Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 12, 2000
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP84-00022R000200030046-0.pdf221.82 KB
)pproved For Release 20%&7/27: CIMM42R00020003Q-0 25X1 C COMMENT ON DRAFT DIRECTIVE REGARDING EXCHANGE TH 25X1A (From 1. I think this is really very good, but it seems to me that, for the purposes at hand, any directive we should recommend ought to be just as specific as it can be made; otherwise, we are going to be exactly where we are now. 2. In the first place, I think the general policy ought to be stated affirmatively instead of negatively emphasizing what we should rather than what we should not send and should be slightly elaborated upon. I should like to get it made plain that CIA's purpose should be to forward as much intelligence as possible to in order to encourage the maximum, receipt of their intelligence and benefit by their comments on the maximum of our production. 3. In the second place, I should like a much clearer idea of where and why I&S comes into this. Their main responsibility seems to be under II. A, Security Regulations, but I don't see just what security regulations are meant. The matter of checking individual recipients should not be involved because, as far as I know, there is never more than one recipient of these things who is some character in the Pentagon connected with the CCS. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RJVJPJRM00200030046-0 000078 Approved For Release 20(7/27: CIA R00020003004 -0 Obviously there is no question about him, and further handling of the document is presumably a matter of the Director's faith in So far as I know, classification never has entered into this process: the idea given me, anyway, as to the nature of the deal made with the 25X1A by General ? was that you could very easily send a TS ORE because it didn't say anything offensive but might withhold a restricted IM because 25X1 C it said that was perfidious. Material marked for US officials only would obviously not be exchanged. As to "other security regulations," it is not clear to me which ones are meant. "Other security regulations estab- lished by governmental planning committees, et" refers, I suppose to the 25X1 C SANACC remnant that thinks the - have no interests in the Western Hemisphere. If so, I should think the thing to do would be to have somebody get together with this committee to review their exchange "policies" and have them changed; or else to go along independent of what their policies (which I believe we are not bound by) happen to be. There is, of course, the matter, which probably is important and I suspect hasn't really been handled by I&S in the course of its preoccupation Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : MINff 2ROO0200030046-0 Approved For Release 2007/27 : CIA- 000200030.0-0 with international insults--- amely that of checking with the IAC agencies., (which may have contributed) as well as S0., 00, and any other group that might have an interest in the disclosure of sources. Probably something should be done about this., and probably I&S should do It. (On the other hand,, I think I'd like it better and that the exchange process would work better if I&S were out out of the business entirely.) 4. As to our own responsibilities: a. Matter of sources is mentioned above,, but obviously we couldntt "delete" anything without., among other things,, making the think we are more childish than they think already. b. Seems to me the dissents., as such, are simply part of the paper and should be considered according to the rules covering exchange in general. There might be a point where we shouldntt want to expose inter-agency squabbling to outsiders,, and I suspect.a provision for this (a specific one) ought to be included in the directive Approved For Release 2001/07/27: CIA-ReI000200030046-0 Approved For Release 20W7/27: CIA-RMI00020003004 -0 5. As to ORE responsibilities in general, it seems to me that the first step would be to establish somehow that we either do or don't trust the My guess is that we do, and if so.. I should think that my first point would stand--that we send them the maxima, rather than the minimum. As to the necessary safeguards: there are undoubtedly policies that 25X1 C we don't want to expose prematurely and we shouldn't want to do anything that would actually offend them (them, by the 25X1 C way, being such officials as happen to read this sort 25X1 C of thing- As to the first, I have always thought that, if ORE is going to make recommendations on ex- change of documents, it should have some sort of guidance. I recommended, 25X1 C for example, some time ago, that certain papers on _ be withheld on 25X1 C grounds that and with Far Eastern commitments of their own; could imply from the documents that we had plans for (which for all I know we did have) inimical to their interests. On this point, as I remember it, I was overruled by the ADORE but sustained by the DCI. In any case, I was shooting in utter darkness, and that is no way to screen intelligence. On the other matter, I should think that withholding Approved For Release 2001/07/27: CIA-A R000200030046-0 Approved For Release 2007/27: CIA-000200030044-0 for reasons of giving offense should be rather rare: it seems to me that 25X1 C you could almost always rely on -good sense and maturity to distinguish between intelligence analysis and personal affront. 6. Other grounds for failure to exchange might well be considered. I think, for instance, that when, in the opi +.on of D/Pub,, the document in question was slight, fatuous, childish, or in general so written that CIA might be- 25X1 C 25X1 C come a -laughing-stock in which would soon lose all confidence, the grounds would be sufficient for withholding of the document. The same might be said about certain ORE's that might be all right in themselves but could be of no sort of use to the 7. Consideration might be given to certain extent blanket restrictikons on exchange. As of now, we do not send them anything except ORE's and SR's. All current intelligence is excluded, including the CIA monthly; IM's have never been considered. I suppose strictly current intelligence should be ruled out because of the time factor, but when the first issue of the CIA came out, there was talk of sending it, and I think the reason for not doing so had to do with security rather than with currency. The IM series, I should think might very well be given some thought. I don't know what, if anything, G Approved For Release 2001/07/27: CIA-RDP.8OD022R000200030046-0 Approved For Release 200QW127 : CIA j2R00020003004 -0 we might get in exchange., but the nature of some of those things is such 25X1 C that- connnents might be most valuable. *UNET -6- Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000200030046-0