DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM THE PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000400070013-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For
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UEVELOPWILId'i 010 A NATIONAL INT LLI . NCL PRO AId
THE PROBLUA
To recommend action pursuant to the letter from the president
dated September 20, 1945 directing the Secretary of State to "take
the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign
intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that
type of activity."
RLCOIail LU DA TIONS
The proposed agreement establishing an Interdepartmental
Intelligence Coordinating i-uthority and an Interdepartmental
security Coordinating /Authority contained in Annex "A", be
approved.
The letter in Annex "B" be dispatched.
Centralized conduct of espionage and counter-espionage
activities be approved in principle, subject to the formula-
tion of detailed organizational and operating plans.
In lieu of a central agency responsible for producing
national intelligence estimates, the projected Special
estimates Staff of the Special Assistant for Research and
Intelligence be assigned this responsibility in collabora-
tion with representatives from other interested agencies as
described in the last paragraph of the following, discussion.
DISCUSSION
The President, in a letter to the Secretary of State dated
September 20, 1945, issued the following directive.
"I particularly desire that you take the lead in develop-
ing a comprehensive and coordinated foreit,n intelligence program
for all z'ederal agencies concerned with that type of activity.
This should be done through the creation of an interdepartmental
group, heading up under the State "apartment, which wQuld formu-
late plans for my approval. This procedure will perm .?i.t the planning
of complete coverage of the foreign intelligence field and the
assigning and controlling of operations in such manner that the
needs of both the individual agencies and the Government as a
whole will be met with maximum effectiveness.
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The Secretaries of War and the Wavy, in a letter to the Secretary
of State dated September 29, 1945, transmitted the recommendations of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to how best to "provide for the develop-
ment and coordination of Intelligence activities related to the
national security". Studies on various aspects of intelligence activi-
ties in the post-war period have also been produced by many other
individuals and agencies, such as the Attorney General, the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget, the Secretary of the J'Navy, the Director
of Censorship, the Librarian of Congress, and a eommittee,in the
War vepa.rtment. All of these studies and recommendations have been
considered in the preparation of this report.
The President's directive clearly specifies that the coordinatinm
authority must be an interdepartmental group heading up under the State
Department, but it does not specify the organization, membership,
or method of operation of that group. The directive also estab-
lishes the scope of activity of the group as the entire "foreign
intelligence field." It does not confine it to "intelligence
activities related to the national security", security(or counter) intelli-
gence, censorship, or other specialized fields, but expands it to
cover the furtherance of our national interests as well as the safe-
guarding of our national security. It therefore includes the commercial
and cultural fields in addition to the military and national security
fields. The directive further authorizes the "assigning and controlling"
of all foreign intelligence operations, and the formuletion of operat-
ing plans to accomplish this for the President's approval,` presumably
when necessary. The directive does not specifically indicate the source
of the funds, personnel, and facilities required to perform the coordi-
nating function and any other
centralized operations deemed necessary.
The interdepartmental character of the group, under State ?.epartment
leadership, implies, however, that such funds, personnel and facilities
should be provided by the participating agencies, with the':principal
responsibility resting upon the State Department. The various factors
which require decision under the President's directive are discussed
below.
Organization of the Interdepartmental Grou
The job of coordinating the. entire intelligence fields will require
two separate interdepartmental coordinating bodies; one with authority
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in the broad field of foreign intelligence activities, and the other
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in'the specialized field of internal security and security intelli-
gence. This division is necessary because the agencies interested,
points of view, and types of operations vary markedly in those two
fields. Some coordination will be necessary between the activities
of the intelligence and the security coordinating authorities. This
coordination, however, is accomplished through the dual membership
of three agencies on the two authorities and through the existence of
a single secretariat serving both authorities.
ti'iernbership of the Coordinating Authorities.
The Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Authority (I.I.C.?s.
will consist of the yacretery of State as Chairman, and of the Secretaries
of Gear and the Navy. .14"y other departments and agencies, such as
Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury,' Interior, Labor, etc., have an
important but specialized contribution to make to and an interest in
the uovernment-wide foreign intelligence program. The departments
designated, however, are the principal users and producers of foreign
intelligence. In determining what membership would be most satis-
factory,
the relative advantage of including all departments of interest
had to be weighed against the disadvantage of creating too large and
unwieldly a top group. The interests of the departments other than State,
War and Navy are provided for through representation on every Committee
in which they have an interest. Thus, while the omission of many de-
partments puts a special responsibility on the State U'epartmert to
represent their interests adequately, it is suggested that the member-
ship be limited to the three principal departments.
Membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not considered necessary
or appropriate since their interests and requirements are not distinct
from but can be represented by the Secretaries of War and the navy.
The Interdepartmental Uecurity Coordinating authority
will consist of the Secretary of State as Chairman, end of the Secretary
of the Treasury, the Secretary of VVar, the Attorney General,. and the
Secretary of the Navy, These represent the only departments with major
responsibilities in that field, and other agencies having specialized
interests may be adequately represented on the proposed specialized
subnoramittees.
Method of Operation.
The functions envisaged for the coordinatinghuthorities are the
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and security activities, and the conduct of certain centralized opera-
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Lions where the need exists.
Formulation of Plans for Coordination
The formulation of plans for coordinating activities will be per-
formed by the formation of committees covering specialized;subjects,
areas, or kinds of operations. The intelligence coordinating uthority,
for example, will establish Committees which might cover such subjects
as 'olitics and Uovernment; People and aocial Forces; Economics; armed
i'orces; ueography; etc.; and such types of operations as ''tandardiza-
tion of Terminology, i''orms and Procedures; T-cquisition of T'oreign t'ubli-
cation; Mapping and Photography; etc. Committees formed by`.the security
coordinating 41.uthority might cover such matters as Censorship; 'T'ravel
Control; Preventive Investigations; Security advisory Services;
Economic uecurity Controls; etc. Each Committee will consist of a
Chairman responsible for the effective conduct of the Committee's
affairs, and of representatives from all agencies having official
responsibilities in the Comrr.ittee's field of activity. The chairman
will normally be detailed on a reasonably long-term basis from the
agency having primary responsibility or interest in that field, E.s
determined by the appropriate 1yuthority. Lach of the other members should
normally be the official in his agency responsible for the.conduot of
affairs in theCommittee's field. In any case, he must be thoroughly
cognizant of and capable of representing his agency's objectives and
requirements in that field.
The ultimate objective of each Committee will be the continuing
review and development of a complete operating plan ta achieve most
efficiently and effectively the national objectives and requirements
in its field, including those of all agencies. In most cases, this
will have to be done piecemeal through the preparation of series of
detailed plans covering specific problems in the field. 1'he first step
will probably determining those problems, assigning them priorities,
and mapping a program along that line.
In the case of each problem, each member will submit the require-
ments of his agency, 'T'hese will be collated and carefully studied to
fill in any gaps or omissions from a national point of vietw.
The actual operations, such as collection, eva.luation'and dissemin-
ation necessary to meet these requirements will then be determined.
Next, the Committee, by mutual agreement, will determine which agencies,
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accomplish the complete operation.
These findings, in the form of an
operating plan and in sufficient detail to permit their effective
implementation, will then be submitted to the appropriate Authority
for approval.
The
uommittoe will subsequently keep that plan under
continuing:; review, and recommend promptly any desirable revision&.
Execution of Plans for Coordination.
The responsibility for initiating and supervising the execution
of approved plans will rest with an Executive Secretary ofthe
Ai.rthorities, who will also plan the i~uthorities' pro grams, :direct
and coordinate the Corrunittees' activities, and otherwise serve the
Execution of approved plans should normally consist of
transmitting such decisions to the agencies designated to implement
them, and' subsequently reviewing the manner of implementation.
In accordance with the President's desire for Otate Department
leadership, the Secretary of estate as Chairman of the "uthorities
should appoint the Executive becretary and his deputies, and should
generally be responsible for furnishing the aecreta.riat. This will
provide for simplified, consistent and effective administration.
Procurement of appropriations will also be .facilitated. The alterna-
tive to this is either an independent budget, which is not., possible
without legislation, or dispersal of the responsibility for adminis-
trative services amongst the participating agencies. such dispersal
is undesirable.
To ensure that the officials of the various departments primr.rily
responsible for the conduct of operations are adequately represented
in the affairs of the Authorities and to assist the Executive secretary
in conducting the Authorities' affairs anti implementing their deci-
sions, there should be an Advisory Group with the Secretariat consist-
ing of full-time representatives of the above-mentioned operating
officials.
Conduct of Centralized Operations.
The actual performance of centralized operations will. require a
radically different procedure from that outlined above, and in fact
should be individually designed in each case to fit the tgpe of
operation. Certain basic principles may however be established.
First of all, no central operation should be undertaken which
can effectively performed by existing agencies within the.pormal
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taken only when required because no individual agency can effectively
perform it. Second, when a centralized operation is decided upon,
responsibility for its effective conduct should always t;e placed
upon a single executive, who should be responsible directly to the
appropriate Authority.
