MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED SOVIET TUNGSTEN IMPORTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00853R000200070002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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atE~~.~. Directorate of ~
r~ ~ Intelligence
~l~~t~ary I~rnplicatons of
~~
~~cre~as~ed Soviet
u ~ ?gsten Imports
'An.t~tielligenee Assessment
ON FILE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Military Implications of
Increased Soviet
Tungsten Imports
The authors of this paper are
Defense Industries Division,
Soviet Economy Division, Office of Soviet
Intelligence Council. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief. Defense
Industries Division
Secret
SOV 82-10171 X
November 1982
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Military Implications of
Increased Soviet
Tungsten Imports
Key Judgments During 1979-81, the USSR bought unusually large amounts of tungsten on
/nformation available the international market. In 1981 it purchased some 22,000 tons of
as oJ'9 November 1982 concentrated tungsten ore-equal to about 11,000 metric tons of contained
was used in this report.
metal (pure tungsten). This was more than triple the annual imports during
the early and middle 1970s. In 1980 and 1981, Soviet tungsten imports
amounted to about 30 percent of the total reported world production for
those years. The fact that the Soviets expended about $600 million in
scarce hard currency on these imports during 1979-81 reflects tungsten's
high priority.
We are confident that these sharply higher purchases are made in support
of military production programs-the annual tungsten supply now substan-
tially exceeds estimated civilian requirements. Although a variety of
military applications is possible, most of the tungsten acquired probably is
earmarked for production of new munitions.
The increased imports have coincided with large purchases of Western
tungsten-related manufacturing technology suitable for military use. The
Kuybyshev Drill Bit Plant (built by Dresser Industries) furnished the
equipment, processes, and expertise for making high-purity tungsten
powders. The Soviets have also legally acquired Western powder-metallur-
gy pressing equipment like that used in the West to make tungsten-alloy
penetrators for armor-piercing projectiles.
According to current technical assessments, atungsten-alloy core for a
steel projectile could increase armor-penetrating capability by about 20
percent over the steel-alloy projectiles now in the Soviet inventory. A solid
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SOV 82-10/71X
November 1982
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tungsten-alloy projectile could provide up to a 40-percent increase in
penetration. Deployment of these new projectiles, therefore, would signifi-
cantly improve the capability of Soviet tank guns to defeat Western tanks,
equipped with either conventional or special armor. We estimate (on the
basis of our understanding of planning factors used by the Soviet military)
that the tungsten imported during 1979-81 alone could support production
of enough cored projectiles to equip the entire Soviet tank force by 1990.
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Past Deficiencies in Soviet Tungsten Technology 5
Method for Estimating Soviet Tungsten Requirements for Drilling 13
Comparison of Major Civilian and Military Uses of Tungsten
Method of Estimating the Amount of Tungsten Required for
Kinetic-Energy Projectiles
2. Tungsten Required for Projectile Production During 1985-90, 7
Estimated by Deployment Scenario
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1F'igures
1.
Tungsten Supplies in the USSR
Soviet Tungsten Supply and Demand Outlook, 1978-85
4. Potential Effect of Tungsten Alloy on the Performance of Soviet 8
Armor-Piercing Projectiles
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Military Implications of
Increased Soviet
Tungsten Imports
Supply of Tungsten
Accelerated Imports. The USSR has recently been
buying unusually large amounts of tungsten in the
international market. Imports first began to acceler-
ate in 1979, when purchases nearly doubled-to 5,800
tons of contained metal (pure tungsten) from 3,200
tons, the average level prevailing during most of the
1970s.
Soviet imports peaked at some 14,000 tons in
1980 before falling to about 11,000 tons in 1981
(figure 1).
imports m an represente a out 30
percent of the total reported world tungsten produc-
tion during the same time period.
