NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000300160004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 1, 1946
• Content Type: MEMO

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM
2 August 1946.
MEMO FOR: Oen. Vandenberg.
Attached is your cOpy of
the memo to the Secretary,
which was given to him yesterday.
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1 Augu?1946.
MEMORANDUM FOR; The Secretary of War.
SUDJECTs Nuclear Intelligence.
There ie need to re-evaluate the intelligence aspects of the
Manhattan Engineering District, particularly in the light of the es-
tabliehment of a National intelligence Authority, and there is need
for a firm intramilitary understanding before the enactment of control
legislation on nuclear fission.
It would seem to mo that our War Department Director of
Intelligence, 01, and the State Department should not be proscribed
from active pursuit of intelligence leads in the field of nuclear
fission, whother.the information be of importance for military or
civilian purpoees. Net only should these agencies be free to pick
up such intelligence in the normal course of their activities, but
they should be directed to pursue such intelligence,
There is at the moment no field of foreign intelligence of
more vital importance to our national security than that of nuclear
developments. The intense foreign activity in this field, both for
military and industrial purposes, is one uhichLwo must monitor with
all the -resources which we can muster..., ..-In,order-most effectively to
marshal our intelligence resources for this task, there is need of
competent and authoritative coordination botuoen the various agencies.
While the over-all responsibility for this task is vested, by Presi-
dentisl directive, in the Director of Gontral Intelligence, who is
charged with the "correlation and evaluation, of intelligence relating
to national security", the various national intelligence agencies,
including those of the War?, State and Navy Departments, should be
most alert to those aspects of this problem falling in their spheres.
1 understand the-ganhattan Engine:cried District holds that
a verbal directive from the President prohibits it from giving ally
information or intelligence on foreign activities in tho field of
nuclear fission to any outside agency, as for example, the joint
intelligence Comlittee? the Director of Inelligcnoe? or the Director
of Control Intelligence,. hem has. boon under censideration for
several monthsa recommendation 'to you from the Joint Chiefs. of ?
Staff (JCS 1664 and JCS 1664/1) that you recommend to the President
that Wisely) the l'ellewing directive to the Direetiers Manhattan
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'U. I desire that you make available to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff all intelligence and information relating to the
capabilities and intentions of nations other then the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada regarding atomic warfare.
X further desire that the Manhattan Engineering District assist
the inte)ligence agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
fullest extent in the latter's evaluation of the capabilities
ntentions of those national
2. The arrangemente for implementing this directive should
be made directly with the joint Intelligence Committee of the
Chiefs of Staff,"
I take it that, beqq9ae the officers of the Manhattan Engineer
District state that the President's verbal directive gives complete
al200,4W in these Matters to General Groves, it is felt that the 047
relief could come from Presidential directive. On the other hand, I
understand from my recent conversation with you that you are able to
t'SuCh action without recourse to the President. If ey. under-
is correct, this course mould, gertainly save valuable time
sear,* papar work
may interest you to know that this proposed directive
already had the approval of Admirals Nimitz and Leahy, and is
nay under discussion in the War Department, preparatory to con-
ation by the Chief of Staff. It seems to me that not only is it V
?light/ desirable that you issue the above directive, or its equivalent,
but also that it should, be 'made clear through appropriate channels
that our various normal intelligence aftenciee should be free to pick
ar r40.94 #14141ttenoe, I have in, *Thi -foreign, int014isencep
United 'Kingdom anct
This would not bar the Manhattan Engineering District from
having its own intelligence agency in,much the same way as the technical
eervioeihave their own technical intelligence agencies, however it
would serve to coordinate intelligence operations in this field by
subjecting tWars to proper aver-all administrative control. Without
soma earl definitive interrelationship the position of the Director
of Central Intelligence, for example, is aMbiguous.
r irtSanc,00 in the. NIA Directive
operates' in accordance vi e
, ,
51, Such intelligemce remind by the intellicence agencies
o your Departmente as may designated by the National
,4z4el3igence Authority shall he freely available to the Director
'Central Intelligence for correlationitv evaluation or dissemi-
nation. To the extent approved by the National Intelligence
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futollif,,:enco? the Director of anns and Operations, and the Director of
Researoh and Development. ;:ach of these individuals must have access
to such information on our own developments as ia requisite to carrying
out their respective responsibilities. Thus, thoso responsible for
intelligence should. have acees to such Tanhattan fact as may have a
henrir on their ftffet-onl .-v;:l.tv'ltion of foreir,n intelence in thit!.
field. The Director of flans and Operations should have access to such
information on our own nuclear developments as are relevant to strategic
planning, to logistics, and to opr!rational use. Corrospondin;7 considera-
tions apply to the Director of 2esearch and Development, with respect
to his r,sponsibility for directing our developmental efforts; either
he is or he is not responsible for the over-all direction or our ro-
search. progrtunt
In each of those cases there is the difficult, but not insolvable,
problem of deciding just how much each of these individuals must know in
order to carry out their responsibilities, and of the extent to which
they may call in onerts from their on shops in makirr MO of this
ti.formatIon, Any eaie in which thrse decisions can not be arrived at
by mutwA ;iivo-ard-teke can nnd ;oulcl )(1 resolved by 4;le Chi9f of Sta.lf
or, if nocossary, by the Deeretary of .
?
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