SOVIET STRATEGY SEMINAR WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00966R000100070006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 28, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
28 September 1982
State Dept. review completed.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT : Soviet Strategy Seminar with Secretary Shultz
1. As a participant in the session with George Shultz on strategy
for dealing with the Soviet Union, I think Paul Wolfowitz did an excel-
lent job of extracting wheat from chaff in his writeup. I was a member.
of the "blocking" school (together with Don Rumsfeld). My view is-that
we should regard the competition with the Soviets as being of indefinite
'rection and formulate our programs and policies accordingly.
2. My interpretation of Paul's "blocking" school incorporates your
comments on strategy for dealing with the Soviets. Paul's description
of the "blocking" school doesn't give enough emphasis to our need to
compete vigorously in the Third World using a variety of policy
instruments, bolstering defense and (to my mind at least) taking a more
forward stance on certain matters inside the Soviet empire. (See for
instance, my separate paper on changing our position vis-a-vis Eastern
Europe.)
3. In response to your suggestion, I think that it would be useful
to do an analysis of the pros and cons of adopting various broadly
different strategies with the Soviet Union. We might do this on our own
or, instead, we might do this jointly with Wolfowitz. (The latter
approach would be analogous to our joint net assessment with the DoD.)
I prefer the latter because policy options can only be fully understood
in the context of what is politically acceptable in the US, but an
independent effort could be done and would be worthwhile.
?achrnent (sent separately w/note)
All portions of this memo
are classified SECRET
SECRET
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 SECRET
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SUBJECT: Soviet Strategy Seminar with Secretary Shultz (DDI/NIC #7875-82)
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 SECRET
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17 September 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Soviet Strategy Seminar
1. I had a little dialogue with George Shultz at lunch today on
Paul Wolfowitz' summary of the Soviet strategy seminar conducted a few
weeks ago. I said that I didn't think the three schools of thought--
the bargainer, the proponent of breaking up the Soviet Union, and the
advocate of blocking Soviet misbehavior--exhausted the number of schools
of thought on this subject.
of our system. What would you think about developing an analytical product
which would look ahead and speculate on where the risks, opportunities, and
likely outcome of pursuing various possible policies with respect to the
2. I am inclined to put my views in the fourth school which would
concentrate on maintaining an adequate defensive posture, avoiding any-
thing which would help the Soviets increase that -burden by enhancing their
own military capabilities and competing in economic and political performance,
including Third World development, to establish and strengthen the superiority
William J. Casey
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September 9, 1982
SECRET
I asked Paul Wolfowitz to serve as an informal
rapporteur to pull together the ideas generated by
the seminar on U.S.-Soviet relations which we con-
ducted in the State Department on August 21. Paul
has provided me with a cogent analysis which I am
forwarding to you. I hope you will find it a use
fu guide to the variety of views on dealing with
the Soviet Union and would welcome your comments.
and ideas.
Sincerely,
George P. Shultz
The Honorable
William J. Casey,
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.
SECRET
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? DEPARTMENT OF STATE ?
The Secretary
August 27, 1982
FROM: S/P - Paul D. Wolfowitz
SUBJECT: Soviet Strategy Seminar
You opened Saturday's meeting by asking the participants'
view of the Soviet Union and of the relationship we should seek
with it. The discussion that followed brought to light three
fundamentally different approaches to Soviet-American rel tia ons,
with disagreements among them centering on whether and how the
two sides' competition can be moderated. There was the familiar
disagreement between the view that it can?be moderated only by
the break-up of the Soviet Union, and alternately, the view that
it can be adequately moderated by the right bargaining approach
on issues that affect Soviet interests. A third analysis, which
emphasized the importance of blocking Soviet opportunities,
assumed no fundamental moderation is possible.
Not every participant, of course, fits neatly into thi
following description of these views. This is sometimes due to
shadings in their view, sometimes to outright contradiction.
Three Outlooks
1. For the bargainers, the key to a satisfactory relation-
ship lies in positioning ourselves to maximize our bilateral
leverage. There is a potential:=s`for mutual accommodation, created
by the vulnerabilities of the Soviet system (and resultant Soviet
caution). Yet to. exploit this potential several steps are needed:
trade must increase substantially, the U.S. government must
acquire the legal power and flexibility to control trade, and we
must earn European confidence and cooperation by setting out a
balanced strategy for using this leverage. To further strengthen
this cooperation, we must also assign the highest priority, not
only to conducting arms talks, but to the early conclusion of an
agreement, even though its impact on the overall balance is ex-
pected to be negligible. The bargainers favor other agreements
as well, and express confidence that the use of rewards and
penalties will facilitate "rules of the game" for competition
in the Third World. Although based on a picture of Soviet weak-
ness, this view foresees an enduring relationship even as the
weakness'passes: our task is to'limit the Soviet Union's mis-
behavior, and this will be possible even as it prospers.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OAD
W a s N i n glo n. O.C. 20520
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2. For the proponents of breaking the Soviet Union up, the
West's only choice is between a Soviet demise and the "Finland-
ization" of Europe. With no basis left for a stable relation-
ship., contacts must be kept to a minimum. Arms control merely
unravels our defense efforts, and trade merely creates reverse
leverage against the West; in this way, the Soviets have
exploited Western internal weakness in the past. Now, how-
ever, the application of economic pressures is the key to
Western success: the Soviet Union's internal weakness (above
all, its economic crisis) is great enough to bring it down,
if -- and only if -- the US squeezes. To do so requires
the same government control over economic. relations that the
bargainers desire. . On the basis of such an all-out struggle,
the problem of managing western public opinion can also be
solved: our leaders, rather than offer a complex and multi-
faceted relationship with the enemy, can now hold out victory.
