USSR MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00853R000300010002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
July-August 1982
State Dept. review completed
Secret
SOV UR 82-007X
August 1982
COPY 5 2 5
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Directorate of
Intelligence
USSR Monthly Review
July-August 1982
Secret
SOY UR 82-007X
August 1982
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Contents
Leadership Succession Perspective: Beyond Brezhnev-
in the USSR Personalities and Policie
The advantage in the current succession struggle appears to have
shifted at least twice in the past seven months-largely because of the
impact that death and illness have had on the existing balance of
power. The poor health of key Soviet leaders, in addition, complicates
our efforts to declare a "projected winner." The policy context in which
the succession is occurring, however, will be as important in shaping
future Soviet policies as the leader chosen.
vulnerable to challenge, especially if his health deteriorates
The promotion of KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov to the party
Secretariat and his replacement in the KGB by an apparent compro-
mise candidate indicate that Brezhnev's leadership is now much more
the succession process.
The succession to Brezhnev could be precipitated by the leader's death
or incapacitation or by his removal-three earlier Soviet successions
followed from among these developments-or even by his resignation,
for which there is no precedent. Regardless, the mechanics of selection
and the pattern of events will provide clues to the underlying politics of
Secret
SOV UR 82-007X
August 1982
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The emergence of Yuriy Andropov as the leading candidate to succeed
Brezhnev has provided considerable speculation in the Western press
about his personality and policy views. Much of the press commentary
on Andropov, however, has tended to oversimplify those views and even
to misread the man
The succession process will significantly politicize policy differences
within the Soviet leadership. Various contenders will seek to exploit
issues facing the Politburo for personal and factional advantage. Given
the seriousness and complexity of the problems a new leadership will
have to face, debate and conflict over policy are likely to be particularly
sharp and intense.
Despite some subtle points of difference, the two main succession
contenders-Chernenko and Andropov-seem in agreement on a flexi-
ble position toward Eastern Europe that is at variance with the position
of ideological hardliners. Recent articles in the party ideological
journal have also taken a pragmatic position on the Polish crisis and
provided a rationale for martial law
25X1
17 25X1
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Moscow has pressed the Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish parties to
concentrate on "international" issues, such as the peace movement. In
this way the USSR advances its own interests but neglects the parties'
more parochial concerns, raising serious implications for their future
strength and political effectiveness.
The Fourth Main Administration of the Soviet Ministry of Health
supervises a special health care system for high-level party and
government officials. The strengths and weaknesses of this system have
considerable impact on the current aging Soviet leadership
The evidence concerning a possible Brezhnev retirement, while incon-
clusive, does suggest a growing disparity between his formal authority
and actual power, a lessened ability to protect himself, and greater
incentives for other Politburo members to move against him. While the
43
25X1
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 timing of his departure cannot be predicted, his retirement or "eleva-
tion" to an honorific post may be announced at the next plenary of the 25X1
CPSU Central Committee
Andropov's election to the Secretariat in May 1982 was a turning point
in Soviet politics, ending the prolonged stability that was based on
Brezhnev's political strength. Now Brezhnev and his protege, Cher-
nenko, are engaged in a political struggle with Andropov, and the
outcome is uncertain
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Leadership Succession
in the USSR
Perspective: Beyond Brezhnev-
Personalities and Policies
Yuriy Andropov's election to the Secretariat in May strongly suggests that
the succession process in the Kremlin has truly begun. The leadership of
the Soviet Communist Party has changed only four times in 65 years, and
each time under dramatically different domestic and international condi-
tions. Accordingly, precedents are fragile and the uncertainties great. The
advanced age and poor health of many members of the current Politburo-
the oldest in Soviet history-have added an element of unpredictability,
moreover, that was not present in past succession struggles.
In our estimation, the advantage in the present contest has shifted at least
twice within the past seven months-due largely to the impact that death
and illness have had on the existing balance of power. The death of senior
secretary Mikhail Suslov in January enabled Brezhnev to push his protege,
Konstantin Chernenko, forward at the expense of Andrey Kirilenko, who
previously had been the leading contender. The subsequent illness of
Kirilenko, in turn, seemed to give impetus to the anti-Chernenko forces,
who threw their support to Andropov, the current front-runner. In short,
the poor health of key Soviet leaders, reportedly including even Andropov
and Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, complicates our efforts to declare a
"projected winner" in the current succession race.
The identity of the next party chief could have an important effect on
Soviet actions, but probably more vital from the US perspective is the
context in which the succession will occur. Even if we could positively
identify the next leader, his present views, insofar as we could discern
them, probably would give us at best a general sense of the direction Soviet
policy would take in the immediate post-Brezhnev period. These views
probably would be modified as he attempted to gain support and even
further altered by the broader perspective of his new post and the
exigencies of international events.
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Whatever his personal policy preferences, no new leader will initially have
the power to push through a comprehensive package of domestic and
foreign policy programs. The new General Secretary's colleagues, acting in
their own interests, will attempt to restrict his power and probably prevent
him from becoming Chief of State-a post Brezhnev acquired only after 13
years as party leader. As in the early days of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev
eras, the General Secretary is likely to share the spotlight, particularly in
foreign affairs, with the President and Premier.
Although the immediate post-Brezhnev period probably will be marked by
a general continuity in policy, an examination of the range of views now be-
ing expressed in the leadership-the topic of one of the following articles-
suggests that conflict over key issues, exacerbated by the succession
struggle, could in time lead to some important shifts. The most pressing
problems appear to be in economic policy, where the current investment
strategy already seems to have aroused opposition within the leadership:
? Some reallocation of resources almost certainly will be undertaken after
Brezhnev goes, with agriculture-in the absence of its principal patron-
becoming a likely target for cuts. Previous cuts in investment may be
restored. Even the defense budget, virtually sacrosanct since the 1960s,
probably will come under some attack. Given the momentum of current
weapon programs and a new leader's need to obtain the support of the
military and security services, however, reductions in the growth of
military spending seem unlikely in the near term.
? Changes in the economic management structure might be undertaken,
despite bureaucratic opposition, because of concern over declining growth
rates. An effort might be made to place functionally related and
overlapping ministries under more centralized management, as Brezhnev
and other party leaders have proposed, while at the same time decentral-
izing operational authority along lines recently approved for the agro-
industrial sector.
Soviet foreign policy is less likely to be politicized than domestic policy,
which has a more immediate impact on individual political fortunes. While
the foreign policy pursued by a successor regime will be largely determined
by the international environment at the time, some areas of debate already
are evident among Brezhnev's likely heirs:
? Soviet leaders have shown varying degrees of enthusiasm for Brezhnev's
efforts to improve relations with the United States, with some-notably
Chernenko-appearing far more supportive than others, such as
Kirilenko.
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? The lessons of Poland seem to have been assessed differently by various
leaders. Chernenko has pointed to the Polish leadership's loss of contact
with the people, Andropov to its ideological deviations, and Kirilenko to
its lack of vigilance against Western intrigues. The post-Brezhnev
Politburo could well be at odds over how best to maintain Soviet control
over Eastern Europe.
? Soviet leaders also could differ over how seriously to pursue an improve-
ment in relations with Beijing. Although some leaders may be eager to
"play the China card," others-Kirilenko among them-appear even
more mistrustful of China than of the United States.
Given the advanced age of the present leadership, many members of the
Politburo will be replaced in the late 1980s by a new generation of leaders
whose policies are even more difficult to predict. Although they have
discretionary authority in implementing the Politburo's domestic policies,
these officials hold positions-in the Central Committee apparatus and
regional party organizations-that provide little involvement in foreign
policy.
What little evidence we have of this younger group's views-through
speeches, articles, and limited contacts with foreigners-reveals no clearly
dominant orientation. Although some appear to favor a more orthodox tack
while others lean in the reformist direction, there is no apparent consensus
regarding the direction future policies should take.
Their eventual policy course will be determined both by domestic politick-
ing and by their perception of Soviet problems and opportunities. These
policies, moreover, are likely to reflect a degree of political compromise and
to defy easy characterization. Such a regime, for example, could undertake
some decentralization of economic management, while at the same time
tightening the enforcement of labor discipline-a move that would contain
elements of both the reformist and orthodox approaches.
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Brezhnev's Political Standing
Moreover, Brezhnev has always prevented the trans-
fer of Politburo members into this key institution and
kept those already in the Secretariat from amassing
sufficient individual power to threaten him. Andropov
has been on good terms with Brezhnev and supported
his foreign policy line-factors that may have kept
Two recent personnel changes-the promotion of
KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov to the party Secre-
tariat in May 1982 and his replacement in the KGB
by an apparent compromise candidate-indicate that
Brezhnev has been unable to dictate key succession-
related decisions. As a result, Brezhnev's leadership
now seems much more vulnerable to challenge, espe-
cially if his health deteriorates. Although there is no
evidence that his policies are under strong attack,
Brezhnev and his proteges will have to be alert to
protect their political positions.
The impetus for the Andropov promotion may have
come from the leadership's growing apprehension
about the increased status of Brezhnev's principal
protege, Konstantin Chernenko. Chernenko reported-
ly has never gained the respect of Defense Minister
Ustinov, Foreign Minister Gromyko, and Andropov,
and the leadership in general probably did not regard
him as a threat-he seemed an unlikely successor to
Brezhnev, especially in view of the strong position of
senior secretary Andrey Kirilenko. In recent months,
however Chernenko's advance-
ment by Brezhnev to fill the number-two spot in the
Secretariat (vacant after Suslov's death in January)
apparently mobilized the opposition to Chernenko.
By transferring Andropov to the Secretariat, Cher-
nenko's opponents have placed a major obstacle in his
path and established a new leading contender to
succeed Brezhnev. This development is notable also as
the first major political setback for Brezhnev since he
25X1 consolidated his position in the late 1960s-and one
that may ultimately endanger that position.
The Threat From Andropov
Brezhnev is likely to have recognized that opposition
to Chernenko could increase his own vulnerability.
Although Brezhnev may have seen merit in having an
"alternative heir" in the Secretariat, Andropov proba-
bly would not have been his choice.
Brezhnev from fighting the promotion.
Brezhnev, nevertheless, knows that Andropov-with
his KGB connection and his potential appeal within
the Politburo-could become a rallying point for
those who believe the party's interests would be best
served by his "retirement." Brezhnev may be relying
on Chernenko, who now appears to have some over-
sight responsibility for the KGB, to protect his inter-
ests. His inability to install a candidate less well
equipped to challenge him, however, suggests that
Brezhnev's authority within the Politburo has eroded.
25X1
The Uncertain Allegiance of Fedorchuk
The selection of Ukrainian KGB Chairman Vitaliy
Fedorchuk to replace Andropov as KGB chief rein-
forces our impression that Brezhnev's power has 25X1
waned. Brezhnev needed a strong protege in this post,
one who would isolate Andropov from his previous
associations and thus reduce Brezhnev's vulnerability
to a potential coup. Several candidates would have
met this need. 25X1
If the Politburo wanted a career officer as chairman, 25X6
the KGB's First Deputy Chairmen, Georgiy Tsinev
and Viktor Chebrikov, should have been the two
leading candidates. (Tsinev is known to have, and
Chebrikov probably has, ties to Brezhnev.) Alterna-
tively, Brezhnev could have advanced a political pro-
tege from the Politburo or from one of the principal
regional party organizations to the KGB to guard his
position. Fedorchuk, however, does not fall in either
category. In fact, the new KGB head lacks both the
political status within the party elite and the profes-
sional standing within the KGB that would have made
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him a likely first choice on any list. His selection,
thus, strongly suggests that he was a compromise
choice]
The selection of Fedorchuk probably was not totally
objectionable to Brezhnev. He apparently was profe
sionally associated with Brezhnev's friend, Tsinev,
As a career KGB official, however, Fedorchu
has had a long association with Andropov-one that
was probably more direct than his association with
Brezhnev
Thus, Fedorchuk is probably less useful to Brezhnev
than other candidates for KGB chief might have been.
Having career ties with both Brezhnev and Andropov
reduces the certainty of his loyalty to Brezhnev in the
event of a challenge, and his lack of influence in
Moscow reduces his ability to prevent such a chal-
lenge. He probably will be unable to cut Andropov off
from his KGB associations. Brezhnev's remaining
time in office, moreover, is limited, and this gives
Fedorchuk little incentive to protect him from a
conspiracy in the Politburo.
