NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 5 OCTOBER 1981

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 30, 2008
Sequence Number: 
18
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 5, 1981
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6.pdf864.22 KB
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Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 Central Intelligence National Intelligence Daily Monday 5 October 1981 Top Secret rn Nm R1_7?f1X 25X1 COPY 2 2 9 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 Contents Poland: Moderates Gain Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yugoslavia: Leadership Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . Zimbabwe-USSR: Holding Relations to a Minimum . . . Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 The compromise resolution on workers' self-management endorsed by Solidarity's congress is a tactical victory for union moderates that allows time for further negotiation of differences between the government and the union. 25X1 There apparently was little support for a militant proposal flatly rejecting the law, which was passed by parliament on 25 September. Instead, the delegates di- rected the new union leadership to organize a referendum on objectionable parts of the law in what seems to be an effort to bring about amendments or to ensure implementa- tion on favorable terms. 25X1 Solidarity leaders evidently will have some latitude in carrying out this directive; no deadline for a refer- endum was set. They also can use the threat of the referendum to bring pressure on the regime as the two sides negotiate the vague areas of the legislation-- especially the issue regarding which directors will be chosen by workers' councils. The government's announcement of price increases for a small number of consumer goods--effective today--has angered many delegates and prompted Solidarity leader Lech Walesa to send a telegram to Premier Jaruzelski demanding their recision. In a conciliatory gesture to the newly reelected union leader, Jaruzelski quickly dispatched two ministers to Gdansk to-consult with Solidarity. The ministers' justifications for the price hikes were re- jected during a heated session, and Walesa again demanded recision of the price hikes. 25X1 The Solidarity leadership is interpreting a recent letter from the head of the Hungarian trade union organi- zation offering to "discuss and debate" the role of unions as a hopeful sign that Solidarity can find some common ground with other East European unions. The Hun- garian message--which declined Solidarity's invitation to its congress because of its "antisocialist, anti- Soviet" platform--is the first offer of a dialogue by any regime-controlled trade union in Eastern Europe. Hungarian motives are unclear--the message may be nothing more than rhetoric--but the-act I ion presumably will not please 25X1 Moscow. Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 Moscow has not initiated any significant new depar- tures in its public commentary on the congress in recent days, although it is sustaining its critical line. The Soviets are keeping pressure on Warsaw by citing continued calls for firmer government action from elements in the Polish party and populace. They are continuing to attack "extremists" in the Solidarity leadership but are also pointing to ositive" voices being raised from the floor at Gdansk. 25X1 The Soviets have reported, but not commented on, Walesa's reelection. Unless some particularly provoca- tive anti-Soviet statements are made at Gdansk, Moscow is likely to withhold a more definitive indication of its future course until after the congress, which appar- ently will continue at least until tomorrow. Top Secret Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 YUGOSLAVIA: Leadership Changes The resignation from the party presidium last week of a longtime Tito confidant is the most significant leadership change since Tito's death and probably opens the door to similar personnel changes. Before Petar Stambolic resigned on Thursday, the leadership had been reluctant to reinvigorate the 23-man presidium that existed when Tito died. Stambolic was one of only three in the leadership who held positions in both the top state and the party bodies. His replacement suggests that the double incumbencies of Kosovo's Fadilj Hodza and Croatia's Vladimir Bakaric also may end soon. The appointment of Dragoslav Markovic, head of the Federal Assembly, to replace Stambolic tends to strengthen Serb nationalist forces in the party leader- ship. Markovic has been in the lead in Serbia's drive to increase its authority over the troubled Kosovo Prov- ince; he has been at odds with another Serb leader, Milos Minic, who believes such efforts risk inflaming Serb nationalism. Minic, however, has no independent power base in Serbia and is not likely to find much support 25X1 for his more moderate views. Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 ZIMBABWE-USSR: Holding Relations to a Minimum economic assistance talks has been rebuffed. Salisbury has responded favorably only to an offer of scholarships President Mugabe continues to block Moscow's efforts to improve relations beyond the establishment of diplo- matic ties, begun last February. A Soviet offer to open for technical studies in the USSR. Moscow also has not been able to persuade Salisbur to establish a diplomatic presence in the USSR. Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 Ton Secret Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030018-6