NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 29 OCTOBER 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00296R000500010013-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 29, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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X,?' Director of op Secret
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
29 October 1981
Top Secret
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Contents
Poland: Continuing the Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
USSR-China: Status of Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Chad: Tensions and Coup Rumors in N'Djamena . . . . . . . 4
Finland-USSR: Soviet Concerns
Spain: Communist Party's Troubles . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Factional Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l0
Albania: Pressure for Increased Western Trade . . . . . . 11
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 POLAND: Continuing the Dialogue
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Top Secret
The Jaruzelski regime apparently will continue its dialogue
with Solidarity despite its harsh condemnation of the general strike
yesterday.
At the Central Committee session yesterday, Jaruzel-
ski called on Solidarity to give up its "festering merry-
go-round" of strikes and to engage in "constructive
cooperation." While the union was preparing to strike,
government officials met with one of union leader Walesa's
closest advisers to plan the next round of union-
government talks. Walesa is expected to meet with
Jaruzelski within a week.
Jaruzelski also announced his intention to propose
to parliament this Friday a framework for "social con-
sultations," something that could lead to more formal
structuring of union-government relations. It is unclear
how far the proposal will go toward meeting Solidarity's
demands. A union official said that Solidarity will push
for creation of a body to oversee economic reform and
coordinate economic preparations for winter.
Party personnel changes announced yesterday do not
appear to signal any major change of Jaruzelski's "firm
but moderate" course. The Central Committee also approved
the Politburo's recommendation that Jaruzelski retain all
three of his top posts.
The appointment of a close Jaruzelski associate,
General Siwicki, brings to three the number of generals
on the Politburo. Two civilians, who are political un-
knowns, were brought into the Central Committee Secre-
tariat; one may be a moderate. Three Central Committee
departments were merged into a single entity to oversee
the nonagricultural part of the economy.
results, it is still concerned about the increasing lack
of discipline among local chapters. Even though one
local union suspended its planned continuation of the
one-hour strike, work stoppages that had already been
under way elsewhere apparently are continuing. The Na-
tional Commission will meet next week to address the
Solidarity's one-hour strike yesterday passed without
incident and provided a successful show of union strength.
Although the leadership is no doubt gratified over the
issue of union discipline and wildcat strikes.
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Moscow reportedly is sending its senior expert on China to
Beijing today for exploratory talks on the border dispute and pos-
sibly other issues.
The Soviets still give no sign of a willingness to
meet the Chinese halfway on any aspect of the border
dispute. Moscow's initiative may thus be designed more
to encourage Beijing to take a less anti-Soviet course,
than presented in the expectation of any immediate pro-
gress toward resolving the border dispute.
it has other options if Sino-US relations deteriorate.
25X1
In addition, the initiative may be aimed at the US
and other third parties to remind them they cannot
count on a continued Sino-Soviet split. Despite its
deep hostility toward the USSR, China also could decide
to use a resumption in border talks to demonstrate that
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CHAD: Tensions and Coup Rumors in N'Djamena
N'Djamena is rife with rumors of an impending confrontation
between forces of President Goukouni and troops ZoyaZ to pro-Libyan
Foreign Minister Acyl which sketchy official reports seem to down-
play.
According to unconfirmed French press reports, Acyl's
followers entered N'Djamena yesterday in force. Libya
is reported to have airlifted additional armored units to
the city Tuesday night and presumably has reinforced key
positions. Libya's second-in-command, Major Jaloud, is
also said to be in the Chadian capital.
while tensions have increased in the Chadian capital,
no imminent showdown is under way. If matters do come to
a head, it may be that Acyl and the Libyans have caught
wind of Goukouni's appeal last week for Western military
aid and an OAU peacekeeping force to forestall a possible
pro-Libyan power grab. The Foreign Minister has long
wanted to seize power, and the Libyans would see him as
a more cooperative Chadian head of state.
Goukouni's small armed following--supported by
another Muslim faction opposed to Tripoli's military
presence in Chad--would almost certainly resist a power
shift. They would have virtually no chance, however,
of fending off a Libyan-backed move by Acyl without help
from Chadian Vice President Kamougue and his southern
non-Muslim faction, which probably would try to stay out
of the fray.
If Acyl does oust Goukouni, Libya will be in a
strong position to effect a political merger with Chad.
Kamougue and other southern leaders oppose such a union,
which could prompt southern Chad to formally secede from
the Muslim north and appeal to France for military and
economic aid.