Implications
Taken together, the two appointments suggest that
the Politburo is denying Brezhnev the power to desig-
nate his successor as party leader and possibly even to
determine the timing of his departure. His authority
in. policy matters does not yet seem seriously affect-
ed-as demonstrated at the May plenum, when he
won approval of the food program he had initiated,
and by the recent movement on arms control negotia-
tions.
he could be forced to yield to pressures to
relinquish that position. His colleagues might make
this more palatable to Brezhnev, however, by allowing
him to retain his more ceremonial post as President
and his membership in the Politburo. Such an ar-
rangement would give him some influence, at least in
the Politburo's selection of his successor as general
secretary-and this influence would make his protege,
Chernenko, a stronger contender than he would be if
Brezhnev were no longer on the scene.
Key Players in the Succession
Yuriy Andropov, 68, has been a Politburo member
since 1973. In May 1982 he also became a member of
the Secretariat-a status that he had previously held
from 1962 to 1967-and relinquished his post as KGB
chief. Andropov's career has given him considerable
experience in both foreign and domestic affairs. Dur-
ing his 15 years as KGB chief, he was responsible for
implementing Soviet policies on human rights and 25X1
political dissent, as well as for the USSR's foreign
intelligence apparatus
In 1944, Andropov began his party career as a second
secretary of the Petrozavodsk City Party Committee.
Three years later he was elected second secretary of
the Karelian party Central Committee-a position he
held until 1951, when he began working in the
Central Committee apparatus in Moscow. Andropov
moved to the Foreign Ministry in 1953 and that same
year was posted to the Embassy in Budapest, where he
advanced from Charge d'Affaires to Ambassador.
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the Politburo.
When he returned to Moscow in 1957 he became
chief of the Central Committee's Department for
Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of
Socialist Countries. After his appointment as KGB
Chief in 1967, he was elected a candidate member of
Andropov appears to be a "moderate" in the Soviet
political context. Over the years he has generally been
more supportive of Brezhnev's foreign policy, especial-
ly detente and arms control, than some other Soviet
leaders. On the other hand, as KGB chief he was
successful in neutralizing the dissident movement in
the USSR by imprisoning or "hospitalizing" its major
leaders or by allowing selected members to emigrate.
His relatively sophisticated approach to such prob-
. 25X1 lems suggests that, as General Secretary, he would be
a tough, resourceful adversary.
Konstantin Chernenko, 70, has been a secretary of the
CPSU Central Committee since March 1976 and a
full member of the Politburo since November 1978.
Chernenko began his party career in 1941, when he
was elected a secretary of the Krasnoyarsk Kray
Party Committee. Two years later he moved to Mos-
cow, where he attended the Higher School of Party
Organizers. After graduation in 1945, he was elected
a secretary of the Penza Oblast (RSFSR) Party
Committee.
From 1948 to 1956 Chernenko was chief of the
Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Molda-
vian party Central Committee, serving briefly under
Brezhnev, who was first secretary in Moldavia during
1950-52. He was transferred to Moscow as a sector
chief at the national level in 1956-shortly after
Brezhnev's promotion to CPSU secretary. In 1965
Chernenko became head of the General Department
of the CPSU Central Committee, a position he still
holds. He became a candidate member of the Politbu-
ro in 1977. 25X1
Chernenko has ranked second only to Brezhnev in his
support for improved relations with the United States
and for arms limitation, and he has been well ahead of
his colleagues in warning about the consequences of
nuclear war. On domestic issues, he has stressed the
need to improve the lot of the Soviet consumer and
called for more attention to letters from the rank and
file and for greater "democracy" within the party.
Andrey Kirilenko, 75, has been a member of the 25X1
Politburo since 1962 and of the Secretariat since
1966. His association with Brezhnev goes back to the
late 1930s when both were local party officials in the
Ukraine. Kirilenko worked as an aircraft design engi-
neer until he switched to party work in 1938. During
the early years of World War II, he served on the
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20
45+1 _ S 1~'I~I~ i
KA,
~Ax
Audrey Kirilenko
Military Council of the 18th Army of the Southern
Front, while Brezhnev was the Council's deputy chief.
Kirilenko was first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk
Oblast Party Committee (Obkom) from 1950 to 1955
and of the Sverdlovsk Obkom during 1955-56. =
In 1956 Kirilenko moved to Moscow to serve as a
member of the RSFSR Bureau of the CPSU Central
Committee. He became a candidate member of the
Presidium (now Politburo) in 1957, probably as a
reward for his support of CPSU First Secretary
Nikita Khrushchev in his clash with the "antiparty
group." In 1961 Kirilenko's career suffered an unex-
plained setback when he was removed from the
Presidium. He made a quick comeback six months
later, however, when he rejoined the Presidium as a
full member and became a first deputy chairman of
the RSFSR Bureau.
Kirilenko has primary responsibility for the supervi-
sion of nonmilitary heavy industry and has consider-
able experience in international Communist Party
affairs. On foreign policy issues, he has been equivocal
in his support of Brezhnev's overtures to the United
States, less optimistic than Brezhnev about the pros-
pects for resolving Sino-Soviet differences, and less
tolerant than most leaders toward East European
deviations from Moscow's guidance and direction. On
domestic issues, Kirilenko has been fairly consistent in
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his advocacy of a strong defense posture, strict cultur-
al and ideological discipline, and the preferential
development of heavy industry.
A veteran manager of the Soviet armaments and
space programs, Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov, now 73,
became a full member of the Politburo in March 1976
and Minister of Defense one month later. He had
previously served as the CPSU secretary for defense
industry and a candidate member of the Politburo
since 1965. 25X1
Ustinov graduated from the Leningrad Military Me-
chanical Academy in 1934. During World War II, he
served as People's Commissar for Armaments (later
Minister of the Armaments Industry); he held this
position until 1953, when he became head of the 25X1
newly created Ministry of Defense Industry. From
1957 until 1963 he was deputy chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers and probably also head of the
Military-Industrial Commission (VPK), which coordi-
nates Soviet defense industry production.
The Defense Minister has been associated with the
military-industrial complex for more than 40 years
and obtained general officer rank in the war, but he
has not been a line officer, and his Ministry appoint-
ment may have been opposed by the professional
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officer corps. His policies, however, have not diverged
noticeably from those of his predecessor, Marshal
Grechko, or from what might have been expected if a
professional military officer still headed the Ministry.
Ustinov has upheld the interests of the professional
military without deprecating Brezhnev's commitment
to detente and arms control. He also has been able to
use his position as head of the military to vote its stock
on sensitive political issues-without raising some of
the fears that such actions by a professional officer
might have raised. The military traditionally has had
increased influence during succession periods, and
Ustinov, who commands considerable respect from
other leaders, will have a strong voice in the selection
of the next party chief.
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Since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the top
leadership of the Soviet Union has changed only four
times. Lenin was struck with an incapacitating illness
in 1922, finally dying in 1924; Stalin died unexpected-
ly in 1953; Malenkov failed to consolidate his position,
losing out to Khrushchev in 1955; and Khrushchev
was removed by his colleagues in 1964. In each
instance, the conflict among the remaining leaders
25X1 over the succession led to considerable internal politi-
cal turmoil.
Current political conditions seem very different from
those of the earlier succession periods; the stability
and businesslike management style of the Brezhnev
years has been well established. Nonetheless, the
current period seems also to contain some uncertain-
ties, and the top Soviet leaders may be increasingly
concerned about the course of the Brezhnev succes-
to the underlying politics of the succession process.
This very process can determine the nature of the new
leadership and how strong and secure that leadership
becomes.
The Main Participants
Although all major Soviet institutions are involved in
a succession, only a few have a prominent role. Two
bodies are publicly prominent in the succession, but in
nearly all instances they have merely pro forma
duties. The Communist Party Central Committee has
de jure responsibility (under article 38 of the party
statutes) for "electing" the party General Secretary.
The Supreme Soviet "elects" its Presidium, including
its Chairman-the Soviet President (under article 119
of the Constitution). F_ I 25X1
The party Politburo-the highest decisionmaking or-
gan in the Soviet political system-has the de facto
power to select Brezhnev's successor unless the suc-
cession reaches truly crisis proportions. It is likely,
therefore, that Brezhnev's 12 colleagues on the Polit-
sion.
the ambiguity over
protocol rankings and leadership responsibilities point
to presuccession political jockeying with the ultimate
outcome in doubt.
Recent political developments-oppo-
sition to Chernenko, the positioning of Andropov in
the party Secretariat, the appointment of the low-
ranking Vitaliy Fedorchuk as KGB chief
tirely from political life.
suggest increased vulnerability to a coup. Conceivably
Brezhnev might even take the unprecedented step for
a Soviet leader and resign from one or more of his
leadership posts, such as relinquishing the General
Secretary post and retaining the Presidency. Alterna-
tively, but less likely, Brezhnev might withdraw en-
Regardless of whether the succession is precipitated
by death, removal, or retirement, the mechanics of
selection and the pattern of events will provide clues
buro (the body now has 13 full or voting members and
nine candidate or nonvoting members) will come to a
consensus informally on leadership assignments. In-
deed, informal meetings of the most powerful Politbu-
ro members are likely to precede any formal Politburo
gathering. It is likely that party Secretaries Andropov
and Chernenko, Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, Defense
Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, Foreign Minister Andrey
Gromyko, party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and
Moscow party secretary Viktor Grishin would first 25X6
meet to develop a consensus and thereby prevent the
occurrence of serious debate in the Politburo meeting25X6
itself.
While only the Moscow-based leaders routinely at-
tend Politburo meetings (usually held on Thursdays in
the Council of Ministers building in the Kremlin),
succession-related questions would probably require
that the three full Politburo members from outside
Moscow-Grigory Romanov (Leningrad), Vladimir
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Shcherbitskiy (Ukraine), and Dinmukhamed Kunayev
(Kazakhstan)-come to Moscow for the formal meet-
ing, which could be convened on an urgent basis if
needed. The other regional leaders and candidate
Politburo members-Geydar Aliyev (Azerbaijan),
Tikhon Kiselev (Belorussia), Eduard Shevardnadze
(Georgia), and Sharaf Rashidov (Uzbekistan)-would
be summoned for the deliberations as well. The
Politburo might not even take a formal vote regarding
Brezhnev's successor-formal votes are taken only
occasionally when there are important disagreements.
If prior maneuvering and politicking created a consen-
sus within the entire Politburo, the Central Commit-
tee would probably be summoned quickly to ratify the
Politburo's decisions. With one major exception, dis-
cussed below, the decisions to promote, demote, or
remove Politburo leaders have been presented to an
obedient Central Committee by the winners of strug-
gles previously resolved behind closed doors of the top
leadership itself. Support among Central Committee
members for individual leaders is unquestionably an
important element in these struggles, but the Central
Committee as a body has not been drawn in overtly.
The Process Delayed
It is possible, however, that serious disagreement
could develop within the Politburo over a successor,
drawing out the pattern of succession-related events.
The convening of a Central Committee meeting, for
example, might be delayed a few days as the leader-
ship attempted to work out a deal. If the Politburo
became so divided that it could not present a united
slate for the Central Committee to approve, the
decisionmaking process would then be thrown open to
the more than 300 voting Central Committee mem-
bers. (The Central Committee has about 319 full
members and 151 candidate members.) Such a course
is not likely in the Brezhnev succession, because it is
in the leadership's interest to settle things beforehand,
but it did happen in 1957 when a Politburo majority
sought to remove Khrushchev from office. (The Cen-
tral Committee backed Khrushchev against his oppo-
nents, and five full members of the Politburo were
removed from office.)
If the succession process were precipitated by Brezh-
nev's death, at some point a public announcement
would be made. The announcement could be delayed,
especially if there were prolonged deliberations con-
cerning the leadership assignments. When Stalin died,
for example, the leadership apparently delayed an
announcement of his death from two to possibly five
days or more to give his heirs additional time to
decide leadership questions and to inform the popu-
lace gradually that Stalin's rule had ended.
More recently (January 1982), the Politburo delayed 25X1
the announcement of party Secretary Mikhail Sus-
lov's death nearly 24 hours after the fact, though it
had been known for five days that Suslov was dying.
Given the political maneuvering that the death of
Suslov-the second most important leader in the
country-engendered, Brezhnev's heirs seem likely to
seek extra time when the General Secretary departs.
