PAKISTAN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP83T00966R000100090003-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 5, 2007
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 19, 1982
Content Type:
MISC
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 88.88 KB |
Body:
Approved For. Release 2007/04/05 CIA-RDP83T00966R00O10000'6O 3 9
Henry S. Rowen
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council 19 November 1982
NOTE FOR: DDCI
FROM : C/NIC
If you think that there is a significant
chance that Shultz and Weinberger have not made
a connection between these aircraft and our
leverage over the Pak-nuclear program, 4 call
should be made to Shultz and WeinbergerA
to call this to their attention.
. Approved -For-Release 20,07/04/05: CIA:RDP8,3T00966R000100090003-9
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
THRU: NIO/NESA
FROM: A/NIO
SUBJECT: Pakistan
1. The first squadron of F-16 aircraft to go to Pakistan did not
leave from Texas this morning. President Zia maintains his firm
position that he will not purchase these aircraft from us without
USAF level radar. Secretary Shultz yesterday at breakfast asked
Secretary Weinberger to reconsider DOD opposition to this sale, since
this could seriously damage the totality of the US-Pakistan relationship,
including cooperation across a broad range of matters.
2. We note that the aborting of the nascent US-Pakistan arms
supply relationship would remove any basis for pursuing General Walters'
conversations with Zia on Pakistan's nuclear program, a serious blow
to US worldwide nonproliferation efforts.
3. As you know, an important component of DOD's position against
sale of radar to Pakistan has been the intelligence judgment that it
was likely to be passed to China. It does seem that our policy not to
supply this advanced US radar to China nor to acquiesce in its probable
leakage to them by Pakistan may cause us to pay a very high price in
other aspects of our relationship with Pakistan, including nonproliferation
efforts.
4. We are bringing this to your attention because no single
intelligence assessment has pulled these various threads together, and
we do not believe policymakers have examined this close linkage.
SECRET
roved For Release 2007/04/05: CIA-RDP83T00966R0