THE WARNING ACCOUNT

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83T00966R000100020009-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 11, 2007
Sequence Number: 
9
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 15, 1982
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP83T00966R000100020009-0.pdf120.16 KB
Body: 
A~'~v~~F~r 2007/04112 :CIA-R T00966R000100020009-0 CENTitAI INTEL~CE i~UTE FUR THE DC I 15 March 1982 When you've read this, Dick and I are ready to discuss it at your convenience. Harry Rowen C/NIC SECRET Approved For R~se 2007/04112 : IA-RDP83T00966 000100020009-0 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Nctionai Intelligence Council MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT : The Warning .Account 15 March 1982. ' e in on your discussions with regard to [ and the warning responsibility. My views as o ows, on the assumption that0is chosen as my successor. 2. The warning account has three inter-related functions: A. Monitor the course of events world-wide to determine whether the Community is providing adequate warning; frame alternate hypotheses; flag anodyne interpretations. B. On the basis of A, ensure that warning is issued and understood at policy level; coordinate the Community response; ensure that the focus of policymakers on the immediate crisis does not blind them to other potential crises. C. Monitor Community performance with respect to 6 and seek ways to improve it; troubleshoot the warning machinery; advise the DCI on programmatic and budgetary issues related to warning. Three of the more important tasks that need attention are: -- Improvement of the NATO warning machinery: ,there is no effective link between US/British intelligence recognition of a threat and the NATO political decision to respond. -- Development of .systematic participation by CIA and State in the strategic warning problem. -- Training of analysts in alternative hypothesis techniques. 3. Function A is entirely substantive, but Functions B and C are primarily managerial. The successful accomplishment of B and C requires SECRET Approved For R~se 2007~t~~1R1~2~. - 6R~ 100020009-0 vesting the responsibility for them in someone in a bureaucratically senior and central position who is a skilled manager and commands the respect of the Community. (See HPSCI'S recommendation that the DCI create a "focal point" for warning, specifically including budgetary matters.) 4. 0 is superb at function A but he is a loner who has been 25x1 a disaster as a manager. While does not have Cochran's 25x1 substantive brilliance, he is an a ective manager who can handle functions B and C and who will have the position and rank to do so. It is passible, moreover, to devise an arrangement that takes advantage of their complementary strengths: -- Vest the overall warning responsibility in as one of his primary duties. This wi give he warning account th isibility and clout it needs, while leaving free to spend most of his time on other matters. Authority over the NIOs is essential to making the warning machinery work. will have it and can exercise it. won't have it and couldn't use it if he had. -- Make ~ his special assistant for warning, with responsibility for Function A. This will strengthen where he needs it and enable him to act large y as a conduit, might need a junior assistant. I believe would be much more comfortable in this role ving the full managerial portfolio; he knows his limitations. -- Provide with a small staff, probably headed epresentative, to assist him in Functions B and C. This group would work directly for him but would be guided substantively by ~ output. 5, Such a set-up would make the most of both men and enable you to provide the Community with the leadership it needs in th is field. 25x1 25X1 25xi 25X1 25X1 25X1 -2- 25X1