EXPLOITING SOVIET VULNERABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00966R000100050018-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: July 20, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

MEMORANDJM FOR: ~J I
F/BONA
NIO/SP &
The attached paper is by General John Vogt,
USAF (retired). We are both members of the Defense
Policy Board and this paper was prepared for that
Board. The Board has' not yet discussed this paper
in detail, but it is clear that it will recommend.
a different emphasis from the R&D focus of the last
page of the paper.
Henry S. Rowen
C/NIC
Attachment
~5 lUl ED TIONSVIOUS
~._ .r .. .. .. ~ ...
Date 20 July 82
T00966 8000100050018-7
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EXPLOITING SOVIET VULNERABILITIES
Assuming the United States is able over the next decade to
match the Soviet Union in the area of strategic nuclear forces,
the major area of contest is apt to be in the Third World.
While NATO forces continue to require substantial improvements,
particularly in conventional forces, the probability is that
the Soviets will not make a major military effort in the Euro-
pean region primarily because a threat against NATO is apt to
be viewed by both East and West as the initial phase of an all-
out strategic nuclear war between the two major powers. For
this thesis to have validity, the United States must continue
to ensure that it does not fall behind in the race with the
Soviets for strategic capability.
The Soviet threat today, and for the foreseeable future,
largely lies in a Soviet view of foreign policy which clearly
calls for projection of Soviet power beyond its own borders
by the use of unconventional force application. At the present
time the Soviets are believed to have over 12.000 military per-
sonnel stationed in 24 countries around the globe. where they
function as a major factor in organizing training, and at the
same time, gaining influence over their client forces. The
Soviets also employ surrogates, or other friendly governments,
in their efforts to subvert Third ti9orld countries. Over 35,000
Cuban military personnel operate as Soviet proxies in 20 coun-
tries around the world. Another major element of Soviet power
projection is their support for terrorists and other quasi-
military groups who receive military equipment, economic aid,
and special training. Through the use of KGB and Soviet General
Staff intelligence unit operations. the Soviets develop an in-
frastructure within a client country which permits them to re-
spond to political openings and to increase their penetration
to the maximum extent possible.
It would appear then that the area requiring the closest US
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attention in the next decade is that of countering this Soviet
power projection capability within the Third `World. While the
US continues to work diligently to build up strength within the
target countries under assault by the Soviets. it would appear
that a more profitable, or certainly additionally profitable
area of operation would be the exploitation by the United. States
and its allies of the vulnerabilities inherent within the Soviet
complex of nations. In this regard, the United States could
steal a page from the Soviet book of strategy. The Soviets
maintain a number of special purpose forces which are trained
and equipped to operate both in war and peace. They include
KGB special security troops, KGB sabotage teams, Ministry of
Internal Affairs troops, internal .troops, and select guards
airborne units under KGB control for special missions. There _
are also GRU troops organized to work directly with groups of
forces acid fleets. All of the above-mentioned forces are capable
of deploying outside the Soviet Union. In wartime KGB and GRU
special forces are intended to operate at some depth behind
enemy lines against key political, military, and economic tar-
gets. While the United States maintains special forces for oper-
ation in wartime, the potential inherent in this type of opera-
tion has hardly been touched. Recent studies done for the De-
partment of Defense have pointed out large areas of inherent
vulnerability within the Soviet/Eastern Bloc empire. Rather
than concentrate our efforts exclusively on countering Soviet
incursions into the Third World area, a potentially far greater
pay-off could come from a systematic exploitation of these vul-
nerabilities knovm to exist within the Soviet bloc itself.
While this paper will not attempt to deal with the diplomatic,
economic, political/social, and technological avenues of ex-
ploitation open to us, these areas should also be the subject
of intensive examination to determine ways to optimize US lever-
age against the Soviet empire: An examination of the Soviet
military'sphere reveals basic weaknesses and strains which can
be exploited in peacetime as well as wartime. V,~hile the peace-
time applications go beyond the area of this current paper's
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coverage, it too should be the subject of a thorough study and
investigation. We will deal here only with areas and avenues
of approach involving the apparent weaknesses in the Soviet
military capability world-wide, but particularly in Europe, if
the vulnerabilities within the Eastern bloc can be exploited
immediately upon the outbreak of a NATO war.
The Soviet Union maintains a special relationship with its
eastern European allies in the military sphere. The Warsaw
Pact is seen as an instrument for the extension of Soviet hege-
mony in Europe and Asia and. perhaps the Middle East, as well.
The Soviets maintain pressure upon the eastern European nations
to contribute more to the Warsaw Pact in terms of manpower,
equipment, and budgetary allocations. The pressure being exer-
ted by the Soviets has amounted to a heavy-handedness which,
in turn, has created some tensions. There is some evidence
that the cohesiveness of the Pact is eroding due to this ap-
proach. Specific examples are not hard to find. Romanian reluc-
tance to accept a greater military burden has led to a certain
intransigence. The Polish domestic instabilities with the con-
commitant serious economic situation has drastically limited
Polish contributions to the Warsaw Pact military effort. East-
German manpower limitations and certain developing animosities
toward the Soviets limit an enhanced role for the GDR within
the military sphere of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets have coun-
tered these trends with a greater reliance on a Soviet command
structure within the Warsaw Pact, which has a countervailing
effect upon the development of command capability within the
Pact national units. The Soviets continue to be committed to
large Soviet military presence within the Warsaw Pact countries
to ensure effective equipping, training, and doctrinal effec-
tiveness in military. operations, The Soviets perceive that
Soviet presence continues to be a requirement in the face of
growing nationalistic tendencies among its Warsaw Pact allies.
