JANUARY 29 MEETING OF THE POLAND SIG

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83T00966R000100010026-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 27, 2009
Sequence Number: 
26
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 1, 1982
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP83T00966R000100010026-2.pdf80.58 KB
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. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP83T00966R000100010026-2 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE NSC Review Completed. Nationa0lntelflgence Council MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: January 29 Meeting of the Poland SIG DDI #0817-82 1 February 1982 1. I lopened the meeting by saying that the Tuesday NSC .meeting would probably be limited to the "extraterritoriality" issue on US sanctions with a more general NSC meeting late in the week. He then asked Hormats and Leland to report on the morning meeting of the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs on the Polish debt. They reported the view that it is most important to press on getting payments, not to let the USSR off of the book on payments, to maintain the threat of default; that if default is called, nothing will he paid. Rescheduling can be used to squeeze them to pay. What we want is to draw hard currency from the East. 2. However, under questioning, they made it clear that they did not .anticipate circumstances in which we wouldn't go along with accepting any payment we could get. - 3. The question was raised about the participation by US banks in financing credits to the Soviet Union. After asserting that there was no such financing now, Leland admitted that US banks are providing short term commercial credits on grain to the Soviets. 4. On grain generally, Long of Agriculture reported that of the 10.9 million tons of grain ordered by the Soviets, 6.2 million tons had been shipped by the end of January. Also that while the 1980 grain embargo had been somewhat disruptive to the Soviets it had not been very effective; - moreover, there is a large supp =.y in the world now. 5. Bailey (NSC) proposed an illustrative set of "intermediate" measures: -- Embargo of fertilizers, pesticides, chemicals; these would have a large effect on. the Soviet Union and a small one on us. -- Meaningful alternatives to Yamal (a mentionimade of Norway). The importance of studying allied safeguards and mechanisms for a Polish default and a burden sharing formula. State Dept. review completed S C r3 k: LI Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP83T00966R000100010026-2 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP83T00966R000100010026-2 6. Hormats mentioned that we have pressed the allies to raise interests rates to the Soviet Union; however, there is a problem with France. He also mentioned the difficulty with the UK on existing contracts for products bought not under license. Henry S.Rowen Chairman Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP83T00966R000100010026-2