NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 10 JUNE 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00296R000300020040-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: June 10, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
Intelligence
Wednesday
10 June 1981
10' June X87
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Poland: Kania's Speech 1
Poland: Financing Problems 2
Lebanon: Conciliation Committee Fails To Make Progress 3
USSR - Western Europe: Pipeline Negotiations StaZZed 5
Spain: Economic Agreement 6
Guatemala-Belize: Status of Negotiations 7
Special Analysis
'turkey: Foreign Policy Under the Generals 8
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In his opening address to the Central Committee ple-
num, which concludes today, Kania said that Soviet "anx-
iety and worry," as expressed in the recent letter to the
Central Committee, were fully justified. He pledged that
activities opposing socialism or the Soviet Union would
will be no mayor departures in policy.
POLAND: Kania's Speech
Party leader Kania yesterday attempted to assuage Soviet con-
cerns by promis2ng more resolute action against eounterrevoZution-
aries,-but his statements confirming that the party congress ~aiZZ
take place on schedule in July and supporting reform indicate there
no longer be tolerated. In citing several of the more
ominous portions of that letter, Kania may hope to con-
vince party members of the depth of Soviet concern.
The Soviets will view Kania's tough statement with
skepticism. Moscow complained in the letter of past
broken promises and suggested that it would be satisfied
with nothing less than rapid action.
For the most part, Kania followed his previous prac-
tice of balanced criticism, supporting Solidarity's trade
union activities while opposing its more political behav-
ior. He welcomed the postponement of the warning strike
set for tomorrow and praised current preparations for the
congress. Kania criticized "conservative trends" in the
party, but, in a tilt toward Moscow, said that forces
pushing the party in the direction of social democratism
are the "main danger."
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POLAND: Financing Problems
Poland's financial difficulties remain acute, despite debt re-
lief provided by Western government creditors in April.
Complex negotiations with Western banks on resched-
uling debt repayments continue to drag. At meetings last
week when Warsaw appealed for new credits, it encountered
strong sentiment that Poland should seek help elsewhere,
mainly from Moscow.
Moscow has made it clear that no
further aid can be expected from the USSR or the other
members of CEMA.
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If the banks agree to reschedule virtually all of
the principal owed to them or continue to honor the in-
formal moratorium on principal repayments, Poland will
still need an estimated $2.5 billion to meet its obliga-
tions this year. Despite the hard line being taken by
lenders, this gap probably can be bridged.
Western creditors may provide new loans to avert the
damaging impact of a default or the disruptions that would
result if Warsaw had to balance its accounts with the West.
Despite its present tough line, Moscow may eventually
agree to extend further assistance.
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LEBANON: Conciliation Committee Fails To Make Progress
has scheduled additional sessions.
The Arab conciliation committee meeting held this weekend in
Lebanon failed to make significant progress in reducing tensions but
positions around Zahlah.
The foreign ministers attending the meeting attempted
to get Phalange militia chief Bashir Jumayyil to sign a
statement renouncing his group's ties with Israel--a key
Syrian demand. Bashir balked, however, apparently because
of the tough language in the statement and the committee's
refusal to consider his demands for Syrian withdrawal from
that is generally holding in Beirut and Zahlah.
Bashir told the US Ambassador that he and President
Sarkis are working on a statement on the Phalange's future
dealings with Israel. They plan to present it to the
next committee meeting--now scheduled for 23 June in
Saudi Arabia--if some Phalange demands are met. The
committee also agreed to meet in Beirut on 4 July and
announced that all parties have agreed to a new cease-fire
Diplomatic Initiatives
President Assad is trying to take advantage of the
missile crisis and the Israeli raid on Iraq's nuclear
research center to ease Syria's isolation in the Arab
The Arab League meeting probably will result in a
rhetorical show of Arab unity that masks continuing deep
differences. The Iraqis will want Syria to scrap its
alliance with Tran and end all military support for Tehran.
Iraqi propaganda has already sought to link Syria and Iran
to the Israeli airstrike to embarrass Damascus and under-
over their dispute.
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Although Syria has not been officially invited to
attend the emergency Arab Foreign Ministers' conference
in Baghdad that starts tomorrow, Foreign I4?inister Khaddam
evidently plans to attend. Khaddam will be the first
senior Syrian official to visit Iraq in two years, and
he plans to sound out, the Iraqis on at least papering
mine its standing in the Arab world.
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USSR - WESTERN EUROPE: Pipeline Negotiations Stalled
the negotiations with West
German and French bankers for a credit package for the
proposed natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western
Europe could remain stalled "indefinitely" because of
high interest rates. This is the first such Soviet ac-
knowledgment that construction of the pipeline could be
delayed. Moscow has stated repeatedly, however, that
the pipeline is the major East-West project in the cur-
rent Five-Year Plan, and the Soviets apparently will work
with the Western countries involved to resolve the current
financing difficulties and allow the project to move ahead.
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SPAIN: Economic Agreement
A national economic accord reached late last week
among representatives of the Spanish Government, employ-
ers, and major labor unions will strengthen the govern-
ment's standing with the public. By pushing through this
pact, which aims at stimulating employment and establishes
modest wage increases for next year, Prime Minister Calvo
Sotelo has demonstrated his determination to tackle long-
neglected economic problems, displaying aggressive lead-
ership in the economic sphere that contrasts with that
of the previous government. The willingness of all
sides--including the Communist-dominated Workers'
Commissions--to make concessions probably reflects con-
cern about restiveness in the military. Although the
pact responds to a key concern of the military by demon-
strating that left and right can still cooperate, it is
likely to do little to reduce military misgivings over
political stability and internal security.
