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Approved For Release 2007/04/05: CIA-RDP83T00966R000100 40 ed For Release 2007/04/05: CIA-RDP83T00966R000100100036-1 Approved For Release 2007/04/05: CIA-RDP83T00966R000100100036-1 CONTENTS WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES AND EAST-WEST SECURITY IN THE 1980s HENRY ROWEN Professor of Public Management, Stanford University Graduate School of Business THE POLITICAL CHOICES UWE NERLICH Foundation for Science and Politics, Ebenhausen IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL 16 RICHARD BURT National Security Correspondent, The New York Times, Washington NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY AND THE OFFENCE/DEFENCE BALANCE .. .. .. 26 ERIK KLIPPENBERG Head of Systems Analysis Group, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Kjeller AIR AND ANTI-AIR CAPABILITIES .. .. , . 33 DONALD A. HICKS Senior Vice President (Technical), Northrop Corporation, Los Angeles COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS C. M. HERZFELD Technical Director, International Telephone and Telegraph, Aerospace Electronics, Components and Energy Group, Nutley, New Jersey Approved For Release 2007/04/05: CIA-RDP83T00966R0001001 Approved For Release 2007/04/05: CIA-RDP83T00966R000100100036-1 New Weapons Technologies and East-West Security in the 1980s Many technologies of military relevance are changing; and they interact in complex ways. Undoubtedly some will play a decisive role in future wars, but which? We can make a few predictions with confidence, more which are only inferences, and still more which are mere con- jecture. There are four non-nuclear technologies whose of lyances are o cardinal importance: (a) those sensing and '^anmiittinr signals over a wide ranje"ftTie eTec.?o-_ia etic s ectrum; () data e"'ff~ness of the other technologies. The first extends our capacity to detect things and non-targets- on- argets - in an increasingly wide range environm and to send enormous amounts of data rapidly over long distances. The first and second together make it possible to search for and extract signals from noise, natura a1' d man place, an.tto guide vehicles ith heat precision To targets. The third- r , together with the others, enables us to build aerodynamic vtnicles which can be small and have tae a y to By + He nap o the earth' for long distances. a fourth ma kes it possible to tailor more closely the effects of weapons to the characteristics of gets and to the error of delivery; is is especia y important or non-nucit r weapons but it is to some extent possible with those which are nuclear. These changes affect our central concerns : NATO's ability to defend eve and its reliance on nuclear threats; the estructw?ness of war and the issue of w e her we should be t ry i g make war more horrible ropurion; (d) ordnance. Tie cone ogiw change lie'in s i to technologies of infor- mation, interacting with and amp ying the or more humane; our ability to e 2 en sea lines o co~m cation; the capacity of East and West to project power into third areas; a~~v whet er ante of technology. Ten Propositions Advances in these technolog' suppor the following propositions: 1. The most elementary proposition is familiarfone can see a target - in the absence of enemy interference - one. K be able t7 h t 1T And many more rge Will a visa e longer distances than in the past: ships, aircraft, air bases, factories, bridges and tanks. This is in marked contrast to the wars of the past, in which hundreds of aircraft might spray thousands of bombs over the landscape in order to get a few on target. Improvements in accuracy now make it possible to reduce the amount of ordnance delivered by a factor of etween 100 and'10,000/ or a wide range of target types, including-soft missile sites, electric power plants, petroleum refineries, steel plants, etc., causing damage that could put such facilities out of action long enough to be significant in imports: tt contin- gencies. However, if the attacking vehic1Ps can be seen, perhaps they too can be t precisMY "I M7 complication suggests a duel which cannot ~' decided in the abstract. But another propositit applies: defe' c!--s are almost inevitably im erfe - sometFing can usua yenetrae, ow t the chances are goo that w at ets throw h xr hit, the attacker will find th netratioti'pt t, worth paying if the target is su cien a ua le. Approved For Release 2007/04/05: CIA-R DP83T00966R000100100036-1. Approved For Release 2007/04/05: CIA-RDP83T00966R000100100036-1 ? 2. Forces that operate against a homogeneous a sily concealed in `noise' created by exercises, background, esReciallx the s Joy or a sur a for examp e, and would be less likely to give ui caVrrW- u_oe e ran lore aria tnereto+ NATO a netptui warning time. . u F s i es. e s ulg attac a v 24ykgc which the sea is no longer black ink. has been evident in the two most recent Arab- 3. Less damage to civi ians - especially from Israeli wars, also applies to navies - era tt~ ng~n the - Ito as an enc ose areas for example, et~i "i l_: %,'?-rranean. acct enta consenuence o war, because more It -does not imply an inexorable cc~ aircraft or cruise missiles against ships.) And information on the location and movement of an those that operate against a more heterogeneous opponent's forces, together with more effective for example, on land or under the means of attack, increases the advantage . o sea, can no longer count on relatively easy moving first. This creates a danger o pry' e-emptive concealment t it iii T1,_ As Andrew Marshall has eaves unsettled the outcome of duels involving universality of proposition 4 above is that better bombs wi hit their targets rather than the first-strike instability but, rather, indicates that adaptations are needed to increase warn;:-.g of and to reduce vulnerability to suc pree ve neighbourhood, and fewer bombs need to get through to the vicinity of the target. This does not mean, of course, that war will necessarily be more humane, only that a deliberate choice will have to be maw . ?s;ivr cans are to e u . agi in, especially with non-nuclear weapons, such a choice will often be at the expense of directing attack at military targets. 