The Soviet leadership took almost two weeks to decide
on Stalin's immediate replacement. It probably will
be able to move more rapidly when Brezhnev leaves
the scene. In the case of Brezhnev's largely ceremoni-
al Supreme Soviet post, there is a formal requirement
that the entire 1,500-member Supreme Soviet name
his successor. This might necessitate a delay of a day
or two just to convene the meeting. The Politburo,
however, may not believe it is essential to fill this post
at the same time as a new General Secretary is
selected. Vasiliy Kuznetsov, the current first deputy
chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium ("deputy
President"), could act as Soviet President for a short
period.
When Brezhnev Dies
If Brezhnev dies while in office, an urgent meeting of
the Politburo will be convened.
After the Politbu-
ro had decided on a course onion, Brezhnev's death
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and the funeral plans would be announced. The new
party chief might deliver the eulogy, and the leading
members of the Politburo would receive protocol
honors. The funeral commission, which is formed to
make and oversee the funeral arrangements, is usually
chaired by a Politburo member, but the commission
does not necessarily reflect the rank order in the
KGB would be essential for the successful implemen-
tation of a coup. It would probably at a minimum be
called upon to play a supporting role, most likely
providing logistic and communications support.
Kremlin.
Should the succession remain unresolved by the time
of the funeral, however, the protocol rankings could
be ambiguous, and the leader selected to give Brezh-
nev's eulogy might not be his replacement. When
Stalin died, for example, the most important Soviet
leaders during the first days after the leader's death
were not on the funeral commission, but all three
(Beria, Malenkov, and Molotov) spoke at the funeral
and headed the rank order. Khrushchev did not speak,
but he did improve his ranking in the leadership at the
25X1 ceremony. The indicators proved to be misleading,
because soon after the funeral Beria was arrested and
Khrushchev became the ranking member of the party
secretariat.
Brezhnev's Removal
If Brezhnev were removed by his Politburo peers,
there would be little warning. Such a move would
necessarily require great secrecy, and until a consen-
sus developed among the key Soviet leaders to oust
Brezhnev, the plotters would be at great risk. Those
who moved against Khrushchev in October 1964-
Brezhnev was probably the ringleader-were ex-
tremely secretive. Even with hindsight it seems there
were no clear indications that Khrushchev's removal
The military would also play a role in the Brezhnev
succession, especially if Brezhnev was removed by a
coup. The military threw its support to Khrushchev
during his fight with the antiparty group in 1957 and
probably acquiesced in the coup against him in 1964.
In the current situation, the support of Defense
Minister Dmitriy Ustinov-both as a senior party
official and military chief-would seem to be crucial.
Once the plotters had gained his support, however, the
military would be expected to go along with the
ouster. The military chiefs have never been an inde-
pendent force in Soviet politics, and their most likely
role in any succession would be as an ally of a faction
in the party leadership.
was imminent
and ratify the plotters' choice for his successor
In 1964 the conspirators at first attempted to present
Khrushchev's ouster as a simple retirement at his
request. If Brezhnev were removed from office, the
scenario would probably be similar. In that event,
Brezhnev would probably be forced into requesting his
retirement for "health reasons." The Central Com-
mittee in plenary session would accept the resignation
The KGB might not be the driving force behind any
coup against Brezhnev-it apparently was not for the
ouster of Khrushchev-but the cooperation of the
A Brezhnev Resignation
It would be difficult to ascertain whether a Brezhnev
resignation was genuine or forced on him by his
colleagues. In recent Soviet history, high officials
have not simply faded away; they have died in office
or have been removed. Brezhnev could surprise us and
throw in the towel. 25X1
If Brezhnev were to resign, he might initially raise the
possibility before the Politburo and perhaps even
indicate his preferences for the succession at that
time. The Politburo could then deliberate, perhaps for
some weeks, over leadership assignments before ac-
ceding to Brezhnev's wish to remove himself from 25X1
political life. While the Politburo worked out new
arrangements, Brezhnev might even withdraw from
most political activity without publicly resigning.
As soon as a consensus was formed in the Politburo on
Brezhnev's successors, a Central Committee plenum
and Supreme Soviet session would be scheduled to
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accept publicly Brezhnev's resignation and ratify the
Politburo's selection of a new leader (or leaders).
Brezhnev's resignation, therefore, might in the early
stages of the process appear as an orderly leadership
change-all the personnel decisions could be made
behind the scenes and presumably under less time
pressure than if Brezhnev were to die or be removed.
ment.
Postscript
Brezhnev's death, retirement, or ouster will trigger an
institutional process that brings forth a new leader (or
leaders) within a relatively short period. The power
and influence of the new leader will be considerable
from the start. The process of amassing decisive
power and the ability to exercise it, however, will take
much longer-probably several years. That process,
moreover, will be largely invisible, involving the new
leaders in the basic political bargaining, trade-offs,
and compromises used to build personal allegiances
and policy support. In this sense, the Brezhnev succes-
sion will only begin with the naming of his replace-
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Secret
Andropov in the
Western Press
The emergence of Yuriy Andropov as the major
contender to succeed Brezhnev has provoked consider-
able speculation in the Western press about his
personality and policy views, but much of the press
commentary has tended to oversimplify those views
and even misread the man. Several articles have
suggested that he is a "closet liberal" who favors
reform and was really not involved in the suppression
of dissidents. Andropov's "liberal" inclinations are
reportedly demonstrated by his association with the
Hungarian economic reforms in the 1960s and 1970s
25X1 and by his personal ties to such urbane, knowledge-
able, and articulate Soviets as Georgiy Arbatov.F__
While Andropov appears to be a "moderate" in the
Soviet context and may be enlightened by Soviet
standards, he was intimately involved in putting down
the revolution in Hungary and has orchestrated the
suppression of the dissident movement in the USSR.
His association with Western-oriented Soviet officials
does not provide a good indication of the internal-
especially economic-policies he would favor. Andro-
pov's level of sophistication mainly suggests that he
would be a tough, resourceful adversary, not a leader
who would try to limit Soviet global influence.
reform fairly quickly.'
the years that favorably portray Andropov, explain
the dubious characterizations of Andropov in the
Western press-for example, that he is a "closet
liberal" or that his elevation to the Secretariat is a
"favorable development" that presages "significant
Perceptions ofAndropov
Yuriy Andropov appears more supportive of Brezh-
nev's foreign policies, especially detente and arms
control with the United States, than some other Soviet
leaders. Even dissidents and emigres have been im-
pressed with him and tend to think of him as enlight-
ened, intellectual, and progressive. At the same time,
Andropov has duplicitously cultivated this image,
attempting to use personal charm and intelligence to
sugarcoat the crackdown on dissidents that he has
directed. Such personality traits, as well as some
KGB-inspired statements to Western observers over
Andropov's role in the KGB has limited his contact
with foreigners and reduced his visibility on the Soviet
political scene. His few speeches and articles over the
years contain little to differentiate his position from
the current party line. The impressions of foreign
Communists and diplomats, and even the occasional
Soviet official's comment about him, all offer no more
than an occasional insight into his substantive views.
25X1
A Reformer?
The notion of Andropov as a reformer stems from his
association with Hungary, and by implication, with
that country's economic reforms. Andropov's own role
in Hungary from 1954 to 1957, however, was hardly
reformist or progressive. He helped to implement a
brutal Soviet repression of the revolution and worked
to restore central control and Soviet orthodoxy in that
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dar's subsequent policies, they have been implemented
very slowly by a regime that has demonstrated its
toward the United States. He has, to judge from his
speeches, been a key supporter of Brezhnev's "de-
tente" and arms control policies, which he regards as
25X1
25X1
25X1
absolute fealty to Moscow.
Andropov's Views
Andropov is a complex figure in Soviet politics whose
opinions and actions are not easily classified as "hard
line" or "liberal." He is a good party soldier and an
intelligent and successful Soviet administrator. Brezh-
nev has said of Andropov "that he is demanding of
himself and others, and an uncompromising Commu-
nist."
In contrast to what some Western journalists imply,
Andropov would be a tough, demanding leader. He
has repeatedly emphasized the need for internal disci-
pline in the Soviet Union, asserting that the rights of
citizens are linked to important duties and that
criticism (in the context of intraparty "democracy")
must be "publicly held and constructive." Such ideas
set Andropov apart from Konstantin Chernenko, his
principal rival for the top party post, who has cultivat-
ed the image of a leader more attuned to popular
aspirations and who has called for more intraparty
"democracy" in terms far less qualified than has
Andropov. Moreover, Andropov acknowledges no ba-
sis for anti-Soviet activity in the USSR and finds its
roots in Western influences and Western "psychologi-
cal warfare." On the other hand, as a tactically
flexible administrator, he may entertain the idea of
limited changes in the current system of economic
planning and management
Andropov would not countenance foreign influence on
what he would perceive as purely internal Soviet
affairs. He probably would also continue to support
countries that are "moving" toward socialism.
He also gave an unusually forceful
serving Soviet interests well
In a more general sense Andropov appears confident
about the course of world developments. He believes
that world trends favor socialism and that "peaceful
coexistence" (the terminology he uses) helps socialism
and reduces the danger of war. He also supports the
need for a strong Soviet military and sees it as
promoting conditions for arms control negotiations
with the United States.
defense of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in a
February 1980 speech. Andropov would probably,
however, try to continue Brezhnev's foreign policies
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Secret
Policy Issues in
the Succession
The succession process will significantly politicize
policy differences within the Soviet leadership. Vari-
ous contenders will seek .to exploit issues facing the
Politburo for personal and factional advantage. Given
the seriousness and complexity of the problems a new
leadership will have to face, moreover, debate and
25X1 conflict over policy are likely to be particularly sharp
and intense
harvest failures.
Economic Issues
Along with Brezhnev's title, the new General Secre-
tary will inherit a difficult and increasingly complex
economic situation. Economic growth has fallen to
less than 2 percent a year for the past three years-
compared with rates of about 4 to 5 percent during
the 1960s and most of the 1970s. This decline in
growth has been largely attributable to increasingly
unfavorable economic conditions, such as decreasing
availability of low-cost resources (chiefly fuels) and
declining increments to the working-age population.
The situation also has been exacerbated by a series of
With the Soviet energy, labor, and hard currency
positions likely to worsen, the economic squeeze can
be expected to tighten. As a result, in the next few
years Soviet leaders will find their resource allocation
choices-to meet the conflicting demands for capital
investment, consumer satisfaction, and military pow-
er-increasingly difficult and painful.
ed from Brezhnev's successor.
The slowing economic growth rate thus far has had
the effect of heightening differences within the lead-
ership over sectoral and regional investment priorities.
No leader appears to have formulated or advocated a
comprehensive or clearly defined economic "reform"
program, and there are no indications that the basic
systemic changes required to make major improve-
ments in the operation of the economy can be expect-
Heavy Industry Versus Consumer Goods. As the full
dimensions of the economic predicament become
clear, the demands of rival claimants for shrinking
resources will intensify and reinforce the tendency of
contenders to stake out independent positions de-
signed to appeal to one or another interest represented
in the leadership. Differences in priorities already
have emerged between one group (represented by
Kirilenko, Shcherbitskiy, and others) that has advo-
cated the priority development of heavy industry and
another (represented mainly by Chernenko) that has
emphasized the need to increase the availability of
consumer goods; both will be marshaling support for
their views.
Kirilenko has advocated the preferential development
of heavy industry fairly consistently throughout his
career-even at times when the consumer sector has
been receiving greater public attention and rhetorical
support from the leadership. Recently, for example,
he has said little about the decision, so heavily
promoted by Brezhnev and Chernenko, to assign a25X1
priority growth rate to the production of consumer
goods in the current five-year plan
Kirilenko's investment preferences, moreover, seem to
be shared by Shcherbitskiy and may have substantial
support among other leaders, such as Tikhonov, whose
past statements have indicated similar priorities.
High-level differences over the current investment
strategy were suggested in February 1982 by an 25X1
unusual Pravda article that criticized the five-year
plan that had just been adopted for providing inade-
quate resources to the machine-building industry-a
sector Kirilenko has championed in the past.
Chernenko, on the other hand, has often spoken out
on the issue, emerging as the leadership's chief advo-
cate of investment in consumer goods. In his Lenin
Day speech in April 1981, in fact, he argued that the
priority growth rate assigned to consumer goods in the
present five-year plan should be considered just a
beginning. In what appeared to be a direct retort to
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warnings from Suslov about the excesses of "consum-
erism," he said that if popular needs were ignored for
the sake of production, not only the people, but
production too, would suffer.
