LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM GEORGE BUSH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00966R000100040064-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 64
• Publication Date: January 10, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C 20505
Office of the Diredor
SEColE ..
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
I have reviewed the 2 December report that the PFIAB
prepared for you on "Intelligence for the Future, " and consider
it to be thorough in its presentation and thoughtful in content.
In particular, I support the PFIAB position that "overriding
importance" must be given to "the development of initiatives.. -
to restore public understanding and trust in intelligence and
intelligence institutions. " As you are aware, I have devoted
much of my time as DCI to serving as spokesman for the
Community in an effort to rebuild both understanding of and
trust in our intelligence' efforts. - - '
My particular purpose in writing you is to assure you
that senior officers of the various organizations dealing with
foreign intelligence are aware of the problems c,ted by the
PFIAB and that work is in train on nearly all of them.
In its "Observations" section, for instance, the PFIAB
lists six matters as "among the most important initiatives to
pursue." Work already is under way on five 'of these, and the
sixth will require Presidential action. - As to the five:
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il. We have spent this year
on experimenting with compara ,.ve an ysis, a
concept. on which PFIAB urges "refinernent."
e. Countering "increasingly sophisticated.
efforts to conceal and deceive" is of continuing
concern to several elements of the Intelligence. Community and increased effort has been applied
to this problem in recent years'.*
The "innovation" on which I consider Presidential attention
might well be directed is the PFIAB proposal that there is
need to pursue:
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"Comprehensive examination of the government's
responsibility to make the public aware of, and to
provide the means of thwarting, intrusions to privacy
by foreign intelligence services and the illegal efforts
of private citizens intercepting communications and
computer data links."
This is an important problem, but it is outside the scope of my
authority as DCI. I suggest that you task the Attorney General
to address these matters on a priority basis.
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The following.7cornments relate- to the. nine PFIAB
recom nendati.oas..(pages=v-...vii).
First recommendation: The NSC should
sponsor development of three or four models'-of the
world 20 years hence, and the -DC. should "undertake
a community wide estimation of the intelligence
system's performance under each of the projected
futures. "
I would welcome NSC involvement in this effort. My
Intel.l.igence Community Staff and the CIA Center for the Study
of Intelligence already have done work in this field, and are
continuing to do so.
Past efforts at long range projection have not proved
particularly useful as a basis for intelligence planning, but this
does not mean we should not continue to develop projection
methodologies which can exploit a potential utility.
Second recommendation: The NSC should "direct
a "most thorough.review" of the subject and. structure.-...
of intelligence. support to crisis management.
My Intelligence Community Staff has devoted major
attention to crisis management problems arid to improving
Community procedures. I also appointed a Special Assistant
to review crisis management practices and develop recommendations
for my decision. Two matters being given special consideration
are improved coordination of Community activities during crises
and the proper wartime role for the DCI.
Third recommendation: The DCI should evaluate
the PFIAB proposal for a 1-2 year study of Soviet
concealment and deception activities by a special team,
with a view toward its early implementation.
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Fourth recommendation: Net assessments,
particularly of weapons systems interaction, will grow
in importance and "a renewed effort is required to
determine how they can be performed and within what
institutional framework. it
There is a need for more organized, more skillfully
staffed, and-more authoritative net assessments that can provide
the bottom line on the judgments about the capabilities of U. S.
forces under differing conditions. The role of intelligence in
these assessments is to supply needed data on.foreign systems,
assist in developing assumptions about them in the absence of
hard data, and generally to play a supporting role.
"-''Fifth recoinniendation; The'D'CI should-t
k
a
e anew
look at the problem of targetting Soviet research and
development "with the view of recommending a more
intensive and more imaginative effort in the future. "
A major effort to better understand Soviet research
0 to better understand Soviet R&D.
Making
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Sixth recommendation: While "Previous intelligence
community efforts to assess foreign (USSR)
perceptions
of the U. S. are applauded, " the PFIAB urges "that they
be made more comprehensive and' that they be kept current.
4
 - >t'sI.acceptfully the soundness
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actions will be taken.' ? ?; k. ;,i = ; - _
pec s o intelligence: recruitment of agents; the management of data; and
in-depth understandings of foreign relationships.
Although this recommendation is broadly stated, the point
made by the PFIAB is well taken. A vigorous effort to acquire
more and better placed human sources has been under way within
CIA for several years. This increased emphasis has borne
significant fruit and, hopefully, the impetus will continue. The
acquisition of quality human sources requires considerable manpower
outlay though well justified. It is, however, difficult to explain in
terms of cost effectiveness. Yet it is on this very issue of cost
effectiveness that we find ourselves most vulnerable to Congressional
budgetary restrictions. If this trend is not reversed, we shall be
forced to devote fewer, rather than more, resources to the
acquisition of human sources.
Eighth recor znendation: ~~
of the U. S. counterintelligence policy is required sl a
basis for the formulation of a national counterintelligence
policy and a statement of counterintelligence objectives.
On 6 September 1976, I sent to the Attorney General a
memorandum on "Establishment of National Foreign Counterintelligence
Policy and Coordination Mechanisms," which proposed a new
Executive Order. The Attorney General's response indicated there
were policy considerations which argued against his chairing the
proposed National Counterintelligence Policy Cornn ittee, but he
did support additional exploration of the problem, which my
:Intelligence Community Staff is pursuing. .
Seventh recommendation: Human source collection
and analytic processes have not experienced advances
corresponding to technological improvements over the
past decade in intelligence collection systems, so "A
.vigorous effort. needs to be undertaken to achieve major
improvements is th
h
ese
uman atf
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 - . ?" ' . Ninth 'recoiizfnendation: Noting that security
discipline of intelli'gnce personnel is difficult to
maintain in a culture-which has come to abhor secrecy,
PF7AB. endorses the Deputy Secretary of Defense's -
suggestion that "a blue ribbon commission examine
these changed values in American society with a view to
determining how to restore adherence to the principles -
of confidential service to the government."
This problem has an'application far wider than the -
Intelligence Community alone. I suggest that implementation
of this recommendation should come from the National Security
Council. I can assure you the Intelligence Community will provide
full support and cooperation to such a panel.
Respectfully,
George Bush -
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The Soviet Strategy Against Third Areas
(and how to do more to counter it)
1. The Well-Known Adverse Trends
a. the large increase in arms transfers, number of advisers,
"active measures.," role of allies/proxies, direct military
operations (in Afghanistan and elsewhere)
b. The successes of the 1970s and currently contested areas;
some Soviet frustrations and setbacks.
c. Particular importance of contiguous areas; especially
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Norway, Turkey;
d=; ffi cul ti es of roll-back once.Rei Army is in place. But also
d='stant areas in Africa, Latin America.
d. Cumulative effect of these trends; demoralization of Western
democracies, Soviets emboldered, key regions affected
(especially Persian Gulf), effect on China?
2. Decline in US/Western Counter Instruments.
a. Decline'in role of Europeans
b. Militray/security assistance; only partly reversed
c. Support for police/internal security
d. Political support
e. Propaganda
f. Covert action
g. Problems with availability of weapons
h. problems of military access
i. Specific Congressional constraints; e.g., Clark Amendment,
H P~ ck"~
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3. What Needs to be Done?
a. Above all, generation of Congressional support
b. Organizational initiatives, e.g. political support,
propaganda, Other?
c. More activity by allies and others with overlapping
interests with US
d. More money for US programs.
e. Other?