THE WARNING ACCOUNT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83T00966R000100020009-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 11, 2007
Sequence Number:
9
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 15, 1982
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
A~'~v~~F~r 2007/04112 :CIA-R T00966R000100020009-0
CENTitAI INTEL~CE
i~UTE FUR THE DC I
15 March 1982
When you've read this, Dick and I
are ready to discuss it at your convenience.
Harry Rowen
C/NIC
SECRET
Approved For R~se 2007/04112 : IA-RDP83T00966 000100020009-0
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Nctionai Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : The Warning .Account
15 March 1982.
' e in on your discussions with regard to [
and the warning responsibility. My views
as o ows, on the assumption that0is chosen as my successor.
2. The warning account has three inter-related functions:
A. Monitor the course of events world-wide to
determine whether the Community is providing adequate
warning; frame alternate hypotheses; flag anodyne
interpretations.
B. On the basis of A, ensure that warning is
issued and understood at policy level; coordinate the
Community response; ensure that the focus of
policymakers on the immediate crisis does not blind
them to other potential crises.
C. Monitor Community performance with respect to
6 and seek ways to improve it; troubleshoot the warning
machinery; advise the DCI on programmatic and budgetary
issues related to warning. Three of the more important
tasks that need attention are:
-- Improvement of the NATO warning machinery:
,there is no effective link between US/British
intelligence recognition of a threat and the NATO
political decision to respond.
-- Development of .systematic participation by
CIA and State in the strategic warning problem.
-- Training of analysts in alternative
hypothesis techniques.
3. Function A is entirely substantive, but Functions B and C are
primarily managerial. The successful accomplishment of B and C requires
SECRET
Approved For R~se 2007~t~~1R1~2~. - 6R~ 100020009-0
vesting the responsibility for them in someone in a bureaucratically
senior and central position who is a skilled manager and commands the
respect of the Community. (See HPSCI'S recommendation that the DCI
create a "focal point" for warning, specifically including budgetary
matters.)
4. 0 is superb at function A but he is a loner who has been 25x1
a disaster as a manager. While does not have Cochran's 25x1
substantive brilliance, he is an a ective manager who can handle
functions B and C and who will have the position and rank to do so. It
is passible, moreover, to devise an arrangement that takes advantage of
their complementary strengths:
-- Vest the overall warning responsibility in
as one of his primary duties. This
wi give he warning account th isibility and
clout it needs, while leaving free to spend
most of his time on other matters. Authority over
the NIOs is essential to making the warning
machinery work. will have it and can
exercise it. won't have it and couldn't use
it if he had.
-- Make ~ his special assistant for
warning, with responsibility for Function A. This
will strengthen where he needs it and enable
him to act large y as a conduit, might need
a junior assistant. I believe would be much
more comfortable in this role ving the full
managerial portfolio; he knows his limitations.
-- Provide with a small staff,
probably headed epresentative, to assist
him in Functions B and C. This group would work
directly for him but would be guided
substantively by ~ output.
5, Such a set-up would make the most of both men and enable you to
provide the Community with the leadership it needs in th is field.
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