(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200020013-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 1999
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: NOTES

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Cc,.. f
p. 5-6: "the Director of Central. Intelligence is hereby authorized to undertake
such research and analysis as may be necessary to determine what ... not being
... performed or are not being adequately performed. Based on these determina-
tions, the Director ... may centralize such research and analysis activities as
may, in his opinion and that of the appropriate member or members of the Intel-
ligence Advisory Board, be more efficiently or effectively accomplished centr -
y.'I
1. This may be reflection of my own ignorance, but might not a mention of
the circumstances of the establishment of ORE be appropriate here. Apparently,
tkexuxx on the basis of above underscoring, IAB Approval was necessary. Is
this right? ORE was established, yet (p. 7) the agencies "were dismayed at the
establishment of an intelligence research activity in Central Intelligence".
Did the DCI just establish it, or what? I don't mean that there should be a lon{
discourse on this, but the question does arise in my mind - under what circum-
stances wav it established?
p. 6: line 6 from bottom: paraphernalia.
p. 6: See point raised above. "This decision of the NIA" on July 19 - to estab.
ORE. Was this decision routine or the result of dispute between DCI and IAB?
Or did the IAB simply go along with the DCI.2 If the NIA decided the matter, it
would seem that there was disputes, see NIA Directive No. 1 on DCI-IAB relations.
p. 12: line 9 from kzkkwm bottom: Scandinavia.
P. 34: bottom of page. Summary of IPB. Contradiction here? - might well have
been the answer to review question tf had been seriously adopted. Then - it is
improbable that it would have succeeded if tried.
P. 3 (in Appendix): line 3 from top: Scandinavia..
h a EMpOAA,[ y DOU ENT
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1.
P. 1: Although there is a footnote listed on footnote sheet for this page
there is no number on the page itself.
posed to come at the end of paragraph 1.
I would judge that it is sup-
2.
L. L: bottom of page: "to the detriment of its main function", over to top
of p. 5. I realize that one of ORE difficulties ,as precisely that
the que'ution of what was its function. However, it seems to me that
this part (looking at it as an outsider) would be strengthened by a
restatement (surmnary) and comment on the section which you have on
p. 8 (1 believe) of Paper Number 1 - the section in which you state
the function of ORE. This might serve to emphasize the whole problem,
3. p. 8: Would not the point discussed in connection with p. 4 also apply
here? "it had been allowed to deviate drastically from this purpose",
4. p., 9: "The memorandum of October 3 to the Office of Reports and Estimates
from the Planning Staff, with an ou'Gline similar to Souerst, must hav(
been based on the thought ..." Authority for underscored wor s? 7
u y t s paragraph is all conjecture reasoning from coincidence.
I am not disputing k the reasoning, but either more documentation
might be in order or else the conjecture admitted as such. "must
have been" so often indicates that the speaker really doesn't know,bu-,
that he is goddamned well going to ram ih= his ideas down the listen
p.l: "That the case must have bei e fective ... " Same as immediately
above. No one has seen i Minh for 5 years, which shows that he
must have ben killed by tuberculosis (which know he had).
6. p.12: "The forrni which th~ took, however; was believed by the Office ...
to have anated (?) directly from, the NSC". Is "prescril2ed" meant
~ ~ ,~,.~~-~.,? _~
here?
p?l7: Appendix C and D. Two'points: Typists have not labeled them. Second,
wouldn't it .b,e worth thinking about bringing some of that material
into the text - to demonstrate the lack of clarity, which is, after
all, one of the main themes of the whole paper? Otherwise, the lazy
reader has to go and wade through the appendix to see xhxi where is
this lack of clarity.
8. p.22: Same point as above.. The texts (of statements of mission) are ap-
parently there, but do not fill the bill. "No adequate definition of
an ORE Mission exists", etc. Why not? Brief statement out the Con
stitution is excellent, but how to answer the argument - OK, there is
the Nat. Security Act and statements of function. What's wrong with
them. In otherx words, to an outsider the point is well made, but
not clearly illustrated.
91 p?23 bottom: "that do not conform to a strict interpretation of the basic
directives". Not clear to me, because it seems(above) that their
whole point.is that adequate basic directives are lacking.
