SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83T00966R000100040021-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 3, 2007
Sequence Number: 
21
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 18, 1982
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP83T00966R000100040021-4.pdf221.71 KB
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Approved For Fj~ease 2007/041:~^RDP83T00966?~000100040021-4 j~ / ;(/ c.Gc ~ ~iJt-~n~t O THE DIRECT?R OF +GEO\ITRAL IhiTEl9.lGEt3CE I~iEMORANDU~~1 FOR FROM SUBJECT DDI 5060-82 18 Junt-' 1982 Director o.f Soviet Analysis Soviet Defense Spending 1. For at least the last two years there have been recurrent references in Agency and interagency publicatior:s to Soviet defense spending having grown at an average annual rate of 4?l~ for the last 10 or more years, and projections that such a rate of grocath will be maintained :~ox_- tl~e necir future at least. The implications of such a growth rate for the Soviet economy are clearly drawn and shoc?~ni to be fairly drastic, especially if the GNP grows at only 2% per annum, as is also projected. 3. Zn studying these papers, I have been struck by the fact that the curves showing Soviet defense spending trends, e.g., the figures on p.p, iv and 11 of publication (a) above, and Figure 1, page 2 of publication (b) above appear to be 1_ir.ear with time, rather than exponential. In fact, a fairly good fit (by eye) is ?provided b~,~ tl-ie straight line relationship from pub]_ir_.ation (b) Experd.itures = 27 + ~ .08 (Y-1959) (in Billion Rubles) where Y is the year. In other words, the Soviets spent 27 billion rubles on defense in 1959, and have increased that by 2.08 billion ALL Pl1Rt~GRAPHS ARE SECRET Approved For F~lease 2007i04~IC:l~~-RDP83T00966R000100040021-4 rubles per year. In estimated dollar casts, the relation- ship is, from publication (a), Expenditures = 150 + 5.56 (Y-1971) (in Billion Dollars) ~+. If this interpretation, or some other linear, but more precise, version of the best fit, is valid there ought to be some reexamination of the projected Soviet defense growth rate and its implications for the Soviet economy. I would be pleased to hear your comments. 5. Attached is my best fit for the curves described. cc: DDI C/NIC SRP:tb Distribution: Original - Addressee 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - DDI - C/NIC - DDI Registry - SRP File - SRP Chrono - S RP - S RP -2- SECP.ET Approved Far Release 2007/04104 :CIA-RDP83T00966R000100040021-4 f.:eneral 6?xpenditnre "Trends "Total Spend'rr>tq /~ttal)'SIS Of t11C 1Ct'ClS and trends in total Soviet defense expenditures ' bctwccn 1951 and 1980 reveals three distinct periods (zcc fit;urc 1 j. (t!) lietwcen 195! and 1955, the trend in defe.nc cr.pcndi- tur'es was clurninated by a dr;unatic increase in 1955 because of large aircraft procurement progrJms for air defense and strategic: attack. Ut.tring this period, the Soviet armed forcer wcrc structured primarily for the type of combat experienced during World War 1 f and wcrc cha ractcrinrl by Ltrgc t:.tctical aviatiort Qnd ground farces forntatiuns. tt~) During the mid- :tad late lc)Sttz, the Soviet force strUCtUre bC~;an lU Uh;lnt'C 111 rCtipl)rISC lQ an el'l)lvlrtf! nuclear doctrine. fanph;.tsis shifted from the rrwinte- nancc of iar~,e gcncraf purpose farces to smaller forces equipped with newly ileveiop:'d missiles anti ~Lcam- lincd fur tl:c rtucicar baUlcficld. Military rnanpuwcr was cut back substantially, and ;ut absolute reduction in Suvict military outlays occurred, which amounted to almost 4 percent a year. js) This declining trend was reversed in 1960 as Soviet defense expenditures began two decades of stcadv increases, The years 19(,0-(,5 represent the. highest. gruuth years, rcl7ccting growing resource commit- ments to f:DTdcl'., space programs, and strategic forces. During this ,~rcriod, dcfcnsc was growing at abr.,ut 8 perc:cnt a year cc?Itilc the rate of ccc,numic growth had declined to bctwccn -) and 5 percent annually because of a slowdown in industrial produc- tivity and the disastrous h;?rvcst of 1963. tu) ' The ;:nalytiis in this rttnn l is i~a:.cd un a broad deliniliun of Suvicl defense expendltures ?hirh includes rtetivities that the tir_rviers may deti;?tc as dr.fcnsc related but which arc not included within the US definition of dcfcn