Chernenko's attitude toward investment priorities is
consistent with his effort to cultivate the image of a
leader attuned to popular aspirations by calling for
commissions to study public opinion, more intraparty
"democracy," and greater attention to letters from
the rank and file. Neither Kirilenko nor Andropov,
however, has shown much enthusiasm for this ap-
proach. Kirilenko, for example, reportedly blocked
Chernenko's efforts to set up a new institute for
sociological research, and Andropov, as indicated by
his statements, has defined the limits of "democracy"
in the Soviet system much more narrowly than Cher-
nenko.
Defense Spending. Concern about the domestic econo-
my also could impel one or another leader to propose
some reduction in the rate of growth of military
spending, if not an absolute cut as Khrushchev did in
the late 1950s. The argument could reasonably be
made that the military budget of the past two decades
has improved the Soviet position vis-a-vis the Western
alliance to the point that the country can afford some
redirection of resources to urgent internal needs with-
out jeopardizing defense requirements.
As indicated by previous public statements, Cher-
nenko would seem more inclined to push for a slower
pace of military growth than most other leaders. He
has stressed, for example, the economic benefits to be
derived from arms limitation. In a succession environ-
meent, however, no new leader, unless he perceives an
existing consensus, is likely to risk antagonizing the
military establishment and conservative forces within
the party by proposing cuts in the defense budget.F_
Regional Competition
In addition to these sectoral clashes, the battle for
resources is likely to heighten conflict between various
regions of the country and their representatives in the
Politburo. Succession politics typically has given re-
gional leaders more influence on national policy, and
contending factions will exploit this situation.
In the debate over regional investment priorities, some
leaders will urge more attention to the economic
interests of the Russian Republic (RSFSR)-a posi-
tion earlier taken by Suslov and an assistant to
Kirilenko. While there are "objective" reasons for
following such a course (Soviet oil and gas reserves,
for example, are concentrated there), these arguments
also could be advanced as part of a larger appeal to
Russian nationalism-a traditional refuge of Soviet
leaders in difficult times. Such proposals would be
strongly supported by local officials in the RSFSR,
who are heavily represented on the Central Commit- 25X1
tee]
Leaders of other republics, several of whom hold
candidate or full membership on the Politburo, can be
expected to argue for more investment in their own
areas, where consumer and ethnic discontent seem
most likely to converge and cause problems for the
regime. The Central Asians, for example, are pressing
hard for the construction of new industrial facilities
and for the costly diversion of Siberian rivers to
provide irrigation water for the southern republics.
Management Reform. The economic dilemma that
Brezhnev's successor will inherit has been heightened
by the regime's failure to deal effectively with the 25X1
underlying problem of chronic inefficiencies in eco-
nomic management. Concern over declining growth
rates will prompt some debate in the post-Brezhnev
Politburo over new approaches to this problem.
Kirilenko has demonstrated more openness than many
leaders to new ideas in the area of economic manage-
ment. He was one of the few Soviet leaders to
associate himself with the establishment of the Soviet
Union's first Western-style business management
school and was the first Politburo member to endorse 25X1
the concept of production associations-a mode of
rationalizing industrial management that aroused
some resistance from the ministerial bureaucracy.
Chernenko and Andropov, by contrast, have said
relatively little about management reform. Recently,
however, Chernenko has spoken out strongly in favor
of the new district agro-industrial associations
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(RAPOs), approved at the Central Committee plenum
in May. These organizations, which could bring some
devolution of authority to the local level at the
expense of the ministries in Moscow, have the support
of many regional party leaders-a group whose sup-
port Chernenko is soliciting. Andropov, to judge from
an article by a former assistant, may oppose this
approach, preferring instead reforms that would rely
on economic stimuli and improved central planning to
increase efficiency.
Foreign Policy Issues
Foreign policy issues also could become a bone of
contention in the post-Brezhnev Politburo. Although
these issues will be determined largely. by the interna-
tional situation at the time, a successor regime today
would face a number of serious foreign challenges,
including:
? The effort by the United States to bolster its
military capabilities.
? Improved relations between China and the United
States.
? A situation in Afghanistan that is proving more
troublesome than the leadership expected.
? A crisis in Poland, a pivotal country in the Soviet
empire.
Political trends in such areas as Central America, the
Middle East, and Europe, nonetheless, will continue
to give the Soviet leadership both problems to deal
with and favorable opportunities to pursue policies
hostile to US interests
Soviet-US Relations. Brezhnev has made detente a
cornerstone of his foreign policy, and his departure
undoubtedly will bring further review of its relative
merits. Enthusiasm about the pursuit of improved
Soviet-US relations, nevertheless, has been on the
wane in the Politburo since 1974, when the US
Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik Amendment link-
ing trade to an increase in Jewish emigration. US
policy has been actively debated in Moscow since
Washington's unexpectedly severe reaction to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Chernenko has been far more enthusiastic than Kiri-
lenko and most other leaders in his support of im-
proved relations with the West, particularly the Unit-
ed States, and of arms limitation. In his Supreme
Soviet election speech in 1979, for example, he went
further than any leader other than Brezhnev in
stressing the importance of what would have been the
next step in strategic arms limitation talks (SALT
III). Kirilenko, by contrast, coupled his endorsement
of the SALT II treaty with calls for "vigilance and
more vigilance" against Western intrigues. Cher-
nenko also has been well ahead of his Politburo
colleagues in warnings about the consequences of
nuclear war, noting in his April 1981 Lenin Day
speech that it posed a threat to "all civilization.'
Andropov ranks somewhere behind Chernenko in his
support for improved Soviet-US relations but has
been a relatively strong supporter of Brezhnev's "de-
tente" and arms control policies, which he regards as
serving Soviet interests. His statements indicate, how-
ever, that he would not tolerate foreign interference in
what he considers an internal Soviet matter, such as
Jewish emigration policy. 25X1
Although such shades of opinion are still discernible,
the Politburo as a whole seems to believe the prospects
for improved Soviet-US relations are more remote
now than they have been in the past-an assessment
that could lead it to endorse efforts to counter,
distract, or embroil US policy. Chernenko's views on
arms limitation and relations with the United States,
thus, seem outside the current mainstream of Politbu-
ro opinion and may require some modification if he is
to gain the support he needs once Brezhnev goes. As
economic growth declines and resources become in-
creasingly scarce, however, other members of the
leadership, possibly even Kirilenko, may become more
amenable to US proposals for arms control, seeing
them as a way of avoiding the cost of arms they may
perceive as necessary to counter the emergence of new
US weapons. F_ -1 25X1
Soviet-East European Relations. Various Soviet
leaders appear to have assessed the lessons of Poland
differently. Chernenko, for example, seems to place
the greatest blame on the Polish leadership's loss of
contact with the people. Some leaders, such as Andro-
pov, chastise the Poles for losing their ideological
bearings, while still others, such as Kirilenko, point
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their fingers at alleged Western interference. The
leadership as a whole, nonetheless, remains commit-
ted to maintaining control over Poland and the rest of
its East European empire.
Soviet leaders, however, could well be at odds over
how best to maintain that control. Subsidization of
Eastern Europe may be viewed as an increasingly
costly burden for the Soviets, but allowing Eastern
Europe to become economically dependent on the
West-as in the case of Poland-is politically danger..
ous. Continued economic shortages in Eastern Europe
on the other hand could increase popular discontent
there to perilously high levels.
The Politburo, therefore, is likely to continue its
vacillation between courses designed to counter
whichever danger in Eastern Europe seems more
pressing at a given time. Andropov, in particular, has
shown a certain flexibility in that regard. After
helping to implement Soviet repression of the Hungar-
ian revolution in 1956, he is believed to have support-
ed Hungarian efforts to rebuild the economy along
lines significantly different from the Soviet model.
The Politburo's basic inclination, however, will be to
require the East Europeans to place more emphasis on
discipline and control to fill the void left by declining
Soviet and Western economic support.
Triangular Politics? Those leaders who believe there
is virtually no prospect for US-Soviet cooperation,
especially on arms control issues, might favor playing
the China card and normalizing relations with Bei-
jing. That option appears to have been left open, at
least, by recent leadership statements-most recently
by Brezhnev's speech in March that offered to resume
border talks and establish new economic, scientific,
and cultural ties.
Even if the Chinese were receptive to such overtures,
however, full normalization of relations would be 25X1
difficult to achieve. Those Soviet leaders who have
been suspicious of US motives appear to have been at
least equally suspicious of the Chinese. Kirilenko, in
particular, has shown his pique toward the Chinese on
several occasions.
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Other Topics
Ideological Atmospherics
and the Polish Crisis
The ongoing crisis in Poland, the death of Moscow's
chief ideologue Suslov, and a growing debate over
domestic economic reform are all contributing to a
public discussion of ideological policy in the USSR.
Succession contenders Konstantin Chernenko and
Yuriy Andropov recently staked out ideological posi-
tions suggesting some modest differences from one
another, but more significant differences from the
orthodox line associated with Suslov. Recent theoreti-
cal articles have also taken a pragmatic line-that is,
they have:
? Attributed the threat of counterrevolution in the
Warsaw Pact not only to a failure to maintain
political vigilance but also to a failure to resolve
social problems.
? Provided an ideological rationale for military rule in
Poland.
The Succession Contenders Weigh In
Andropov and Chernenko have recently addressed a
number of ideological issues that have implications for
Eastern Europe. On the dangers of political pluralism
and the legitimacy of the Soviet experience, both have
taken positions that suggest definite limits to tolerable
divergence from that model. They seem to differ
somewhat on the seriousness of the threat to socialist
regimes, but they both advocate ideological flexibility
and acceptance of "national peculiarities" within the
socialist community. These views place them more at
odds with the orthodox ideological associates of Sus-
lov than with one another.
Andropov, in his Lenin Day speech on 22 April, made
an obvious effort to record his, as well as the leader-
ship's, positions and to burnish his image as an
ideologist. Mixing orthodox shibboleths with calls for
ideological adaptability, he addressed two issues par-
ticularly applicable to Eastern Europe: political plu-
ralism and different national models of Communism.
On pluralism, he noted the "essential difference"
between capitalism, where pluralism manifests itself
as a class struggle, and socialism, where class antago-
nism cannot arise. Because hostile political parties
have no place under socialism, "pluralism" is an
irrelevant concept. In East European countries, where
several parties do exist, each can represent a different
social base, but all must adhere to socialism. Western
advocates of "pluralism" for Warsaw Pact countries
really want "organized opposition to socialism," but
this the USSR will not tolerate.
In tackling the delicate issue of "different roads to
socialism," Andropov argued that diversity within
socialism was inevitable. However, he warned that
"decisive objections" arise when "the general laws of
socialist construction are effectively rejected." Pecu-
liarities are tolerable, but if debate is allowed to focus
on "various models, various notions of the very es-
sence of socialism" instead of on "its radical differ-
ence from capitalism," serious problems can ensue.
Andropov strongly hinted his own support for the
Brezhnev doctrine that there is no turning back from
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the socialist path and reaffirmed that a Leninist
vanguard party is essential. His remarks suggest a
degree of toleration for divergence within the bloc-
but only under the banner of the Communist Party.
Chernenko, at the same time that Andropov was
drafting his speech, submitted an article to The
CPSU ideological journal Kommunist addressing the
same issues. His line was similar to Andropov's on the
negative consequences of pluralism, but he seemed to
evaluate differently the issue of the gravity of "con-
tradictions inherent under socialism." Andropov's
speech stressed the qualitative differences between
"contradictions" under socialism and capitalism, and
Chernenko (in remarks most likely drafted with An-
dropov's views in mind) argued that "the art of
political leadership ... lies in revealing" these contra-
dictions and "outlining ways of overcoming them."
Chernenko seemed to be implying that Andropov,
then still head of the KGB, saw the solution of such
problems simply in terms of increased control-a
strategy which did not confront growing social
problems.
The Advocates of Orthodoxy
The positions of both competitors contrast sharply
with the orthodox views associated with Suslov and
his supporters. Suslov's formulations (particularly
those made in mid-1981 at the height of the "revision-
ist" threat in the Polish party) struck an inflexible
note, warning that the "slightest deviation from
Marxism-Leninism"-by which he meant the Soviet
model-would have grave consequences.
Although Suslov died in January 1982, his adherents
are still well entrenched in the Soviet ideological
apparatus. Their voices have been muted since his
death, but in the months preceding martial, law, they
made their viewpoint heard. In November 1981, in
the most authoritative assessment of the general
lessons of the crisis up to that time, Petr Fedoseyev (a
Central Committee member and Suslov protege) as-
serted that the bloc must guard against "private
property habits, nationalism, religious fanaticism, and
petit bourgeois psychology."