The large outlays of hard currency committed to these
purchases clearly reflects their high priority. The
Soviet Union's tungsten import bill for 1979-81
amounted to about $600 million
The USSR has been an importer of tungsten for many
years. During 1960-67, its imports ranged from 2,000
to 8,000 tons per annum. China was the only source of
supply for the Soviets during that time, and trade was
conducted on a barter basis. Imports from China were
halted during 1967-69 because of deteriorating politi-
cal relations between Moscow and Beijing and Chi-
na's desire to bolster its hard currency earnings by
marketing more tungsten in the West.
The Soviets resumed tungsten imports from both
China and Western Europe in 1970. Beijing has
limited its direct tungsten sales to the USSR to 700 to
Figure 1
Tungsten Supplies in the USSR
1,000 tons per annum during most of the 1970s,
preferring instead to market most of its output in the
West for hard currency.
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The Soviets also have been buying tungsten-most of ,
it of Chinese origin-through various metals dealers
in Western Europe. 25X1
their purchases there ranged between 6,000 and 8,000
tons in 1980 and 1981.6 The Soviets also bought 500 25X1
to 1,000 tons of tungsten directly from Bolivia and
Peru in 1981 and were reportedly seeking additional
supplies in South America in early 1982.' Recently,
tained several hundred tons of tungsten from sales of ~
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he Soviets ob- 25X1
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US Government stockpiles by the General Services
Table 1
Soviet, Chinese, and US
Production of Tungsten a
Metric tons of
contained tungsten
sources give no in ication of an increase in Soviet
imports. For example, the Quarterly Bulletin of the
UN Committee on Tungsten reports that total imports
by all Communist countries amounted to about 1,800
tons in 1979-the last year for which complete data
are available
~in 1979 the Soviet urchases alone were about
5,800 tons
The market for tungsten, as well as other primary
commodities, is weak. A tungsten surplus dampens
the market reaction to increased Soviet purchases and
reduces the visibility of these purchases
Growing Domestic Production. The substantial
growth in Soviet imports is clearly not compensation
for a decline in domestic tungsten production. Annual
production rose by about one-third during 1970-81
and, according to our calculations, is still growing. We
estimate that output amounted to 9,400 metric tons in
1981-roughly one-fifth of total world production in
that year and nearly three times the output of the
United States (table 1).
The Soviets' largest tungsten-ore-concentrating plant
is at Tyryn-Auz (Northern Caucasus); others are at
Dzhida (Buryat ASSR), Iul'tin (Magadan Oblast),
Vostok II (Primorskiy Kray), and numerous scattered
locations in Central Asia and Kazakhstan.
output was roughly 4,000 to
tungsten production in the Magadan
Oblast fluctuated between 2,000 tons and 2,700 tons
per annum during most of the 1970s. Fragmentary
information suggests that tungsten production in all
other regions of the USSR may have risen from about
1,000 tons in 1970 to between 2,000 and 2,500 tons in
1981.
1960
1970
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981 n
5,400
6,900
8,100
8,300
8,500
8,800
9,000
9,200
9,400
13,990
5,470
6,710
5,660
6,470
8,660
10,130
Unknown
Unknown
3,160
4,220
2,490
2,660
2,730
3,130
3,015
2,722
3,538
We anticipate that Soviet tungsten production will
continue to rise during the 1980s, although possibly at
a slower pace. Increased output will come from the
Vostok II plant, which was commissioned in 1977 and
may not yet be operating at full capacity. The Soviets
have reported that they are building a second plant to
exploit another deposit which has been discovered
about 70 miles west of Vostok II. Increased output
from these sources will offset a substantial loss of
production in the Magadan Oblast by the mid-1980s,
and total production probably will increase to as much
as 10,000 tons per year by 1985.
