NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00296R000200010018-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 13, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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,,7dSE"mac Director of Top Secret
Central
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
13 March 1981
Top Secret
CO NID 81-059JX
i-i arc
Copy 236
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Top Secret
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Contents
Situation Reports
Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
El Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Briefs and Comments 25X1
USSR-Japan: Relations Remain Strained . . . . . . . . . . 8
Liberia: Clash Over Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Taiwan: New Crackdown on Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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Zambia: Short-Term Financial Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Bolivia: More Pressure on Garcia Meza . . . . . . . . . . 11
Special Analysis
USSR-Poland: Moscow's Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Top Secret 25X1
13 March 1981
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The Solidarity chapter in the eastern city of Radom has
raised a number of demands that the government probably considers
nonnegotiable, and the increasingly tense situation could lead to
past behavior.
In addition, the media have laid out the evidence
against the dissidents held since last September who were
recently charged with plotting to overthrow the socialist
The chapter in Radom has demanded the dismissal of
local officials who suppressed workers during disturbances
in 1976, the transfer of police buildings to the local
health service, and the dropping of legal procedures
against dissidents. Accession to these demands would
affect the morale and authority of the security services
and probably would provoke demands from throughout the
country that the police be called to account for their 25X1
Solidarity leader Walesa realizes that strike
activity can develop a troublesome momentum, but he can-
not disassociate himself from the grievances aired in
Radom. Although he is likely to become involved in the
negotiations, his presence may not help moderate the
demands of the workers in Radom who appear determined to
have their demands at least partially met.
guard.
Campaign Against Dissidents
The police yesterday detained prominent dissident
Adam Michnik for three hours and told him to report to
a Warsaw police station three times a week. Michnik
eluded the police last week with the aid of a worker 25X1
system.
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The government's tougher stance has provoked a strong
reaction from several regional Solidarity chapters, which
have threatened strikes if harassment continues. In the
past, Walesa and Solidarity's entire national leadership
have pledged to strike if dissidents such as Michnik and 25X1
Jacek Kuron were arrested.
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
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The munitions flow to the guerrillas has dropped off consid-
erably in recent weeks, apparently causing several guerrilla units
to experience shortages. Efforts to renew deliveries using differ-
ent methods and routes are continuing, however, indicating that
large amounts of weapons and ammunition are still in the pipeline.
Government troops, meanwhile, began operations this
week in two areas of central and eastern El Salvador.
The operations are likely only to harass the insurgents
by keeping them on the move.
Venezuelan and Mexican Reaction
Former Venezuelan President Perez believes that
neither the Salvadoran Government nor the guerrillas can
win a protracted struggle and that only negotiations can
solve the issue. He told the US Ambassador last Saturday
that a settlement would have to include both the Demo-
cratic Revolutionary Front and President Duarte, although
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not as junta President. Perez seems convinced that the
military also would have to be given a role, but believes
that Defense Minister Garcia has to go.
Perez claims he has sent word to Fidel Castro that
his policy of intervention in Central America can only
lead to Cuba's greater isolation in the hemisphere and
to increased dependence on the Soviets. Perez is capable
of sudden changes in position, but as long as he believes
that moderation is politically advantageous and that he
can influence US policy in Central America, he is likely
to cooperate with efforts to find a solution in El Salvador.
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Mexican President Lopez Portillo, without specifi-
cally mentioning the US, told journalists this week that
"interventionist tendencies" in Central America are much
more dangerous than ideologies because ideological con-
flicts can be discussed or voted on. His remarks are a
continuation of Mexican efforts to forestall increased
US involvement in El Salvador and avoid a superpower ,)GV4
Political Fallout in Western Europe
The question of negotiations between the junta and
the leftist opposition is continuing to cause political
problems in Western Europe. In West Germany, the Social
Democratic Party is looking for a face-saving way to
cool the issue or at least to avoid being blamed for a
deterioration of relations between the US and Western
Europe over El Salvador. They are willing to work for
a political settlement and to cooperate with the opposi-
tion Christian Democrats to devise a common European
approach to the issue.