"Where the struggle is not sufficiently resolute,
views and convictions hostile to socialism imper-
ceptibly penetrate the tiny pores of the way of life,
threatening to corrupt social institutions from with-
in.... The current domestic political crisis in
Poland was preceded ... by a sharp deterioration
in the ideological climate, the spread of narrow-
minded, consumerist sentiments and nationalist
prejudices, and the weakening of class vigilance."
[Emphasis added.]
According to Fedoseyev, the basic problem in the East
European countries was that their transition to social-
ism-without genuine revolution or civil war-had
left "remnants of the exploiting classes and antiprole-
tarian parties" unpurged. Those remnants were well
placed to attack the foundations of the socialist
system whenever it might be ideologically weakened.
His exposition clearly implied the need for a thor-
oughgoing purge of all dissidents and a major effort to
restructure Eastern Europe along Soviet lines-for
example, to attack religion, further socialize agricul-
ture, and intimidate intellectuals. The warning on the
cost of ideological laxity and petit bourgeois consum-
erism clearly had implications not only for Eastern
Europe, but for the USSR as well-and is implicitly
critical of the policies associated with Brezhnev.
Coming to Grips With the Polish Crisis
Within the Soviet leadership, the dominant assess-
ment of the situation in Poland to date has been far
closer to the flexible approach associated with Brezh-
nev and his two most likely successors than to Suslo-
vian orthodoxy. The March issue of Kommunist
carried two articles on the Polish crisis-the first
attempt since martial law to put the lessons of the
Polish crisis into an ideological context. These sum-
marized the dominant line:
? The crisis grew out of both internal and external
factors.
? Martial law is ideologically justifiable as a necessity
in the medium term.
? A degree of national divergence within the bloc may
continue, but the party's leading role must be
maintained.
? Any efforts to introduce concepts of pluralism or
nonalignment are anathema and threaten the secu-
rity interests of the Soviet Union.
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The articles did not touch on certain equally critical
issues:
? The long-term legitimacy of martial law in Poland.
? The degree of toleration for political reform within
the Warsaw Pact.
These issues may be under debate within the
leadership.
The article by Jaroslav Kase, chief editor of the
Czechoslovak Communist theoretical journal, is the
more broad ranging. Kase argued that "imperialism"
has made use of dissidents and internal contradictions
in Eastern Europe to discredit the Communist system
but asserted that "the real danger of counterrevolu-
tion" only emerges when an internal foe "becomes
organically linked with severe and longstanding errors
committed in the building of socialism" [emphasis
added]. Signs of such errors were visible in Hungary
in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in
1980-81. According to Kase, prevention of this danger
requires not only ideological vigilance (an approach
associated with ideological conservatives) but also a
willingness to tackle problems (a more pragmatic
approach like that advocated by Chernenko).
Contemporary anti-Communism, Kase cautioned, has
become sophisticated and dangerous. In place of the
restoration of capitalism, it seeks a "marketplace
economy" (that is, market socialism) and bourgeois
freedoms. Anti-Communists have shifted from politi-
cal to economic demands and from cultivating the
intellectuals to appealing to the workers, as in the case
of the Solidarity movement in Poland. The call for
"pluralism" signifies in Poland and elsewhere an
attempt to weaken the Communist Party's leading
role. Religion also plays a significant role in the
assault on socialism, since it has now adapted to the
modern world and has taken up social causes. Finally,
the imperialist powers-the United States and West-
ern Europe-themselves assist internal counterrevolu-
tion by applying economic pressure through entan-
gling credits and threats of economic boycott.
Kase clearly sought to present a balanced retrospec-
tive assessment of a threat that could crop up else-
where in the bloc. On the one hand, by focusing on the
critical failure of Poland's political leadership, he
seemed to agree with the pragmatists in suggesting
that the problem is social and economic as well as
political and external. On the other, by arguing that
ideological neglect and entanglement with the West
contributed to the crisis, he provided ammunition for
the more orthodox Leninist critics of Polish policies.
The article strongly implied that the threat of anti-
Communism would not disappear and might even
grow stronger.
Addressing the idea that the martial law regime in
Poland smacks of "Bonapartism"-an ideologically
embarrassing accusation that surely troubled conserv-
atives of the Suslov school-Kase counters rather
weakly that Bonapartism is a "specific historic prod-
uct of the bourgeoisie," and is therefore inapplicable
to Poland. He ignores the question of martial law's
longevity, an omission that suggests both sensitivity
and uncertainty on this point. His balanced assess-
ment of the causes of Polish unrest is close to the
positions espoused by less ideologically rigid Soviet
leaders like Andropov and Chernenko.
The other Kommunist article, by Polish party secre-
tary Marian Orzechowski, agreed that "errors and
deformation in the leadership of the party and state
[that is, bad management] had resulted in weakening
the link with the masses and prompted discontent and
protest among them." Trying to strike a middle
ground, he defended both the Polish program of
"renewal"-as fully in accord with Marxism-Lenin-
ism and "our country's specific national nature"-and
martial law. Reflecting concern over the threat of
pluralism, he also rejected "interpretations [of the
party rules approved in 1981 ] which disrupt the
cohesion of the ranks and the effectiveness of action
associated with unity and centralism" and asserted
that any "factionalism" would be disastrous for the
party. Instead, he called for "an ideologically and
organizationally cohesive and morally pure party"
capable of winning the allegiance of the masses. With
Kremlin security concerns in mind, he warned that
the desire for "Finlandization" was a "first step" in
separating Poland from its allies and could not be
permitted.
The two authors clearly attempted to provide a theo-
retical framework for interpreting the Polish crisis by
attributing it primarily to leadership failures rather
than to concessions to national peculiarities and by
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defining some of the limits of reform (for example, in
the party). They carefully skirted certain possibly
contentious issues, however-the legitimacy of pro-
tracted military rule in a socialist state and the precise
limits of toleration for reform.
Prognosis
Andropov and Chernenko have taken public positions
that allow for the possibility of a degree of experimen-
tation and accommodation in Eastern Europe. Never-
theless, these two leading contenders to succeed
Brezhnev have emphasized the necessity of maintain-
ing order and the supremacy of the existing regimes
and. have opposed any major departure from the
general "laws of socialism" (that is, the Soviet model).
The latter emphasis suggests that they would oppose
any significant economic or political reform that
.threatened to diminish the party's control.
Despite their insistence on party supremacy, neither
Andropov nor Chernenko appears particularly dis-
turbed about the current continuation of the martial
law regime-that is, Poland's domination by the
military rather than the party. Neither seems to
endorse the legitimacy of such a system, however, and
both would clearly prefer a return to the normal
pattern of party hegemony as soon as it is feasible.
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25X1
Moscow and the
Eastern Mediterranean
Communist Parties
Moscow's insistence that Communist parties give first
priority to Soviet goals, particularly those opposing
NATO and US policies, threatens the attainment of
other, local Communist goals in Greece, Turkey, and
Cyprus.
Moscow's Options
The USSR's foreign policy options in the eastern
Mediterranean are limited by a number of interrelat-
ed factors. The hostility between Greece and Turkey,
symbolized by a divided Cyprus, invites Moscow to
play each side against the other. Yet, in each country,
a traditional suspicion of Soviet subversion thwarts
such ploys. Moreover, the enduring identification of
both sides with the West means that both Athens and
Ankara continue to look to the United States for
solutions even though the United States often is
blamed for problems in the region
The Communist parties in these three countries
would, moreover, be of limited help in any Soviet
effort to exploit tensions in the region. The Cypriot
Party, one of Cyprus's largest parties, seeks political
respectability through cooperation with the govern-
ment and other responsible behavior; the Greek Party,
far smaller in electoral strength, must contend with a
government more vulnerable to pressures from the
right than from the left; and the Turkish Party-
small, illegal, and exiled-is of negligible political
importance.
With little prospect of successful involvement in the
internal politics of the region, Moscow has pressed the
Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish parties with special
single-mindedness to concentrate on "international"
issues, such as the peace movement. In this way the
USSR advances its own interests but neglects the
parties' more parochial concerns, raising serious im-
plications for their future strength and political effec-
tiveness.
The Cypriot Communist Party, Partner in
Government
Cyprus's status as a neutral/nonaligned country gives
a certain legitimacy to the local Communists' propa-
ganda. The party (AKEL, the Progressive Party of the
Working People) can, in obedience to Moscow,
espouse principles and express criticism that rarely
are in serious conflict with official government policy.
Further, Cyprus's sad experience of invasion and
military occupation by one NATO member, Turkey,
in conflict with another NATO member, Greece,
stands for some as an indictment of NATO and its
leading member, the United States, as imperialistic
and belligerent. 25X1
To be accepted as a responsible political force, the
Communist Party has generally cooperated with the
Cypriot Government but has done so as a "silent 25X1
partner." In April of this year, however, it promulgat-
ed a program of formal political cooperation with the
right-of-center Democratic Party (DEKO) of Cypriot
President Kyprianou.
The provisions of the "common program" suggest that
DEKO made significant concessions to AKEL. Nota-
bly, the program advocates resolution of the Cyprus
problem by means of: UN-sponsored negotiations
between representatives of the Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot communities and, if that fails, re-
course to an international conference under UN aus-
pices-a Soviet proposal first advanced in 1974.' The
program reaffirms Cyprus's nonalignment and its
' The Soviets advocate "internationalization" of the Cyprus prob-
lem as meaning establishment of an international conference in
which the USSR and its allies would, for the first time, be given a
direct role in determining Cyprus's future. Greek Prime Minister
Papandreou's intention in promoting "internationalization," howev-
er, is to expand the role that Greece and other Western countries
would play in negotiations. He believes Kyprianou subscribed to
this approach during his visit to Athens early this year and that the
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The Pro-Soviet Communist Parties
in the Eastern Mediterranean Countries
Mid-1981
Population
(Estimate)
Communist Party
Membership
Percentage of Vote;
Seats in Legislature
Status
Cyprus
636,000
12,000
(estimate)
32.8 (1981);
12 of 35 Greek
Cypriot seats
Greece
9,671,000
33,500
10.9 (1981);
Legal
(estimate)
13 of 300
special tie to Greece but stresses the need for support
from the socialist countries, appearing to slight the
West.
The Communists-who may have damaged their
domestic political image by openly allying themselves
with Kyprianou, the man they publicly rejected as
undependable two years ago-also made concessions.
Should continued opposition by Papandreou indicate
that the alliance is counterproductive to Soviet inter-
ests even before the election next year, Moscow may 25X1
urge AKEL to make additional concessions to DEKO
to allay concern in Athens about the extent of Com-
munist power, or even to dissociate itself again from
Kyprianou. Either way, the Cypriot Communist Party
would see its progress toward political legitimacy at
least temporarily checked by the USSR.
The gamble by Moscow and AKEL for their individ-
ual and shared goals might ultimately fail. Reported
uneasiness among the Communist rank and file about
collaboration with the "unreliable" Kyprianou could
eventually disrupt the alliance. Other parties-nota-
bly the Socialist (EDEK) and far right Rally parties-
have vociferously protested the AKEL-DEKO pact,
and Kyprianou's overt collaboration with the Commu-
nists could help bring about his defeat in the presiden-
tial election scheduled to be held before next Febru-
The Greek Communist Party, the Government's
Conscience on the Left
In Greece, the Communist Party (KKE) 2 is smaller
than in Cyprus in terms of electoral strength. It
regularly reminds the Greek electorate of the dangers
of rightwing government, condemning the United
States for sustaining the military junta through the
early 1970s and for trying-by means of the US bases
in Greece and other aspects of military cooperation-
to regain such control.
emonstrations in mid-May to protest
the visit of US Secretary of State Haig and to mark
the opening of the UN Special Session on Disarma-
25X1
ment were among their successes.
25X1
"of the Exterior" (KKE/Ext) to distinguish it from the tiny,
Eurocommunist-oriented Party "of the Interior" (KKE/Int).
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The KKE has also, since Papandreou's election last
October, tried to serve as the Socialist Prime Minis-
ter's conscience, urging him to build on the leftwing
rhetoric of his campaign and criticizing him for
failing to distance himself from the United States and
NATO. Disappointed that the new Prime Minister
has not acted more in accordance with his campaign
rhetoric about removing nuclear weapons from
Greece and reducing the US presence there, Moscow
encourages the KKE's criticism as a means of keeping
pressure on the government. Because the Soviets
want, however, to avoid driving Papandreou further to
the right, they probably have advised the Greek
Communists not to push him too far. Consequently,
25X1 neither the KKE nor the Soviets have so far criticized
Papandreou by name.