10. p.28: No footnote sheet for this page, which contains a footnote to a
quotation.
(OVER)
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NOTES ON PAPER NUMBER 3**
25X1A
1, p. 31 "It is interesting., in the light of later developments ... and co-
ordinated with the rest." Air evidence in re why this procedure
was adoptec.,in view of President's letter., etc.? An interesting
point.
2. p. 2: Last paragraph: "The DCI was to be represented ... by his Coordin-
ator whose function would be to settle disagreements that might arist
among the members." How?
3. P. 4: Top. contention that DCI by supplying editors would take
some responsibility for final product. Then below: "Souers directed
the CPS to appoint a coordinator ... who would act for the Director
in his capacity of making decisions when the committee members could
not agree."
4. p. 9: Towards bottom: "no department seems to have been willing to cooper-
ate to the extent that its own facilities became fully available to
the rest."
Notes 2,3,L. bring up again the question of" coordination" and" responsibility: If
the DCI settles disagreements., doesn't he take some responsibility2 And yet
Parlonan says that taking responsibility is going beyond the job of coordinator.
?If the DCI doesn't settle disagreements., how are they settled? All this is not
clear to me. If the DCI can't force Agencies to cooperate (p. 9, bottom)., how
can he settle disagreements (p. 2) or have any capacity for making decisions
(p. 4)?
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NOTES ON PAPER. NUMBER 4:
(non-interpretive)
1. L-..5: "interpretative". On p.9 this appears as "interpretive".
NOTES ON PAPER NUMBER 5:
1. p. 2: Ambiguities in NIA #1 and NSCID #l? I don't see them - seems to me
that the statements are pretty clear. The various organizations
shall do this and that. Also - difference between "enjoin" and "comet
per. you mean here tide use of physical force? DCI's right of
inspection to take care of "this omission". Nhat omission? Bmx=m
I really can't see that there is any omission in the directives -
the agencies shall do so-and-so. The only dmission I can see is
that they don't spell out the penalty for non-compliance. If this
is so, shouldn't this whole thing be re-stated in some such terms?
Wouldn't some examples of Inglis's historic remarks in the Most
Historic Meeting of Bee. 8, 19147, be appropriate here - to show
graphically the point at issue?
2.
P.
14: Typist's error: "principal" should be "principle"???
3.
p.
7: line 2 from top: "impassee" should be "impasse"???
14.
p.
9-10: Discussion of NSCID #3 and NSCID #1: the point is well taken
here. Is there anything in the existence of "escape clauses" in
both documents (by agreement with the pertinent agency; as appro-
priate to their respective responsibilities) to add to strength of
..agencies' refusal to supply information? In other words., something
bedides the agencies' own definitions of "intelligence" and conse-
quent actions?
5. No notes on Enclosure to Paper Number 5.
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N01 ES ON PAPER xnimrR 6:
i.. I._ 5: Center of page: conflict.
2. p. 27: Bottoms - arbitrarily arranged in chronological order. First one
is 1948, others in order.
3, p28 ORE F.a? 9-48 (Cuba). This summary is not clear. Did the State De-
partment mean that because Cuba is small its elections could not
affect the security of the United States - which is so much more
powerful than Cuba2 Or was the issue in re the embarrassment
to the USf which might increase if the elections went one way
rather than another?
4. . 37: line 8 from bottom: "he must have in-shed ... 11 Why?
5. p. 38: line 6 from, bottom: "a memorandum (undated but must have been sent
aft4r April 17) ..." Why?
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DOTES ON PAPER NU :BER, 7: (~J t .
1.
a
l:
1_ine 6 from top: "non-in terpretatige". Dictionary does NOT recog-
r:.. e "interpretive", at least the Winston does not.
2.
P.
1:
line 5 from bottom: Scandinavia.
3.
4:
halfw ,y doi-rn the page: northern.
4.
p.
6:
line 5 from bottom: . an "extended period of unrest ...
-
"
.
savm~z~~ CIG
was not allowed, at first,
p. 8-9: You say that v
to publish comments or evaluations in the Daily", but that it soon
began to do so. This is just a point of interest: did it begin to
co.m-z:ment in defiance of any actual directives, did it begin to do so
and,m since no one objected, contirnaed, or what? This is
certainly not a vital point, but appeals to my sense of curiosity.
p.-7: line 7 from top: the use of Comments apparently became "official"
soon after-the first one. Cf.~ immediately above. Was arty of this
a question of directives, or just a situation which evolved like
Topsy? ( rew, to you) .