Third, a centralized operi~.tion should be e,
completely cooperative venture on the part of all agencies having
official responsibilities in that field. The necessary funds, per-
sonnel, and facilities should be provided by such agencies, appor-
tioned by agreement amongst them and with the approval of the
appropriate Authority on the basis of their relative responsibilities
and capabilities in that field. Any other solution will not provide
for maximum utilization of existing resources, will encourage over-
centralization and lead to une:conomival and unnecessary duplication,
and will inevitably infringe upon the basic responsibilities of
existing departments and a gencies. An independent budget would
require on annual airing of the operation, thus jeopardizing its
security which in certain cases would result in serious loss of
effectiveness, iVioreover, it is likely thi.+.t independent agencies out-
side'the normal governmental framework would find it increasingly
difficult to obtain adequate funds. Finally, as previously noted,
the president's directive, by its stress on interdepartmental activi-
ties, implies a desire for cooperative, rather than independent,
operations.
?roposed Types of Centralized Operations.
centralized operations which have already been proposed include
the conduct of espionage and counter-espionage activities and the
production of national intelligence estimates. Other types of operations
which might later be given consideration as suitable to be conducted
centrally are the production of topographic studies of specific areas and
the maintenance of a central file of biographical records:-of foreign
personalities.
The principle of centralized conduct of espionage and counter-
espionage activities should be approved, subject to the formulation
of detailed organizational and operating plans by specia].committo.es
appointed by the intelligence and
eourity Authorities respectively
immediately upon their establishment. The difficulties, dangers and
expense, of such activities and the imperative need for utmost security
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carefully controlled by a central lLuthority. moreover, their usefulness
to all agencies charged with safeguarding the national security makes it
inappropriate and undesirable for any single agency to undertake such
activities. Apportionment of the responsibility for providing funds,
personnel and facilities will also enhance the possibilities of maintain-
ing security. Such apportionment of funds not specifically earmarked for this
purpose is understood to be acceptable to the3ureo.u of the Budget.
It is further recommended that the Department of State oppose
the establishment of an interdepartmental or independent agency for
the production of national intelligence estimates. Intelligence
estimates are useless if produced in a vacuum. They are useful only
when they assist directly in the formulation of foreign policy, or
the conduct of foreign affairs. Any intelligence agency producing
estimates must therefore be a part of somebody performing those
functions. Only by such an integrated relationship can an intelli-
gence eeenay ke?p? abreast of our foreign objectives and affairs so
that. it may assist in their accomplishment and conduct. It has been
suggested that a central agency producing national intelligence
estimates could serve the .resident, the Secretaries of State, uvar
and Navy and various interdepartmental groups dealing in foreign
affairs. That suggestion overlooks the fact that the Secretary of
State is principally responsible for advising and assisting the
President in the field of foreign affairs and for coordinating the
activities of all governmental agencies in that field. It is there-
fore appropriate that the Department of atate assume the regponsi-
bility for the production of any national intelligence estimates,
with the advice and assistance of other governmental agencies. Lath
Secretary should and will inevitably continue to look to his own
intelligence agency despite the existence of a central agency.
It is recommended that, in lieu of such a central agency, the
projedted Special Estimates Staff of the Special Assistant for Research
and Intelligence undertake the production of any national intelligence
top-level
required by the President, the Secretary of State and other
or supra-departmental officials and agencies of the Govern-
ment. For that purpose, the Secretaries of War and Navy should be
invited to detail full time representatives from air, ground and
naval intelligence to each of the four geographic sections of
that st~p~rovt~lfr~"s~do/~r~~i~~goo~o~,~4ma~~o~a,o
Uortuaerce, Labor, etc. j should be invited as th _ e F~es:
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the event of disagreement within that reinforced staff, the heads of
the interested agencies should attempt to reconcile such differences
through consultation. should that prove impossible, the nature of the
disagreement should be clearly stated in the final estimate.
It is also proposed thet the 6pecial Estimates staff in the
Department of state, with the assistance of an adequate number of
representatives from the har and navy Departments, shall assume
responsibility for preparing weekly political reports of the type thf:.t
are now produced independently, and with much duplication of effort,
by units in the state Department, the military Intelligence service
and the Office of Naval Intelligence. In that manner a central reporting
organization can be achieved and such organization can be given
any other reporting functions of an interdepartmental character
which it can perform with advantage.
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