The AKEL-DEKO agreement has provoked the
sharpest disagreement thus far between Papandreou
and the Greek Communists.
The KKE strenuously
criticized his public statements as interference in
Cyprus's internal affairs but did not exercise its more
potent options of mobilizing its supporters in labor,
youth organizations, and the intelligentsia.
Indeed, as its public criticism has sharpened, the KKE
has seemed in other ways to be trying quietly to
reassure the ruling Socialists that it wants to maintain
smooth relations. The day before Secretary Haig
arrived in Athens in mid-May, for example, the party
staged a demonstration to protest US and NATO
policies on INF and other issues.
The restrained tone of Soviet criticism of Papandreou
and Moscow's encouragement of-if not insistence
upon-a degree of accommodation by the Commu-
nists to the Socialist government indicate that-at
least for the moment-Moscow seeks only to prod
Papandreou toward policies more amenable to Soviet
interests, not to foment active opposition to his gov-
ernment. This accommodation almost certainly has
entailed costs to the Greek Communist Party. It no
doubt has discredited the KKE in the eyes of some
who may be disillusioned with the performance of the
Socialist government and are seeking a more princi-
pled leftist opposition
25X1
The Turkish Communist Party,
a Negligible Political Force
Within Turkey, where it is proscribed and its mem-
bers hunted, the tiny Turkish Communist Party
(TKP) can do little to promote Soviet interests. The
exiled party is headquartered in East Germany and is
heavily dependent on the Soviets and East Europeans
Evidently, the Soviets have decided that it makes
more sense to channel Turkish discontent toward a
more attainable goal-the erosion of West European
support for NATO policies-than to encourage futile
efforts against the government in Ankara. Despite
Moscow's desire to woo Papandreou and its recogni-
tion that the generals currently in power in Ankara
are not favorably inclined toward the USSR, the
Soviets still tend to avoid antagonizing the Turks.
Ankara's promulgation in late April of new regula-
tions concerning navigation in the Turkish Straits
25X1 25X1
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reminded the Soviets of their stake in relations with
the government that could deny their ships access to
the Mediterranean Sea.
Far more than in Greece, moreover, the Soviets
regard the probable costs of promoting effective oppo-
sition to the government through the Communist.
nist party interests other than,its own
parties, accept the argument that the need to focus on
the INF controversy and other Western policies is
crucial. Nevertheless, by concentrating on the more
general "peace" themes, local Communists may un-
dercut or neglect their other, more parochial interests.
Over the longer term, Moscow may have to ponder
the precedents of the Yugoslavs, the Italians, and
other proponents of national adaptations of Commu-
nism to determine the wisdom of neglecting Commu-
25X1
25X1
25X1
Conclusion
The Soviets have always regarded other Communist
parties to some extent as fodder for the USSR's
crusades. While they seem to impose their priorities
with special single-mindedness in the eastern Medi-
terranean, the parties there, like other pro-Soviet
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25X1
Soviet VIP Health Care
The death in January 1982 of 79-year-old Mikhail
Suslov, leading ideologue of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU), underscored the mortality
of the aging Soviet leadership. Several of these men,
including Brezhnev, have been afflicted with life-
threatening illnesses, and the preservation of their
lives and health is due largely to a special subsection
of the USSR Ministry of Health called the Fourth
Main Administration. This health-care organization
has sustained, beyond what might have been expected,
the longevity in office of the current leaders. Al-
though it may have given the Western world the
security of dealing with men whose past behavior and
ideas are well known, it has also helped saddle the
Soviet Union with a moribund Politburo, whose full
members, at an average age of 70, seem ill equipped
to handle the kind of political and diplomatic changes
that confront the nation
The Fourth Main Administration
Background. Shortly after the Soviet Government
moved to Moscow from Petrograd (now Leningrad) in
1918, the Kremlin Medical-Sanitary Administration
was established; it later became a part of the CPSU
Central Committee and was renamed the Medical
Department of the Affairs Administration. During
the 1920s and 1930s this department developed a
network of hospitals, outpatient clinics, sanatoriums,
and pharmacies established especially to serve party
and state officials. Just before World War II, the
Ministry of Health established the Fourth Main
Administration (Fourth MA) to assume responsibility
for these special health-care facilities and for VIP
treatment. The CPSU Medical Department was rele-
gated to basically administrative functions.
Scope of the System. The Fourth MA is responsible
for serving the medical needs of:
? Senior Soviet leaders and their immediate families.
? Other high-level CPSU officials.
? Senior officers of the Committee for State Security
(KGB).
? Prominent public figures and other officials down to
the republic ministry level.
? Foreign dignitaries.
The care that each patient receives is governed by
rigid rules. These include guidelines for the assign-
ment of physicians:
? Every top Soviet official is assigned a permanent,
personal physician (usually of his choice).
? Middle-level, but still senior, government and party
officials and their families are under the care of a
junior physician supervised by a higher level
consultant.
? Further down the hierarchy, several officials and
their families may be under the care of a single
doctor. 25X1
The VIP health network is extensive: every major
Soviet city has at least one clinic for the exclusive use
of VIPs. Numerous facilities dot the Baltic and Black
Sea coasts. 25X1
Administration Director Chazov. Since 1976 the di-
rector of the Fourth MA has been cardiologist Yev-
geniy Ivanovich Chazov. He heads the Kremlin Poly-
clinic and is personal physician to General Secretary
Brezhnev. Chazov is also a consultant on health
problems of other Kremlin leaders. His duties include:
? Making house and office calls on Soviet leaders.
? Writing medical reports and findings on VIPs.
? Arranging for the transfer of patients to Fourth MA
facilities.
? Arranging staff consultations with outside medical
specialists on difficult VIP cases.
? Keeping the leaders informed of the medical prog-
ress of their ailing peers.
Chazov's status was publicly acknowledged in July
1978, when Brezhnev awarded him the Order of
Lenin, a Hammer and Sickle Gold Medal, and the
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title Hero of Socialist Labor during a nationally
televised ceremony. Chazov was made a full member
of the CPSU Central Committee in May 1982
Advantages to Elite
The system of preferential health care affords sub-
stantial advantages to the Soviet elite, including:
? Excellent prophylactic care.
? Best equipped and most modern facilities.
? Ready access to scarce medications
Limitations
Political Considerations. Doctors on Fourth MA
hospital staffs obtain their positions not only because
of skill but also because of political or personal
connections. Such nonmedical considerations have
usually ruled out Jews, Armenians, or others consid-
ered politically unreliable, even though qualified pro-
fessionally. Thus, VIP facilities may not always pos-
sess the best staff doctors. Prominent outside
specialists are called in whenever serious medical
problems are encountered.
Separation From Research. Because of the adminis-
trative and physical separation of medical research
facilities from medical institutes, VIP and other phy-
sicians are often unaware of new medical discoveries,
while researchers are frequently out of touch with the
needs of practicing doctors.
Retarded Professional Development. Because of the
limited patient admission policies of VIP facilities and
consequent light workload, staff physicians get less
day-to-day work experience than their counterparts in
the public health system. In addition, because VIP
doctors and nurses often perform daily services that
are beneath the level of their professional abilities, the
sharpening of their medical skills is further impeded.
Conservative Approach
Physicians treating VIPs are reluctant to take
chances. They still remember the arrest in January
1953 of Kremlin doctors (most with Jewish names) for
allegedly plotting to murder senior party and military
personnel. Only the death of then-CPSU General
Secretary Josif Stalin forestalled the execution of
those doctors.
Surgeons know that they and their procedures will be
investigated should a patient die while undergoing
surgery. A physician involved in two such deaths is
barred from further participation in the work of the
Fourth MA.
Using outside specialists as consultants on as many as
80 percent of all cases, Fourth MA doctors have 25X1
sought to minimize improper treatment and career
risk. If the patient being treated is important enough,
Western equipment and pharmaceuticals are ob-
tained, and foreign doctors are brought in to consult
on or even to conduct treatment.
Major VIP Health Facilities
Central Clinical Hospital. The Central Clinical Hos-
pital is variously referred to as the Kremlin Hospital,
the Kuntsevo Hospital, or the Zagorodnaya Hospital.
It has all the facilities of a general hospital, and it is
apparently limited to VIP patients. Treatment ranges
from outpatient care to intensive care for the seriously
ill who require extensive hospitalization or major 25X1
surgery.
Kremlin Polyclinic. The Kremlin Polyclinic, a branch
of the Central Clinical Hospital, is a system of 25X1
physically separate clinics and hospitals. The head-
quarters, which is the building generally referred to
when discussing the Kremlin Polyclinic, is especially
well equipped for resuscitation. Patients are generally
treated on an outpatient basis.
M. V. Lomonosov Central Polyclinic. The Lomonosov
Central Polyclinic is sometimes referred to as the
Medical Directorate in Lenin Hills, the New Central
Clinical Hospital, or the Leadership Hospital. The
polyclinic has both inpatient and outpatient facilities;
VIP patients with both serious and minor illnesses are 25X1
admitted to the hospital section of the polyclinic.
Little information is available on the polyclinic's
facilities, but they are believed to be among the best
in Moscow.
Barvikha and Other VIP Sanatoriums. Barvikha and
other special sanatoriums are exclusive facilities for
the treatment of VIPs. In addition to receiving medi-
cal care, officials can rest and have mud baths,
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massages, and heat treatments. They can also enjoy
recreational activities, film showings, and luxuries
unavailable to the public. No surgery is performed.
Unusual Treatment
In addition to the several major medical facilities,
other units exist for the treatment of special VIP
medical problems:
Emergencies. Emergency treatment for high-level of-
ficials taken ill inside the Moscow Kremlin is avail-
able in the Kremlin First Aid Unit, also called the
Inside Polyclinic. Physicians specializing in reanima-
tion and pulmonary resuscitation are on 24-hour duty
in a special room maintained solely for General
Secretary Brezhnev
Alcoholism. The V. P. Serbskiy Psychiatric Institute
in Moscow has an unnumbered, unnamed section
devoted to the care of VIP alcoholics.
enced another group of Russian leaders.
clientele continues to grow; it may even have included
General Secretary Brezhnev and former Health Min-
ister Boris Petrovskiy. In the land of scientific social-
ism, medical mysticism apparently remains as deeply
rooted as it was 66 years ago when Rasputin influ-
Psychiatry. The V. M. Bakhterev Psychoneurological
Institute in Leningrad has treated VIP patients with
psychiatric problems. Officials seeking psychiatric
help usually turn to private practitioners, however,
because they are afraid that if they go to a hospital,
they will be removed from their posts.
Faith Healing. The most unusual health care service
available to Soviet VIPs is provided by a 33-year-old
"Assyrian" faith healer (a native of the Georgian
SSR) named Yevgeniya (Dzhuna) Davitashvili. Ru-
mors abound concerning the healing abilities of this
woman, and despite increasing official unease, her
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Briefs
Soviets Improve Recently released trade and financial data indicate Moscow's effort to reverse the
Hard Currency bad turn its payments position took last year paid some sizable dividends in the
Payments Position= first quarter of 1982. A 50-percent jump in exports combined with a slight drop in
imports sliced the trade deficit to $1.3 billion, or only a third the size of the first
quarter 1981 deficit. Larger sales to West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Italy accounted for 60 percent of the increase in exports. We believe that the
export surge to these countries was due largely to stepped-up sales of oil. Increased
sales to Iraq-presumably of machinery and equipment-accounted for another
fourth of the rise in exports. Meanwhile, gross debt to Western banks, which was
up $2.5 billion in 1981, declined by $1.5 billion in the first quarter, and the usual
drawdown of assets in Western banks was held to less than $2 billion compared
with the $3 billion fall in the first quarter of 1981. 25X1
Soviets Seek Foreign Thus far in 1982 Soviet oil production is behind target. By the end of May the So-
Technology as a Remedy viets were 63,000 barrels per day (b/d) ahead of the same period last year, but still
to Oil Problems F___-] short of the 100,000 b/d increase targeted for the full year. Soviet drillers achieved
record rates in April and May but still will be hard pressed to meet this year's
drilling goal. The Soviets are seeking foreign technology and equipment as short-
and long-term remedies to their problems. Much of the technology acquisition
planned for the longer term would increase Soviet self-sufficiency in oil equipment.