Resource Base. There is no impending decline in the
Soviet domestic tungsten resource base which could
explain increased imports. Soviet geological studies
claim that the USSR's reserves of tungsten are among
the largest in the world "-a claim supported by
Western experts. According to the US Bureau of
Mines and other Western specialists, Soviet reserves
are between 150,000 and 260,000 tons, sufficient to
support current production for 15 to 30 years." At the
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upper end of the range, estimated Soviet reserves
amount to about 10 percent of the world's total.15
Construction of new concentrating capacity also indi-
cates that the proven tungsten resource base is grow-
ing. Tungsten deposits were brought into operation at
Ingichka in the Uzbek SSR in 1973 and at Vostok II
in 1977, according to Soviet press and geological
reports.16 Other Soviet press reports
indicate that concentrating plants
were built nearby to exploit these deposits. According
to their published standards, the Soviets do not build a
new tungsten plant unless it has a reserve base
sufficient to support production for at least 20 years."
The size of these deposits is unknown, but the Soviets
claim they are "large." According to their system of
mineral classification, "large" tungsten deposits con-
tain at least several hundred thousand tons of ore.18
Depending on the richness of the ore body, these new
deposits should ultimately yield several thousand tons
of metal.
Finally, the Soviets are continuing a large tungsten
prospecting effort. The bulk of the work will be
centered in Tadzhikstan, Kazakhstan, and the Soviet
Far East. Because of the long leadtimes involved in
bringing new deposits into operation (10 to 15 years),
the present efforts can be expected to provide new
tungsten supplies during the 1990s and beyond.
Additions to Stockpiles. The Soviet Union's annual
supply of tungsten-domestic production plus im-
ports-averaged around 10,000 tons during 1971-78,
according to our estimates. As figure 2 shows, annual
supply rose to about 21,000 tons in 1980 and 1981
because of sharply higher imports. Assuming little or
no increase in consumption (see discussion of demand,
below), we calculate that Moscow will have added
roughly 30,000 tons of contained metal to its tungsten
stockpiles over the period 1979 through 1981." Even
if imports fell to the 1970s level (about 3,200 tons)
during 1983-85, the steady gains in domestic produc-
tion would enable the Soviets to add 9,000 tons more
to their stockpiles during 1983-85.
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Figure 2
Soviet Tungsten Supply and Demand
Outlook, 1978-85
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Demand for Tungsten
Civilian Demand. Just as there is no impending
decline in domestic production, neither are there any
sharp changes in civilian demand that would explain 25X1
the sharp growth in tungsten imports. We estimate
that actual annual consumption grew slowly during
1970-78, reaching only about 10,000 tons by the end
of the period. Available evidence indicates that most
of this was consumed in the civilian sector, with little
going to military uses. We are confident that civilian
consumption has grown little since 1978, and that no
major new civilian uses of tungsten are being planned
(see discussion on conservation, below).
During the 1970s, tooling and mining uses accounted
for most of Soviet tungsten consumption, reaching as
much as 8,000 tons per year.
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used 1,500 to 2,000 tons each year or t e mining
industry. The largest share went for coal cutters,
percussion and rock-drill bits, and blades and teeth
for excavation equipment. An additional 5,000 to
6,000 tons per year went for a wide range of industrial
processes and products such as cutting tools, die
facings, high-temperature valves, and components for
the chemical and nuclear industries.
intend to accelerate the development of tungsten-free
alloys using other metal alloys and ceramics. Accord-
ing to their calculations, they will save as much as 650
tons of tungsten per annum during the current plan-
roughly 7 percent of estimated production in 1981.21
The poor quality of drill bits has long been one of the
major impediments to Soviet efforts to make oil and
gas drilling faster and more efficient. During the
1980s, greater reliance will be placed on tungsten-
based drill bits to carry out ambitious drilling pro-
grams. The Soviets plan to drill about 300 million
meters for oil and gas exploration during the decade,
and we estimate that meeting this target will require
about 3.5 million tungsten-carbide drill bits. Produc-
tion at that level would require 400 to 450 tons of
tungsten per year (appendix A).
Thus, increased civilian use of tungsten in the USSR
is likely to consume at most only a small share of the
rapidly growing supply. This increase could be more
than offset by continuing efforts to limit the industrial
use of tungsten.
As early as 1967 the Soviets decided to limit the use
of tungsten for all but the most essential industrial
applications-reportedly because of uncertainties
sardine the supply of tungsten from China.
by 1973 the Soviets
had made remar a e stri es in limiting the use of
tungsten for tools and steel alloys.