4. The invaders rather than the invaded will pro rsa van age. making a ami iar but usually muddled dis- tinction between offensive and defensive weapons. For example, are mobile air defences which are movir?g forward as part of a combined- arms team offensive or defensive weapons? Clearly both; however, invaders usually have to concentrate their forces and often make them- selves visible as they do so; this now makes them more vulnerable. Eric Klippenberg rightly points out that our problem is not offence versus defence - or invading and blocking - in general, but the Warsaw Pact's ability to invade and ours to block.- er o invade they must move an wit improoveTsensors their movements will e more easily detected. c eear cave in -'Point is amp ious- aT'nain' s" on unfrie ndlyshores: if e iffi"- nvaded side is equipped with modem surveillance technologies and precision weapons, the invader's prospects are not promising. A less clear but probably valid argument of a similar kind can be applied to blocking ground invasions, especially where the inva s routes 7, channelled y~ie terrain. The act - if also equipped with weapons o preci7on - may be able to launch an attack that is both owerfu and smaller. Such an 'ttac would , generate Tewer -signals- an tnese siana s s could be more 6. dvances in technology make some measur, .'o reduce vulnerability easier. Improved sensors now make it possible to detect small but pos- sibly lethal forces earlier. But heavy dependence on warning anti high alertness is risky and costly; it is better to seek a posture that would force a potential first-striker to mount a lar er any noi?ier - e on. This can done by using distributed or dispersed systems made up of small, which are also less likely to be seen, linked by advanced communication tech- nologies. Because increased precision reduces payload needs, and therefore vehicle size in many cases, small vehicles might be substituted for lamee. is principle applies to aircraft, cruise missiles and remotely piloted vehicles (RPv), and ships. 7. Dis . rice matters less. The performance of some high precision navigation and guidance systems does not vary with distance (the manu- facturer of the global positioning system advertises a XPloot median inaccurac anywhere). Satellites have eased the problem of _ gathering i onfrmanoa at a distance; the cost of movement by sea has been low for some time, and increased distance adds little to expense; long-haul air transport costs have continued to decline with the advent of jumbo jets. But distance is not irrelevant: the interval between a decision to move forces and their first arrival at the distant terminus and the time it takes to fill a `pipeline' can be important parameters. The local conditions of the terminus are also very important (for example, whether there are local oved For l elease 2007/04/05: CIA-RDP83T00966R000100100036-1 ncreasmr, great y. Tha necessity or dispersal, concealment and mobility increases the demand for control, while these technologies of informa- tion enormously increase the supply possibilities. As Uwe Nerlich and others have pointed out, the main obstacle to realizing these possibilities may be vested organizational interests within services and within separate national governmo l T~'e e Will be a great advantage accruing to -rose who develop operational procedures for handling large amounts of data and who design procedures for information handling and decision-making which match well to technological and human air defences or a local logistic distribution Some Inferences network), but these factors are more or less If these changes, vigorously pursued, promise a independent of distance. relative improvement in NATO's ability to block 8. Both the demands on command and control an invasion and to do so while reducing collateral and the potential for exten utg its s PF-i damage, it would seem that they would be l i onset by each other, and this gives an advantage to the side with the most weapons. Although the Soviet Union lags in some of these develop- of the technological developments are partially Mis lesson 10. A technological lead is extremely useful, but size o orces still matters a great deal. Some adva o ogy. We should expec o see 9. Advanced technology is necessary hands of those who develop and adopt an effective doctrine for its use. The tank had been around for twenty-five years before it was first used with decisive effect. It required years of doctrinal development by Fuller, Liddell-Hart, " r aga otners betore to u po en ca was realized by Gud eerian_The German success with tanks was no^t based on superior technology but on a superior concept of how to use a not-very- mobile SAM and deployed cruise missiles). The winner of the future Z as in the past - will often be the side that runs out of weapons and troops second. espi a superior NATO in o ion ec no ogles, the Soviet Union might manage simply to blast through with enough tanks, artillery an peop e. 1 Does the Vietnam War demonstrate that it is not even ne~~ces~ssa__rr?er aps, but the fairlymod_em Set SAM ee envere undoubtedly useful in vie t an Sov"et---~ade artillery, and, in the end, tan`s made'a'great Chile ence in the S h. unambiguously a good thing. Consider, however , the furore in the United States and Germany over the neutron bomb. The neutron bomb h as been attacked on t e ounds that it is a too destructive and (b) not destructive Pnough. Those of the (first view claim that such weapons are too destructive because the effect of neutrons is nog well enough known, or declare that radioactive fallout may be increased. Those of the second view declare that the gap between nuclear and non-nuclear arms has been narrowed and that the reduction in civilian damage makes the use of these weapons tempting, more likely and there- fore dangerous because, once nuclear weapons are used, escalation follows. This dispute bears on the potential role of improved non-nuclear technologies. Advanced non-nuclear technologies wit[ cause ~---indi .