in
inventory value, largely because it has eight relatively
more expensive nuclear-powered missile cruisers.
During the 1964-80 period, the United States up-
graded its cruiser force by adding 15 missile cruisers
and retiring 12 older units. Six of the new ships were
nuclear powered, joining two pre-1964 nuclear-
powered units. In addition, 12 older ships underwent
conversion or modernization to upgrade their capabili-
ties. F____1 25X1
The Soviet Union added 25 missile cruisers in the 16
years after 1964. All were still conventionally 25X1
powered in 1980 (a large nuclear-powered missile
cruiser-the Soviet Navy's first nuclear-powered sur-
face warship-was undergoing sea trials). Only a few
ships had been modernized and only three old cruisers
were retired. The new construction included two units
of the Moskva class of missile helicopter cruisers. the
Soviet Navy's first aviation ships.F___-] 25X1
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Figure 6
Percentage Composition of Inventory Value of US and Soviet
Major Surface Warships, 1964 and 1980
1964
Total: $33 Billion
1980
Total: $33 Billion
1964
Total: $7 Billion
1980
Total: $15 Billion
Destroyers 63
Destroyers 32
Cruisers 44
Destroyers 31
Destroyers. The inventory value of US destroyers was
cut by more than half between 1968 and 1974, as the
United States retired most of the World War II-
vintage ships, but recovered to about two-thirds of its
1968 value by 1980 as the result of a force buildup in
the late 1970s. Soviet destroyer inventory value
changed little during the period (see figure 9). As a
result, the large US lead in destroyer inventory
value-more than 3 to 1 in 1964-nearly vanished in
the mid-1970s but rose again to about 2 to 1 by 1980.
because the new ships were larger than the retired
units and most of them had relatively costly gas
turbine propulsion.
The Soviet Union deactivated over 45 obsolescent
destroyers in the 16 years after 1964, while adding 16
new missile destroyers and upgrading 17 older ships in
conversion. As a result, the size of the force dropped
from 94 to 63 units, while destroyer tonnage fell by
one-fourth. Inventory value stayed up, however,
largely because of the higher costs of the new vessels
with gas turbine propulsion
During the period, the United States deactivated
more than 175 destroyers and acquired 31; the new
ships were mostly larger units-all without missile
armament-acquired in the late 1970s. In addition,
22 older vessels were upgraded (over half of them
were converted to carry missiles). By 1980 the de-
stroyer fleet was down to 79 units from 224 units in
1964, and tonnage was down by nearly one-half. The
drop in destroyer inventory value was less severe
Frigates. US frigate inventory value nearly quadru-
pled between 1964 and 1980, remaining considerably
above the fast-growing Soviet frigate inventory value.
In 1980 the US value was about 80 percent higher
(see figure 10). The United States maintained a
greater lead in force size and tonnage than in inven-
tory value because many of the new US frigates were
built very economically.
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Figure 7
Trends in Indicators of US and Soviet
Carrier Strength
Soviet
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Yr 1 1
1964 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
Figure 8
Trends in Indicators of US and Soviet
Cruiser Strength
I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1964 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
585936 1-82 585937 1-82
7 Secret
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Figure 9 Figure 10
Trends in Indicators of US and Soviet Trends in Indicators of US and Soviet
Destroyer Strength Frigate Strength
Inventory Value Inventory Value
Index: 100=1964 US Index: 100= 1964 US
125 500
0 I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 i i i 1 1 1 /i i i i i i i 1 1
1964 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 1964 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
Force Levels Force Levels
Units Units
200
100
Tonnage Tonnage
Index: 100=1964 US Index:100=1964 US
0 I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Lill- i i i i i i i
1964 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 1964 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
US
US
US
Soviet 20
25X1
25X1
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Figure 11
Inventory Value of US and Soviet Major Surface
Warships and Small Soviet Frigates, 1980
Average Age of US and
Soviet Major Surface Warships a
US
10.9
Soviet
12.7
Destroyers
Small
Frigatesa
US
15.9
Soviet
10.4
Large Frigates
US
Soviet
Since 1964 the United States has acquired 57 non-
missile frigates and 11 missile frigates and retired 34
older vessels. As a result, the US force nearly doubled
in number (from 36 to 70 units), and its tonnage
nearly quadrupled. No ships underwent conversion
upgrading, since only two of the 70 frigates in service
in 1980 had been built before 1964. The Soviet Union
added 28 missile frigates and some 70 small frigates
to its Navy during the period of 1971-80. The missile
frigates are comparable in size to the newest US
frigates and are intended for open-ocean missionsF_
The USSR has a number of small frigates-ships
from 1,000 to 3,000 tons displacement-that are
primarily dedicated to coastal defense, although they
are capable of open-ocean operations. The US Navy
has almost no ships of this size. The Soviet small
frigates are not included in this inventory comparison,
but even if they were the United States would retain a
sizable lead in inventory value, as shown in figure 11.