~as recently as 1979 the Soviets were continuing
the efforts to cut their use of tungsten as an alloy,
using instead molybdenum (a large portion of which is
imported) and other combinations of chrome, nickel,
and cobalt.20 The Soviets also are known in trading
circles to use a large amount of synthetic diamonds
for industrial cutting tools-for which tungsten is
widely used in the West.
According to statements made by the Minister of
Nonferrous Metals, P. Lomako, in May 1982, limit-
ing the industrial use of tungsten remains a priority
objective during the current plan period. The Soviets
Military Demand. In the West, tungsten has been
used extensively in weapons during the past decade.
The most common application is penetrator material
for kinetic-energy armor-piercing projectiles. The
newest types of kinetic-energy penetrators are essen-
tially long rods fitted with fins for stability in flight.
Most are either tungsten alloy cores jacketed in steel
or almost entirely solid tungsten alloy. The heavy
alloys used are often as much as 90 percent tungsten.
Gun systems ranging from 35-mm antiaircraft cannon
to 105-mm and 120-mm tank cannon fire kinetic-
energy projectiles that use tungsten heavy alloy as a
penetrator material. Other Western military uses of
tungsten include fibers for composite materi
superalloys for aerospace applications.
In contrast, Soviet military use of tungsten probably
declined during the 1970s. Kinetic-energy projectiles
fielded during the 1950s for Soviet tank, antiaircraft,
and antitank guns had bullet-shaped tungsten-carbide
cores as penetrators, but the production of those older
gun systems declined or ceased during the 1970s. In
the early 1960s the Soviets fielded their first long-rod
penetrator in the 115-mm kinetic-energy projectile for
their T-62 tank. The penetrator material was alloy
steel in a long-rod design which offered higher
performance than that of the older Soviet projectiles
with tungsten-carbide cores. The 125-mm kinetic-
energy projectiles the Soviets later fielded with their
T-64 and T-72 tanks also used long-rod penetrators
made of alloy steel.
Nevertheless, the Soviets did make some military use
of tungsten for composite materials, superalloys for
aerospace, and components for nuclear submarines.
(Appendix B compares Soviet and Western civilian
and military uses of tungsten.)
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Past Deficiencies in Soviet Tungsten Technology
Tungsten-alloy penetrator materials like those fielded
in the West during the 1970s would have provided
Soviet projectiles substantially greater performance.
But their powder-metallurgy technology at the plant
level-particularly quality control and nondestructive
test equipment-was inadequate, and this precluded
the production of long-rod penetrators made of tung-
sten alloy. As recently as the middle 1970s, Western
companies that tested the quality of tungsten powders
produced in the USSR judged them to be unusable by
Western standards.
The Future
New Military Uses. The increased Soviet imports of
tungsten coincide with major purchases of tungsten-
related Western manufacturing technology that has.
potential military applications. For example, in the
late 1970s the Soviets legally purchased technology
that enabled them to develop and produce tungsten-
alloy penetrators for their antitank projectiles. ~
In addition to this basic processing technology, the
Soviets have already obtained, or have contracted to
buy, additional manufacturing equipment and exper-
tise of the kind used in the West to make tungsten-
leading Soviet military scientific-technical journal,
Tekhnika I Vooruzheniye (Equipment and WeaponsJ,
described a US 105-mm armor-piercing projectile, the
M735, which consists of a tungsten-alloy core
sheathed in a steel body~The penetrator
(core) material is 90 percent tungsten, alloyed with
nickel and iron. The article reveals that, at a mini-
mum, the Soviets are familiar with the design features
of the M735 and suggests that they may have adopted
some of the same design approaches.
The Soviets systematically evaluate Western military
hardware and designs to incorporate desirable fea-
tures into their own designs.
It is reasonable to assume that the Soviets will pursue
development of an even more capable projectile made
of solid tungsten alloy. In this projectile design the
entire body, except for the windshield (nose) and fins,
based penetrators.
