NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 17 OCTOBER 1981

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 30, 2008
Sequence Number: 
68
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 17, 1981
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
Body: 
\ Director of 1 op secret Central Intelligence National Intelligence Daily Saturday 17 October 1981 Top Secret CO NID 81-242JX 17 October Copy 229 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Poland: Pressure on Solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Lebanon: Leftist Attacks on the Government . . . . . . . 3 Western Europe: Disagreement on CSCE . . . . . . . . . . 4 OPEC: Dwindling Current Account Surpluses . . . . . . . 5 Turkey: Political Parties Dissolved . . . . . . . . . . 7 Netherlands: Government Resigns . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Senegal - The Gambia: After the Coup . . . . . . . . . . 9 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 POLAND: Pressure on Solidarity Party leader Kania's attack yesterday on Solidarity, combined 25X1 Union leaders will react vigorously to this unex- pected strike ban and will view it as a major drawback in their economic talks with the government, which began on Thursday. As a matter of principle they would not risk the anger of the rank and file by surrendering--even for a short time--Solidarity's chief weapon. If the re- gime presses this issue--such a measure must be authorized by the parliament--Solidarity probably will feel compelled to follow through with its threatened general strike next week. 25X1 he act more forcefully against Solidarity. Kania's call for a prohibition against strikes dur- ing the fall and winter in his speech to the party's Central Committee was partly for economic reasons. This proposal and the purge of liberals now under way, however, were also in response to hardline critics' demands that 25X1 fen the union leaders' posture in negotiations with the regime. This most explicit attack by Kania on the union will force its leaders to defend themselves against the charge of having political ambitions--something union moderates had tried to play down at the recent congress. Kania, seconded by Politburo member Olszowski, accused elements in Solidarity of wrecking the economy in order to take over political power. 25X1 The rash of wildcat strikes and strike alerts in at least eight provinces over shortages of food, especially meat, will put pressure on Solidarity to avoid making concessions during the talks. The union is asking for increased control over the distribution, export, and rationing of food, and Solidarity's chief negotiator said that, unless the talks ended "satisfactorily," Solidarity would call the general strike. The government, meanwhile, yesterday rejected Solidarity's proposal for a rnment- 25X1 union "social council" to oversee the economy. ove The government does not have the capability to in- crease food supplies and cover meat rationing commitments. Despite the recent procurement price hike, farmers have Top Secret Ton Secret Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 contracted to supply only about one-half as much meat to the state in the next three months as they did in the same period last year; they can get much higher prices in black market sales. In addition, the government's chronic prob- lem in supplying farmers with coal in exchange for meat will become more difficult because of the drop in coal output resulting from the dispute between the government and the union over Saturday pay for miners. Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 The Muslim leftist National Movement is sharpening its attacks on the government in an apparent effort to broaden Muslim support for restructuring the Christian-dominated political system before the presidential election next summer. The three-week-old campaign initially focused-- probably with Syrian collusion--on the government's reluctance to move boldly to implement the declarations of the Arab Conciliation Committee on severing Phalange ties with Israel and opening traffic crossings in Beirut. The principal target of the campaign has been Prime Minister Wazzan, the ranking Muslim in the government, who is especially vulnerable to Muslim criticism. Movement spokesmen, led by Communist Action Orga- nization chief Muhsin Ibrahim, recently have shifted their attacks to more fundamental Muslim grievances, including Christian dominance of the 23,600-man Army, and have accused the government of siding with the Phalange on key issues. Some observers in Beirut believe, however, that Ibrahim's real goal is to use the attacks to launch the Movement's campaign for fundamental changes in Lebanon's current power-sharing arrangements as the presidential election approaches. Wazzan has obtained support from several old-line Sunni Muslim figures and Christian leaders. He has sought to deflect leftist criticism with personal state- ments supporting the reorganization of the Army and defending Palestinian claims that they should be exempt from any implementation of the Conciliation Committee's proposed ban on arms shipments through Lebanese ports. The National Movement's renewed attack on the government will aggravate longstanding confessional differences. If it continues, other major factions are likely to begin similar campaigns, focusing on their own basic grievances rather than on the more overriding problems of maintaining the cease-fire in Beirut keeping the Arab conciliation process alive. Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 WESTERN EUROPE: Disagreement on CSCE Allied and neutral participants are urging the US to make concessions on human rights and security issues that are unresolved at the CSCE review session in Madrid. 25X1 is possible without the link to security issues. Other allies consider that further human rights progress The UK, speaking for the EC states at the North Atlantic Council meeting on Monday on CSCE strategy, said that the EC no longer believes the West should insist on a meeting of human rights experts after the review session in order to balance a conference on security issues. Norway believes that Western participants should be pleased with the human rights progress already achieved. 