~.. le~Gtntlis: criminate destruction_ Should we reject them on the grounds that to use them will be too tempt- ing? Not if we believe that we face a formidable adversary against whom we need a capacity to act which is militarily effective without being suicidal. The second part of this requirement, a capacity to take non-suicidal action, is more irr ortant in an alliance than a sing:, sate. Political decisions are more likely to be a en i the criterion of achieving a desired military effect within the constraint of limited civilian damage can be met. Modem non-nuclear technologies can do more: for some missions they can substitute for nuclear wP p21S,4VI/here t is is t e case, ere is noTurring of the distinction between nuclear and nun-nuclear - the firebreak between non- nuclear and nuclear choices is widened. This can hardly be in dispute. But it does not follow that a large-scale substitution of non-nuclear for nuclear weapons must come next. Firstly, although the Soviet Union lags in the develop- ment of technologies of information, she does not seem to lag in fielding useful equipment and in making needed adaptations, and NATO's Secondly, whatever the potential for improving the non-nuclear blocking capacity, the need to discourage a nuclear attack on Europe remains Approved For Release 2007/04/05: CIA-RDP83T00966R000100100036-1 .. 0 0 Approved For Release 2007/04/05: CIA-RD-P83T00966R000100100036-1 I urgent. Thirdly, more vehicles will be genuinely including those with area coverage, and they will dual-capable - .. ~Mav and no. - present a much greater threat of disruption and because the effectiveness of small non-nuc ear damage to NATO forces than in the past. Mobile packages is higher. Cruise missiles and RPV air defences and improved low-altitude r" provide perhaps the best examples. covT eraQe have ome urgen for NATO 1 orce improvement. Defending Europe Defence of the flanks may be especially Unless NATO continues to make changes to affecte by the increased vu nerability of sea and reduce its vulnerability, the Pact's surprise-attack ail forces noted in Proposition 2 above. In a capacity will growl it may a re e o Soviet attacking force these components could mount a powerful attack without extensive be subject to high attrition. So also might some reinforcement, and such an attack could give of the Western forces moving in reinforcement NATO little usable warning. In constrast, if of The lesson yet again, is o ?void NATO's posture is resilient to sudden attack thee'gian is A multiplicity of . sma., -. anitsC''7 in ---?_ .- ... .. pre:a aunt earlier arrival o 5'7tne .. -:. free- (gt:. it could be vulnerable durin t is te ? g process if mnis on the flank - an important mo lea!~-s ~TO has invested in improved battlefield esi d eratum - as well as providin more difficult ' .surveillance= mobile artillery air a tverd -area- r e Soviet attac munitio m ns, i prove an i- an weapons etc It is natural to speculate not only about the Despite the growing difficulty . of penetrating implications of these developments for the modem air defences, much more effective attack Alliance vis-a-vis the Wars P b aw act ut also against fixed targets for example, bridges ands about the implications for intra-Alliance relations ' comman centres) rnra t be manage in -order of changes in information technology. One e orwacd p movement and supply of should not, however, conclude that increased Pact forces. On the battlefield, improved US technical dominance in the Alli ill b ance w e a target-acquisition technology and the use of consequence. These technologies are dynamic; RPV, drones and recisiO weapons ea onS p p (inclu g the United States has a lead in some, but others advanced area munitions cou serve to aTunt in the West are not far behind. They are ubi- a ov , at least tb re quitous - they will pervade both civil and extent of disrupting it, perhaps with substantial military sectors. It is important for the West direct destruction. (There is a good deal of to stay ahead, and fortunately it seems to have disagreement about the best way to achieve these an advantage in economic organization, and ei ds.)2 even in culture, in these technologies. The Soviet Union, of course, is adopting these It is difficult to see major implications for technologies, and (given her higher material large states relative to small states in these production rates) her inventories of advanced developments, but other distinctions may emerge weapons may grow rapidly. She is investing clearly. For instance, people who live on islands heavily not only in the ground-force equipment will find it easier to pr(;ct .t themselves r" ainst about which we hear so much - tanks, self- invasion, whereas those who depe' nci on un- propelled artillery, anti-tank weapons and impede" movement- o s pping may nd t. em. armoured personnel carriers - but also in se yes at a disadvantaL ere are essc-I tgc surveillance, electronic countermeasures and JaBati-and for the '. n t'rnr ..ere' command-and-control capacities. She is also Because the prospects for action at a distance investing much more than before i t i l n act ca are impoved- the possibility o an've aircraft with offensive capacities. These are non-nuclear attack across political boundaries is equipped with modem i i I prec s on munitions, more likely. at least asair st VI-zr '~