NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 24 NOVEMBER 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00296R000500040094-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2009
• Sequence Number: 94
• Publication Date: November 24, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of i op secret
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
24 November 1981
Top Secret
243
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USSR: Brezhnev's Statement on INF . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
USSR-US: Defense Cost Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
France: Pressures From the Left . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
China-India: Negotiations Resuming . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Middle East: Development Plan Postponed . . . . . . . . . . 5
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President Brezhnev's offer yesterday of unilateral reductions
in Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces on the eve of US-Soviet
arms talks in Geneva represents little more than a repackaging of
two earlier Soviet proposals.
refraining from additional SS-20 deployments.
with the dismantling of these two older systems while
The latest Soviet proposal, while calling for reduc-
tions in INF in return for US agreement to a moratorium
for the duration of the talks, did not, however, specifi-
cally include SS-20s.. Moscow contends that the process
of replacing SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with the SS-20 already
constitutes a de facto reduction, and its offer could,
therefore, suggest no more than a willingness to proceed
The Soviets also may hope that, if they prolong the
talks in Geneva, this will ensure that their proposed
moratorium ultimately will develop into the renunciation
of NATO's INF deployment plans they originally sought in
October 1979. Over the shorter term the Soviets may cal-
culate that if they demonstrate sufficient seriousness
in the negotiations, certain West European governments
might reconsider their support for NATO's deployment
plans.
The Soviet paper released on the eve of Brezhnev's
departure for Bonn also restates earlier Soviet proposals
and arguments on INF. It provides no new data on Soviet
forces or on the USSR's count of Western systems. The
paper maintains that both Soviet military doctrine and
USSR's SS-20s, are the real threat to Europe.
deployment of Pershing Its and cruise missiles, not the
forces are purely defensive in nature and NATO's planned
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USSR
Note: The confidence band in 25
the chart is calculated as ?10
percent of our estimate for
each year. I
1971 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
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USSR-US: Defense Cost Comparisons
A comparison of dollar costs for defense activities from 1971
through 1980 reveals that Soviet costs exceeded US outlays by 40
percent.
billion--50 percent higher than the US outlays.
US expenditures also have grown at about a 3-percent
rate. Soviet defense costs last year were about 195
Dollar cost comparisons give indications of the mag-
nitude and trend of Soviet and US military programs, but
do not measure force effectiveness. During this 10-year
period, for example, Soviet defense costs grew steadily
at an average annual rate of 3 percent, while US outlays
declined until 1976 at about 4 percent a year; since 1976 25X1
and engineering costs were 50 percent larger.
percent higher, while research, development, testing
Soviet expenditures for the decade exceeded US out-
lays for each major resource category. Their costs for
military investment--the procurement of weapons and equip-
ment and for construction--exceeded the comparable US
figure by 75 percent. For operating costs, which include
expenses for uniformed personnel and maintenance costs
for the military establishment, the Soviet figure was 20
The Soviet costs for strategic forces, including
offensive, defensive, command and control and warning
forces, were more than three times greater than corre-
sponding US outlays. Costs for Soviet general purpose
forces--land, tactical air, naval and mobility (airlift
and sealift) forces--exceeded the US figure by 60 per-
cent, but US expenditures for support forces were slightly
higher than the Soviet outlays.
creasingly advanced military systems.
forces will continue to grow as the Soviets deploy in-
The evidence indicates that Soviet leaders continue
to emphasize military force improvements despite mounting
economic problems. Costs associated with new ICBM, SLBM,
and strategic air defense systems will drive up strategic
forces costs, and the procurement of new aircraft for the
tactical air forces will account for much of the growth
in cost for general purpose forces. Costs for support
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President Mitterrand's decision to ask parliament for powers
to implement promised social reforms by decree is aimed at aZZa?./ing
leftist impatience with his government's economic policies.
The Socialist-controlled National Assembly is cer-
tain to approve the request. Beginning early next year,
the government intends to reduce the work week to 39 hours,
institute a fifth week of paid vacation for salaried
workers, lower the age for early retirement, and increase
business incentives for creating jobs.
Mitterrand probably will argue that recourse to
limited decree powers--a step used occasionally by his
predecessors--is necessary to accomplish urgent reform
while parliament is bogged down with nationalization and
governmental decentralization issues.
The President's main concern is to stem growing dis-
satisfaction with government policies within his leftist
constituency. There have been scattered strikes and de-
marches from pro-Socialist and Communist unions protesting
the government's allegedly cautious approach to nation-
alization, tax reform, and job creation. Mitterrand
probably also hopes to preempt possible moves by leftwing
Socialists and Communists for more radical social reforms
in the National Assembly.
The government's move on social reforms will not go
far toward meeting the concerns of leftwing critics.
Despite Paris's efforts to stimulate rapid economic growth
and reduce unemployment,[
pected to climb higher.
gross domestic product
will rise only by 1.75 to 2 percent in 1982. Unemploy-
ment, which passed the 2 .million mark last month, is ex-
The Mitterrand government's room for maneuver will
be limited by its continuing desire to encourage new
business investment to combat unemployment. Implementing
reforms by decree and simultaneously suggesting that more
forceful measures are possible, however, will further
weaken business confidence in the Socialist leadership.
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CHINA-INDIA: Negotiations Resuming
Negotiations between China and India on their border
dispute and other issues will open on 10 December in
Beijing. The talks--stemming from Foreign Minister Huang
Hua's visit last June--probably will result in prolonged
sparring as each side probes for concessions on the
border question. New Delhi is linking increased cultural,
scientific, and trade contacts with China to progress on
the border issue. China's interest in countering the
USSR in South Asia and India's desire to gain diplomatic
maneuvering room are likely to keep the dialogue alive.
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MIDDLE EAST: Development Plan Postponed
Arab League staffs apparently have removed from the
agenda for the Arab summit this week a major new aid
plan that was to have added at least $15 billion to the
$42 billion committed to fellow Arab states by Arab oil-
exporting countries at the last three summits. The post-
ponement is forced by Iraq's heavy demands for financial
support in its war with Iran. Since the beginning of
the conflict, the other Arab oil-exporting states have
disbursed at least $14 billion to Iraq, about double the
transfers of both military and economic aid to all other
recipients over that period.
The postponed regional development scheme has been
drafted by Arab League economists after a decade of study.
When the plan is reconsidered next spring, League officials
plan to reduce the burden on Arab oil-exporting countries
by seeking the participation of private investors, banks,
and foreign governments on a project-by-project basis.
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