25X1 In addition, the EC states are anxious for the US to drop the word "continent" from its formulation of the area to be covered by a post-Madrid security meeting. They believe that it is too restrictive and is not needed to exclude the Azores from CSCE jurisdiction to protect Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force transit. Portugal has indicated that it considers "Europe" to include the Azores, whether or not the word "continent" is used in The reliance on the EC--as opposed to the NATO-- forum by the allies for coordination of Western positions on CSCE is increasing as they sense widening differences between themselves and the US. The allies hope to persuade Washington that Western unity can best be maintained in Madrid if the US is willing to make compromises that they believe are required to ensure that the CSCE process continues. Top Secret Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 1981 (estimated) 1982 (projected) a OPEC 109 62 39 Algeria 2 -1 -1 Ecuador b -1 -1 Iraq 7 -14 -11 Kuwait 14 11 9 Libya 9 -3 -1 Nigeria 5 -6 -6 a Based on a unified bench mark price of $34 per barrel. b Negligible. Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 OPEC: Dwindling Current Account Surpluses OPEC's current account surplus is likely to fall from $110 billion in 1980 to about $60 billion this year and $40 billion in 1982. The reduction will show up in improved current ac- count balances among the OECD countries. What little relief the less developed countries are getting from stable oil prices is being lost to higher interest costs on their mounting foreign debt. 25X1 The organization's oil sales will decrease to about 20.5 million barrels per day this year, 9.3 million less than the record level of 1977 and 4.5 million below 1980. While Saudi Arabia maintains its exports at the level of 1980, Iran and Iraq together will export less than 2 million barrels per day--about half as much as in 1980-- and other OPEC countries will export nearly 25 percent less than last year. Oil revenues, down $25 billion, will be supplemented by $40 billion in earnings on in- vestments. 25X1 OPEC imports this year are likely to be $155 billion, up 16 percent from 1980. Iraq has increased imports Nigeria, Libya, and Algeria continue high levels of purchases despite payments deficits. Nigeria in particular must curb imports soon to conserve foreign Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Top Secret 6 25X1 17 October 1981 or enough votes to obtain a parliamentary majority. Andreas Papandreou's Socialists still have an even chance of unseating the center-right New Democracy in national elections tomorrow, even though the Socialists appear to have lost much of their momentum during the closing weeks of the campaign. New Democracy, led by Prime Minister Rallis, has recovered much of the ground it had lost to Papandreou because of a poorly organized start. The Socialists, nevertheless, attracted the larger crowds, and most of the opinion polls--although generally unreliable--still give them either a plurality ask the leader of the party with the most seats to put together a minority or coalition government. The new government would face its first confidence vote within a few weeks after parliament convenes on 16 November. President Karamanlis and other Greek observers believe that neither of the two major parties is likely to obtain the absolute majority--151 seats--needed to form a stable single-party government. In that event, Karamanlis would be required under the constitution to Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 The military council yesterday disbanded political parties, whose functions had been suspended since the military takeover a year ago. The move opens the way for the creation of two or three new parties that are internally more democratic once the constituent assembly-- scheduled to convene next Friday--produces a new con- stitution. The council, however, is unlikely to sanction any new parties until late 1982 or early 1983--after a constitutional referendum and the passage of laws on new parties and elections. 25X1 tion of the council's reforms after it steps down. In any event, the military probably will retain for it- self a substantial political role to ensure the continua- The generals appear determined to inject new blood into the political system in an effort to end the bickering that characterized past parliamentary politics, but they may not insist that former Prime Ministers Demirel and Ecevit be permanently excluded from the political process. 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 NETHERLANDS: Government Resigns Top Secret 25X1 Prime Minister van Agt's month-bld center-left government fell yesterday following disputes between the coalition partners over budget proposals. Queen Beatrix would like the three-party government to con- tinue in office and is likely to retain van Agt in a caretaker capacity and appoint a respected political figure to try to find a compromise economic program ac- ceptable to both van Agt and Labor Party leader den Uyl. A formula to hold the coalition together probably will be found because most Dutch politicians do not want new elections now and because Labor leaders are re- luctant to give van Agt a chance to form a government 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 SENEGAL - THE GAMBIA: After the Coup tary police as a first step toward integration. has absorbed loyalist remnants of The Gambia's paramili- Senegal is pushing for a political union with The Gambia by the end of the year as the price for restoring the Jawara government to nominal power after the coup attempt in July by Marxist rebels. Tentative plans envision a loose confederation that initially would preserve each country's identity and government. The Senegalese Army, which continues to keep order in Banjul, Complete integration, however, may take years. Gambian elites believe a merger would cost them consid- erable political and economic power. In addition, there are distinct linguistic and cultural differences-- Senegal is French-speaking and The Gambia is a former British possession. France, which maintains a major naval base in Senegal, and the UK have quietly endorsed the idea as a positive development for regional security and Western interests. Top Secret Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Ton Seereti Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1 Approved For Release 2008/12/30: CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1