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NO TES ON PAPER NUMBER 8:
I. P. 7: line 7 from bottom: "As an officially. uncoordinated publication..."
2. p. 9: line 10 from bottom: "evasive" rather than "elusive"77?
3. p 9: line 2 from bottom: "someone who must have perceived..." Evidence?
"probably perceived", or "may have pere ved" might be better?
4. p. 12: first line of quotation at top of page: It must have
occurred to .." If it must have occurred toam, why,
25X1A
then, does this merely e ha s exp..aa_n subsequent
action. If it must have occurred to him I should think that it
25X1A certainly explained his subsequent action. Or,. if it pndrq= per-
25X1A haps explained his subsequent action then it may have occurred to
him. snp speaking).
5. P. 11.4: End of first paragraph following end of quotation (top part of
page): "Rather, he must have gone according. to ..111 Evidence?
He robabl did, since his act was in agreement with what Montague
recommended. Sorry to keep riding the hobby horse of "must have".
Seems.,xxilm doesn't it, rather like trying to serve a Moslem a
meal of pig's knuckles??
6. P. 14: Center of page: picayune point no. 1,345,678. "might have become"
a turning-point. I should say that the whole incident actually was
a turning-point - only the turn was not made. In other words, an
issue of great importance did arise and was settled one way instead
of another, albeit almost in a fit of absent-mindedness.
7. p. 180
. Center of page (under "Ft~ance") : were not the French and Italian
Communist parties in a plurality rather than a majority? ~ift (I'v,
been to graduate school, Uncle George).
8. p. 19 line 2 from bottom: Trieste.
9. P. 22: bottom line: insistence.
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NOTES ON PAPER NUMBER 9:
( ~' J
1.
pp. l:
2?
-P? 13:
3.
p. 23:
4.
p.3 8t
e
t
op of the page: u precedented.
p. 40: line 7 from top: sphere.
6. P- 43: lines 6 - 10 from top: must have. Any evidence except the logic of
the situation. Did they rebalance the desirability or, per-
haps did they flip a coins This may be facetious, but was there and
evidence that such a debate went on?
Y?x . 53: line 2 from top: "this friendship". Reference is Saudi Arabia, not
Ibn Saud.
8. ~? 53: line 3 from top says '"Qavam"; line 7 from top says "Qavan" - con-
p 51-55: bottom line, p. 53 - top line, p. 54: "US influence is at a
low
bb
e
an
d
an improvement ca
t b
10.
P 58:
11.
~? 59:
12.
p. 62:
13.
.~. 63:
114.
P. 75:
15.
p. 77:
16?
:
17.
a.. 78:
line 6 from top: thesis.
line 3 from bottom: nationalism.
line 7 from bottom: omit "On" (last word in line).
line 5 of the quotation (from the beginning of it), NOT line 5
from th
nno
e in the near future." Is this
correct, or is there an omission between "be" xx and "in"???
lines 9-11 from bottom: "Therefore, as for the US primarily a
mom sea and air power, the more defensible positions lay beyond
the Asiatic mainland." Shouldn't this read something like: "since
the US is primarily a sea and air power..."???
line 4 from top: words "The best" are ran together: thebest.
line 3 froln bottom: "drift" is meant??
line 6 from top: sarong set of quotation marks around "coalition".
Should be 'coalition'.???
FOOTNOTE #3 ON BLUE FOOTNOTE SbEET: "Dutch-Indonesian
center of page: "Syngrian Rhee faction" instead of "ghee Syngian
faction"???
eer of page: of what was the North Korean government representa-
tive?? TNot clear to me in what way it was (or would be) more re-
presentative than the Rhee government in South Korea.
line 6 from top: ' ltreducejng"??? Is this a mistake in the original
teLt?? If so, shouldn't there be a "sic"??
18. Throughout: Some inconsistency in underlining, etc., of passages and title
in margins of pages.
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NOTES ON PAPER NUN'