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President Kekkonen's decision to resign will introduce an
element of uncertainty into what in recent years has been one of
Moscow's most stable foreign policy relationships in Western Europe.
able with the existing bilateral relationship.
someone like Ahti Karjalainen, who has established close
relationships with several Soviet leaders and is comfort- 25X1
Soviet officials have given discreet indications of
their concern over who will succeed Kekkonen. Social
Democratic Prime Minister Koivisto, who enjoys an over-
whelming lead in presidential preference polls, may ap-
pear too independent for the Soviets. Moscow prefers
The Soviets appear to be aware that blatant efforts
to influence the choice of president could easily back-
fire. They will not hesitate to exert their influence,
however, if they suspect that ties with Helsinki would
be weakened.
be seen in Moscow as threatening.
are likely to deal cautiously with any issues that may
Koivisto's opponents have yet to reach agreement
on an eventual consensus candidate. None of the candi-
dates likely to be put forward for the presidential elec-
tion next January will advocate any fundamental departures
from Finland's policy of remaining outside great power
conflicts or making certain accommodations to Soviet
security interests. The various candidates, realizing
that Soviet sensitivities probably were heightened by
both the Conservative election victory in Norway and the
recent visit by Secretary of Defense Weinberger to Sweden,
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SPAIN: Communist Party's Troubles
The troubles encountered by the Communist Party in its regional
branches probably will erode further the party's strength in the next
national election, which could be held early next year.
In the election last week of the Galician regional
assembly, the Communists received less than 3 percent of
the vote and won no seats, while two other parties on
the far left won nearly 10 percent and four seats. Al-
though the vote does not necessarily signify a national
trend, the loss of one-third.of the vote the party won
in Galicia in the national election in 1979 will worry
the national leadership. 25X1
The debacle in Galicia was followed by a public
display of dissension between national leaders and the
Basque regional party. The Basques are refusing to obey
instructions to refrain from 'oinin a leftist Basque
nationalist coalition. 25X1
The national secretariat has ordered the dissolution
of the Basque party's central committee and the election
of a new committee, but the Basque Secretary General as-
serts he will not comply. Such defiance is-likely to
encourage greater independence among other regional
parties--particularly the Catalan, which has caused the
national leadership considerable trouble in the past.
Party leader Carrillo managed to impose his views
and resist reform efforts at the party congress in July,
but he probably will be unable to mend the cracks in the
party or retain in the next election the 11 percent of
the vote the Communists won in 1979. Although party
members generally agree with Carrillo's Eurocommunist
views, they dislike his autocratic style. As long as
con-
he remains at the helm, the Communists are likely to
tinue to decline as a force in national politics.
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ANGOLA: Factional Dispute
Savimbi's South African - backed insurgency have sharpened.
Differences in the ruling party over how to deal with Jonas
Leaders of the "Catete group," a black nationalist
faction in the party, reportedly have voiced interest in
seeing the government open negotiations with Savimbi's
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
The nationalists are becoming increasingly concerned over
the disruptive impact on the economy of the fighting and
The mulatto-led faction that dominates the regime
remains opposed to any negotiations with Savimbi aimed
at bringing him or other top UNITA leaders into the gov-
ernment. This faction is more dogmatically Marxist and
of South African military incursions.
pro-Soviet than the nationalists and appears to be
President dos Santos--a black who is aligned with
the mulatto-led group--seems interested in a rapproche-
ment with UNITA. Neither he nor others who favor such a
solidly backed by Moscow and Havana.
policy, however, appear to have enough support in the
Savimbi has been encouraged by the growing factional
strife in the government, by popular discontent resulting
from the country's economic problems, and by the US ad-
ministration's efforts to obtain repeal of the Clark
Amendment barring aid to Angolan insurgents. Although
guerrilla operations have increased somewhat, UNITA has
failed to expand significantly its areas of influence
outside southern Angola, its main area of ethnic support.
party and armed forces to move in that direction.
South Africa continues to provide aid to UNITA but as-
sistance from other sources has fallen off.
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Some members of the leadership may urge increased
trade with the West at the party congress next week, but
proponents of self-reliance probably will resist abandon-
ing the country's isolationism. A recent article in the
party ideological journal admitted that Western technology
is essential to modernize industry and improve the quality
of manufactured goods. Although the article reaffirmed
Albania's policy of refusing any foreign credits or
economic aid, the call for increased trade probably reflects
the views of those in the leadership who want a more ra -
matic approach toward economic planning. 25X1
The current draft five-year plan calls for a doubling
of foreign trade, and disagreement over this issue may be
the reason that passage of the plan is almost a year behind
schedule. Tirane has already experienced difficulties this
year in finding resources to acquire capital goods from
the West. Albania's ability to deal with Western firms
will remain questionable as long as the constitutional
prohibition against foreign credits is in effect.
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