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Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Directorate of Secret Intelligence The Soviet Union and Nonruling Communist Parties Secret SOV 82-1011OX August 1982 Copy 0 2 9 5 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Directorate of Secret Intelligence The Soviet Union and Nonruling Communist Parties A Research Paper This report was prepared by of the Current Support Division, Office of Soviet Analysis, in close cooperation with other offices of the Directorate of Intelligence and Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Policy Analysis Division, SOVA, Secret SOV 82-1O110X August 1982 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 The Soviet Union and Nonruling Communist Parties 0 Overview The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) recognizes and maintains relations with some 80 nonruling Communist parties worldwide. The majority are in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Despite their proliferation in the Third World, however, most are small, weak, and ineffective. More than a third are illegal or restricted from participating in electoral politics. Nationalism, not Communist ideology, is the dominant political force in the developing countries. The Communist parties that have succeeded in gaining power owe their success almost entirely to external support from the Soviet Union and its proxies. While retaining their Leninist organizational structure and authoritarian style, several nonruling parties in Western Europe, India, and Japan have evolved into mass parties attracting broad electoral support and winning parliamentary representation. With the exception of the French and the pro-Soviet Indian parties, they have asserted their independence from the CPSU on a range of issues and have sought to establish national identities. The small West European pro-Moscow parties influence national politics through propaganda and labor movement activities and, in a number of cases, through their connections with the left wings of ruling or major opposition socialist and social democratic parties. 25 The nonruling parties vary greatly in their dependency on the CPSU and their willingness to support Soviet policies. Nevertheless, all nonruling parties, including even the largest and most independent West European parties, seemingly need to retain ties to the CPSU and remain within the international movement. For this reason, the elements promoting agree- ment among the various Communist parties are of more concern to the West than those generating discord. These parties are bound to Moscow by an ideological vision of the future in which the triumph of "peace, freedom, and socialism" is secured by the destruction, or at least a significant weakening, of Western democratic values and institutions. Even when little else is agreed on, this shared vision provides the basis for political cooperation against the West, especially the United States. Information available as of 15 July 1982 has been used in the preparation of this report. Secret SOV 82-1011 ox August 1982 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Nonruling Communist parties pose a serious challenge to US national interests where they conduct Soviet-supported, subversive activities in Central America, South Africa, and Iran. The 1979 Sandinista victory in Nicaragua marked a watershed in Soviet assessment of the prospects for revolutionary change in the Caribbean Basin. The Soviets urged the Communist parties, particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala, to abandon nonviolence and join existing insur- gent movements. Although these parties represent small minorities within the guerrilla organizations, the Soviets hope that their superior organiza- tion and discipline combined with Soviet aid will guarantee them a role in any future revolutionary regimes. The pro-Soviet South African Communist Party (SACP), an exile organi- zation, finds little support within South Africa. But it channels Soviet funds to, and thus influences, the African National Congress (ANC), the principal insurgent group operating in South Africa. Although the ANC itself is not a Communist organization, it is almost entirely dependent on the USSR and its allies for funds, arms, and military training. The Soviets provide substantial financial, material, and propaganda sup- port to Tudeh, the Iranian Communist party. Despite its affiliation with the USSR, Tude been tolerated because it publicly supports the Khomeini regime; Tudeh now serves as an instrument of Soviet subversion and political pressure; in the future it might play a de- cisive role in Iranian politics should the clerical government be displaced by a united secular left. The attitudes of the nonruling West European parties toward the CPSU vary from unconditional support of any position to explicit criticism of security and foreign policy actions, such as those in Afghanistan and Poland. All West European parties share with the CPSU opposition to US 25 25 and NATO curity policies, which serves Soviet interests when translated into action. 25 25 In addition to ideological ties, most nonruling parties also are bound organizationally and financially to the CPSU. The CPSU has at its disposal a number of coordinating mechanisms and a large staff for Secret iv Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret conducting bilateral and multilateral relations with other parties. Most small and medium-size parties depend entirely upon annual Soviet subsi- dies for their operating expenses. Even the largest parties, which have multiple sources of income, indirectly derive substantial financial benefits through commercial transactions with the USSR. In general, the Soviets have not found nonruling Communist parties to be highly effective in promoting their foreign policy interests in either the West or the Third World. Most of these parties lack access to political power, suffer from declining ideological appeal, and many are legally proscribed. In Western Europe the Soviets have advanced their interests more successfully through international and ad hoc front groups rather than Communist organizations. In recent years, moreover, the CPSU has developed varied ties with leftwing socialist leaders and members of the Socialist International. The Soviets cite parallel views on international security policies and Third World issues to approach the socialist and social democratic parties, several of which are major coalition partners or the main political opposition in NATO countries. In Asia and Africa, the Soviets have gained more politically by supporting national liberation movements and other radical groups and by forming alliances with socialist-oriented but non-Communist radical regimes than by aiding local Communist parties. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 CPrrvt Soviet Relations With Nonruling Communist Parties 1 Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, and South America 1 Regional Survey of Selected Nonruling Communist Parties 6 Portugal 16 Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway 16 Austria, West Germany, Great Britain, and Holland 17 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret I Appendixes A. CPSU Coordination and Funding of Nonruling Communist Parties 29 B. CPSU Relations With Non-Communist Parties and International Front Organizations 33 1. Nonruling Communist Parties in Central and South America and the Caribbean 6 2. Nonruling Communist Parties in Western Europe 12 3. Nonruling Communist Parties in the Middle East and Africa 18 4. Nonruling Communist Parties in South and Southeast Asia 23 5. Soviet International Front Organizations 36 1. Soviet Leaders Meet With Latin American and West European Communist Party Officials 2 2. Rally Against Missile Deployment in Western Europe 4 3. Leaders of Central and South American Communist Parties 8-9 4. Leaders of West European Communist Parties 14-15 5. Leaders of Middle Eastern Communist Parties 20-21 6. Leaders of the Indian Communist Parties 24 7. Kenji Miyamoto 26 8. Press Conference at Paris Meeting Convened by Soviets 30 9. CPSU Officials and Socialist International Representatives in Moscow 35 10. The World Peace Council, the Most Important Soviet International Front Organization Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret The Soviet Union and Nonruling Communist Parties 0 Mexico has long been an important base for Soviet operations in Central and South America; it provides Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, and South a haven for revolutionary exiles and Communist party America members from throughout Latin America. The Mexi- Soviet manipulation of several Communist parties in can Government has also frequently permitted various Central America poses a potentially significant chal- Soviet front organizations and "solidarity" commit- lenge to US interests even though these parties are tees to hold meetings and congresses. small and lack influence 2 25 The 1979 Sandinista victory in Nicaragua caused the Soviet Union to reassess prospects for revolutionary change through armed struggle in Central America. As a result, Moscow has urged regional Communist parties, particularly those in Guatemala and El Salvador, to abandon their traditionally nonviolent tactics and join existing insurgent movements. Al- though these parties represent small minorities, the Soviets hope that their support for the insurgents, as well as the parties' superior organization and disci- pline, will guarantee them a role in any future revolutionary regimes Mexican Communists support Soviet interests through their anti-US propaganda and demonstra- tions and their participation in Soviet international front activities. On Soviet instructions, the Mexican Communists also seek to reinforce existing tendencies within the Mexican Government and establishment that oppose US policy and interests in Central America. 2 In the Caribbean, the Soviets provide limited finan- 2 cial and training support to the Communist and Marxist parties of the Dominican Republic, Guade- loupe, Martinique, Guyana, Haiti (in exile), and Ja- maica. All of these parties are small, weak, and ineffective, and most of their efforts are devoted to In Mexico, CPSU relations with the Communist movement have been strained at times because of Mexican nationalism and the Soviet invasion of Af- ghanistan. Moscow has backed the recently formed Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM), hoping it will be more supportive of Soviet regional and interna legitimate political activities. Communist parties in South America exert little influence on national and regional politics. The Soviets subordinate their ties with the parties to efforts to improve relations with the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. Even where these parties are not legally excluded from the politi- cal process, they must contend with conservative anti- Communist governments and compete for influence 25 2 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Soviet Leaders Meet With Latin American and West European Communist Party Officials CPSU Secretaries Andrey Kirilenko (center) and Boris Ponomarev (right) meet with Rodney Aris- mendi, First Secretary f the yan Com- munist Party. Leonid Brezhnev greets Luis Corvalan, General Secretary of the Chilean Communist Party, in 1976 after Corvalan's release from prison in Chile and his arrival in the Soviet Union where Enrico Berlinguer (second from right), General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party, at a Kremlin meeting with Boris Ponomarev Leonid Senior CPSU Secretaries hold talks with a dele- sovtoto, Eastfoto m gation of the French Communist Party, headed by General Secretary Geor es Marchais seated opposite Brezhnev) Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret on the left with new radical groups and terrorist organizations. Although severe economic and political problems and social inequities throughout the region present opportunities