Some recent examples:
? Production. In May the Soviets met with foreign representatives to discuss
tubing requirements for development of the Tenghiz field in Kazakhstan. This
project will require the import of corrosion-resistant, high-pressure pipe. On
another project in Kazakhstan, they are seeking technical assistance to remedy
the inefficient use of previously purchased US steam generators at the giant
Uzen' field. (The generators were operating at only 7-percent capacity as of
June.) 25X1
? Drilling. press reports point to drill-pipe shortages as a critical
bottleneck. A recent order of seamless pipe from Japan could be part of an effort
to ease the situation. In addition, a Soviet attempt to purchase a turn-key drilling
equipment plant (for drill collars and kellys) may eventually lead to a long-term
solution to part of the pipe problem.
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? Offshore. The Soviets are heavily dependent on foreign technology for their
offshore development. They recently received the second of three drill ships from 25X1
Finland and are now negotiating for five offshore jack-up rigs for ice conditions.
Soviet Economic Aid Oleg Bogomolov, the influential director of the Economic Institute for the World
to Eastern Europe Socialist System, the Soviet Union was
feeling the pinch from its economic assistance to its East European allies. He
complained that Soviet planned oil deliveries to Eastern Europe are an increasing
burden to the Soviet Union. He fixed the Soviet overall subsidy to Eastern Europe
at $7.5 billion in 1980-a figure 60 percent less than CIA estimates-mostly
resulting from subsidized oil deliveries. His other comments suggest that the East
Europeans would have to pursue conservation efforts strenuously for both oil and
nonoil products because the USSR would not be increasing its economic support.
Bogomolov also explicitly repudiated any Soviet responsibility for the debts
incurred by "our East European allies." He took issue with extensive borrowing
from the West to modernize industry, arguing that such support often retarded the
development of domestic industries. Officials of the USSR State Bank took a 25X1
similar line atly asserting that the USSR would not
pay any part of the interest on Poland's 1982 debt and expressing deep resentment
toward American efforts to cut credits to the USSR 25X1
USSR-Mozambique:
More Soviet Advisers
ance t e Soviet advisers-reportedly numbering as many as 800-already in the
country. Their main task has been high-level planning, instruction, and technical
support. Seven advisers were reported killed last month by guerrillas about 150
kilometers from Maputo. F_ I
Moscow apparently intends to increase its counterinsurgency support to Mozam-
bique to protect its influence. It also wants to ensure the survival of the leftist re-
gime, which is under intense pressure from the insurgents. In addition, the USSR
values Mozambique as a base from which to exert guerrilla pressure on South
Africa and as a center for commercial fishing.
25X1
25X1
New Soviet Ambassador Vil Konstantinovich Boldyrev has been named Soviet Ambassador to Iran. For the 25X1
to Iran past four years (1978-82) he has been chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's
Middle Eastern Countries Department, which is responsible for relations with
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A candidate of philological sciences, Boldyrev specialized in Iranian studies and
Farsi at Moscow State University. His first assignment was at the Embassy in
Tehran (1956-60), where he rapidly advanced from attache to second secretary.
While in Tehran, he served as the principal interpreter for then-Ambassador N.
M. Pegov. Pegov, now head of the Cadres Abroad Department of the Communist
Party's Central Committee, was also Boldyrev's chief later in New Delhi, where
Boldyrev acted as a counselor. Within a year, he was promoted to minister-
counselor. When he left New Delhi in 1974, he became deputy chief of the Foreign
Ministry's South Asian Department, where he remained until his appointment to
the Middle Eastern Countries Department. 25X1
New Soviet Ambassador Vladislav Petrovich Zhukov, who most recently served as Ambassador to the 25X1
to PDRYO Sudan (December 1978-March 1982), has been appointed Chief of Mission in
Aden. From 1973 to 1974 he was deputy chief of the Soviet delegation to the Ge-
neva Middle Eastern Conference. As a first secretary and later as a counselor at
the Embassy in Beirut (1966-7 1), Zhukov was the principal Soviet contact with the
Palestine Liberation Organization and with the Lebanese Communist Party. His
other assignments have included working as vice consul in Damascus (1956-62)
and as a first secretary in Baghdad (1963-64). 25X1
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Viewpoint
The following two essays provide differing assessments of the instability in the
Soviet leadership.
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Prospects for
Brezhnev's Retirement
An assessment of the prospects for Brezhnev's retire-
ment depends on the judgment of how much power he
currently exercises and on whether other Politburo
members have a sufficiently strong desire to remove
him. The evidence, although inconclusive, suggests a
25X1 growing disparity between Brezhnev's formal author-
ity and his actual power, a decrease in his ability to
protect himself from attack, and the presence of
25X1 stronger incentives than heretofore for other Politburo
members to move against him.
Brezhnev's Political Position
On the surface, Brezhnev remains the preeminent
25X1 party and state leader. Although he has missed
several recent meetings at which protocol required his
presence, he continues to perform many of the official
functions of his job such as giving speeches, making
policy pronouncements, and presiding over important
25X1 meetings.
Brezhnev's public prominence, however, constitutes
virtually the only evidence that he continues to play a
significant role in the leadership, and it is not neces-
sarily a valid indicator of how much influence he
wields behind the scenes. We cannot ascertain on the
basis of Brezhnev's appearances and his reading of
prepared statements whether he is now an independ-
ent actor, a figurehead who is articulating policies
worked out within the Politburo as a whole, or a
leader whose preferences cannot be ignored but who is
"propped up" and manipulated by a small group of
aides and close associates.
There is no question, however, that Brezhnev's health
is precarious and deteriorating. The state of his health
is germane to the question of his political power, for
power surely evaporates if a leader lacks the physical
or mental capacity to exercise it. While Brezhnev has
apparently recovered from the physical setback he
suffered in late March, his condition is degenerative
in character and is progressively eroding his mental
and physical capabilities. Despite fluctuations from
day to day and week to week, no long-term improve-
ment is possible. The contraction of his attention span,
the weakening of his powers of concentration, and the
curtailment of his working hours have developed over
a period of several years and have cumulatively
increased his dependence on others. His reliance on
the few people who have regular access to him and
enjoy his confidence-specifically, his personal staff
and Chernenko-certainly reduces his ability to exer-
cise independent influence, and may to some extent
make him their creature or puppet.
Viktor Louis-the Soviet journalist with
KGB connections-told US Embassy officials that
Brezhnev was no longer able to provide effective
leadership. Early this month he indicated that he
doubted whether Brezhnev would be able to hold his
position much longer. There are also indications that
other Politburo members-including Chernenko, An-
dropov, Gromyko, and Tikhonov-are expanding
their roles and receiving a greater share of the
limelight than previously. And recent appointments to
key KGB positions suggest that Brezhnev may not
have effective control over the security apparatus.
25X1
At the same time, unflattering rumors about Brezh-
nev and his family persist. These and the appearance
of indirect public criticism of Brezhnev indicate a
breakdown in party discipline and an erosion in the
leader's prestige.F- -1 25X1
Heretofore, most Politburo members presumably saw
an advantage in Brezhnev's continuation in office.
They may have collectively believed that his remain-
ing made their own positions secure, while projecting
the appearance of leadership unity at a time of serious
economic and foreign policy problems. Inability to
agree on a replacement for Brezhnev may also have
been a key restraining factor. Finally, even those
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eager to see him leave may have believed that his poor
medical prognosis counseled waiting for nature to
take its course rather than taking the risk of attempt-
ing to oust him.
The system, however, cannot function indefinitely
with an impaired and inactive party head, and the
arguments for moving against Brezhnev have become
more compelling in recent months. The emergence of
Chernenko and Andropov as the leading contenders to
succeed Brezhnev has destroyed the equilibrium in the
leadership. Other leaders, increasingly aware that
Brezhnev's remaining time is limited, now have a
greater incentive to make deals to protect their inter-
ests once he is gone. Under these circumstances, their
awareness that derogatory rumors have tarnished
Brezhnev's image, embarrassment at his poor
performance in carrying out even the ceremonial and
mechanical aspects of his job, and cognizance that his
political defenses have weakened, could combine to
galvanize Brezhnev's peers into action. Conceivably,
lack of confidence in Brezhnev's ability to perform
adequately in a summit with President Reagan could
give a sense of urgency to the need to resolve the
succession.
Political opportunism will count for more than past
loyalties in determining where various leaders line up.
Even Chernenko would abandon Brezhnev if he con-
cluded that allegiance to his chief had become a
political liability and saw the opportunity to strike a
bargain that offered him some promise of a share of
power in the post-Brezhnev leadership. Chernenko has
recently been involved in a wide range of activities
and apparently has important responsibilities in sever-
al key areas of party work. Although originally
dependent on Brezhnev, by now he may have estab-
lished himself as someone in a position to claim a
significant share of the spoils, should he choose to
cooperate in a move against Brezhnev.
The Mechanics of Removing Brezhnev
In the final analysis, Brezhnev serves at the pleasure
of the Politburo. Any move to replace him would have
to involve several key Politburo figures, and would
require the acquiescence of a majority of the Politbu-
ro membership. In securing the compliance of the
Politburo as a whole and ensuring the secrecy of the
proceedings, the support of the security forces and
military would be important, if not essential.
If Brezhnev has not already effectively retired in
place, he would perhaps be able to block a move to
oust him, provided that he learned about a conspiracy
before the Politburo as a whole had made a decision.
He or Chernenko could call a Politburo meeting and,
if he were healthy, he could perhaps dominate the
proceedings through his powers as chairman. Alterna-
tively, he could call a meeting of the Central Commit-
tee, where he probably enjoys greater support than on
the Politburo. Khrushchev prevented his removal in
1957 by such an action.
Even if Brezhnev still has considerable power, howev-
er, his ability to prevent the emergence of opposition
appears to be reduced. With the recent appointment
of the relatively unknown Fedorchuk as KGB head,
bypassing Brezhnev's long-time crony Tsinev, the
KGB's commitment to Brezhnev is no longer assured.
The loyalty and effectiveness of the KGB, which
monitors leadership communications and is therefore
in an excellent position to detect conspiracies, is
necessary to any Soviet leader's security.
Moreover, Politburo members under Brezhnev have
enjoyed greater physical and career security than in
the past and consequently have less reason to fear
opposing the party leader. Police terror has dissipated
as a credible political weapon, and Brezhnev's power
of appointment and removal from office has always
been constrained to some degree. If he discovered that
powerful figures such as Ustinov and Andropov were
in league against him, it is not certain that he could
marshal Politburo support for their removal. In any
event, once the Politburo acted, it would be too late
for Brezhnev to reverse the outcome
Brezhnev is not likely to step down voluntarily.
Brezhnev's desire to cling to office is
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
probably as strong as that of past Communist leaders. 25X1
44
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In over 20 successions in Communist states since
1917, not once has a party leader relinquished power
of his own volition.
If Brezhnev is forced out, however, other leaders
might prefer that his retirement appear voluntary to
minimize the unsettling effect of the succession on the
Polish and other East European regimes. The belief
that Brezhnev continues to command considerable
respect among rank-and-file party members in the
Soviet Union could also impel other leaders to retire
Brezhnev with full honors.
Under these circumstances, there is a strong possibili-
ty that Brezhnev will be kicked upstairs, retaining his
prestige but not his power. If confronted with the
option of retiring in disgrace or elevation to a senior
statesman position, Brezhnev would probably make
the same choice that Ulbricht made in 1971. The East
German leader yielded his party post, but was allowed
to retain the presidency briefly until his death.
Another possibility is that the Politburo would allow
Brezhnev formally to retain both the Presidency and
the General Secretaryship, while relinquishing the
substance of power to the man chosen to be his
ultimate successor as party head. This could be done
either informally with no public announcement, or by
the creation of a new position for the intended heir.
This situation, however, would not be tenable for very
long.
Recent Developments
Several developments suggest that the Politburo may
have acted around 24 June to expand Andropov's
responsibilities, and perhaps to arrange for his succes-
sion to Brezhnev:
? On Thursday, 24 June, the day the Politburo usual-
ly holds its regular weekly meeting, Andropov repre-
sented the leadership at a Kremlin award ceremony
that Brezhnev did not attend. The ceremony was a
manufactured event that could have been canceled
or delayed if Brezhnev was indisposed.
? On 25 June a European diplomat posted to Czecho-
slovakia told the American Ambassador that An-
dropov had formally assumed Suslov's portfolio
within the Secretariat. The Soviet Ambassador in
Prague subsequently reiterated this, and indicated
that the question had only recently been decided.
