NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00296R000200010070-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: March 25, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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/SL Y Director of Top 'Secret
Central
!AxIntelligence F
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
25 March 1981
Top Secret 25X1
Copy 2 2 9
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Top Secret
Poland: Pivotal Meeting Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Spain: Military Assigned to Basque Region . . . . . . . . 3
Latin America - Cuba: Mounting Diplomatic Hostility . . . 4
Syria-Jordan: Propaganda War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
USSR: Oil Export Reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Liberia: Banking Crisis Looms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Special Analysis
Poland: Possible Turning Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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Denmark
* PRAGUE
Baltic Sea
Poland
West
Germany
*BUDAPEST
Hungary
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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POLAND: Pivotal Meeting Today
Neither the regime nor Solidarity has shown any sign it in-
tends to give in during the very difficult and perhaps pivotal meet- 4-- .-7-.,
25X1
ay
Party leader Kania yesterday said Solidarity's call
for strikes created the "danger of self-destruction" and
turned a local incident into an issue that "threatens na-
Deputy Premier Rakowski, who will meet with union
leader Walesa today, warned that Solidarity's leaders are
attempting to become the "new owners" of Poland. He also
said "stubborn demands" will not break socialist power
.
in the country but might lead it into a "fratricidal con- 25X1
Solidarity, after a long and stormy meeting Monday
night, yesterday issued a call for a warning strike on
Friday and a general strike next Tuesday unless the gov-
ernment meets its demands. The union also has formed a
10-member strike committee headed by Walesa that will op-
erate out of Gdansk. Union leaders from the Warsaw area
have moved into the large Ursus factory to conduct their 25X1
The union is waging an extensive and apparently ef-
fective propaganda campaign about the incident in
Bydgoszcz. Posters and leaflets providing Solidarity's
version of events have appeared in a number of cities,
and the populace apparently believes the union's story.
Students in Krakow have declared a strike alert in sup- 25X1
Top Secret
Top Secret
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The political tension has aggravated the food short-
age. Radio Warsaw last night reported that long lines
of people were waiting to buy food in three cities along
the Baltic coast and that an "acute" food shortage exists.
The governor of Gdansk has ordered all food rationed.
Even before the latest political crisis, a Politburo mem-
ber suggested that food riots could occur in Poland if
supplies do not improve. In addition, a Polish economist
recommended immediate introduction of bread rationing.
Moscow has signaled approval for a hard line toward
Solidarity by carrying in TASS the statement made by the
Polish Politburo on Sunday essentially word for word.
TASS, significantly, quoted from the original Warsaw
Radio version of the statement and ignored changes in a
subsequent Polish version that appeared to leave open the
door for some compromise by the regime. 25X1
Moscow Radio commentator Yuri Shagylin yesterday
echoed this tough stance and called Solidarity's plans
for protest strikes "political" in nature. In a broad-
cast on Sunday, he had charged Solidarity's leadership
with attempting to establish "dual power" in Poland.
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SPAIN: Military Assigned to Basque Region
The decision to send troops into the Basque region to back up
security forces may alleviate military concerns about terrorism but
could jeopardize improved relations between Madrid and the regional
government.
Madrid's quick response to the recent killing of two
Army officers in the Basque region is a measure of the
government's wariness of potential military unrest follow-
ing the attempted coup last month. Madrid has been re-
sisting military involvement in Basque security problems,
fearing such a move would swing local opinion behind the
Nevertheless, it is the first time since Franco's death
the Army has had a role in combating Basque terrorism. 25X1
The terrorists probably will seek to portray the
military as an army of occupation and are likely to
step up their campaign of killing officers in an attempt
to provoke harsh reprisals that would drive Basques into 25X1
th
'
e terrorists
camp.
Before the decision to send troops into the region
was announced, the moderate Basque Nationalist Party,
which dominates the regional government, for the first
time publicly offered to help Madrid fight the terrorists.