for leftist exploitation, Commu- nists and other radicals must contend with well- institutionalized governments that enjoy the strong backing of the armed forces and entrenched private- sector elites. Except in Colombia, where the Commu- nist party is loosely allied with a paramilitary group, the South American parties follow a nonviolent line laid down by the Soviet Union (see figure 1) Although most of the region's mainline Communist parties receive Soviet assistance and support Soviet international policies, these groups must operate in a nationalistic political environment. For this reason, and because South American Communists have been weakened by factionalism and competition from newer, more militant leftist groups, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans appear to believe that the parties offer much near-term potential through either the ballot box or armed struggle. The Soviets' interest in cordial relations with the key states in the region also limits their manipulation of the Communist parties. Western Europe West European Communist parties, tracing their an- tecedents to pre-Leninist times, have claimed that their socioeconomic environment was the focus of Marx's own thought. Therefore, the parties' ongoing dispute with Moscow stems not only from arguments over Soviet actions (for example, Afghanistan and Poland) but also from claims that their parties have roots and legitimacy independent of Soviet interests. Some of these Communists even insist that their parties are the most advanced because of their Marx- ist tradition and the experience of operating in demo- cratic, industrialized states Because West European nonruling Communist parties can compete legally and equally for electoral support, their difficulties charting policies-conducive both to good, or at least correct, relations with Moscow and to maximized domestic popularity-are increased. Al- though the Soviets favor Communist party participa- tion in the parliamentary system, they are sometimes reluctant to see parties with independent foreign and security policies actually come to power. The Soviets, however, do not usually interfere with local Commu- nist choices of domestic tactics and strategies. Despite the efforts of several parties to attract broad support by espousing democratic politics and independence from the USSR, they are suffering from declining electoral strength and waning ideological appeal. Even the most independent West European Commu- nist parties are reluctant to break formal ties with Moscow. European Communists also share a need for community in a world Communist movement (see figure 1). Nevertheless, their independence is a genu- ine development, not a clever choice of tactics.II Opposition to US security policy binds the parties and serves Soviet interests, especially when translated into actions thwarting US and NATO policies (see figure 2). Some of the small and politically insignificant parties in northern Europe, however, are simply con- duits for Soviet policies, providing funds and organi- zational support to the peace movement. West European Communists do not uniformly support Soviet security policies; therefore, their activity in defense of Soviet security interests varies widely. Italian Communists, for example, while opposing NATO's basing of cruise missiles, have held back in attacking the government because they recognize the danger to European security posed by Soviet medium- range missiles. Nevertheless, each West European Communist party maintains active contacts with Soviet officials at- tached to local embassies and other diplomatic mis- sions. While these contacts do not always result in mutual agreements, they do reinforce interparty com- munications. The parties that find it easiest to serve Soviet interests are those combining staunchly pro-Soviet orientations with poor domestic electoral prospects. The West German, West Berlin, and Austrian Communist par- ties, for example, are simply mouthpieces for Soviet policies. While ineffective in an electoral sense, these Communists give important organizational assistance to domestic peace movements and other anti-NATO interests. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Rally Against Missile Deployment in Western Europe The French Communist Party holds a rally in December 1979 opposin deployment of US medium-range missiles in Western Europe. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret The Middle East and North Africa The nonruling Communist parties of the Middle East and North Africa are small and generally operate, even where legally tolerated, in an inhospitable envi- ronment. They enjoy little electoral strength and have little observable impact on national political life. Much of the energy of the faction-ridden parties is devoted to making inroads among trade unionists and students (where they now must compete with Islamic fundamentalists), propagandizing through both legal and clandestine publications, and attempting to pro- mote occasional civil disorder. As a result, the Soviets have not benefited very much from the region's Communist parties and have focused their efforts on radical nationalist movements. The exception to this generalization is Iran's Tudeh Party, which has emerged from years of repression and exile under the Shah. After many years of participate in existing political systems. They have not gained mass appeal and electoral support because of the postcolonial generation's anti-Communism and historical, social, cultural, and religious factors. Ex- cept for India where Communists rule two states, Communist parties have little political impact, and few appear capable of serious political disruption. The pro-Chinese parties have been in decline since Beijing withdrew its support following the Cultural Revolu- tion (1966-69). Southeast Asia and the Pacific During the past two decades, the Communist parties of Southeast Asia, with few exceptions, have become increasingly independent of both Moscow and Beijing. This trend began when the Sino-Soviet rift of the early 1960s fragmented local Communist parties by forcing them to take sides. Most openly supported Beijing until China's Cultural Revolution when sever- supporting a party with no apparent prospects for al Maoist groups attempted unsuccessful revolutions gaining power, the Soviets now have a loyal client that of their own. The survivors of these uprisings appar- not only participates in Iranian politics but also might ently have decided to judge for themselves the future become an important factor in the country's future.F~strategies best suited to local conditions. Sub-Saharan Africa Although nonruling Communist parties play a limited role in Sub-Saharan Africa, Marxist parties have proliferated throughout the region. Only five coun- tries-Senegal, Nigeria, the French Department of Reunion, Lesotho, and South Africa-have nonruling Communist parties officially recognized by the Soviet Union. None of these groups has been able to attract political support in its own country because Commu- nist ideology is generally unpopular throughout the region. The Soviets give these parties verbal support and limited financial assistance; all parties consistently support Soviet positions. The South African Communist Party poses the great- est threat to stability because it provides leadership and funnels Soviet funds to the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa's main insurgent group. South Asia Most pro-Soviet Communist parties in South Asia have renounced violent tactics and have chosen to Since the establishment of diplomatic ties with the United States, Beijing has sought to improve relations with governments in Asia by withdrawing financial support from several of the remaining pro-Chinese Communist parties. Beijing's once prominent role as the exporter of violent Commmunist revolution, however, has been assumed by a new Asian power-Vietnam. Vietnam might well become an Asian Cuba in the 1980s, encouraging and assisting sympathetic factions within Asian parties. Hanoi's involvement might lead to either the parties' increased factionalism or Moscow's replacement of Beijing as the primary supporter of Asian Communism. Should the Soviets challenge the Chinese, Beijing might respond by once again increas- ing its involvement in neighboring Communist move- ments. The nonruling pro-Soviet parties of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines support Soviet foreign policy interests and international front activities. The Japanese Communist Party, which is independent of 25 2 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Nonruling Communist Parties in Central and South America and the Caribbean Estimated Population in 1981 Communist Party Membership Percentage of Votes in Latest Election; Seats in Legislature Argentina 28,130,000 80,000 claimed (No elections scheduled) Proscribed Pro-Soviet Bolivia 5,490,000 500 est. (1980 elections voided) Proscribed Pro-Soviet Brazil 124,800,000 6,000 est. (1978) Proscribed Pro-Soviet Chile 11,162,000 20,000 est. (Elections promised) Proscribed Pro-Soviet Colombia 25,217,000 12,000 est. 1.9 (1978); 3 of 311 Legal Pro-Soviet Costa Rica (PVP) 2,332,000 6,000 est. 2.7 (1987); 3 of 57 Legal Pro-Soviet Dominican Republic 5,855,000 4,500 est. .62 (1982); none Legal Pro-Soviet Ecuador 8,275,000 1,000 est. 3.2 (1979); none Legal Pro-Soviet El Salvador 4,610,000 800 est. (1976) Proscribed Pro-Soviet Guadeloupe 304,000 3,000 est. 38.6 (1981); 1 of 3 in Paris Legal Pro-Soviet Guatemala (PGT) 7,310,000 750 est. (1974) Proscribed Pro-Soviet Guyana (PPP) 857,000 Unknown 20.4 (1980); 10 of 65 Legal Pro-Soviet Haiti (PUCH) 5,923,000 350 est. (1973) Proscribed Pro-Soviet Honduras 3,940,000 1,500 est. (1980) Proscribed Pro-Soviet Jamaica (WPJ) 2,268,000 3,000 est. NA (1980); none Legal Pro-Soviet Martinique 302,000 1,000 est. 6.4 (1981); none in Paris Legal Pro-Soviet Mexico (PSUM) 69,100,000 112,000 claimed 5.4 (1979); 18 of 400 Legal Independent Panama (PPP) 1,928,000 550 est. NA (1978); none Legal Pro-Soviet Paraguay 3,268,000 3,500 est. (1973) Proscribed Pro-Soviet Peru 18,119,000 3,000 est. 2.8 (1980); 4 seats Legal Pro-Soviet Uruguay 2,944,000 7,000 est. (No elections since 1971) Proscribed Pro-Soviet Venezuela 17,913,000 4,500 est. 1.4 (1978); 1 of 195 Legal Pro-Soviet a Sources for tables 1 through 4 are Richard F. Staar, ed. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982) and Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact- book-1982. the Soviet Union, is heavily involved in the peace movement and opposes US foreign and defense policy interests in Japan. Regional Survey of Selected Nonruling Communist Parties Central America (see table 1) Guatemala. The pro-Soviet party of Guatemala, the Guatemalan Workers' Party (PGT), is proscribed; its total membership is estimated at 750. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret Honduras.1 About half of the PCH's estimated membership of 1,500 broke away in mid-1980 to begin terrorist 25 actionsi El Salvador. El Salvador's Communist party (PCES) is illegal (see figure 3). Its estimated membership of 800 includes guerrillas. Prior to the 1979 Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, the essentially nonviolent doc- trine of the party closely followed Moscow's design for regional parties to work within their own political systems. The PCES received yearly stipends-some possibly reaching $150,000-but these were neither guaranteed nor unconditional. All Soviet aid to the party was reportedly cut off during the 1970s in response to PCES disorganization and factional dis- putes. The turmoil of the 1970s, however, radicalized PCES followers. Anticipating an outbreak of civil war, the party in April 1979 formed its own armed wing, the Liberation Armed Forces (FAL). At Moscow's urging, since January 1980 the PCES has been allied with four other Marxist insurgent groups in the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, which is conducting guerrilla operations against the Salvadoran Government. Although Mos- cow has been trying to bolster the PCES by channel- ing some funds and materiel through the party to the insurgents' joint command, the PCES apparently remains the smallest and probably least influential member of the leftist alliance. While the PCH has been chronically weak and plagued by discord among its leaders, it could benefit from the unity agreement by eventually establishing control over the other radical groups opposing the Honduran Government. In this scenario, the PCH, acting on Soviet and Cuban instructions, might be in a position to shape the political and military outcome of the anticipated "prolonged popular war." Costa Rica. Three Communist parties within the Costa Rican Communist coalition (PU) generally cooperate in the Legislative Assembly, but they re- main philosophically and tactically divided. The larg- est is the Moscow-line Popular Vanguard Party (PVP), which has an estimated membership of 6,000 and effectively controls more than 50,000 workers. Although the PVP reportedly has a paramilitary brigade of 150 to 200 members who fought alongside the Sandinistas in 1979, the party has generally eschewed violent tactics within Costa Rica. In con- trast, the small, radical, Havana-line People's Revolu- tionary Movement (MRP) has consistently advocated violent solutions to political problems. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: (T IA-R DPf3:lTnOf35:IRnnnlnnn7nnn'i-F Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Jorge Handel, Secretary Gener- El Dario de Hoy al of the Communist Part o El Salvadorl Mexico (see table 1) Mexico's Marxist left is weak and divided. Some tangible progress toward leftist unity did occur in the recent Soviet-backed formation of the Communist- dominated Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM), but the Communists are not yet close to commanding national influence. The PSUM, a loose alliance of the Mexican Communist Party with four smaller leftist parties, has only 100,000 to 125,000 members, reflecting Communist weakness among peasant and labor organizations. Giocondo Dias, Secretary Gen- eral of the Brazilian Commu- The Caribbean (see table 1) The region's largest and potentially most important parties are the Dominican Liberation Party (DLP) and the Dominican Communist Party (DCP) in the Dominican Republic. The pro-Soviet DLP consists of an estimated 15,000 members under the leadership of former president Juan Bosch. It has a growing constit- uency among the discontented urban poor. The party, which receives Soviet funding, reportedly is willing to prepare a cadre for armed struggle in light of the left's poor performance in the May 1982 presidential elections. (The DLP in coalition with a smaller radical party won 1 percent of the total vote.) During 1981, the Moscow-line doctrinaire DCP, with approximately 7,000 members, lost considerable ground to Bosch's party. Moreover, the Soviets have Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret Radames Larrazabal, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Venezue- Athos Ava, Secretary of the Communist Party of Argentina. the Duvalier reeime.I cut their funding in half. Although the DCP prefers legitimate political activities to violent tactics, it is increasingly ineffective. It reneged on its agreement with the Cubans and Soviets to unite in an electoral coalition with Bosch's party; it received less than 1 percent of the vote in May. Guyana's People's Progressive Party (PPP), officially recognized by Moscow, ostensibly represents the East Indian majority in the country. There are no reliable figures on the size of its membership. The PPP plays an ineffective role in opposition to Socialist President Burnham. Party leader Cheddi Jagan has longstand- ing ties to Havana and Moscow. The United Party of Haitian Communists, scattered in exile among at least four countries, has shown little ability to engage in more than propaganda attacks on There are two legal Communist parties in Jamaica- the Communist Party of Jamaica (CPJ) and the Worker's Party of Jamaica (WPJ). The CPJ has a mostly inactive membership of only about 50 people; it controls several Communist front groups in Jamai- ca, including affiliates of the two most important Soviet fronts-the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions. The WPJ, con- sisting of 3,000 members, is well organized. It is 2 2 25 recognized and supported by the Soviets and Cubans. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 South America (see table 1) Venezuela. The Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) has been in decline for the past several years and now has no more than 4,500 active members (see figure 3). The reform programs of the two major Venezuelan parties essentially preempted its constituency. The PCV hews to the Soviet line without reservation. For its loyalty, the party receives monthly subsidies, and its leaders receive privileged treatment in Mos- cow. Its support for the Soviets' 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, resulted in a split that cost it nearly half its members, including most younger leaders. The PCV supports Soviet views by sponsoring a number of friendship societies and cultural organiza- tions. It also distributes Soviet propaganda tracts and places pro-Soviet information in the Venezuelan me- dia. These activities, however, exert little influence within the country. Colombia. The Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), made up of approximately 12,000 members, has a nationwide organization and exerts disproportionate political influence by infiltration and control of osten- sibly nonparty groups. It dominates several large labor confederations and has fomented serious labor disorders, sporadic social disturbances, and student violence. On international issues, the Soviet-trained PCC leadership adheres closely to the Soviet line.= The PCC, reluctant to become directly involved in violence, has publicly renounced terrorism as a means of gaining power. This position allows the party to dissociate itself from actions of its paramilitary arm, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), one of the country's most effective guerrilla organizations. The FARC is responsive to the PCC but is not subservient, often taking more radical action than the PCC would favor; since 1975 it has become increasingly independent in its political strat- egy. PCC contact with the FARC is maintained through liaison agents trained in Moscow. The FARC's top leaders are also PCC Central Committee members, some of whom have received training in Moscow; in addition, it has received some aid and training from Cuba Brazil. Communist parties and splinter groups play only a minor role in Brazil despite the recent political liberalization and have little chance of exerting much influence in the foreseeable future. The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) is a small, lackluster group- ing of about 6,000 members (see figure 3). The PCB has no chance of achieving its principal political objective, party legalization, soon. Although the PCB generally follows the Soviet line, its leadership is in disarray and lacks ideological consistency. Three splinter groups, which a decade ago waged a much publicized terrorist campaign, were decimated by security forces and now are incon- sequential. Soviet aid to the PCB, extensive in the 1950s, has declined to relatively low levels of support for propa- ganda and organizational activity. Moscow probably believes even major assistance would not reinvigorate the party. Moreover, such efforts would undermine the increasingly important commercial ties that have developed between the Soviet Union and Brazil in recent years. Argentina. The 60-year-old Argentine Communist Party (PCA), with 80,000 members, is the most tightly knit and best organized party in the country (see figure 3). Under the new 1982 party law, the Communists will be able to engage in political activity leading up to elections promised for 1984. Their electoral appeal, however, is unlikely to broaden significantly because their largely middle class mem- bership has had only marginal success in attracting working-class Argentines, despite the current econom- ic crisis. The mainstream PCA is nonviolent and has consist- ently supported the military regime's plan for gradual transition to democratic government. This support has allowed the PCA to survive government purges of leftists since 1976, and recently increased Argentine- Soviet trade may have further strengthened its posi- tion. Although it maintains ties with other Latin American Communist parties, it is indigenously fi- nanced from business investments and receives no known external support. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret Peru. The pro-Soviet Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), although legal, is a minor force in national politics. Its membership is estimated at 3,000. The party is a minority in the legislature and has failed to exploit its powerful labor affiliate to construct a strong popular base. For some time the Soviets, who provide most of the PCP's funding, have been extremely dissatisfied with the party's performance. They have urged the recently adopted reforms and will increase fundin if the party shows progress in rebuilding its strength Although the Soviets want a strong and activist PCP, Bolivia. The Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB) fol- lows the strict Moscow line; it receives Soviet funding, periodically sends representatives to the USSR, and they have reason not to promote violent revolution in echoes Soviet positions on international issues. The Peru. They believe that any such attempt would PCB is proscribed and numbers fewer than 500 disrupt their close military training and supply rela- members. The party has little ability to destabilize tionship. Moreover, the Soviets probably fear that Bolivia in the foreseeable future but, over the long insurrection would provoke a rightwing military coup term, the Soviets probably hope to maintain a party that would severely set back PCP and Soviet gains. structure that could take advantage of eventual politi- Chile. The Chilean Communist Party has been banned since 1973 when the military toppled Salvador Allende's Marxist regime. It still may have as many as 20,000 members. The majority of the party's top echelon is in exile. Those leaders who remain in the country are either in hiding or maintaining a very low profile. While the Soviets have become more vocal during the past year in calling for the overthrow of the Pinochet regime, they do not believe it is imminent and they have not committed major resources to the Chilean Communists. Ecuador. The Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE) has considerable strength in the labor movement but attracted so little support in recent elections that it lost its electoral status. The PCE, riven by factional- ism and having difficulty attracting new blood, pre- sents little threat to stability or near-term opportunity for Soviet exploitation. Composed of an estimated 1,000 members, the PCE finances and controls the nation's largest labor confederation, which has more than 100,000 members, and it also influences the Worker's Unity Front of democratic and Communist cal liberalization or serve as a core for active resist- ance. Uruguay. The Government of Uruguay, outspokenly anti-Communist in both domestic and foreign affairs, has kept the outlawed Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) in a weakened and defensive state. The regime has permitted increased political activity offering the Communists some opportunity, but aggressive securi- ty force activities will probably continue to force party members to concentrate on organizational survival. The PCU has approximately 7,000 members. The Soviet-line party receives financial and propaganda support from Moscow. Paraguay. The Communist Party of Paraguay (PCP), with approximately 3,500 members, is proscribed. Its activities both within