Meanwhile, the Socialist International's efforts to
arrange negotiations are stalled, because of uncertainty
over how the US, the Duarte junta, and the Salvadoran
left will respond.
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A lack of US support for negotiations could strengthen
the forces already opposed to other US-sponsored programs--
such as TNF deployment--which require confidence in the
ability of the US to gauge the Soviet threat and to deal
with it safely. 25X1
Chinese Commentary
Recent Chinese media coverage of events in El Sal-
vador conveys support for US moves there to counter
Soviet Bloc intervention. Beijing has cited US policy
toward El Salvador as reflecting Washington's tougher
stance against the USSR in the "new era" of the Reagan
At the same time, the Chinese show concern for
Latin American sensitivities by expressing opposition
to external intervention. During the recent visit to
China by the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, both the
Chinese and the Venezuelan attacked the USSR and Cuba
by name but did not mention the US in decrying "outside"
interference. F_ I 25X1
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Soviet Ambassador Polyanskiy's meeting with Liberal Democratic
Party leaders on Wednesday apparently failed to reverse the deteri-
oration in Soviet-Japanese political relations.
The Japanese raised the Northern Territories issue
at the outset, calling it a "fishbone stuck in the throat"
of bilateral relations. Polyanskiy evidently criticized
the recent Japanese campaign for the return of the ter-
ritories as "anti-Soviet" in nature, and pushed for im-
proved economic ties. Both sides also used frank and
sometimes heated language in repeating their standard
positions on Afghanistan, the Polish problem, and the
Soviet military buildup on the Northern Islands.
Prime Minister Suzuki has agreed to hold talks with
Polyanskiy next week if the Ambassador's meeting with
Foreign Minister Ito next Wednesday is productive. Suzuki
is aware that the Soviets are eager for a dialogue, and
he intends to press Japan's case on the Northern Islands.
The Prime Minister presumably will reiterate his opposition
to Soviet attempts to separate economic and political orlYl
Polyanskiy may give Suzuki a letter from President
Brezhnev, perhaps similar to those sent to the US and
European countries on the need for a US-Soviet summit and
a TNF freeze in Europe.
In addition, the Ambassador is almost certain to
mention Brezhnev's proposal at the Soviet party congress
regarding the development of confidence-building measures
in the Far East. Moscow appears to be disappointed with
Tokyo's cautious response on the initiative but may hope 25X1
that the meetings next week will provide an opportunity
to sound out the Japanese on the matter.
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LIBERIA: Clash Over Foreign Policy
A showdown is developing between Foreign Minister Matthews
and military Leaders over his efforts to increase ties with pro-
Matthews has unilaterally forged ahead with his
policy of "true nonalignment" despite complaints from
Head of State Doe and other military men on the ruling
council. He has permitted the Soviets to double their
Embassy staff and is allowing the Libyans and Cubans
to open resident diplomatic missions.
Matthews also has accepted modest amounts of aid and
scholarships from the USSR, Libya, and Ethiopia. He is
scheduled to visit Cuba later this month.
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TAIWAN: New Crackdown on opposition
The arrests of opposition politicians defeated in
legislative elections late last year may be an effort by
authorities on Taiwan to intimidate other members of the
opposition who are using their positions in the legisla-
ture to criticize the regime. So far five have been
arrested and charged with violating the election law
enacted before the elections in December. The authori-
ties have convicted two of the five, and doctored evidence
apparently was used in one case. Taipei also has indi-
cated that it intends to try again to gain control of
Taiwan's Christian organizations, particularly the
Presbyterian Church, which is sympathetic to the opposi-
tion. 25X1
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Zambia has negotiated a $150 million line of credit
with six international banks to pay for most of its oil
needs this year. Last month oil imports were halted
because of lack of funds. Without sufficient oil, Zambia
would have had to cut back copper and cobalt production.
Zambia accounts for 11 percent of US imports of refined
copper and 10 percent of US cobalt supplies.