The Basque moderates, however, are caught in a difficult
position. If they help Madrid, they also will become
targets of the terrorists and will be vulnerable to
charges of collaborating with the enemy. If they do
nothing they risk losing the hard-won Basque autonomy
in the event the military is provoked into a takeover. 25X1
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LATIN AMERICA - CUBA: Mounting Diplomatic Hostility
Colombia's suspension of relations with Cuba following the
exposure of Cuba's involvement with the most active Colombian ter-
rorist group is the Latest example of growing diplomatic hostility 25X1
Last week as Costa Rica was closing down its con-
sulate in Havana, the Cuban Ambassador in Lisbon was
expelled and Portugal recalled its charge. In addition,
Cuba's relations with Peru and Venezuela have been in-
creasingly strained since early last year, and Ecuador 25X1
s
h
i
~
via
e verge o sever
11-j t res.
With the departure of the Colombian diplomats, the
only Latin American countries with ambassadors still in
Havana are Argentina, Nicaragua, Panama, and Mexico. The
move by Bogota, however, is not likely to diminish the
influence of the predominant hardliners in the Cuban
leadership. Havana already is accusing Colombia of 25X1
conspiring with the US against Cuba.
Cuba's diplomatic arrogance during the past year
reflects the low priority President Castro assigns to
normal state-to-state relations. It also underscores
his continuing commitment to subversion and violent 25X1
revolution.
The Colombians, meanwhile, are likely to increase
efforts to stamp out the guerrillas, and they may in-
crease support to Central American governments threatened
by similar insurgencies. The recent exposure also will
reinforce Bogota's interest in improving its close rela-
tions with the US. The Colombians may request additional
US military equipment and training for their counterin-
surgency campaign.
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SYRIA-JORDAN: Propaganda War
Intensified propaganda attacks on each other by Syria and
Jordan underscore the continuing tension between them.
Jordanian King Hussein, for the first time since
relations with Syria began to deteriorate markedly late
last year, publicly attacked President Assad last weekend,
accusing him of splitting the Arab world and undermining
the Palestinian cause.
Assad replied in kind to Hussein yesterday, calling
on Jordanians to "overthrow the traitor." He qualified
his stance with an offer of reconciliation should Hussein
"open all borders for Palestinian guerrilla activities
against Israel."
The Syrians previously have denounced Hussein and
tried to undercut his standing with other Arab leaders
by focusing their propaganda attacks on Jordanian contacts
with Israeli politicians. Damascus media have exploited
reports of a recent meeting between Hussein's brother and
Israeli Labor Party chairman Peres to strengthen Syria's
claim that Jordan is seeking to arrange a unilateral agree-
ment with Israel on the status of the occupied West Bank.
Some Arab leaders are concerned the dispute may
be getting out of control.
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USSR: Oil Export Reductions
Analysis suggests that the USSR is likely to cut
oil exports to hard currency customers this year by
about 200,000 barrels per day--more than 20 percent.
Some customers already have been notified by the Soviets.
Exports to Italy will be cut by 40,000 barrels per day
and to France by 20,000 barrels per day. Sweden expects
its supply of Soviet oil will also be reduced. Breaking
with tradition, Moscow is increasing its oil price even
more than OPEC countries. This development tends to
confirm that the reductions reflect Soviet supply dif-
ficulties rather than a slackening demand for Soviet oil.
Several Soviet officials, moreover, have told the Ital-
ians that internal needs prompted the export cut.
LIBERIA: Banking Crisis Looms
The closure by the government of the Bank of
Liberia--a major commercial bank partly owned by
Chemical Bank--is further eroding confidence in Liberia's
troubled banking system. The bank was heavily in debt
to the country's central bank
the $25
million in the untied funds that the US Embassy reports
Liberia will need through June, mainly to help pay
foreign debts.
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POLAND: Possible Turning Point
Top Secret
Solidarity and the government are on another collision course
and will have greater difficulty than ever before in avoiding vio-
lence. The chances have increased markedly that the regime will
impose martial law even though doing so risks provoking widespread
disorder and a military intervention by the Soviets.