There is also a growing perception by the Soviets that certain
Warsaw Pact nations do not view Soviet world-wide objectives
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?
as a matter of their primary interest or concern. There is also
growing evidence that certain of the Pact countries would be
reluctant to become involved in a war against NATO if it were
initiated by the Soviets. All of this is further compounded
by the fact that there has been a recent tendency for the in-
telligensia, religious clergy, and the working classes to unite
in opposition against government policies. Soviet forces are
perceived in eastern Europe as adjuncts of police domestic se-
curity forces and are accordingly resented.
In summary, there are potential exploitable vulnerabilities
in the following situations within the Warsaw Pact:
1) Greater resistance to Soviet colonialist policies.
2) Growing anti-Soviet antagonisms.
3) Increasingly divergent Soviet and eastern European na-
tional aspirations.
4) Growing friction between a Soviet need for political
hegemony in eastern Europe and increased eastern Europe
tendencies to work toward political and economic inde-
pendence and closer trade relations with the West.
5) The requirement for continued presence of substantial
numbers of Soviet forces within Eastern Bloc countries
to provide a presence and to ensure that the bloc con-
tinues to adhere to its military principles and doctrine.
It is generally accepted that the basic Soviet objective in
any attack on (rJestern Europe would be to apply maximum force
designed to achieve a quick victory, while at the same time
limiting damage to the Western European productive base. Any
effort mounted by the West on the outbreak of hostilities to
fragment or divert. the main thrust of the combined forces would
work to slow down or perhaps even stall the Soviet offensive.
lydhile NATO has engaged in extensive planning, training, and
exercising to deal with the Soviet main force attack by conven-
tional military operations,..a much less extensive effort has
been made in the area of disrupting Soviet military potential.
One might well ask what would the impact of large-scale support
to irregulars, guerrilas, or oth;r organized. opposition elements
within the Eastern Bloc countries have upon the Soviet attack
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plan. Opposition would probably include a large percentage
of disaffected populace further complicating the cohesiveness
and military effectiveness of initial military operations as
forces are bled off to deal with uprisings behind their lines.
For example, the supply of easily-transported, relatively light
but highly destructive modern weapons to such forces would ma-
terially enhance their disruptive capability. If US forces could
be configured to provide such support in a timely and coordi-
nated manner, we might well see a disruptive effect on critical
supply lines that would impact strongly on the achievement of
initial military objectives in an attack on NATO. Of course
a number of fundamental questions are immediately raised. For
example, what degree of NATO political support would be forth-
coming for such planning within the military structure of NATO
today? What are the. prospects for revised thinking within the
NATO military structure leading to a successful development
of this capability? What are the precise targets for such mili-
tary activities, that is, what forces within what Eastern Bloc
countries should be specifically targeted? More fundamentally,
can the present NATO strategy which renounces offensive concepts
be changed to incorporate a concept of offensive activity and
planning directed against the ~?Jarsaw Bloc itself?
Assuming the United States could achieve a consensus among
its NATO allies that exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities within?
the Eastern Bloc immediately upon the outbreak of war in NATO
vras a desirable thing, the United States could then undertake
to substantially augment and improve its special operations
forces. While US special operations forces today have great
potential to deal with pre-crisis and low intensity conflict
operations, they serve also as a complement to other forces in
time of war. It is suggested that marked improvements in these
forces now could give them far greater potential in main line
conflict, such as a war within NATO, and. might result in high
pay-off .in terms of frustrating any Soviet desire for a quick
victory in Europe. At the present time all services are parti-
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cipating in the development of special operations force struc-
ture. They include special forces, psychological operations
units, counter-terrorist and civil affairs units of the Army,
special operations forces of the Air Force, and unconventional
warfare units of the Navy, such as the Naval Special Warfare
groups, SERI, Teams, special boat units, and under-water demo-
lition teams. It is suggested that an enhancement on a large
scale of the current capabilities would represent a substantial
improvement in dealing with the threats facing the United States
and its allies today. For example, the major R&D programs of
all services are currently directed toward main force nuclear
and conventional systems. It is suggested that major R&D efforts
in the area of developing weapons and vehicles highly suited
to the special forces missions would result in large pay-off
for the dollars expended.
Summary and Recommendation. There is a large area of Soviet
vulnerability especially within the Eastern Bloc which could
be systematically exploited upon the outbreak of war in Europe
if a concerted effort is made to expand the existing modest
potential currently available within the US force structure.
The Soviet attack plan for Europe is a highly structured and
time critical operation which could. be derailed by well executed
operations along critical Soviet supply lines. It is recommend-
ed that the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy initiate a
study to examine areas of high potential pay-off starting ini-
tially with a research and development effort within each of
the services, specifically directed toward the development and
eventual procurement of specialized weapons and vehicles such
as STEALTH transport aircraft and specialized heliocopters cap-
able of infilitrating special troops well behind Soviet lines
in the event of hostilities in Europe. The R&D effort would
concentrate on the exploitation of new technologies, including
full exploitation of electronic warfare capability, clandestine
communications, and light-~ieight demolition and anti-armor wea-
pons. At the same time following acceptance of this concept
at the national level, the US should initiate discussion within
TviATO Defense ministries and military authorities.
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