Paraguay and in exile in Buenos Aires are frequently monitored by security forces, and it represents no significant threat to the government at present. labor groups and a Moscow-line student federation= Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Nonruling Communist Parties in Western Europe Estimated Population in 1981 Communist Party Membership Percentage of Votes in Latest Election; Seats in Legislature Austria 7,509,000 25,000 est. 0.96 (1979); none Legal Pro-Soviet Belgium 9,900,000 10,000 est. 2.3 (1981); 2 of 212 Legal Independent Cyprus (AKEL) 636,000 12,000 est. 32.8 (1981); 12 of 35 Greek Cypriot seats Legal Pro-Soviet Denmark 5,100,000 9,000 est. 1.2 (1981); none Legal Pro-Soviet Finland 4,798,000 47,000 est. 17.9 (1979); 35 of 200 Legal Pro-Soviet France 54,000,000 500,000 est. 16.2 (1981); 44 of 491 Legal Pro-Soviet Great Britain 56,000,000 18,500 claimed 0.05 (1979); none Legal Independent Greece 9,671,000 33,500 est. 10.9 (1981); 13 of 300 Legal Pro-Soviet Ireland 3,400,000 500 est. NA (1981); none Legal Pro-Soviet Italy 57,200,000 1,715,890 claimed 30.4 (1979); 201 of 630 Legal Independent Luxembourg 400,000 600 est. 5.0 (1979); 2 of 59 Legal Pro-Soviet Malta 370,000 150 est. NA (1981); none Legal Pro-Soviet Netherlands 14,200,000 13,000 est. 2.1 (1981); 3 of 150 Legal Independent Norway 4,100,000 500 est. NA (1981); none Legal Pro-Soviet Portugal 9,996,000 187,000 est. 16.7 (1980); 41 of 250 Legal Pro-Soviet San Marino 22,000 300 est. 25.0 (1978); 16 of 60 Legal Independent Sweden (VPK) 8,324,000 18,000 claimed 5.6 (1979); 23 of 349 Legal Pro-Soviet Legal Pro-Soviet Proscribed Pro-Soviet West Germany 61,666,000 48,856 claimed 0.2 (1980); none Legal Pro-Soviet The Communist movement in Paraguay is split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions; the PCP is pro- Soviet. Most PCP members are in exile. Both Moscow and Beijing provide financial support to their respec- tive factions Western Europe (see table 2) Italy. The Italian Communist Party (PCI)-the larg- est, most independent nonruling West European party the government in the late 1970s (see figure 4). and Italy's second-largest political party with a claimed membership of more than 1.7 million-has fallen on difficult days. Its leaders are convinced that they must reach out to broader elements of the electorate if they are to regain the momentum that brought them to the verge of formal participation in Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret The PCI-Soviet polemics over Poland have brought relations to a new low, but the Soviets have not given up on efforts to influence PCI policies. Party leader Berlinguer has been especially worried by reaction from within the party's leadership to the PCI's sup- port for liberalization in Poland. Armando Cossutta, the leading pro-Soviet figure in the PCI leadership, has been outspoken in his criticism of the PCI stand on Poland. While Berlinguer might view Cossutta's public stance as divisive and a challenge to his leadership, it is equally possible that he is tolerating it in order to appease pro-Soviet elements in the party. I-- I The PCI exerts influence at all levels of Italian politics. Several recent Italian governments have had to rely on Communist support and include PCI posi- tions in their own platforms in order to remain in power. Moreover, the PCI alone or in coalition with the Socialist Party dominates many regional and city governments and controls political patronage. The PCI's control of the country's largest trade union gives it additional weight in political and economic affairs. Although the PCI opposes Soviet views on various international issues, there is a convergence of PCI- CPSU positions on some questions. The PCI, for example, has opposed the deployment of US cruise missiles in Italy, and it has sponsored several anti- INF and peace rallies. PCI parliamentary members have argued against defense modernization and have advocated democratization and unionization of Italy's armed forces France. With an estimated membership of 500,000, the French Communist Party (PCF) is the second- largest West European nonruling party (see figure 4). The PCF is linked financially and ideologically to Moscow, but how much the Soviets may dictate PCF foreign and security policy is uncertain. Although Moscow's financial support is probably of limited importance to the PCF, the party receives a substan- tial indirect subsidy through its heavy involvement in commercial trading companies that deal with the Soviet Bloc. The Soviets also derive some financial advantage from this arrangement. The PCF's support for Soviet policy, including the invasion of Afghanistan and martial law in Poland, has hurt the party more than it has helped. The PCF's working-class electorate has defected in droves, and the party has lost much of its former attraction for intellectuals and artists. PCF ability to gain support for Soviet policies is severely limited. Although French Communists have organized demonstrations against US enhanced radiation weapons, against US policy in Central America, and in support of peace 2 and disarmament, these demonstrations have had little impact. PCF control of France's largest trade union confeder- ation also is limited; the threat to use it to challenge the government remains more theoretical than real. The party's control of patronage through its domi- nance of many important municipal and local govern- ments gives it a solid base of supporters. Ironically, the PCF's defense policy views are closest to those 2 held by the Gaullists: favoring an independent nuclear capability and supporting the government's decision to build a seventh nuclear submarine. To date, the PCF has not exploited its position in the government to support Soviet views. Participation, moreover, is both an asset and a liability. On the one hand, the PCF enhances its influence through radio and television and builds up its reputation as a respectable political party. On the other hand, howev- er, the party is being forced to endorse policies it actually abhors, and it is losing a big share of its traditional disaffected protest vote. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Leaders of West European Communist Parties Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret Harilaos Florakis, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Greece-Exteriors Ezekias Papaioannou, General Secretary of the Cypriot Pro- gressive Party of the Working Leonid Brezhnev with Alvaro Cunhal, General Secretary of the Portuguese Communist Party.1 --I Liaison ? Enrico Berlinguer (left), Secre- tary General of the Italian Communist Party, and Luigi Longo, PCI President, at an April 1976 meeting of the par- ty's Central Committee. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Spain. The Spanish Communist Party (PCE), during Santiago Carrillo's tenure as party leader, probably will not be of much use to Moscow. Carrillo's anti- Soviet security policies have become more virulent with the declaration of martial law in Poland and have led him to the unusual step of announcing a formal break with the CPSU. Carrillo's possible successors may be less overtly hostile toward Moscow but probably would not turn their backs altogether on Carrillo's Eurocommunist line. The PCE has approximately 120,000 members. No evidence exists of Soviet financial support of the PCE. The Soviets have made at least one abortive effort to create a pro-Soviet alternative to the PCE, and there is evidence that at least moral support for some splinter groups is continuing. Such support could be mobilized if the PCE's policy remains staunchly anti- Soviet. There are indications of receptiveness to Sovi- et overtures in the Catalan regional party organiza- The PCE opposes Madrid's granting of base rights to the United States; the Spanish Government can be expected to use this as leverage in bilateral treaty negotiations. Portugal. The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), under the leadership of Alvaro Cunhal, has been one of Moscow's most loyal West European allies (see figure 4). The Soviets helped fund and advise the party's effort to gain power during the revolution in the early 1970s. Almost all observers believe that the Soviets still subsidize Portuguese Communist activity. The PCP claims 187,000 members. Its substantial strength, about 17 percent of the electorate, developed largely as a result of the party's long record of opposition to the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship. To ensure continued worker and peasant support, the PCP has energetically defended its policies, both in the parliament and in the streets. The Stalinist nature of the party, however, has kept out intellectuals. The PCP leadership is free to follow the Soviet line in foreign policy because most members are not very interested in events outside Portugal. The PCP takes strongly anti-US positions on southern Africa and Latin America, and it opposes US use of Lajes Air Field in the Azores. The PCP newspaper has been used to float suspected Soviet disinformation regard- ing US policy toward Angola. Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. The Finn- ish Communist Party (SKP)-although the largest, with approximately 47,000 members, and most influ- ential North European party-is beset by a deepening internal schism that has greatly diminished its politi- cal effectiveness. Party liberals, who are the majority, are frustrated by the failure of Soviet officials to rein in the dissident activity of the Stalinist hardliners. The liberals have demonstrated a growing willingness to act contrary to Soviet guidance and instructions. The less influential Stalinist dissidents depend on financial subsidies from the USSR and continue to support Soviet policies, including those toward Af- ghanistan and Poland in particular. In Sweden, the CPSC maintains relations with both the Leftist Communist Party (VPK) and the Commu- nist Workers' Party (APK). The VPK, which has a modest parliamentary delegation, projects the image of a national Communist party with a democratic attitude. It claims 18,000 members. The VPK has often been outspoken in its criticism of Soviet policies. The APK staunchly defends Soviet policy positions. We do not know either the real or claimed size of the APK's membership. Both parties are believed to receive financial support from the USSR and its East European allies. Neither party is particularly influen- tial; chances for growth have been seriously hampered by Soviet behavior in Afghanistan and Poland and by a Soviet submarine's recent intrusion into Swedish waters. The Danish (9,000 members) and Norwegian (500 members) pro-Soviet Communist parties are small, insignificant, and without parliamentary representa- tion. They are unswerving defenders of Soviet interna- tional interests; we think that they receive financial support from the Soviet Bloc. Cyprus and Greece. The Cypriot Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) is a growing, well- organized, well-disciplined Communist party (see fig- ure 4). With approximately 12,000 members, it cap- tured 33 percent, a plurality, of the popular vote in the Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret May 1981 general election, giving it 12 seats in a 35- member parliament. The party's growing electoral strength results from its relatively moderate domestic policies. The government already relies on AKEL for informal support, and the party is a potential coalition partner. In foreign policy, it follows a strictly pro- Soviet line. Soviet financial support for AKEL mainly consists of wine purchases from AKEL-dominated enterprises. The pro-Soviet Greek Communist Party-Exterior won 11 percent of the vote in recent national elections and is the third-largest party in the parliament (see figure 4). It has an estimated membership of 33,500. Nevertheless, although the party has substantial in- fluence among intellectuals and students, its organiza- tion is stagnant, which might prove a hindrance to future electoral