Zambia will still need help from the IMF to prevent
further defaults on its debt and to maintain copper and
cobalt production. The IMF has agreed to extend a three-
year line of credit to Zambia, but the amount is still
under discussion. The IMF is insisting that President
Kaunda impose new austerity measures that will be particu-
larly unpopular with Kaunda's urban constituents. If the 25X1
negotiations drag on, some of the banks involved in the
most recent loan say that they will back out.
Most military officers who had demanded former
Interior Minister Arce's removal from any position of
influence are outraged over his appointment as the new
head of the military academy, the Army's second most
prestigious post. They are likely to move against
General Garcia Meza soon unless he removes Arce immediately
and attempts to institute real reform. Garcia Meza,
however, probably will not be able to carry out either Orlin
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USSR-POLAND: Moscow's Strategy
The USSR is increasing pressure on the Kania regime to take
more resolute action against dissidents and against the militants
in Solidarity and to complete plans for the possible use of martial 25X1
law. The Soviets are pursuing these tactics partly to strengthen
the resolve of the Polish party
They presumably want to see whether is sne 25X1
of action is effective before deciding on their own use of force.
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The communique following the summit last week in
Moscow between the Soviet and Polish leaders underscores
the Kremlin's dissatisfaction with the Kania regime's
performance. It states that Poland "was and will be"--
rather than "is"--a reliable link in the socialist com-
munity and for the first time raised the Brezhnev Doc-
trine in reference to the Polish situation. 25X1
The growing ferment among rank-and-file members for
liberalization of the Polish party is of increasing con-
cern to the Soviet leaders. Soviet confidence in First
Secretary Kania and the Polish party appears lower than
at any time since the crisis began last July. Moscow's
approval of the unprecedented appointment of a military
officer, General Jaruzelski, to head a Communist govern-
ment is the clearest indication that it recognizes that
the Polish party has become bankrupt. 25X1
A Polish diplomat in Moscow reports that the Soviets
told Kania last week to delay indefinitely the extraordi-
nary party congress, which had originally been scheduled
for early next month. The Brezhnev leadership's fear in
1968 that a coming party congress in Czechoslovakia would
oust the remaining pro-Soviets and institutionalize party
liberalization was a major factor in the decision to
invade. Moscow apparently has similar fears about a
Polish congress and wishes to take no chances. 25X1
--continued
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The Soviets have no clear alternative to Kania as
party leader. Despite his poor record, they probably do
not doubt his loyalty or fear that he is a potential
Polish Dubcek. They probably also consider that his
replacement at this point by a hardliner might further
damage the Polish party. Nevertheless, one of the few
remaining moves the Soviets can take short of military
action is to sack Kania, and, if he balks at fully imple-
menting Moscow's current strategy, the Soviets will Or_V1
Demanding Action
The summit communique also indicates that Moscow
will no longer tolerate procrastination and compromise
by the Polish party. It states that a "firm and resolute
rebuff" to Poland's internal and external enemies is
"particularly urgent" and that a I __1 "radical improvement" - - -- t - --- - - 25X1
-
The Soviets apparently want Kania immediately to
fulfill his repeated pledges to seize the initiative
from Solidarity.
The Polish regime's brief detentions over the last
10 days of dissident leaders Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik
appear to be a direct outcome of the summit in Moscow.
The Kremlin will press Warsaw to follow up on these
moves to isolate the dissidents from Solidarity--the
first step in an attack that the Soviets will want even- 25X1
tually to be aimed at the union itself.
Top Secret
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Outlook
Moscow apparently is pushing Kania to adopt a more
forceful policy, even though it has doubts about his
ability to make it work.
The Soviets probably believe that under these
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circumstances there is a high risk of uncontrolled
violence that would require direct Soviet military inter-
vention. 25X1
At this point, it is unclear whether Moscow has de-
cided to accept this risk. The Soviet leaders probably
still hope that the regime can somehow contain the re-
action by Solidarity that a crackdown on the dissidents
would bring. If public order does break down, however,
the Soviets would be in a better position to justify a
military intervention to world opinion.
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Top Secret
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