FUNCTIONS OF THE 'GLOBAL SURVEY GROUP.'

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040054-0
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
R
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 21, 2000
Sequence Number: 
54
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 17, 1947
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040054-0.pdf201.88 KB
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Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040054-0 Transcribed by EH for ABD October 1, 1953 17 July 1917 MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, R & E SUBJECT: Functions of the "Global Survey Group." Reference: Memorandum for the Director, "Organization of the Office of Reports and Estimates," 3 July 19117. 1, The Reference defines the functions of the proposed "Global Survey Group" in general terms, as follows: Constantly studies all pertinent intelligence for the express purpose of promptly detecting and bringing into focus world developments affecting the national security with special emphasis upon the strategic implications of multinational situations. Produces the World Situation Estimate. 2. The essence of this concept is that the Group should be` composed of a few carefully selected men of broad intelligence experience (rather than particular specialization) and of proved insight, who, being relieved of routine operational responsibilities, have the freedom (inevitably denied to all chiefs of operational units) to ponder the broader aspects and less obvious implications of the developing international situation, to consult the most expert opinion with respect to trends thus perceived, to effect the ultimate correlation and synthesis, and to give appropriate guidance to the staffs and branches concerned. Taken from "Souvenirs of G/GS" 3. This concept is not new, but previous attempts to imple.. ment it have fallen short of the mark .? e.g., the "Twelve Apostles" in G-2 and, later, the "Specialists." The first of these experi- ments failed because the "Apostles" were too far removed from the everyday work of M.I.S. and became eventually no more than odd-job handymen for the A.C. of S., G-2. The second failed because the "Specialists," individually, were too narrowly specialized and temperamentally unable to keep free of the day to day business of M.I.S. Manifestly, very nice discrimination and judgment is re- quired to maintain desirable detachment midway between the self. defeating extremes of involvement and isolation. The relationships which should exist between the G.S.G. and the operating staffs and branches of O.R.E. therefore require thoughtful consideration, although they should not be too rigidly prescribed in advance. Thin ?docum Us bem Sapro'eci for release through *np xlss~g~,xc x ?' R Irw PROGRAM of *'h ~ C+~r tF#A IW11 e,A9ene Agency. Date f D.T~? r h'4'/' 7 2 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040054-0 MD O i 13 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040054-0 4. As a corollary of its broad surveillance of the developing situation, which will be accomplished in large part through thought- ful scrutiny of the intelligence produced by C.I.G. and the Depart- mental agencies, the G.S.G. should not only advise the staffs and branches of O.R.F. regarding the broader implications of regional and functional developments, but should also guide the intelligence production program, indicating requirements for Daily and Weekly coverage, for estimates in the O.R.E. series, etc. Moreover, the G.S.G. will have occasion to initiate O.R.E. (and perhaps Depart- mental) intelligence studies preliminary to its preparation of the World Situation Report, This function resembles the overall co-? ordination and supervision formerly vested in the Intelligence Staff, but must be distinguished from the executive responsibilities in- herited from the I.S. by the three successor staffs, formerly I.S. divisions. For many reasons it would seem desirable that this function be accomplished, not by formal paperwork, but by informal consultation and discussion with the staff and branch chiefs con- cerned in each case. 5. The chiefs of the Current Intelligence and Estimates Staffs will inevitably turn to the G.S.G. for guidance which they have hitherto received from the Intelligence Staff. It is proper that they should consult the G.S.G. regarding the broader aspects and deeper implications of particular reports and estimates, and the G.S.G. should be located near them in order to facilitate such con. siltation. All concerned, however, must be on guard lest the G.S.G. be diverted from its function much as Dr. VanSlyck was drawn into the day to day operations of the Current Division, I.S. 6. The Chief and Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Staff have customarily conducted the Tuesday afternoon oral presentation and a preliminary Monday afternoon meeting in O.R.E. In the sense that this is a routine process resulting in the presentation of current intelligence, the function may be considered to devolve upon the Current Intelligence Staff. In the sense that it is, at least potentially, a means whereby the branch chiefs may be brought peri- odically to consider the global significance of developments in their respective jurisdictions, it is a proper function of the G.S.G. On balance, I would recommend that the G.S.G. be charged with coordi- nating and conducting the Tuesday presentation, for the express pur- pose of developing the preliminary discussion as indicated above and the presentation itself as a review of the global significance of current events rather than a miscellany of local developments. 7. At least for the time being, the recruiting objective for the G.S.G. should include no more than five P-8ts and a corresponding clerical staff, The professional personnel should,include a chief Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040054-0 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040054-0 (as primus inter pares, for administrative convenience) and four associates, all chosen primarily for personal qualifications in- dicated in paragraph 2, but with incidental regard'for a balanced- representation of the interests of the I.A.B. agencies or of appro- .priate disciplines (history, political science, economics, sociology). Recruitment should be sure rather than hasty or expedient, preferably by selection after probationary service elsewhere in O.R.E. As the Group develops it should acquire a junior professional secretary to function as did the Secretary, Joint Intelligence Staff, but such assistance is not an immediate requirement. The maximum strength presently foreseeable would thus be, in tabular form: Chief P-B 1 Associates P..8 4 Secretary P-3/P>1 1 Secretary to Chief CAS'-.5 1 Clerk-Stenographers CAF..3 4 It must be reiterated that this strength should be regarded as an ultimate maximum, not likely to be attained in this fiscal year if proper care is observed in recruitment, cc: Chief, Planning Staff Chief, Executive Staff Dr. VanSlyck Current Division Projects Division LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE Chief, Intelligence Staff, ORE Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040054-0