growth. Austria, West Germany, Great Britain, and Holland. The Austrian and West German Communist parties with 25,000 and 49,000 members, respectively, are pro-Soviet organizations with little or no electoral support. The Soviets often use them-and the Greek party as well-as conduits for propaganda and as organizers of pro-Soviet, anti-US, anti-NATO activi- ties in Western countries. These parties, along with the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (formally part of the East German Socialist Unity Party), depend largely or entirely on Soviet or Soviet-Bloc The British, Belgian, and Dutch Communist Parties, small and without significant electoral prospects, also receive some Soviet aid. These parties, however, sup- port Eurocommunist foreign policies. They have suf- fered internal rifts as a result of the Polish crisis. The Belgian Communist Party may lose its hardline dissi- dents because of its Eurocommunism. Both the Brit- ish and Belgian parties exert some influence on the left wing of their countries' labor and socialist parties. The Middle East and North Africa (see table 3) Iran. Tudeh, the Communist Party of Iran, is small, with an estimated 1,500 hardcore members and lacks non lar u ort but it is well organize Although the Khomeini regime has been more tolerant of Tudeh than of other leftist groups, it has on several occasions moved against Tudeh, even while expanding contacts with Moscow. Both Iranian officials and opposition leaders claim that Tudeh has proved useful to the Khomeini regime by providing information on ethnic minority dissi- dence, leftist opposition groups, and plotting of coups by armed forces' members.) Tudeh leader Kianuri firmly believes in following the Soviets' lead (see figure 5). With their strong backing, he took over the party in January 1979. Party members are regularly trained at Soviet and 25X East European party schools. Soviet financial assist- ance to Tudeh may be as high as $1 million a month. The Soviets also supply large amounts of newsprint- a scarce commodity in revolutionary Iran-that al- lows Tudeh to produce a wide range of publications under both its own name and those of its several front groups. Tudeh has between 5,000 and 6,000 sympathizers. The party emphasizes tight discipline and clandestine 25 organization. Tudeh and Soviet objectives are promoted by a Sovi- et-based and -controlled radio station, the National Voice of Iran (NVOI), which presents itself as a patriotic, non-Communist institution su porting the Khomeini regime. Tudeh's close identification with the Soviets means that it is widely distrusted as an element of Soviet foreign policy. The party, therefore, has been unable to attract substantial popular support. Tudeh's efforts to form a leftist front have consistently been rebuffed by mainstream elements of other leftist groups. Party members cannot run for office; no known party member holds an official position. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret Nonruling Communist Parties in the Middle East and Africa Estimated Population in 1981 Algeria (PAGS) 19,422,000 Egypt 43,300,000 Iran (Tudeh) 39,958,000 Iraq 13,575,000 Israel (RAKAH) 3,948,000 Jordan 3,443,000 Lebanon 3,097,000 Lesotho 1,365,000 Morocco (PPS) 21,590,000 Nigeria (SWPP) 79,682,000 Reunion 518,000 Saudi Arabia 9,686,000 Senegal (PIT) 5,834,000 South Africa 29,313,000 Sudan 19,312,000 9,107,000 6,663,000 Communist Party Membership Percentage of Votes in Latest Election; Seats in Legislature Status Orientation 450 est. (1976) Proscribed Pro-Soviet 500 est. (1979) Proscribed Pro-Soviet 1,500 est. NA (1980); none Legal Pro-Soviet 2,000 est. NA (1980); none Legal Pro-Soviet 1,500 est. 3.4 (1981); 4 of 120 Legal Pro-Soviet 500 est. (No elections since 1967) Proscribed Pro-Soviet 12,000 est. NA (1972); none Legal Pro-Soviet Negligible (1970 elections nullified) Proscribed Pro-Soviet 2,750 est. NA (1977); 1 of 264 Legal Pro-Soviet 500 est. (1979) Proscribed Pro-Soviet 2,000 est., 10,000 claimed NA (1981); none in Paris Legal Pro-Soviet Negligible (No elections scheduled) Proscribed Pro-Soviet 1,000 est. NA (1978) Legal Pro-Soviet 500 est. NA (1977) Proscribed Pro-Soviet 1,500 est. (1980) Proscribed Pro-Soviet 5,000 est. 3.0 (1981); none Legal Pro-Soviet 100 est. 2.1 (1981); none Legal Pro-Soviet In the long term, Tudeh could benefit from its own organizational skills and the USSR's material sup- port. Its political opportunities will expand if the cleric-dominated government is unable to consolidate its control. To pose a major threat to the regime, however, Tudeh would need broad support from other leftists and, possibly, the ethnic minorities. Iraq. The small Iraqi Communist movement, long the object of Baathist government repression, is split into four competing factions, its members scattered with most of the leadership in exile. It has little power or influence inside Iraq About 2,000 members of the Iraqi Communist Party (CPI), the largest faction, are scattered throughout the Arab states, the USSR, and Eastern Europe (see figure 5). The CPI's Politburo operates in Moscow and Prague. The CPI publicly supports Soviet policies including the invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets minimize their overt backing of the CPI to maintain and strengthen good relations with Iraq's Baathist govern- ment. In the summer of 1980 Moscow even attempted unsuccessfully to engineer a reconciliation between the CPI and the Baath Party. The CPI's usefulness to Moscow is further weakened by tension between the exiled leadership and members still inside Iraq Morocco. Morocco's Communist party, the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), was founded in 1974 and is permitted to function openly because of its moderate stance (see figure 5). As a loyal opposition, the PPS, for the most part, solidly endorses King Hassan's policies and is considered to be an authentic nationalist party; it holds one seat in Parliament. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret Some financial support for the party comes from the Soviet Union. Active PPS members are estimated to number fewer than 1,000 Egypt. There are several Communist parties operat- ing illegally in Egypt and among Egyptian exiles in Western Europe. The most important is the Egyptian Communist Party (ECP), reestablished in 1975. The party is pro-Soviet and has close ties to other pro- Soviet Communist elements in the Middle East. It probably has a few hundred members. The party takes a pro-Soviet line. Although hard 2 evidence of Soviet financial support is not available, some assistance may be provided through East Euro- pean embassies. Syria. The Syrian Communist movement is split into four major factions, only one of which is legal; its total membership is estimated at 5,000. In return for legal status the Bakdash faction, with Soviet encourage- ment, has until recently fully supported the foreign and domestic policies of the ruling Baath Party (see figure 5). Its support for the Assad regime, however, has driven many of its members into more radical, outlawed factions. In an attempt to stem the loss of membership, the Bakdash faction issued a manifesto in November 1981 criticizing the government's eco- nomic policies and the lack of political freedom. Assad promptly retaliated and removed all Commu- nist party names from the list of candidates for the People's Council. The party takes a pro-Soviet line, but evidence of have been provided through East European embassies, however. estimated Lebanon. The Communist apparatus in Lebanon con- sists mainly of the Lebanese Community Party (LCP) and the Communist Action Organization CAO both legal parties The Sudan. The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) was the largest and best organized Communist party in Africa until it was decimated by the arrest of many of its members and the execution of its top officials following an abortive Communist-led coup in 1971. During the next few years, it recovered much of its strength (total membership was estimated at 1,500 in mid-1979) but was damaged badly by another govern- ment crackdown following party-orchestrated antire- gime demonstrations in August 1979. 25 25 have nea rly 12,000 members, and in April 1981 its militia had between 1,500 and 2,000 full-time members. If part-time militia members and party loyalists were called to military duty, the total strength of the LCP militia could reach approximate- ly 10,000 men. The CAO developed from a group that broke away from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in the early 1970s, but today it is primarily a Lebanese rather than a Palestinian party and draws its membership mainly from Shia Muslims in southern Lebanon (see figure 5). In April 1982 full- time CAO militia strength stood at between 300 and 500 men. This number could reach as high as 5,000 with the addition of part-time militia members and other party activists. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Leaders of Middle Eastern Communist Parties Nur-ed-Din Kianuri, Secretary General of the Tudeh Party of Problems of Communism Mushin Ibrahim, founder and leader of the Communist Ac- tion Organization in Lebanon. Muhammad Aziz, Secretary General of the Ira i Commu- nist Party. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret Jordan. The Jordanian Communist movement, with about 1,000 members, is split in several factions.- Khalid Bakdash, chairman of Sovfoto, Eastfoto m the pro-Soviet faction of the Syrian Communist movement. The Jordanian Communist Party (JCP), established in 195 1, has little influence. Its activities are tolerated by the government, but it was outlawed for much of its existence and forced to operate underground for long periods of time. Receiving aid from Moscow, the JCP endorses Soviet views on most regional issues. Its support for the Soviet position on recognizing Israel's right to exist has made it difficult to recruit followers from Jordan's Palestinian population. 25, Israel. The Israeli Communist Party (RAKAH) is closely allied with Moscow; it supports the Soviets' call for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 borders, establishment of an independent West Bank- Gaza Palestinian state, and recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Because of its Soviet ties and extremist positions, RAKAH is generally shunned b the other parties in the 120-member Knesset 25 RAKAH's leadership is 25 almost exclusively ewis , but its backing comes mainly from Israel's Arab citizenry, particularly Arab residents of the northern Galilee district. It has 25, approximately 1,500 members. 