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GUATEMALA-BELIZE: Status of Negotiations
Guatemalan Foreign Minister Castillo reportedly is
considering postponing the treaty talks with Belize next
week in London, probably until late this month. Guate-
malan officials are becoming increasingly restive in the
face of domestic criticism of their territorial conces-
sions and what they see as Belizean obstinacy. The two
major unresolved issues are Guatemala's use of several
Belizean cays and its rights to maritime passage to the
Caribbean.
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TURKEY: Foreign Policy Under the Generals
The military rulers in Ankara have made Turkey a more accom-
modating NATO ally, but recent developments in the Middle East and
Turkey's dependence on Arab and Iranian oil contribute to Ankara's
caution on regional security issues. European criticism of the
military government for failing to restore democracy and the dis-
putes zoith Greece over Cyprus and control of the Aegean ensure that
Turkish foreign policy zviZZ continue to be puZZed in different di-
rections. Frustrations arising from conflicting demands could cause
Ankara to become Zess accommodating to the West.
The generals, who do not have to answer to a parlia-
ment, have been conciliatory on some issues, including
Greek reintegration into NATO. They have made it clear,
however, that they will not sacrifice what they consider
to be Turkey's national interests.
Ankara's dependence on Arab and Iranian oil--Turkey
gets 75 percent of its oil from Iraq and Iran--is prompt-
ing the government to reevaluate its relations with Israel.
It has so far reduced its representation in Tel Aviv to
the second secretary level.
The generals hope to promote a "linking role" for
Turkey between the West and their oil supplying neighbors
that would enhance Turkey's value to NATO and safeguard
ties to the Middle East. In practice, this linkage in-
volves cementing closer political ties with the US,
seeking greater economic links with Arab and Islamic
countries, and occasionally acting as a diplomatic
go-between.
The linkage does not extend to military issues.
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the generals probably would not
reject any US or NATO proposal out of hand. They would
carefully weigh each case and might agree to allow the
use of bases if it seemed mutually advantageous. Whatever
happens in the Middle East, however, Turkey's preferred
annroach would be to keep as low a profile as possible.
Troubled Relations With Europe
As Turkey's dependence on Western economic and mili-
tary aid grows, the generals are trying to mend fences
with European allies. Increasing European criticism of
the failure to return to civilian rule quickly,, however,
is taxing the commanders' diplomatic skills.
The ruling National Security Council--composed of
the five service chiefs--understands the need for more
open communication with Europe but is determined not to
jeopardize its reconstruction and stabilization effort.
Top Secret
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for democratic government.
Restoring stability to Turkey takes precedence over mem-
bership in European institutions and over economic aid.
The generals would face a difficult decision, however,
if the Europeans tied their ,aid to a specific timetable
In the OECD session last month, $940 million in eco-
nomic assistance for Turkey was pledged; the Turks had
hoped for a significantly larger amount than last year's
$1.2 billion, or at .least as much. Ankara views the
reduced figure as an expression of disapproval over the
lack of democracy and alleged human rights violations.
attacks on Turkish diplomats. For example,
Relations with European countries also are strained
by a view that no one cares much about persistent Armenian
Turkish-French relations are at an
alltime low because the French failed to apprehend the
March.
Armenians who killed two Turkish diplomats in Paris last
Dealings With Greece
The generals have been more forthcoming than their
predecessors with the Greeks--they allowed Greece to re-
enter NATO, made significant concessions over airspace
issues, and reportedly are willing to submit. concrete
proposals for resolving the Cyprus dispute. Turkish-
Greek relations now appear to have reached another
plateau, and the next steps will require sacrifices of
national interest that neither side is anxious to take.
additional irritants.
Incidents by Turkey--violations of Greek airspace,
strong reactions to Armenian demonstrations in Athens,
seizure and detention of a Greek fishing vessel--are
magnifying traditional contentious issues. Turkish sus-
picions about a US security guarantee to Greece against
Turkey, and Greek insistence on a military balance in
the Aegean--both within the context of the US-Greek De-
fense Cooperation Agreement now being negotiated--are
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image the generals are acquiring in Europe.
in due course. Nonetheless, they enhance the negative
These latest events appear to be isolated cases ag-
gravated by posturing on both sides, and relations between
the two countries are likely to resume their upward swing
for the war between Iran and Iraq--is likely to grow.
Prognosis
Until a firm date is set for the return of democracy,
Turkey's European allies are likely to be more critical of,
and less helpful to, the military regime. Consequently,
Ankara has no choice but to seek better relations on all
fronts. Its involvement in regional issues--such as par-
ticipation in the Islamic Conference's mediation effort
tain economic aid from their allies.
seek a resolution of the Cyprus issue--if only to main-
The generals probably also will pursue greater po-
litical and economic links with the West, particularly
the US. They will continue to interpret their NATO com-
mitment strictly, however, and are likely to exclude
Turkish involvement in any operations in the Middle East.
In the meantime, they probably will strive to foster
better relations with Athens and make active attempts to
sure to draw Turkey closer to its Islamic neighbors.
If the economic aid were cut off or tied to a rigor-
ous timetable designed to oust the generals before they
complete their program, Ankara might respond by turning
its back on Europe. Unless the US were able to make up
the shortfall, the generals would come under strong pres-
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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