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Table 2
Tungsten Required for Projectile Production During 1985-90,
Estimated by Deployment Scenario a
Deployment
Scenario
Number of Gun
Systems in Active
Inventory in 1985
Total
Projectile
Requirements
Kilograms of Tungsten Contained Tungsten
Required per Projectile Manufacturing Requirements
(in metric tons)
(estimated)
Tungsten-alloy
Solid Tungsten
Cored
Alloy Cored Solid
125-mm guns in T-64, T-72,
and newer model tanks
22,000
2,700,000
5.0
10.0 13,500 27,000
115-mm guns in T-62 tanks
15,000
1,840,000
4.4
8.8 8,100 16,200
100-mm guns in T-54 and
T-55 tanks
13,000
1,600,000
3.0
5.5 4,800 8,800
100-mm T-12 series antitank
guns
4,000
500,000
3.8
7.6 1,900 3,800
Total
54,000
6,640,000
28,300 55,800
a For a discussion of the method of calculating these estimates, see
appendix D.
functions as the tungsten-alloy penetrator. France,
Israel, West Germany, Austria, and the United States
have begun production of solid tungsten-alloy pene-
trators in the past few years. The tooling and process-
es they use to make such penetrators are essentially
the same as those used to manufacture the cores.
Manufacturing technology acquired from the West
gives the Soviets the needed equipment and expertise.
Estimated Production Requirements. We estimate
that mass production of projectiles with tungsten-
alloy cores is likely to be under way about 1985. The
amount of tungsten needed would depend on the
extent of planned deployment. For example, we esti-
mate that in 1985 active Soviet units will have some
22,000 T-64 and T-72 series and newer model tanks.
Production of the 2.7 million 125-mm projectiles
needed to equip all these tanks would take five or
more years and consume more than 13,000 tons of
tungsten during 1985-90.
More ambitious deployment options are possible. For
example, if the Soviets chose to equip their older
T-62s (we estimate that 15,000 T-62s still will be
deployed in active units in 1985) with tungsten-cored
projectiles, an additional 8,000 tons of tungsten would
be consumed during 1985-90. In addition, we estimate
that 13,000 early model T-54 and T-55 tanks will still
be assigned to active units in 1985. It is unlikely that
the Soviets would produce tungsten-alloy cores for the
projectiles now fired by the T-54 and T-55, but if they
did, it could increase the total needed by nearly
another 5,000 tons.
The roughly 30,000 tons of tungsten the Soviets have
apparently added to stockpiles during 1979-81 would
be enough to support production of up to 6 million
projectiles with tungsten-alloy cores-enough to equip
the entire Soviet tank force by 1990. Eventual produc-
tion of solid tungsten-alloy projectiles probably would
almost double tungsten requirements for the same
number of projectiles. Because cored projectiles prob-
ably will remain effective well into the 1990s, howev-
er, the Soviets may not convert entirely to solid
projectiles for some time. Table 2 shows how the total
manufacturing requirements for tungsten might vary
by deployment scenario.
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Battl~eld Implications. Tungsten alloy is substan-
tially more effective as an armor-penetrating material
than the steel alloy the Soviets now use in their long-
rod kinetic-energy penetrators. Deployment of tung-
sten-alloy long-rod penetrators would significantly
improve the capability of Soviet tank guns to defeat
Western tanks equipped with either conventional or
special armor. According to current technical assess-
ments, atungsten-alloy core for a steel projectile
could increase penetration as much as 20 percent, and
a solid tungsten-alloy projectile could increase pene-
tration as much as 40 percent Z' (figure 4).
Western tank armor developments probably are driv-
ing Soviet efforts to improve their kinetic-energy
penetrators. Special armor arrays, which offer West-
ern tanks much greater protection, are likely to
continue to improve. Against a given armor, on the
other hand, tungsten-alloy penetrators offer the same
penetration at ranges greater than are possible with
steel-alloy projectiles. Combined with fire control
improvements currently being made, this tungsten-
alloy capability extends the effective engagement
ranges of most Soviet tank guns now in service.