Total Major Surface Combatants
14.2
13.5
US 15.1 12.5
Soviet 10.7 15.1
a Average age is based on the age of the original hull, even though a
number of ships have undergone conversions between 1964 and
1980. Ships undergoing conversion during the period were included
in the calculations of ship age averages.
b The Soviet Navy had no aircraft carriers or large frigates in 1964.
Age of the Forces
In 1964 the Soviet major surface warship fleet was
considerably younger on average than the US force,
but by 1980 the United States had the younger
force-the average age of Soviet ships grew from 1 1
to 15 years, while that of US ships fell from 15 to less
than 13 years (see table 2). The United States phased
older ships out much more rapidly than did the Soviet
Union, and it built more new units. In 1980 the Soviet
force contained at least three dozen obsolescent 25X1
cruisers and destroyers (many of which face retire-
ment over the next several years). Among the units
built before 1964 and still in inventory in 1980, fewer
than a third had completed a conversion or other
major upgrading. In contrast, the United States in
1980 had virtually no ships facing retirement, and
about half of its older ships had been converted or
otherwise substantially modernized.
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Figure 12
cted Force Levels of US and Soviet
P4 Surface Warships
Units
0 i 1 1 i i i
1980 81 82 83 84 85
Figure 13
Projected Trends in Inventory Value bf
US and Soviet Major Surface Warships
0 i 1 1 i i i
1980 81 82 83 84 85
Us
(Including
Carriers)'
Us
(Excluding
Carriers)
aus force does not include carriers in Service-Life Extension Program
(SLEP)
bSoviet force does not include anticipated large aircraft carrier.
Outlook
In 1980 the United States had almost no obsolescent
major surface warships, so that virtually all of the
ships to be acquired through 1985 will be net addi-
tions to the fleet. By 1985 the US force is projected to
total about 235 ships, up from 189 units in 1980 (see
figure 12). New units will include:
? One nuclear-powered large aircraft carrier.
? One nuclear-powered missile cruiser, which became
operational in 1981.
? The first two of the new missile cruisers equipped
with the Aegis air defense system.
? Two antisubmarine warfare destroyers.
? Four units of a new missile destroyer class.
? About 35 missile frigates.'
In addition, two reactivated and modernized battle-
ships are expected to be operational by mid-decade.
The new nuclear-powered missile cruiser is the
last nuclear-powered surface combatant that the US
' US force projections are based on the Five-Year Defense Program,
Fiscal Year 1983 Budget Submission, dated 16 October 198 LC
Navy has planned to obtain. Surface. warships (other
than carriers) will in the future be equipped with
gas-turbine propulsion, a trend which began in the
mid-1970s.
The Soviet Navy had a relatively large number of
obsolescent units in 1980 and is likely to retire more
units by 1985 than it acquires. Consequently, the
Soviet force is expected to decrease slightly, from 129
units in 1980 to under 125 by 1985. By then, the
Soviet Union is likely to have obtained:
? Two more small aircraft carriers.