(They do not, however, have to scare our people: the pressure
tactics of the break-up school are "risk-free.")
3. Those who focus on blocking Soviet misbehavior spell
out the implications of concluding that the competition
cannot be fundamentally moderated: first, that overturning
the Soviet system requires more leverage than we have;.
second, that bargaining directly with the Soviets -- on
trade or arms control -- gives us less leverage than we need.
Effective leverage comes instead:from creating an environ-
ment in which Soviet opportunities are limited, and Soviet
advances can be resisted -- throuch an improved military
balance, cooperation with like-minded states, and promotion
cz political and economic stability. Trade and arms control
are not incompatible with this approach, but the marginal
benefits they yield must be strictly weighed against the
confusing signals they send our own public. Economic pressures
are also not incompatible, but because they too yield only
marginal benefits these have to be weighed against the dariage
cone to our efforts to promote cooperation and unity with
other states.
Assessment
All three of these outlooks are found in the Administration,
and obviously have some ground in common. in particular, all
emphasize the importance of pursuing a policy that can sustain
public support over the long term. You heard some sophisti-
cated advice from all sides about managing this difficult
problem:
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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--..The bargaining partisans point out that a showy openness
to negotiation is not enough. To command the public and allied
support that will strengthen our negotiating hand, we need a
convincing strategy that promises results, that can get from here
to there.
-- The break-up advocates would sustain public support by
stating our differences with the Soviets in maximum terms, in
principled, ideological rhetoric.
Yet both of these analyses expect to put the Soviet-American
relationship on a new basis,: and for this- reason they may compro-
mise sustainability for other goals. For example:
-- The bargainers set an extremely stiff test for showing
that our policy is realistic and effective: in this way an early
arms agreement becomes a top priority. The paradoxical conclusion
is that the only way to sustain a long-term competitive posture
is to satisfy the public's desire for an end to competition. In
practice, this may be simply self-defeating.
-- The bargainers' view of economic leverage makes the ?same
compromise. To strengthen our hand in the long run, we have to
increase the US share of East-West trade; in the short run, this-
is not likely to convince our allies to practice restraint. If it
does not, our leverage will not increase.
-- The break-up school similarly compromises its long-term
prospects for a massive effort in the short run. Our allies and
our publics will demand early results, which may prove unattain-
able.
Implications
The problem of sustainability? by contrast, looks most acute
to those who envision continuing Soviet opportunities throughout
(.and beyond) this decade. The blocking strategy you heard at the
meeting rejected our bilateral leverage toward the Soviets as
marginal. In this view, there is less to be gained and more to be
lost by nuanced use of rewards and penalties. The key word here
is "simplicity." The economic, diplomatic and security dimensions
of our policy must be consistent..
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This seemed to me a very powerful line of argument. The
Soviet Union retains considerable flexibility and our policy
must serve us whether the Soviets hunker down for a few years
or take a more confrontational line. One difficult problem is
left unresolved, however: our approach to negotiation. The
public wants consistency but it also wants all means for
resolving conflicts explored. And those who have least hope
of moderating the competition for good are always suspected of
negotiating half-heartedly.
If we are not to be.whip-sawed by these conflicting pressures,
we need a fuller negotiating strategy, particularly for arms
control, but extending to other areas as well. We run risks
whether we stand indefinitely by radical proposals or fall back
to positions that seem to call the competition off. To resolve
this problem, we need to see the fundamental difference between
agreements that put the competition on a new, qualitatively
safer basis and those that affect it marginally at best. In the
right circumstances, either one can be acceptable as long as
we know -- and the public knows -- which is which. If we are
settling for second-best, it should be clear that we are
settling, and that the broader competition goes on. An innova-
tive approach (botched in the follow-up) to solving this problem
was the Carter Administration's March 1977 double offer on
SALT: letting the Soviets choose between major and marginal
change. Our problems are a bit different now, but this may
not be a bad model for*our relationship as a whole.
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