2 Sub-Saharan Africa (see table 3) South Africa. The pro-Soviet South African Commu- nist Party (SACP) is a small exile group with fewer than 500 members. It has little popular support inside South Africa. It does, however, exercise considerable influence over the policies of the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa's principal insurgent group. The SACP also helps funnel Soviet funds to the ANC. The ANC itself is not a Communist organization, but it depends on the Soviet Union and its allies for almost all of its military equipment and training. The SACP believes that the ANC's recent success in carrying out terrorist activities will encourage more violent forms of black opposition to white rule. Most ANC attacks have been targeted against economic facilities and government offices, and the group has purposely avoided loss of life while carrying out its operations. Many ANC black militants resent the Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 influence of Joe Slovo and other SACP leaders, most of whom are white, and some ANC members believe that the SACP has sought to avoid casualties because of its reluctance to endanger whites. The SACP, however, is intent on maintaining influence in the ANC and probably will eventually accept a more indiscriminate terrorist campaign to appease militant Although most of its efforts are devoted to assisting the ANC, the SACP maintains its own organization and leadership. Most members are probably in Lon- don, but others who also belong to the ANC spend much of their time in African capitals. The Soviet Union is the primary financial backer of the SACP, which often holds its Central Committee meetings in Moscow or other East European capitals. The SACP is consistently pro-Soviet and supports Moscow's posi- tion on all international issues. Senegal. None of Senegal's six legal Marxist parties is a strong force in domestic politics. A small segment of urban intellectuals are members; the overwhelm- ingly rural population offers almost no support. More- over, the parties' leaders are highly competitive, seem- ingly unwilling to cooperate with each other. Of the six parties, Moscow recognizes only the Parti de l'Independence et du Travail (PIT), with probably 1,000 members. The PIT has close ties with Senegal's militant teachers' union and in 1980 participated in the union's various antigovernment activities. Soviet support o e Nigeria. Because of their conservative nationalism and entrepreneurship, Nigerians have little interest in Communism and other radical ideologies. There are five small Marxist parties, all illegal. The Nigerian Socialist Working People's Party (NSWPP), the larg- est with about 500 members, plays an active legal role in the Nigerian Labor Center. As the only party officially recognized by Moscow, it receives Soviet funds. The NSWPP, which does little more than attend Soviet party congresses, has not played an active role in labor strikes or other antigovernment activity. French Department of Reunion. The Parti Commu- niste Reunionnaise (PCR) in the French Department of Reunion is Sub-Saharan Africa's largest Commu- nist party, claiming 10,000 members as of late 1981. The PCR, founded in 1959, draws its support from unskilled and unemployed workers. Maintaining close ties with the French Communist Party, it has adopted a relatively moderate political stance, advocating lim- ited economic and social reforms and continued French dependency. Internationally the PCR has consistently supported the Soviets and probably re- ceives their financial support South Asia (see table 4) India. The Communists have been unable to exploit rapid economic and social change in India. The ruling Congress Party's political domination, Indian cultural institutions, and Hindu religious traditions are strong barriers to Marxism. These factors have shaped the character of Communist parties, forcing them to work within the Hindu caste system and to participate in parliamentary democracy. Electoral support for the two major Communist par- ties, the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India (CPI) and the more independent Communist Party of India- Marxist (CPM), remains weak. With fewer than a quarter of a million party members, the CPI and CPM constitute the leading opposition to Prime Min- ister Gandhi's Congress (I) Party, but the two parties do not act as a bloc. In the 1980 national elections, they increased their parliamentary representation from 29 to 48 seats, with most of the gains going to the CPM (13 seats). The overall trend, however, showed the Communists receiving a declining propor- tion of the popular vote, which dropped from 9.8 percent in 1971 to 8.9 percent in 1980. The Soviets can rely on the CPI's prompt obedience to directives, but their ability to influence Gandhi through the Communist parties has declined since the 1970s. The CPI and the Congress Party had main- tained a close political relationship with CPI support for the Prime Minister following from the 1971 Indo- Soviet Friendship Treaty. The CPI paid a heavy price, however, for its association with Gandhi's mid-1970s Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret Estimated Population in 1981 Communist Party Membership Percentage of Votes in Latest Election; Seats in Legislature Australia (SPA) 14,800,000 1,500 est. NA (1980); none Legal Pro-Soviet Bangladesh 90,680,000 2,500 est. NA (1979); 1 of 300 Legal Pro-Soviet Burma (BCP-White Flag) 35,289,000 3,000 claimed Proscribed Pro-Chinese India (CPI) (CPM) 692,400,000 - 150,000 est. 100,000 est. 2.6 (1980); 11 of 525 6.2 (1980); 35 of 525 Legal Legal Pro-Soviet Independent Indonesia 154,300,000 50 est. (1977) Proscribed Pro-Soviet Japan 117,700,000 440,000 claimed 10.4 (1980); 29 of 511 Legal Independent Malaysia 14,330,000 3,000 est. (1978) Proscribed Pro-Chinese Nepal 15,338,000 1,500 est. NA (1981); none Legal Pro-Soviet New Zealand (SUP) 3,117,000 200 est. 0.5 (1981); none Legal Pro-Soviet Pakistan 90,439,000 300 est. (1979 elections postponed) Proscribed Pro-Soviet Philippines 50,100,000 200 est. (1978) Proscribed Pro-Soviet Sri Lanka 15,172,000 6,000 est. 1.9 (1977); none Legal Pro-Soviet Thailand 48,787,000 1,000 est. (1979) Proscribed Pro-Chinese emergency rule, and its political credibility was al- most destroyed in the 1977 elections that swept her from power. The CPI thereafter adopted, probably with Soviet approval, a line sharply critical of the former Prime Minister. Today the widening gulf between the Indian Commu- nists and the Prime Minister displeases the Soviets, who do not want to risk their special relationship with India for a weak and divided Communist movement. Gandhi herself exploits the fact that Soviet obliga- tions to her government and India's strategic impor- tance to the USSR far outweigh the USSR's sense of responsibility to the Indian Communists The Soviets are attempting to encourage cooperation between the CPI and the stronger CPM, which not only increased its parliamentary strength in the 1980 elections but also won control of two state govern- ments (see figure 6). CPSU delegations sent to India, as well as high-ranking CPSU officials stationed spearheaded by the two Communist parties. 25 open up possibilities for a challenge from the left there, have made it clear that Communist unity is a major Soviet goal. While the Soviets recognize that Gandhi currently dominates the national political scene, they also believe that once she leaves office her party might be weakened by internal strife that would 2 CPI and CPM statements indicate that the two parties may be edging toward the cooperative rela- tionship Moscow seeks. At a January 1982 congress, the CPM called for "left democratic unity" and endorsed pro-Soviet positions on several international issues without the usual criticism of Soviet "revision- ism" and the usual reference to evenhandedness be- tween Moscow and Beijing. At its March congress, the CPI reiterated its position on the need for a "left and democratic" alternative to the Congress (I) Party and for better cooperation with the CPM. The change Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 C. Rajeswara Rao, General Secretary of the Communist Prominent Politburo members of the Communist Party of In- dia (Marxist). From left to right: E. M. S. Namboodiripad, Harkishan Singh Sur'eet, and Promode Dasgupta.I in the CPM's stance has removed a major impediment to a rapprochement between the two Communist parties and has given rise to speculation that they might reunite. Sri Lanka. The Communist Party of Sri Lanka/Mos- cow (CP/M) is the largest (approximately 6,000 mem- bers) and most important of Sri Lanka's numerous Communist parties. During the 1970s it took part in the united front government of Prime Minister Ban- daranaike and exerted some influence on government policy. Today the party is irrelevant politically; it has one member in Parliament. There is no evidence that the CP/M supports insurgency or terrorism in Sri Lanka; it is known to oppose the Tamil separatist movement. Moscow continues to support the CP/M both finan- cially and organizationally, but it has been unable to resolve the leadership succession question that fol- lowed the death of the party's founder last year. The CP/M generally adheres to the Soviet foreign policy line; it endorsed the invasion of Afghanistan and totally supports Soviet disarmament policies. The CP/M also has backed Soviet policy by mounting propaganda campaigns against the United States for alleged opposition to an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and for trying to establish a naval base on the island of Diego Garcia. Nepal. Political parties have been banned in Nepal since 1960. The Communist movement is split into numerous pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese parties, but in recent months the line between them has become increasingly blurred. Some pro-Chinese elements ap- pear to be gradually moving toward the pro-Soviet camp because of long-range Soviet attempts to unify Nepalese Communists and i s fficient financial and logistic support from Beijing Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret Pakistan. The pro-Soviet Communist Party of Paki- stan, with fewer than 300 members, has been under- ground since it was banned in 1954. The rare public statements attributed to party leaders have invariably supported Moscow's line. What little foreign support the party receives comes from the USSR, some probably funneled through Afghanistan Bangladesh. The Communist movement in Bangla- desh is fragmented into some 30 factions of which only eight deserve attention. The most important Marxist groups are three pro-Chinese parties: the United People's Party, the Sammyabadi Dal, and the Ganotantrik Party. The Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal is independent of both Beijing and Moscow. There are four pro-Soviet parties: the Bangladesh Workers' Party, the National Awami Party headed by Muzaf- far Ahmed, the Jatiya Ekota Party, and the Commu- nist Party of Bangladesh (CPB). The CPB appears to be the only one completely under Moscow's control. Communists have had little success at the polls; they seem too weak and fragmented to pose a serious threat to any Bangladesh Government, but occasional acts of violence and strikes might cause temporary disruption in some sectors of the economy. Southeast Asia and the Pacific (see table 4) Philippines. The Beijing-oriented Communist insur- gency in the Philippines presents the greatest threat to US interests in Southeast Asia. The 8,000-strong Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA), have grown in the past decade from a minor nuisance into a potentially serious threat to President Marcos's gov- ernment. Currently active in at least 43 of the coun- try's 72 provinces, the party draws support from rural people suffering from government corruption, military abuses, and poor economic conditions, and from radi- cal students and others seeking to limit US involve- ment in the Philippines. Although the CPP is still allied with Beijing on all international issues, it has 25 been funded almost entirely from domestic sources since China withdrew its financial support in 1975. In addition to the Maoist CPP, the Philippines also hosts the quasi-legal, Soviet-influenced Philippine Communist Party (PKP), which has been quietly working to achieve full legalization. With approxi- mately 200 members, the PKP poses little threat to the Philippine Government. It has attracted followers at the University of the Philippines, the country's intellectual center. There is evidence that Moscow would prefer the PKP to pursue Soviet objectives more aggressively, but the party remains essentially unresponsive except in its opposition to US military bases in the Philippines, an issue that finds support among youth and labor. The PKP receives an annual Soviet subsidy of $75,000. Burma. The Burmese Communist Party (BCP)- second-largest nonruling Communist party in Asia (with from 12,000 to 15,000 armed troops)-is the region's major remaining Chinese client. Beijing pro- vides most of the BCP's military aid-although the party also uses revenues from domestic opium produc- tion-and the BCP follows China's line on major international issues. Termination of Chinese aid would seriously weaken the BCP and might cause some elements to seek Soviet or Vietnamese support- a possibility Beijing uses to justify its continued funding of the party. The BCP maintains a "liberated area" in Burma along the Chinese border from which it conducts an active insurgency against the govern- ment and tries-unsuccessfully, so far-to exploit Burmese economic and social ills. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Thailand. Thailand has two Communist insurgen- cies-a predominantly Sino-Thai group linked to Chi- na and a small, new pro-Soviet, pro-Vietnamese group comprised of ethnic Thais. The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) with its military arm, the Thai Peo- ple's Liberation Army (TPLA), was originally a branch of the Chinese Communist Party dedicated to the overthrow of the Thai Government. Although Chinese support for the party has diminished since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Bangkok, the CPT-TPLA retains about 8,000 guerrilla fighters who wage jungle warfare against Thai military forces. Support for the CPT appears to be declining both because the party's Maoist line is out of step with the intellectual left and because the Thai Army has been somewhat successful in curtail- ing the insurgency. Malaysia. Outlawed in 1948 and militarily contained by 1960, the predominantly ethnic Chinese Commu- nist Party of Malaya continues a limited insurgency from bases on the Thai side of the border. Split into three factions in 1974, the party's total membership is about 3,000. Beijing made a show of reducing its support for the party in June 1981 by closing down its own propaganda broadcasts while a rebel-controlled station continued to operate. Kampuchea. An anomaly is the ousted but interna- tionally recognized Government of Democratic Kam- puchea (DK), a guerrilla organization of 30,000 to 35,000 armed combatants primarily located along the Thai border. With military assistance from Beijing, the DK is fighting Vietnamese occupation forces and the Vietnamese and Soviet-backed regime now con- trolling Cambodia. Although the DK officially dis- banded its Communist party in December 1981, the move was probably merely a propaganda ploy; the party is believed to remain intact within the DK government-in-exile structure. Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) is the third-largest nonruling party in the world, the largest in Asia, and claims a membership of 440,000 (see figure 7). Recognizing that the Japanese people would never support a violent revolution, the JCP seeks to establish itself as a moderate, responsible party determined to defend the national interest against both Communist and Figure 7. Kenji Miyamoto, Chairman of the Japanese Communist Par- ty. Western governments. The JCP has asserted its inde- pendence from both Moscow and Beijing and has criticized the USSR for its invasion of Afghanistan and interference in pressure on Poland. While not directly supporting Soviet foreign policy objectives, the JCP is engaged in political actions that challenge US foreign and defense policy interests in Japan. The JCP is seeking, for example, to broaden an antinuclear, peace and disarmament campaign with anti-US overtones. The party also carries out demon- strations against US military activities in Okinawa, hoping to bring about reexamination and possible abrogation of the US-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty. It opposes Japan's own defense buildup and is attempting to upset the government's timetable.I Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Australia's Communist movement is split into four parties: nonali ned pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, and Trotskyite. The 1,500-member Socialist Par of Australia (SPAI serves as the Soviet mouthpiece. The SPA exerts more influence than its numbers would indicate. It controls or strongly influences several key unions, most of which are also affiliated with the Australian Labor Party (ALP). Thus, the SPA's influence is felt within the ALP. There are five small Communist parties in New Zealand. Of these, the New Zealand Socialist Unity Party (NZSUP) is the largest (approximately 200 members), the most important, and the only Commu- nist group in New Zealand supported by the Soviet Union. Throughout its 15-year history, the NZSUP 25 has maintained close links with the Soviet Union, totally endorsing its foreign policy positions. 2 Despite its small numbers and its tiny electoral support, the NZSUP has gained significant influence 25 in the New Zealand trade union movement. Like their Australian counterparts, members of the NZSUP are active in supporting Soviet international front organi- 2 zations such as the World Peace Council and World Federation of Trade Unions. 2 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret Appendix A CPSU Coordination and Funding of Nonruling Communist Parties The days when the nonruling Communist parties formed a network of obedient foreign agencies under the tight control of Moscow "center" are long gone. Today, CPSU relations with the nonruling parties are more complex and differentiated; they are conducted primarily on a bilateral basis but multilateral rela- tions remain important. While the Soviets can still count on the unquestioning loyalty of many parties, their contact with several large independent parties has assumed the form of bargaining relationships between sovereign powers. Like a conventional foreign office, the Department is organized into geographical and functional compo- nents; its geographical components are subdivided into regional offices with individual country desks. One of the largest sections of the Central Committee apparatus, it may have as many as 100 professional staffers. A special section, the Consultants Group, managers and the Politburo and Secretariat. The CPSU, nevertheless, enjoys a special status in the international Communist movement as first among equals. It derives considerable prestige from its associ- ation with Lenin, the Bolshevik revolution, and its long experience in "building socialism." A pro-Soviet nostalgia that lingers in many nonruling parties en- hances that prestige. More important, however, the CPSU has at its disposal an array of organizational and funding mechanisms to support its claim to the "leading role" in the movement. Coordination Mechanisms The CPSU Central Committee maintains a large organization and permanent staff-its International Department-dedicated to the conduct of relations with all nonruling parties around the world. The International Department is an executive agency of the CPSU Secretariat. Boris Ponomarev, an alternate (nonvoting) member of the Politburo and a CPSU secretary, oversees the daily operations of the Depart- ment on behalf of the top Soviet leadership. Pono- marev is ultimately responsible to CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev. Until his death in January 1982, senior ideologist Mikhail Suslov was Ponomarev's mentor in the Secretariat. It is not clear whether Suslov's role has passed to Konstantin Chernenko, who has assumed many of Suslov's responsibilities, or to Yuriy Andropov since his co-optation to the Secre- tariat in May of this year. The most important interparty matters are handled by meetings between the top CPSU leadership and their counterparts in the nonruling parties. At the next level, the first deputy chief and five deputy chiefs of the International Department, comparable to deputy foreign ministers, serve as the CPSU's plenipotentia- ries in conducting relations and negotiations with foreign parties. The heads of the regional offices and the desk officers comprise the party's "diplomatic corps." advises the Department's 25 2 The conduct of interparty relations requires a great 2 deal of travel from Moscow by Department officials or to the Soviet capital by representatives of the tment does no nonruling parties because the Dep maintain a large foreign presence 25 Aside from ad hoc exchanges between party delega- tions, national and regional gatherings of the nonrul- ing parties play an important role in the conduct of CPSU foreign relations. The CPSU regularly sends delegations to foreign parties' congresses and confer- ences and receives foreign party delegations at its own meetings in Moscow, providing an opportunity for interparty discussions and consultations. It also sends observers to regional conferences called at the initia- tive of the participating parties. In some instances, the Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Press Conference at Paris Meeting Convened by Soviets Georges Marchais speaks at a press conference held at the conclusion of a meeting of 22 East and West European parties in Paris in April 1980. The Soviet Union convened the meeting to coordinate political and propaganda activities aimed at reversing the NATO decision to modernize intermediate-range nuclear forces. Soviet representative Boris Ponomarev is seen in the middle. Soviets have organized regional conferences in Eu- rope, the Middle East, and Central America for the express purpose of coordinating the policies and activ- ities of the nonruling parties (see figure 8). Such meetings frequently produce mixed results at best for the Soviets' efforts to secure backing for their own views. The CPSU remains stymied in its plan for convening an international convocation of all ruling and nonruling parties. The only permanent multilateral organ of the interna- tional Communist movement is the "theoretical" jour- nal Problems of Peace and Socialism (also published as World Marxist Review). Located in Prague, the journal's headquarters is staffed by representatives from among the 63 ruling and nonruling Communist parties affiliated with its editorial council. The real locus of power, however, appears to be the editorial 2 25 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret board, which always has been headed by a high- ranking Soviet member of the CPSU Central Com- mittee and staffed by a sizable Soviet contingent. Problems of Peace and Socialism appears to be under the supervision of the International Department. The Problems of Peace and Socialism organization facilitates the CPSU's conduct of interparty relations. It provides a regular mechanism for Soviet contacts with other Communist parties and for exchanging information and views on international and national issues of concern to the whole movement as well as the individual parties. The journal and its biweekly Infor- mation Bulletin are used to disseminate Soviet views on important issues and elucidate strategies and tac- tics. Periodic conferences convened in Prague supple- ment the system of bilateral and regional meetings used by the Soviets to monitor the policies and activities of the ruling and nonruling parties. The most recent editorial conference, in November 1981, was attended by 90 ruling and nonruling parties, including even the independent Italian and Spanish parties. