PRODUCTION OF A 'WORLD SITUATION ESTIMATE.'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000200040055-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: November 12, 1947
• Content Type: MF

TA;ppmradPayriMefba-cjiIB2000/09/14: C IA-RDP84-0002 tO0( 04G855-9
October 1, 1953 Now ` i4vo 7 "Souvenirs of G/GS"
12 November 1947
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, R & E
Subject: Production of a "World Situation Estimate."
1. The Global Survey Group is charged with the production
of 'World Situation Estimates." The content and frequency of
these Estimates are not specified. I understand that ORE under-
took to produce them on its own initiative, and suppose the .
content and timing are left to the discretion of ORE. Presumably
the Estimates would consist of a more extended exposition of those
matters presented in current and summary form in the CIA Series.
It has been anticipated that Estimates would be produced semi-
annually, the first by the end of the current year.
2. A prerequisite to the preparation of a World Situation
Estimate, as herein envisaged, is the existence of a body of
staff intelligence prep ared by the several. Branches with reference
to their particular concerns but affording coverage of all situa-
tions of global significance. This is not to say that the World
Situation Estimate would be merely a miscellany of Branch
estimates collected under one cover. On the contrary, it must
be a coherent analysis of the world situation from a global point
of view. The Branch estimates from which it is derived will
presumably have to be reworked by the Global Survey Group to meet
this requirement? The prerequisite staff intelligence must be
provided, however, before the Global Survey Group can proceed
with its task.
3. On my return from leave in early September it was my
intention to initiate s series of projects designed to close the
gaps in our staff intelligence coverage and to permit the completion
of the first World Situation Estimate on about 1 December. During
September and early October, however, the Global Group was pre-
occupied with meeting the unanticipated and urgent requirements
of the National Security Council and its Staff Group, Thereafter
I was unwell and had to defer specific planning for the World
Situation Estimate until about 1 November.
4. On canvassing the situation I now find that the available
staff intelligence is generally adequate with respect to the Near
East, the Far East,, and Latin America,, but that it is decidedly
inadequate with respect to the U.S.S.R., the U.K., France, and
Germany. Those four countries, however? constitute the very crux
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of the world situation as we have analyzed it in CIA 1. ORE
should have produced a complete and thoroughly analytical coverage
of them on general grounds, apart from the requirements of a World
Situation Estimate. The actual state of ORE coverage with respect
to each is as follows:
a. The U.S.S.R.: ORE has produced no general analysis
of Soviet o coves and strategy since ORE 1 (23 July 196).
That part of ORE 1 relating to the basic policy of the
U.S.S.R. is still generally valid (as it should be). But
ORE 1 was produced by one man over the weekend to meet an
unanticipated and urgent requirement. It has always been
subject to improvement with more time for deliberation and,
at the age of sixteen months could also be improved in the
light of subsequent developments. As regards current Soviet
M
strategy for the accomplishment of basic objectives (see
cial Evaluation No. 22), it is of course far out of datee
c. France: ORE coverage of France has been exclusive.
ly in theorm of current intelligence; no thorough analysis
of the French situation has ever been attempted or projected.
Yet France is the key to the situation in Western Euroioe,
There is presently in preparation an estimate of the current
political situation in that country, but on form it is more
likely to run as current than as staff intelligence. A
thorough analysis of all factors in the French situation is
definitely required,
d. Germany: ORE has produced no staff intelligence
on Germany except ORE 11/1 (8 April 1947)? That paper, as
its title implies, was a summary review of the objectives
and policies of the occupying powers rather than a thorough
analysis of the German situation. Such an analysis should
have been produced are now in anticipation of the C.F.M.
meeting a fortnight hence. A report on Germany is in prepara.
tion, but its original version was current rather than
staff intelligence and it is still too slight and superficial
to provide the thorough analysis of the German situation
that is required.
5. Personnel of the present Global Survey Group produced
both ORE 1 and ORE 11/1, the first singlehanded, the second with
some assistance from the Branch. The Group, however,, in not the
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proper body to prepare any one of the four estimates specifically
required and certainly cannot produce all of them and a World
Situation Estimate simultaneously.
6. Under the existing organization of ORE it is an implicit
function of the Global Survey Group to propose projects designed
to correct deficiencies in ORE coverage as the Group perceives
them. The procedure for giving effect to such proposals is un-
clear, however. The Group itself lacks authority to direct the
Branches to take appropriate action or to see to it that any
action taken actually satisfies the requirement indicated. More.
over, three requirements indicated herein result from the con-
sistent inability or disinclination of two Branches to perform
the primary function of ORE (thorough intelligence analysis, as
distinguished from current intelligence reporting). This is a
matter too fundamental to be dealt with through the routine
functioning of the Global Survey Group and the Estimates Group.
Both in theory and as a practical matter, it appears that only
the Assistant Director himself has the requisite authority to
give the direction and the instruction needed in these circum-
stances.
7. Recommendations:
a. That the Eastern European-U.S.S.R. Branch be directed
to prepare, as a matter of priority,, an analysis of basic
Soviet objectives and of current Soviet strategy, on the
order of ORE 1.
b. That the Western European Branch be directed to
prepare, as a matter of priority, thorough analyses of the
situation in France and the situation in Germany.
c. That the Northern Branch be directed to complete
ORE 76 as a matter of priority.
d. That each Branch be instructed that in each case
the Desideratum is a thougHful analysis of the fundamental
situation rather than a superficial account of current
events.
e. That the preparation of a World Situation Report
be deferred until the estimates referred to above are avail-
able at least in final draft.
LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE
Chief, Global Survey Group
cc: Assistant Dir., ORE
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