(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000300070025-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 25
• Content Type: MISC

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Source for these transcripts: The Dulles Report,, 19119.
The numbers in the upper left-hand corner of the sheets are identical to the
page numbers in the original Dulles Report.
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The "operating" services of common concern which have been assigned to
the Central Intelligence Agency are carried out by three Offices. The Office
of Special Operations is responsible for foreign espionage and counter-espionage
(See Chapter VIII). The Office of Operations is charged with the exploitation
of domestic contacts for foreign intelligence, the monitoring of foreign broad-
casts and the exploitation of intelligence information found in foreign docu-
ments, press and other publications (See Chapter VII). The Office of Policy
Coordination is charged with conducting secret operations abroad under a spe-
cial mandate from the National Security Council which stipulated that the As-
sistant Director, Office of Policy Coordination, must be nominated by the
Secretary of State, and that his appointment by the Director is subject to
approval by the National Security Council. This is the only case, as mentioned
above, in which the National Security Council has prescribed internal arrange-
ments within the Central Intelligence Agency or limited the appointive author-
ity of the Director. (See Chapter IX).
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SECURITY
Although there is no evidence of any laxness in the administrative ar-
rangements for security, there are a number of circumstances and policies which
detract from the general security of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is
very difficult to create adequate security, other than mere physical security,
around an organization which was publicly created by statute, employs about
three thousand individuals, and encompasses a wide variety of activities. The
fact that some of these activities are carried on is a matter of public record;
the existence of others and particularly operating details are highly secret.
Yet, by combining in a single organization a wide variety of activities, the
security of the covert activities risks being compromised by the lower stand-
ards of security of the overt activities.
In the Washington area, the Agency occupies about twenty buildings, all
of which can be readily identified as buildings of the Central Intelligence
Agency. In various cities throughout the United States, the regional offices
of the Office of Operations conduct their business under the name "Central
Intelligence Agency". Over two thousand individuals publicly identiir them-
selves with the Central Intelligence Agency which has unfortunately become
publicized as a secret intelligence organization.
This security problem is an aftermath of the wartime periods, with its
public dramatization of espionage and other secret operations and a rapid
turnover of personnel. Intelligence has become a subject of general discus-
sion to which the publicizing of inter-agency rivalries has contributed. For
example, after the there was a public airing before
a Congressional Committee of the handling of secret intelligence concerning
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developments in Damaging disclosures were made regarding certain
operating details of secret intelligence activities conducted by the Central
Intelligence Agency. During the past years there have been newspaper and
magazine articles concerning the Central Intelligence Agency and its secret
activities abroad.
Lest further incidents of this character occur, every effort should be
made to prevent the public disclosure of secret information relating to the
operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Under the National Security
Act (Section 102 (d) (3))v the Director of Central Intelligence is made re-
sponsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure. This mandate appears to give the Director authority to resist
pressure for disclosure of secret information.
If, however, in his relations with Congress or with other Government de-
partments, the disclosure of secret information is sought from the Director,
and if he has any doubt as to whether he should comply, it should be established
practice for him to refer the question to the National Security Council in
order that it may determine whether or not disclosure is in the public interest.
We believe that other steps can also be taken toward an improvement of
security. There should be greater flexibility in the Central Intelligence
Agency's organisation by distinguishing between those functions which are
written into the statute and hence are public and those whose existence, and
certainly whose operations, should remain secret. The two should be adminis-
tratively and functionally separated, and appropriate concealment should be
given to the secret activities as discussed below. (See page 116).
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At the same time., a serious endeavor should be made to reverse the pres-
ent unfortunate trend wherein the Central Intelligence Agency finds itself
advertised almost exclusively as a secret service organization. It should be
presented instead to the public as the centralized coordinator of intelligence.
This would help to cover rather than uncover its secret operations. Even with
these specific steps, in the long run only organizational discipline and per-
sonal discretion will insure security.