According to the diplomat, preparations were under
way to ensure Andropov's orderly succession to
Brezhnev, and word to this effect was being passed
to East European Communist parties. 25X1
? Brezhnev did not meet as scheduled with Jordan's
King Hussein during the King's 25-28 June visit to
Moscow,
IOn 3 July, TASS an- 25X1
nounced that Brezhnev had departed Moscow that
day for a rest.
25X1
Brezhnev usually vacations in the Crimea in July, so
his departure does not necessarily have any political
significance. Absence from Moscow, however, may
increase his isolation. If Brezhnev's Politburo peers
have decided to remove him, they might do so while
he is out of town. Khrushchev's absence from Moscow
facilitated his ouster in 1964.
A Politburo decision to retire Brezhnev would require
the calling of a plenary meeting of the CPSU Central
Committee. Earlier in June a Yugoslav correspondent
in Moscow claimed to have heard that a plenum
would be held this summer. More recent reporting,
however, suggests that a plenum may be held in
September.
Several months ago Brezhnev called for two plenums
this year-one for agriculture and one for manage-
ment issues. The one dealing with the farm program
has been held, and it is conceivable that the next
plenum will deal only with management reform.
Considering Brezhnev's political circumstances, how-
ever, there is a strong possibility that the next ple-
num-whenever it takes place-will be the occasion
for his retirement or a major change in his formal
status. 25X1
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Prospects for Brezhnev's Rule
and His Succession
Expectations about what will happen in the Brezhnev
succession are necessarily shaped by our understand-
ing of Soviet politics during Brezhnev's tenure as
General Secretary. My own view is that Brezhnev
dominated the Soviet leadership in the past decade,
that his position grew even stronger after the 25th
Party Congress in 1976, but that it now is in jeopardy.
Brezhnev's increasing dominance in the 1970s was
reflected in a substantial turnover in the core leader-
ship (the Politburo and the Secretariat) and in the
burgeoning Brezhnev personality cult. His power grew
despite the manifest decline in his physical capacities
and the economy's worsening performance in carrying
out policies that were publicly attributed to him and,
as I believe, largely originated with him
It is often said that Brezhnev ruled by consensus, but
this judgment requires qualification. True, unlike
Khrushchev, Brezhnev did not force radical organiza-
tional reforms on reluctant colleagues, but he made
many difficult decisions and adopted strong policies
that are not likely to have commanded a consensus.
His response to the reduced growth of national in-
come, for example, was not to make balanced reduc-
tions in the growth of consumption, defense, and
investment, but to make deep cuts in investment
growth. The series of decisions reducing growth of
investment adopted between 1975 and 1981 adversely
affected metallurgy, transportation, and machine
building, and probably was vigorously opposed by
responsible officials in those sectors. Similarly, his
insistence on giving a large share of investment to
agriculture, especially his concentration of large agri-
cultural investment in the non-black-earth regions,
probably was not a consensual decision.
Brezhnev's power has also been evident in his leader-
ship arrangements. In his first decade in office (1964-
73) he brought a number of established figures into
the Politburo, but he was careful thereafter to limit
the access of ambitious younger leaders to residence
in Moscow and especially to places of power in the
Secretariat. As his power continued to grow after
1976 he advanced cronies, such as Konstantin Cher-
nenko and Nikolay Tikhonov, into the Politburo. His
aim, it appears, was not only to protect his own
position but in time to arrange the succession in favor
of his septuagenarian protege, Chernenko. While this
strategy enabled Brezhnev to increase his power
despite his growing infirmities and the economy's poor
performance, it had serious vulnerabilities:
? Production of a debilitated central leadership re-
portedly leading to calls for restoring vigor to the
top bodies. 25X1
? Dependence on the central leadership's acquies-
cence in Brezhnev's choice of an heir presumptive.
While Mikhail Suslov was alive, Brezhnev moved at a
deliberate pace and with characteristic prudence. He
did position Tikhonov to succeed Aleksey Kosygin as
head of government and effected this even before
Kosygin died. Brezhnev was more cautious, however,
in advancing Chernenko, who had served during the
past two decades as his direct subordinate. Having
brought Chernenko into the Secretariat in 1976, and
into the Politburo thereafter, Brezhnev allowed him to
remain in the fourth-ranking position, after himself,
Suslov, and Andrey Kirilenko. When Suslov's death
opened a vacancy in the second-ranking post in the
Secretariat, however, Brezhnev moved rapidly to as-
sure that Chernenko filled it, despite Kirilenko's
seniority. 25X1
At this point the vulnerabilities in Brezhnev's strategy
proved costly. Chernenko's credentials as heir pre-
sumptive were dubious. He has never been the respon-
sible leader of a regional party committee or even of a
government ministry. Almost his entire career has
been as a staff official close to Brezhnev. Senior
Politburo members have known him as a paper shuf-
fler and as Brezhnev's armor bearer. Brezhnev's effort
to establish him as the second-ranking member of the
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Secretariat and the heir presumptive evidently pro-
voked powerful resistance. Had Brezhnev not kept his
younger proteges at a distance, he might have been
better able then to advance one of them as a counter-
weight to Chernenko and thus appease Chernenko's
opponents. Instead, Yuriy Andropov, the head of the
KGB, evidently capitalized on the opposition to Cher-
nenko to force his way into the Secretariat.
preferences, incipient political alignments, and per-
sonal indiscretions. Such information may have
proved valuable in efforts to forge an ad hoc alliance
against Chernenko. In addition, the rumors about
Brezhnev's family that circulated last April suggest
other ways in which such information could be em- 25X1
ployed. Inasmuch as violations of "Leninist norms"-
nepotism, abuse of privilege, and "factionalism"-are
widespread in the top leadership, opportunities for
political blackmail doubtless are present. Of course,
blackmail when the potential victims are so numerous 25X1
can be a dangerous game.
Andropov's accession to the Secretariat may not have
been the outcome of a political process simply. It is
hard to conceive of a majority in the Politburo that
would freely choose him for the post. The Brezhnev
faction itself (Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Pelshe, Kunaev,
and Chernenko) and allies like Ustinov and Gromyko
had good reason to keep the knowledgeable police
chief out of the Secretariat, as did ambitious provin-
cial leaders like Romanov and Shcherbitskiy. Con-
ceivably Andropov found allies among Kirilenko, Gri-
shin, and Gorbachev who were willing to pay the price
of accepting Andropov into the Secretariat in order to
create a counterweight to Chernenko. Once Andropov
decided to make his move in opposition to Chernenko,
his 15-year service in the KGB provided him with
useful information about his colleagues, including
medical details, social ties, political tendencies, policy.
Andropov's election to the Secretariat is a turning
point in Soviet politics, putting in question the pro-
longed stability that was based on Brezhnev's political
strength. The succession process, whose onset has
been proclaimed by observers numerous times in the
past, has now truly begun. A triad of senior secretar-
ies has emerged made up of Brezhnev, Chernenko,
and Andropov. It differs, however, from earlier triads
such as those formed by Joseph Stalin-in 1949 when
he brought Khrushchev into the Secretariat to bal-
ance Georgi Malenkov-or by Nikita Khrushchev-
in 1963 when he brought Nikolai Podgorny into the
Secretariat to balance Brezhnev. Brezhnev does not
seem to have formed this triad to counterbalance one
contender with another; it evidently resulted from
Andropov's efforts. The new Secretariat-made up of
five full Politburo members (Brezhnev, Chernenko,
Andropov, Kirilenko, and Mikhail Gorbachev), two
candidate Politburo members (Boris Ponomarev and
V. I. Dolgikh) and three non-Politburo members (I. V.
Kapitonov, M. V. Zimyanin, and K. V. Rusakov)--
must redistribute the organ's tasks and powers in
circumstances of intensified political struggle
Andropov is now in a position to choose between two
strategies: to lie low until Brezhnev's departure, when
he would try to assert himself from his vantage point
in the Secretariat, or to try immediately to enhance
his powers in order to limit Chernenko's. The second
strategy risks an early confrontation with Brezhnev,
perhaps before Andropov is ready for it, and would
probably produce intense conflict that could not readi-
ly be concealed from the outside world. The first,
quiescent strategy risks permitting Chernenko to gain
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control over the key levers of power, leaving Andropov
in an inferior position. Although the strategy might
permit short-term surface stability, it would probably
lead to intense conflict once Brezhnev left the scene if
Chernenko attempted to consolidate his, Dower against
strong, perhaps widespread, opposition.
Prospects for the succession also have been radically
affected by Andropov's promotion. For several years
Chernenko has served as Brezhnev's alter ego, com-
pensating for such physical infirmities as Brezhnev's
poor hearing and speech articulation and his need to
rest even after short periods of activity. Having now
shown that he plans to make Chernenko his heir
presumptive, Brezhnev cannot draw back easily even
though his intent has provoked resistance. Ironically,
just when he has finally shown a determination to
arrange his succession, his ability to do so has been
brought into question. Brezhnev is wed to Chernenko
as his alter ego and heir presumptive both; Chernenko
is unlikely to try to break free despite the tensions
generated by such closeness and mutual dependence.
Brezhnev's recognition that he needs an alter ego and
that his own days as General Secretary are numbered
(granted the number he has in mind may be as high as
a thousand) might lead him to go far in conferring
authority on Chernenko. In the past, such arrange-
ments made in advance have eased the succession. In
this instance, however, there is reason to question
whether Chernenko, because of his poor qualifications
and the opposition he has already provoked, could
consolidate his position once Brezhnev departed. But
Chernenko may never be put to the test. The Brezh-
nev-Chernenko duo's capacity to maintain its
strength, or even to protect itself against opponents, is
uncertain. The KGB cannot be relied on to protect
Brezhnev against palace conspiracies because of An-
dropov's continuing ties to KGB personnel and the
appointment of one of his regional subordinates (Fe-
dorchuk) to replace him as KGB head. Perhaps
Brezhnev's weakened political authority will encour-
age resistance to his measures and increased criticism
of the economy's performance. Already individual
leaders are withholding support from favored Brezh-
nev measures, such as decentralization in the food
program.
If this analysis is valid, key inferences follow:
? In the period ahead we may expect an increased
drawing together of Brezhnev and Chernenko be-
cause of their mutual dependence, as well as the
emergence of polarized factions supporting and
opposing this duo.
? Leadership instability is now probable, perhaps
leading to a weakening of Brezhnev's authority by
attacks from an anti-Brezhnev faction or, less likely,
to a Brezhnev counterstroke against Andropov.
Brezhnev's capacity to engage in productive sum-
mitry consequently cannot be assumed.
? The likelihood that the Brezhnev succession will be
initiated by his ouster or by a medical episode
precipitated by a domestic political crisis is now
substantially higher than before Andropov entered
the Secretariat.
? If the Brezhnev-Chernenko duo were to survive and
maintain its political strength, Chernenko's chances
of succeeding to Brezhnev's post would improve,
although his chances of subsequently consolidating
power still would not be good. The outcome might
be a prolonged succession lasting several years
before the leadership once more became stable.
? Were Andropov to succeed Brezhnev, the element of
uncertainty would be appreciably heightened.
Granted, Chernenko could surprise us by displaying
personal qualities and far-reaching goals we never
thought he possessed, but our understanding of
Andropov is even less developed. Without our realiz-
ing it, he may possess the superior intelligence,
ambition, drive, and tactical skill that would enable
him to defeat his rivals and quickly consolidate
power. 25X1
In any event, the superannuated condition of the
leadership will rapidly create vacancies in the succes-
sion that an able General Secretary would fill with his
own people. A strong new general secretary would be
in a position to address the regime's deep and long
neglected problems. While he would probably not
Approved For Release 2008/09/12 : CIA-RDP83T00853R000300010002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/09/12 : CIA-RDP83T00853R000300010002-1
institute fundamental reforms in institutions and
practices, he might substantially alter the country's
foreign and domestic policies to enhance the regime's
performance and strengthen his control over the ma-
chinery of rule. Whether Andropov or any other
succession candidate has the capacity and political
imagination to take control and make such changes is
questionable, but the opportunity is there. Someone
may try to seize it.
Approved For Release 2008/09/12 : CIA-RDP83T00853R000300010002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/09/12 : CIA-RDP83T00853R000300010002-1
Approved For Release 2008/09/12 : CIA-RDP83T00853R000300010002-1
 Approved For Release 2008/09/12 : CIA-RDP83T00853R000300010002-1
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/09/12 CIA-RDP83T00853R000300010002-1