ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES - PHILIPPINE BASE NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00951R000100120013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2007
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: December 27, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 27 Dec 82
TO:
NI0/EA Files
ROOM NO. I BUILDING
k F'oriele`ase 20 66%4 (E:? QA-RDP83T00951 R000100
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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
DDCI
27 December 1982
FROM : I IA/NIO/EA
SUBJECT : Analysis of Possible Future
Contingencies in East Asia
Attached is the first of four contingency
papers done under the auspices of NIO/EA.
The remaining three are on the ROK, Sino-
Soviet relations, and the likelihood of Labor
governments coming to power in Australia and
New Zealand.
Attachment
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 Approved For Release 2007/04/1e NFIDENT AL T00951 R00010012001RIt #10499-82
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
27 December 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Chairman, National Intelligence Council
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
I
STAT
SUBJECT : Analysis of Possible Contingencies - Philippine Base
Negotiations
1. Background -- We are now getting into- a year of talks with the
Philippine Government -- technically scheduled for April-September
1983 -- under the terms of the US-Philippine Base Agreement which is
next up for formal review in 1988. Mainstream analysis is that the 1983
talks should hew to precedent with most items taken care of through
official level wrangling between US Embassy/Military and counterpart
Philippine teams in Manila. A few matters would be held to the end to
be settled by direct talks between Ambassador Armacost and President
Marcos, to the dramatic credit of the latter. Thus far, we see no
reason not to anticipate a replay of this traditional scenario.
2. Plausible but not likely to occur -- Should Ferdinand Marcos
depart the scene in 1983, either by death or removal, the base review
could be much messier, with the role of the Philippine military hard to
foresee. If a successor felt that it was in his or her interest to
demonstrate ability to handle the Americans in a style comparable to
Marcos', then the outcome probably would be similar to those obtained in
the past. However, if standing up to the Americans seemed more useful
to insure succession, or if Leftist pressure made continuation of the
bases under present circumstances undesirable, a successor or contending
successors could levy unacceptable demands on the US in the course of
these talks.
3. Marcos at his worst -- Marcos may feel that he is being taken
for granted by the US -- a malady to which he has fallen prey in the
past -- and attempt to tax us to the utmost in the course of these
talks. For example, he may feel that the presence of the Soviets in
former US bases in Vietnam raises the worth of Clark Field and Subic Bay
STAT
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Assistant NIO for East Asia
 Approved For Release 2007/04/12 : CIA-RDP83T00951 8000100120013-0
CONFIDENTIAL
to Washington and escalate his monetary, sovereignty and other demands
to unacceptable levels. Under such circumstances he would be more
difficult to placate but presumably would still want a successful
outcome to the negotiations. If the talks drag on into 1984 an element
could be Marcos' estimate as to whether there will bL a Republican or
Democratic Administration in 1985. Marcos is believed to feel that the
Republicans are basically more sympathetic to him and that he is more
likely to extract greater concessions from them than from a Democratic
Administration which might be preoccupied with his record on human
rights, corruption and dismembering of the institutions of Philippine
democracy. Accordingly, if Marcos thinks the Democrats are coming back
into power in the United States he will probably wish to settle on
favorable arrangements with the United States under a Republican
Administration.
4. The Spratlys Claim -- We anticipate that the Philippines will
again press us to enlarge the area to be defended by the United States.
under the security treaty to include the Spratlys, which we have always
declined in the past. In addition to the US view that the Philippines
claim to the Spratlys is intrinsically weak, the US has always resisted
assuming a defense commitment to islands claimed by China and Vietnam as
well as the Philippines. Marcos might feel he has to make a great show
of pressure on the US on this traditional item. Eventually he should be
deterred if the USG remains resolutely opposed.
5. The Money -- A package of assistance to the Philippines, to be
included in the State and DoD budgets, will be negotiated in return for
the continued use of our military facilities there. Congressional
approval will be sought and is now anticipated. However, if there
should be a sanguinary and repugnant succession drama or a series of
human rights outrages, Congress might delay and otherwise manifest
reluctance to come up with the wherewithal.
6. Miscellany -- Other items may occasionally grab a headline in
the course of these negotiations but don't qualify for our plausible
contingency list above. These include impasses on the questions of
judicial restriction over US servicemen commiting crimes, and the role
and authority of the Filippino base commanders at Clark and Subic.
Moscow might decide that a bit of saber rattling is in order to activate
the Philippine Left and scare the faint hearted against our continued
military presence there. However, we anticipate that this would
strengthen Marcos' and the Filippino military resolve to keep the
American military in the Philippines as protection against Soviet power
deployed from Cam Ranh Bay. Hard to fit under any heading is Marcos'
and general Filippino feeling of distaste for discussions by US and
Japanese leaders of Japanese naval patrols 1000 miles south of Japan,
which includes Manila Bay. In a perverse way, such discussions may
provide further incentives for the Fi1'ppinos to keep the Americans in
Clark anc Subic, reducing the likelihood of the Japanese fleet to
STAT
 Approved For Release 2007It 4J I fl ilpP83T00951 8000100120013-0
SUBJECT: Analysis of Possible Contingencies - Philippine Base Negotiations
(NIC #10499-82)
NIC:A/NI0/EA
(27 Dec 82)
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - EXDIR
1 - ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - A/NI0/EA Chrono
1 - NI0/EA File
1 - DDI Registry
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