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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS BRANCH
The third Branch of the Office of Operations is the Foreign Documents
Branch which has the responsibility for exploiting foreign language documents
and foreign periodicals and press for intelligence purposes. Unlike the
and the,Contact Branch, which operate by virtue
of charters accorded the Central Intelligence Agency by National Security
Council Intelligence Directive Nos. 6 and 7, respectively, the Foreign Docu-
ments Branch has no such charter and is, therefore, not recognized officially
as a unique common service. The other departments and agencies do some of
their own translations of foreign language documents, etc., but also rely on
the Foreign Documents Branch.
The Foreign Documents Branch is engaged in completing its exploitation of
large quantities of materials captured during the recent war. In addition, it
monitors current press and periodical publications and besides these routine
translations it occasionally translates specific documents upon request. It
also maintains for the various consumer agencies a continuing program of
abstracting from periodical publications specific materials in such fields as
electronics, transportation, etc.
There is a constant and large flow of production from the Foreign Docu-
ments Branch in the form of extracts from the foreign press; current periodical
abstracts, both general and technical, dealing with items of intelligence value
contained in Soviet and other foreign periodicals; an industrial card file rec-
ord for inclusion in the Foreign Industrial Register of the Office of Collec-
tion and Dissemination; biographical intelligence reports; a bibliography of
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Russian periodicals, special accession lists and various translatiorr of cur-
rent material to meet continuing requirements.
Inasmuch as it is virtually impossible to have a large pool of expert
translators who are at the same time specialists in various fields., it is most
important that the work of an agency such as the Foreign Documents Branch be
performed in close relationship to and under the constant guidance of the con-
sumer agencies. It would, therefore, seem that instead of being associated in
the Office of Operations with the Contact Branch and the
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STATSPEC with which it has little in common., it mould be preferable
for the Foreign Documents Branch to be a part of the proposed Research and
Reports Division suggested in Chapter VI.
(1) The Office of Operations consists of three distinctive activities.,
which represent useful and recognized functions in their own field but have no
particular relation to each other.
(2) The Contact Branch should be integrated with the Office of Special
Operations and Office of Policy Coordination under single over-all direction
(Operations Division) within the Central Intelligence Agency.
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(4) The Foreign Documents Branch should be made part of the proposed
Research and Reports Division if one is created.
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(5) if the remains a part of the
Central Intelligence Agency, it should probably be administered by the new
Operations Division, but its product should be currently available for analysis
in the new Research and Reports Division.
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At the outset of this report we gave a brief summary of our survey and
findings, and at the various chapter endings we have added those conclusions
and recommendations which were applicable to the subject matter of the chapter.
We have been critical of the direction and administration of the Central
Intelligence Agency where we felt that there had been failures to carry out
its basic charter. We have also pointed out what we have judged to be in-
adequacies in administration and lack of over-all policy guidance within the
organization. At no time, however, have we overlooked the great difficulties
facing a relatively new and untried organization which has been viewed with
some suspicion and distrust even by those whom it should serve. We believe
that some measure of this suspicion and distrust is being dissipated. and that
what is needed today is for the Central Intelligence Agency to prove that it
can and will carry out its assigned duties. We have proposed specific steps
which can be taken toward this objective.
The progress of the Central Intelligence Agency should be continuously
tested by the National Security Council against the accomplishment of the pur-
poses of Sec. 102 of the National Security Act. That is to say, the Central
Intelligence Agency should be prepared to show what is being accomplished:
(1) To coordinate the intelligence activities of the Government;
(2) To provide, in close collaboration with other governmental intelli-
gence agencies, for the central correlation of intelligence relating to the
national security; and
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(3) To perform the intelligence and related services of common concern
assigned to it by the National Security Council.
In these fields the Central Intelligence Agency has the duty to act. It
has been given, both by law and by National Security Council directive, wide
authority, and it has the open invitation to seek from the National Security
Council any additional authority which may be essential. It must not wait to
have authority thrust upon it. Its basic mandate is clear. We recognize that
it will require initiative and vision to carry it out. If this is done, we
will have made a satisfactory start toward achieving one of our most essential
defense requirements, an adequate intelligence service.
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