Both sides are talking tough. The harsh party
Politburo statement as well as the government's stub-
bornness during talks with the union on Sunday suggest
that the party feels compelled to stand firm in the face
of union demands over the incident at Bydgoszcz.
The union has put the government on the defensive
with its propaganda campaign on police brutality. It
also has tried to deny the regime its ultimate weapon
of a declaration of martial law by moving regional union
headquarters into the factories and by making a general
strike the automatic response to such an action.
Solidarity's Position
The incident at Bydgoszcz--following other instances
of increased police harassment of Solidarity--has brought
to the surface and focused attention on the workers' deep
resentment of the repressive activities of the privileged
security services. The workers have lost some of their
fear of the police, are determined to resist the use of
force by the police, and see the incident as a test of
their resolve. Union leaders believe that with 10 mil-
lion members and wider popular support they can stand 25X1
up to the police and win.
Solidarity's minimum demands probably are high.
Many in the union will not be satisfied with the sacking
of a few local policemen in Bydgoszcz and will remain
adamant that political officials also be dismissed.
--continued
Top Secret
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Some activists also want broader assurance that
harassment of the unions will stop. Solidarity leader
Walesa, who prevented wildcat strikes over this issue
last week by threatening to resign, may now not have the
ability or the inclination to prevent a general strike if
the government does not show signs of being responsive.
The Regime's Options
The government probably has adopted a tough stance
because it is under great pressure from hardliners and
the Soviets to stand firm, and because it may believe
Solidarity has exaggerated an incident that was in large
measure provoked by union activists. Moreover, it does
not want to weaken the security forces, one of its few
remaining loyal and effective instruments of power.
The regime could try to strike a limited compromise
by blaming local police officers. It also could go much
further in meeting Solidarity's demands--or refuse to
give in at all. The government probably will try offer-
ing a limited compromise first, because this involves
the fewest risks, allows it to show a continued commitment
to political solutions, and increases its ability to de-
pict Solidarity as the irresponsible party should no OtiYl
compromise be fou nd.
If a compromise is to succeed, however, the authori-
ties will have to try to bring indirect pressure on
Solidarity to moderate its demands. This could involve
appeals to the Church, hints of martial law, or threats
of military force. The Church may refuse to become in-
volved, however, until the government has shown it will
act against cases of police brutality. 25X1
Some in the regime may be prepared for greater com-
promise, believing the Soviets still want to avoid mil-
itary intervention. Consequently, another capitulation
by the government cannot be ruled out, even though it
might weaken party chief Kania's political standing
and severely damage relations with Moscow.
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If the regime decides not to give in, it must be
prepared to face a general strike. There would be con-
siderable pressure on the government to preempt or con-
trol such a strike by declaring martial law even though
any element of surprise is gone. 25X1
Such a course raises the chance of extensive unrest
or a total impasse between striking workers and security
and military forces. Either prospect could lead the
Soviets to intervene. The party leadership nonetheless
appears to be much closer to adopting this course than 25X1
The Soviet Factor
The Soviets probably regard this latest crisis as
a pivotal test of the Kania regime's determination to
stand firm. Moscow has been urging such a course on
Warsaw with increasing forcefulness.
The Kremlin has drastically narrowed the Polish
regime's room for compromise by publicly adopting a hard
line on the incident at Bydgoszcz. In past confrontations
between Solidarity and the regime, the Soviets have either
refrained from direct public comment or broken their
silence only after the issue has been decided.
A "victory" by the government would give Kania's
stock a badly needed boost in Moscow. Should the party
again give up more than Solidarity, however, Moscow may
begin to push for Kania's replacement by someone more
willing to take a tougher line. If the regime does not
back off and Solidarity continues planning for a general
strike, Soviet leaders will put even greater pressure OrlYl
Moscow realizes there is a considerable risk that
martial law could lead to uncontrollable violence, which
would require direct Soviet military intervention. There
is no evidence indicating the Soviets are readying the
massive force necessary for an intervention under such
chaotic circumstances. Nevertheless,
last December.
Soviet forces in and around Poland are
more prepared for intervention than at any time since
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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