NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000300160005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 1, 1946
• Content Type: MEMO

34 Approved For Release 2005/01/10 :
MENEO?RANDIJIA 'FOR: The Secretary of War,
SUBJECTs Nuclear Intel enoe.
84-00022R000300160005-0
1 August 1946.
There is need to re-evaluate the intelligence aspects of the
Manhattan Engineer District, particularly in the light of the es-
tablishment of a National Intelligence Mthority, and there is need
for a firm intramilitary understanding before the enactment of control
legislation on nuclear fission.,
It would seem to me that our War Department Director of
Intelligence, ON4 and the State Department should not be proscribed
from active pursuit of intelligence leads in the field of nuclear
fission, whether the information be of importance for military or
civilian purposes. Not only should these agencies be free to pick
up such intelligence in the normal course of their activities, but
they should be directed to pursue such intelligence,
There is at the moment no field of foreign intelligence of
more vital importance to our national security than that of nuclear
derrelopessnte. The intense foreign activity in this field, both for
military and industrial purposes, is one which we must aonitor with
all the resources which we can muster. In order most effectively to
marshal our intelligence- resources for this task, there is need of
competent and authoritative coordination between the various agencies.
While the over-all responsibility for this task is vested, by Presi-
dential directive, in the Director of Central Intelligence, who is
charged with the "correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating
to national security", the various national intelligence agencies,
including those of the War* State and Navy Departments, should be
most alert to those suspects of thie problem falling in their spheres.
I understand the Manhattan Engineering District holds that
a verbal directive from the President prohibits it from giving any
information or intelligence on foreign activities in the field of
nuclear fission to any outside agency", as for example, the Joint
Intelligence Committee. the Director of Intelligence, or the Director
of Central Intelligence. There has been under consideration for
several months a reoommendation to you from the Joint Claes of
Staff (JCS 1664 and JCS 1664/1) that you recommend to the President
that he issue the following directive to the Director, anhattan
Engineering Districts
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re that you make available to the Joint Chief*
of Staff all intelligence and information relating
capabilities intentions of nations other than the United
States, the 'Dated Kingdoms and Canada regarding atomic warfare.
I further desire that the Manhattan Engineering District assist
the intelligence agency of the joint Chiefs of Staff to the
fullest extent in the latter's evaluation of the capabilities
and intentions of those nations.
*2. The arrangements for implementing this directive should
be nada directly with the Joint Intelligence Comittee of the
Joint Chief* of Staff.*
I take it that' beePpee the officers of the Manhattan Engineering
state that the President's verbal directive gives complete
in these Matters to General Groves, it is felt that the only
could come from Presidential directive. On the other hand, I
understand from my recent conversation with you that you are able to
direct such action without recourse to the President. If my under-
standing is correct, this course would eertainly save valuable time
and much unnecessary paper work.
It may interest you to know that this propoad directive
has already had the approval of Admirals Leahy* and is
presently under discussion in theDepartment, preparatory to cone
sideration by the Chief of Staff. It seems to me that not only is it
highly desirable that you issue the above directive, or its equivalent,
but also that it should be made clear through appropriate channels
that our various normal intelligence agencies should be free to pick
up nuclear fission intelligence. / have in mind foreign intelligence,
exclusive of the United Kingdom and Canada.
This would not bar the Manhattan Engineeri-ng District fran
own intelligence agency in much the same wry as the technical
ve their own technical intelligence agencies, however it
to coordinate intelligence operations in this field by
them to proper over-all administrative control. Without
finitiee interrelationship the position of the Director
Intelligences for example, is ambiguous.
For instance, in the NIA Directive Mo. 1 the Director of
reel Intelligence operates in accordance with the following
ructions*
* * *
*5. Such intelligence received by the intelligence agencies
of your Departments as may be designated by the National
Intelligence Authority shall be freely available to the Director
of Central Intelligence for correlations. evaluation or dissemi-
nation. To the extent approved by the National Intelligence
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Authority', the operations of said intelligence agencies shall
be open to inspection by the Director of Central Int?fligenc.
in connection with planning fanctionse
'8, within he scope of existing law and Presidential
directives, other departments and agencies of the executive
branch of the Federal Government shall furnish such intelligence
information relating to the national security as is in their
possession, and as the Director of Central Intelligence may
fro. time to time request pursuant to regulations of the
National Intelligence Authority,"
It would seem to me there should likewise be explicit in-
to the Manhattan Engineering District to make foreign in-
on nuclear fission available to the Director of Central
in the same way that he is to have access to ax y other
lligence.
some such clear understanding and express
ral Intelligence Group be expected to give
urance that the intel1igence coverage is con-
at all times. This responsibility surely can
hands of the Manhattan Engineering District
as they butone specialized area of intelligence, After
all, ccetent evaluation of intelligence depends on broad fmillarity
with foreign intelligence, which must include all fields.
am here mainly concerned with the foreign intelligence
aspect of the field represented by lanhattan Engineering District,
but there is a further aspect involving domestic information which
is most germane to the general problem of national security. While
I shall attempt to delineate this aspect in terms of the Manhattan
project, it will be seen that it will apply with equal force to any
military plans or developments affecting our security.
Manifestly, information on our own most recent developments
of techniques and war devices depending on nuclear fission should be
confined to the minimum number of individuals consistent with effective
War Department functioning. But among these should be included, as
individuals the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of
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InteUiinoe he Director of Plans and Op rations. and the Director of
Research and Developments Each of these individuals must have access
to such information on our own developments as is requisite to carrying
out their respective responsibilities. Thus, those responsible for
intelligence should have access to such Manhattan facts as may have a
bearing on their effectual evaluation of foreign intelligence in this
fields The Director of Plans and Operations should have access to such
information on our own nuclear developments as are relevant to strategic
plenming, to logistics, and to operational use, Corresponding considers,
time apply to the Director of Research and Development, with respect
to his responsibility for directing our developmental efforts; either
he is or he is not responsible for the over-all direction of our re-
search programl
In each of these cases there is the difficult, but not insolvable,
problem of deciding just haw much each of these individuale must knew in
order to carry out their responsibilities, and of the extent to which
they may call in experts from their own show in making use of this
information. Aey case in which these decisions can not be arrived at
by mutual give-andp.take can and should be resolved by the Chief of Staff
or, if necessary, by the Secretary of War.
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM
2 August 1946.
MEMO FOR: Oen. Vandenberg.
Attached is your copy of
the memo to the Secretary,
which was given to him yesterday.
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