NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000300160003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 2, 1946
• Content Type: MF

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VIUMR DEPARTMENT -
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM
2 August 1946.
MEMO FOR: Gen. Vandenberg.
Attached is your c6py of
the memo to-the Secretary,
which was given to him yesterday.
25X1
? This document has been
approved for release through
the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Date fiZS/7/
Approved
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1 Auguat 1946.
MNMOANDUM FOR: The Secretary of War.
SUMMT: Nuclear Intelligence.
There iu need to re-evaluate the intelligence aspects of-tho
Manhattan Engineortne District,? particularly in the light of the es-
tablishment of a National Intelligence Authority? and there is need
for a firm intramilitary understanding before the enactment of control
?Iegislation on nuclear fission.
It would soom to mc t,hal, our or r)opartment Director of
Intelligence, ONi0 and the State Department should not be proscribed
from activ6 pursuit of intelligence leads in the field of nuclear
fission, whether the information be of importance for military or
civilian purposes. Not only .,,nould these, azencies be free to pick
up such intelligence in the normal course of their activities, but
they should be directed to pursue such intelligence.
There is at the romc,nt no field of foreign intelligence of
more vital importance to our national security than that of nuclear
developments. The intense foreign activity in this field, both for
military and industrial purposes, is one unich we must monitor with
all the resources which we can muster. In order most effectively to
marshal our intelligence resources for this task, there is need of
competent and authoritative coordination between the various agencies.
7Jhile the over-?11 ?responnibIlity for task. Jo vested, by Proci-
donLipl 01.roold'.,) in the Director intolli);oneo, who is
charged with the "correlation and eveluaidon of intelligence releLing
to national security", the various national intelligence agencies,
includin7 those of the War, aato triel Navy Departments, should be
most alert to ti:Jse aspects of 1.,,Its)1-obl(s-.!;. falling in their spheres.
r,,frag1,11:ti:V"17
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desire that you nako available to the joint Chiefs
of Staff all intelligence_ 4nd information relating to the
.capebilities and intentions of nations other than the United
States, the United Kingdoms and Canada regarding atomic warfare.
I further desire that the Manhattan Engineering District assist
the intelligence agency of the joint Chiefs of Staff to the
fullest extent in the latterts evaluation of the capabilities
and intentions of those nations._
"2'. The arrangements for implementing this directive should
be made directly with the Joint Intelligence Committee of the
? Joint Chiefs-of?StafW"
I take it that, becig5se the officers of the Manhattan Enginseri
District state that the President's verbal directive gives complete
authority in these Matters to General Groves, it is felt that the only
relief could come from Presidential directive. On tho other hands I
understand from my recent conversation with you that you are able to
direct suet: action without recourse tothe President. If morunder-
standing is correct, this course would portal:Ay save valuable time
and much; unnecessary paper work. ? -
It may interest you to .know that this proposed directive
has already had the approval of Admirals Nimitz and Wally, and in
presently under discussion in the War Departments preparatory to con-
sideration by the Chief of Staff. It seems to me that not only is it
highly desirable that you issue the above directive, or its equivalent,
but also that it should be made clear through appropriate channels
that our various normal intelligence agencies should be free to pick
up- nuclear fission intelligence. I have in. mind-foreign, intelligence,
excluqdve::f: the. United ?-Kingdom andCanada
This would not bar the Manhattan Engineering District from
having its own intelligence agency in much the same way as the technical
services have their own technical intelligence agencies, however it
would serve to coordinate intelligence operations in this field by
subjecting them to proper over-all administrative control. Without
some each definitiye interrelationship the position of the Director
of Central intelligence, for examples is aMbiguous.
. Per instance, in the NIA Directive N4,1 the Director of,
-4entra1.]Inte3ligence'operates-in'accordance?with the following" -
? instructions:?
15. $uCh intelligence received by the intelligence agencies
of your Departments as may be designated by the National
Intelligence Authority shall.be freely avAllable to the Director
of CentralIntelligence for correlation evaluation or dissemi-
nation. To the extent approved by the National Intelligence
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operations of said intelligence agencies shall
be open to inpeet4on by the Director of Central Intelligence
in connection with planning. fuziotions?
,Within the scope of existing law and Presidential
o' other, departments snd agencies 4 the executive
P040r03,, Government shnIT furnish such inte3ligence
itc,rclatisg.?to the ,national security as is in their
? ,01$1400 and ..as?thei Director of Central Intelligence may
time to-,.time. request pursuant to regulations at the
nal Intelligence A.uthority*,?
seem to me' there should likeel,se.be explicitin-
tructions to the
.
lianhattan Engineering District to make foreign inr7
Aelligenee. on nuclear fission available to the .Director of Central
-.T.nte3ligence, in the 'came-vay that he .is to have ?,access to any other
fQrign1.ntellige
such. clear understanding and express
,T.ntalligence Ozvup be expected to give
'that, the, intelligence coverage is con-
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tiaTie0,:i'vo,'21.3is responsibility surely can
f the Ifanhattan,Engineering District,
but one. specialized area of: intelligence, Atter
uatin of ' inWligence' depends on broad familiarity
intpltig ,enne latieh'salat- include 'Pal. fields*"
,mainly concerned with the foreign intelligence
represented by ilanhattan Engineering District,:
-4.1Pect involving domestic information lanich
general pmblem, of national security*.,bile
to this 'aspect terms of the Xanhattan,
t it will applywith equal force 'to
,e4Fting our ,oe
ion' on our own most recent developments
cos, depending on nuclear fission should be
r? individuals reonsietent with effective
among these 'u], be included, as
the Director of
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Inlellif7onco, the Director of flans and Operations, and tho :at:rector of
Researeh and Development,. :.,1:ch of these individurOs must have access
to such information on our own developments as is requisite to carrying
Out their respective respomibilities. Thus, those responsible for
intr,11172nco sbolad have ac as to such :ariflattan fa ta as ricy have
on VIloir frk-vooa v )1,tion of foroir-,n t;.dlli erce in
Ibid. The 1)1rector of Ilaus and Operations should have access to such
information on our awn nuclear developments as are relevant to strategic
planning, to lodstics, and to opr,rationa use. Correspondin;, considera-
Lions alvly to the Director ofem,rch and Developmnt, with respect
to his responsibility for directing our developmental efforts; either
he is or he is not responsilrle for the over-all direction or our re-
search program!
In each of these cases there is the difficult, but not insolvable,
problem of deciding just how much each of these individuals must know in
order to carry out their responsibilities, and of the extent to uhich
they may call in experts from their own shops in makin use of this
;:ny or)so in vhIch tftoce Occisions c'rui, not 1m arrived at
hy rlutiva J.ve-nd-take. cni shoul0, he resolvod by thc Chif of 3tot'!:
or, if n2ez=ary, by the Decretary of .:ar, .
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