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret Appendix B CPSU Relations With Non-Communist Parties and International Front Organizations Despite CPSU claims regarding the international Communist movement's strength and growing influ- ence on world affairs, the nonruling Communist par- ties rarely serve as highly effective instruments of Soviet foreign policy. The majority of these parties find themselves in politically weak or legally restrict- ed positions and therefore are unable to influence the policies of their respective countries. The largest and most influential parties tend to be also the most independent and unwilling to do Soviet bidding. To compensate for this, the Soviets find it expedient to form temporary relationships or formal alliances with non-Communist parties and groups that are stronger than the indigenous Communist movement and may even have access to governmental power. These relationships may take the form of party-to- party contacts conducted by the CPSU or they may be carried out through a number of Soviet-sponsored international front organizations. In either case, the separate strands of these relationships come together in the International Department. The immediate tactical purpose behind Soviet con- tacts with non-Communist parties is not so much recruitment of these parties to the Soviet cause- although in some cases that may be a maximal objective-as it is to counter opponents of Soviet policies by splitting their ranks and detaching some of their supporters. When successful, these relationships and alliances enable the Soviets to penetrate, influ- ence, and even subvert the political process in a country where there is no effective Communist party or one willing to do Soviet bidding. Relations With Socialist Parties For many years, the CPSU has had strained relations with the independent and nationalistic Japanese Com- munist Party while enjoying rather good relations with some elements of the Japanese Socialist Party. In the late sixties and early seventies, the Soviets began courting their historic enemies on the West European left-the socialist and social democratic parties. To some extent the decision to do so was forced on the Soviets, since they had launched a broad diplomatic offensive to reduce tensions with Western Europe. Many socialist and social democratic parties had become major coalition partners or key opposition parties in several NATO countries, and the Soviets recognized an opportunity to influence West Europe- an policies and public opinion-and through them US-Soviet relations-by establishing cooperative rela- tionships with some leftwing leaders and members. From Moscow's viewpoint, the utility of such relation- ships lies in the fact that some socialists and social democrats frequently formulate policies outside the Atlantic Alliance framework that clash in significant ways with NATO and US positions. The Soviets are primarily interested in a tactical political, not ideolog- ical, rapprochement with the democratic left by coor- dinating views on detente, security, disarmament, and North-South issues. They view this as complementing a broader diplomatic effort to establish a network of pan-European agreements and institutions on the 2: 25X Senior members of the CPSU leadership and high- ranking officials of the Central Committee's Interna- tional and International Information Departments serve as contacts with the socialist and social demo- cratic parties. The policy of rapprochement with the 2 5: Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 non-Communist left appears to be controversial in Soviet policymaking circles, and it has produced mixed results. Defending this policy before the most recent CPSU congress, Brezhnev lauded the coopera- tive relations the CPSU enjoys with a number of parties while acknowledging that "many" socialists are "afflicted with the virus of anti-Communism" and "refer to so-called Atlantic solidarity to justify the arms race." Soviet policy also suffers from several conceptual and practical contradictions, the most important being the resentment of some West Europe- an Communist parties that oppose CPSU cooperation with their chief rivals for influence on the left.I A special target of Soviet influence is the Socialist International, an organization that includes primarily West European and Latin American socialist and social democratic parties. The Soviets are interested in the Socialist International because its executive body has formulated policies on disarmament and Third World issues that are at odds with West European and US policies. The Soviets have been particularly active in seeking to formalize ties with the International's Advisory Coun- cil on Disarmament. The Soviets have participated in one of the Council's conferences, have maintained regular contacts with its study group on disarmament, and twice have hosted meetings with the Council in Moscow (see figure 9). During both of these sessions, the Council's leaders were received by Brezhnev and Ponomarev for high-level discussions. Relations With Afro-Asian "Vanguard" Parties The CPSU, acting through the International Depart- ment, maintains relations with parties, movements, and guerrilla organizations throughout the Third World's "zone of national liberation." ' The Soviet ' Soviet theoreticians usually exclude Latin America from this "zone" because most of that continent's nations emerged from colonial status during the 19th century and display a higher level of political and economic development than the postcolonial countries of Asia and Africa. The Soviets probably include Central America in the zone of national liberation in practice, if not in theory, as demonstrated by their current support for Marxist-Leninist guerril- la movements there. They may eventually recognize the New Jewel Movement in Grenada and the Sandinist National Liberation Front of Nicaragua as "van uard" parties rulin "revolutionary-demo- cratic" regimes. Union's long-range political strategy depends in par- ticular, however, on the development of close party-to- party ties to a number of radical, socialist-oriented regimes already in power. Of these, the most impor- tant are those ruled by "vanguard" parties, which the Soviets regard as prototypes for full-fledged Marxist- Leninist party-states. The countries ruled by van- guard parties include Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen, Benin, and the Congo. The Soviets see these regimes as models for future political and economic development in Africa and Asia through "close ties with the international Com- munist movement and the CPSU." They also envision the evolution of a bloc of states that will be linked to the Soviet alliance system in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Cuba through a network of party and governmen- tal ties that will shrink further the sphere of Western influence in the Third World. Georgiy Kim, a leading Soviet expert on Third World affairs, outlined this strategy saying that "a growth of the role of states that now hold the left flank of socialist orientation can be expected. Along with the strengthening of the positions of the vanguard parties of the working people and their turning into true Marxist-Leninist parties, these states may come close to direct integra- tion with the world socialist system, which in its turn will be a fresh factor of a further deepening of the crisis of present-day capitalism." This integration process is under way. Representatives of the vanguard parties participate in Soviet and East European party congresses and in conferences and publishing activities of Problems of Peace and Social- ism. They are also active in various Soviet front organizations. With the exception of Benin and the Congo, since 1980 the vanguard party regimes have been accorded observer status at annual meetings of the Soviet Bloc's intergovernmental economic coordi- nating body, the Council of Mutual Economic Assist- ance. Moreover, all except Benin maintain a range of political, economic, and security relations with the USSR codified in special "friendship" treaties, and most have provided the USSR with access to impor- tant military basing facilities on their national territo- Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 CPSU Officials and Socialist International Representatives in Moscow CPSU officials and representatives of the Socialist International meet in Moscow in February 1982. Seated on the left from front to back are Leonid Brezhnev, Boris Ponomarev, Andrei Aleksandrov, Brezhnev's chief foreign policy aide, and Vital''' Shaposhnikov deputy chief of the International Department. International Front Organizations International front organizations play a vital role in the USSR's conduct of public diplomacy and propa- ganda (see table 5). They are used to mobilize public opinion in support of policies the Soviets favor and against those the Soviets oppose. The front organiza- tions present themselves as genuinely public, interna- tional, and nonpartisan, and thus they are able to attract support from a wider range of political, social, professional, and religious groups than if they were identified openly as Communist and pro-Soviet. The International Department is the ultimate source of Soviet funding and coordination for the activities of the international front groups. The Soviets do not acknowledge this publicly, and the connection be- tween the CPSU and the fronts is concealed by using Soviet "public" organizations as conduits for funds and directives from the International Department. Thus, for example, the direct link between the inter- national Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization based in Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Soviet International Front Organizations Year Founded Headquarters Claimed Membership Number of Affiliates Country Affiliates Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organi- zation 1957 Cairo No data 87 Christian Peace Conference 1958 Prague No data At least 80 International Association of Democratic Lawyers 1946 Brussels Ca. 25,000 Nearly 80 International Organization of Journalists 1946 Prague Over 180,000 Over 120 International Union of Students 1946 Prague Over 10,000,000 Ca. 118 Women's International Democratic Federation 1945 East Berlin Over 200,000,000 129 114 World Federation of Democratic Youth 1945 Budapest World Federation of Scientific Workers 1946 Paris World Federation of Trade Unions 1945 Prague World Peace Council I Cairo and the International Department is the nation- al Soviet organization of the same name. 0 The World Peace Council (WPC), headquartered in Helsinki, is the largest, most influential, and best endowed (nearly $50 million per year) of the interna- tional front groups. It conducts propaganda and politi- cal action campaigns on a worldwide basis on every international, political, and security issue of interest to the USSR. The WPC also serves as a clearinghouse and coordination mechanism for all other front orga- nizations, whose executive officers sit on the WPC's presidential committee. Romesh Chandra, a veteran official of several Soviet front organizations and a former Central Committee member of the pro-Soviet Indian Communist Party, has been President of the WPC since 1977 (see figure 10). The organizational link between the WPC and the International Department is the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace. Oleg Kharkhadin, a staff officer of the International Department, is a vice president of the Soviet Committee. In Helsinki, the WPC secretariat includes one full-time Soviet repre- sentative and another Soviet official serves as a vice president. Vitaliy Shaposhnikov, a deputy chief of the International Department is a member of the WPC's presidential committee. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Secret The World Peace Council, the Most Important Soviet International Front Organization Leonid Brezhnev presents an Order of Lenin to Romesh Chandra, an Indian Commu- nist who serves as President of the World Peace Council.l- WPC activities are planned a year in advance and executed according to a "program of action" worked out in Moscow and Helsinki. While the themes of the yearly programs vary, they are almost always decid- edly anti-US and anti-NATO. So far this year, the WPC has held numerous worldwide rallies against US policy toward El Salvador and a conference in India on creating a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean that was attended by representatives of some 20 countries. The primary emphasis in the 1982 plan is on preventing implementation of NATO's decision Members of the World Peace Council's Presidential Commit- tee assemble at the US Capitol during a 1978 visit to Washing- ton. WPC President Chandra is in the middle of the second row regarding modernization of intermediate-range nucle- ar weapons. The plan calls for a series of national events (demonstrations, seminars, and colloquiums) opposing the NATO decision and international pro- test meetings of mayors, elected officials, and "peace forces" from West European towns and regions where new US intermediate-range missiles are to be de- ployed. Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP83T00853R000100070003-6