? Two units of a new class of nuclear-powered missile
cruisers (this count includes the one that became
operational in 1981).
? About 15 conventionally powered missile cruisers,
comprising three new classes.'
? Five missile frigates, including one unit of a new
classF I
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Figure 14
Percentage Composition of Inventory Value of US and Soviet
Major Surface Warships, 1980 and 1985
1980
Total: $33 Billion
1985
Total: $44 Billion
By the mid-1980s the US major surface warship fleet
will probably be nearly twice the size of the Soviet
force.' Both fleets, but particularly the Soviet force,
will be substantially upgraded as the trend toward
technologically more sophisticated ships continues on
both sides. Soviet-but not US-ships will generally
be larger than in 1980. Consequently, the inventory
value of both forces will rise considerably, but the
United States will probably somewhat enhance its
advantage in inventory value. As before, US carriers
will account for much of the difference (see figure 13).
"This count of the US force excludes one aircraft carrier undergo-
ing service life extension. The count of the Soviet force excludes a
large aircraft carrier now being developed, which is currently
1980 1985
Total: $15 Billion Total: $22 Billion
Frigates 14
Destroyers Carriers 10
Carriers 8 16\
The 1985 US force shown here does not include a carrier in Service-Life
Extension Program. Soviet cruisers include two classes that NATO has
designated as destroyers. If the NATO designation is used, the share of
cruisers in 1985 is 48 percent and that of destroyers is 28 percent.
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For both navies, the acquisitions projected through
1985 will produce a considerable shift in the composi-
tion of inventory value, with the trends continuing
toward frigates for the United States and cruisers for
the USSR (see figure 14). The US force will increase
somewhat in average age, as virtually no ships will be
deactivated, and the Soviet force will become slightly
younger, as retirements outnumber new units. As a
result, the average age of both fleets probably will be
roughly comparable by 1985 (see table 3).
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Projected Average Age of US and
Soviet Major Surface Warships a
Battleships
Us
Soviet
Large Frigates
US
9.6
10.6
Soviet
3.9
7.8
US
12.5
14.7
Soviet
15.1
14.1
a Average age is based on the age of the original hull, even though a
number of ships have undergone conversions between 1964 and
1985. Ships undergoing conversion during the period were included
in the calculations of ship age averages.
b Excludes carrier in the Service-Life Extension Program.
c The US and Soviet Navies had no battleships in service in 1980; the
Soviet Navy will have no battleships in 1985.
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Appendix
Methodology for Costing
Soviet Ships
Under the sponsorship of the Joint CIA/DIA Mili-
tary Costing Review Board, a major analytic effort
was begun in 1977 to study the dollar cost of con-
structing Soviet major surface combatants in US
shipyards. a leading US naval
architectural firm with considerable experience in
designing major surface combatants, conducted the
basic design work. Two subcontractors,
added first-hand con-
struction and cost experience and detailed familiarity
with Soviet ship design. The effort resulted in a Soviet
major surface combatant cost-estimating model. F_
was used to move the costs into 1980 dollarsl
The computer-based model was designed to cost
Soviet surface combatants in the 1,500-to-12,000-ton
(full-load displacement) range. It calculates only the
basic ship cost-the costs of weapons and sensors,
reflecting Soviet equipment quality and based on the
costs of US analogs, are estimated separately and
added to the basic ship cost. The model costs a ship on
the basis of Soviet design practices and construction
schedules. Moreover, Soviet ship design characteris-
tics and US shipyard practices in the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s were incorporated into the model to take
into account the effect of technological changes over
time. For each ship class, two cost estimates are
generated: a lead-ship cost, embracing the higher
costs associated with the first of a kind, and a follow-
ship cost, reflecting the lower unit costs associated
with "learning curve" experience. The model pro-
duces costs in constant 1979 dollars. A price index
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