Potential Additional Uses. Estimated production re-
quirements for the kinetic-energy penetrators de-
scribed above do not entirely explain the large quanti-
ties of tungsten the Soviets are now acquiring. With
their rapidly growing inventories of tungsten and the
Western powder metallurgy manufacturing technol-
ogy now in place, the Soviets can pursue further uses
of tungsten in their military systems. The tungsten
imports began to rise sharply several years before the
date when, according to our analysis, the Soviets will
begin production of their new tungsten-alloy cores.
This early stockpiling, plus unconfirmed emigre re-
porting, suggests that other military applications of
tungsten may be already in train. Other production
programs could consume several more thousand tons
of tungsten.
Figure 4
Potential Effect of Tungsten Alloy on the
Performance of Soviet Armor-Piercing
Projectiles
Projectile configuration
125-mm BM-9/12
(steel alloy)
(Soviet data)
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Millimeters of armor penetrated
Penetration estimated at 0 degrees obliquity and 2,100 meters range against
rolled homogeneous armor; actual penetration against special armor varies.
A number of Western munitions programs that make
use of tungsten alloy are available to the Soviets as
models of proven design approaches:
? Sweden has developed, for its Bofors L70 automatic
antiaircraft gun, a 40-mm fragmentation projectile
that increases lethality severalfold by using tung-
sten-alloy balls rather than steel balls as its pre-
formed fragments. The US Army recently adopted
this projectile for its new Sergeant York mobile air
defense gun. Combined with the improved proximi-
ty fuzes that the Soviets are now developing, tung-
sten-alloy fragments would make both their artillery
munitions and their surface-to-air missile warheads
much more lethal.
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? Sweden also has developed a new artillery munition,
the Harald X-600, which uses miniature tungsten-
alloy kinetic-energy projectiles (or flechettes) to
penetrate the tops of armored vehicles.
? West Germany is introducing tungsten-alloy kin-
etic-energy projectiles for use with its Gepard air
defense assault gun. The projectile is intended for
use against attack helicopters.
? The United States is replacing steel fragments with
tungsten alloy in the conventional warhead for the
Lance surface-to-surface missile.
The Soviets may not be planning a munitions program
like any of these. They simply may be unwilling to
proceed with their major new tank munitions produc-
tion program for tungsten-alloy penetrators before
amassing large stockpiles of tungsten. Without ade-
quate stockpiles, military production programs that
require large amounts of imported material would be
vulnerable to interruptions in imports like those for
tungsten that occurred in the late 1960s. Another
possibility is that mass production of tungsten-alloy
penetrators originally was slated to begin earlier, but
was delayed by technical problems encountered in
development. Future trends in Soviet tungsten im-
ports may provide some insight as to which of these
explanations is more likely.
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Appendix B
Comparison of Major Civilian and
Military Uses of Tungsten
High-speed steel cutting tools High-speed steel cutting tools
Tungsten-carbide cutting tools Tungsten-carbide cutting tools
Dies and die facings Dies and die facings
Light bulbs and electronic tube filaments Light bulbs and electronic tube filaments
Components for nuclear reactors Components for nuclear reactors
Refractory liners and electrodes Refractory liners and electrodes
Tungsten in gas welding Tungsten in gas welding a
Rock drill bits for gas and oil drilling Rock drill bits for gas and oil drilling s
Blades, teeth, and cutters for mining equipment Blades, teeth, and cutters for mining equipment
Superalloys for aerospace uses Superalloys a for aerospace uses
Chemical catalysts and pigments
Fibers for composite materials Fibers for composite materials
Tungsten-carbide bullet cores Tungsten-carbide bullet cores
Rocket motor components Rocket motor components
Tungsten-alloy penetrators for: Tungsten-alloy penetrators for:
Armor-piercing kinetic-energy projectiles Armor-piercing kinetic-energy projectiles
for tank guns for tank guns a
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