RECONCILIATION OF PLANS FOR COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP84-00022R000400070020-2
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 30, 2004
Sequence Number: 
20
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 26, 1945
Content Type: 
REQ
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PDF icon CIA-RDP84-00022R000400070020-2.pdf361.95 KB
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'-?-- Approved For'Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP84-00022R00C14000700.202 kuk k A It possible, to rotate Deportment lad Ur De- intelligens* There ct_.4 A a. t *iU be the oosasttt* at the 4,41, emetastive lumed at the eentral tatalligene assay will be a Nate Doperhment espleareei end j. *here the tied reepeneibility tar litre gie estimate*" Viii side* effegd*0 Tot 4010,111, The eepareetin at the tap dirottlas aresatiatimos into two Authorities, one tor Isrbelligoine eM en for ksatt7, permits a glen line of distiootion to be preeerved between the two Wes at tanstiemmi, an that is eroswideved W nos to be of adman/. Dowever, the iimeablesvteaded top argeidasties is orimisrilo a devise ter notralising nearel of positive latolligenee in Stet*, Sr and navy ingr other &rein that imemplished the purpose, while bringing in ft a.osnttysetters the other Departanate intereated in nouritr, would be eqs4I eanytable. The other point relates to the inalcsi relavmentative of Up 'Iola Chiefs of MAW* Ths 5tate D. den mat vademittandieby sun a eaqamienhetive should he inclined, sine the interests at the Join Wets et atm* OM be represented adequately by Ur and mavr. Moreover it is believed tbst sunk leave/ea iselghts the setboriky tee heavily an the idlitory #141. This.cant bar, b,. apprcv?!d n1)'Th This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT the OR1(?,, only, for the use of DCl/HS. the Central 11,c.., The record copy has been peleesed to National Archives 13_0( 8 0 under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM. HRP 1- Date prffrdIrcie.le0 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDI/34--11U022R? 00 00070020-2 Approved ForRelease 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP84-00022R000400070020-2 also believed that inelusioo o tile* at the J nges the chericter of the Autherit4 in tint it comes tote a Heard or top Polior offioore who aan hind their respeetive deportmeate. loins ways representative, the JCS osnwosld hove to consult hi* 4jps3j On matters important enough to petit+, ottention at the, C bird; and in preetioe this would probably mean that mere t the Authoritysnead hese to so thromen net ealy the intend am inert of the eoreerol departnents but else the separate *chtu.r of the 441et Chief* of tan. A sessamtion for resolving the differences as to the top Authority is tos oixt the Jcit reprise tattoos k; Constitute the $oeretariem of Stote, her and single autharity for both Intolaisom and Seourity; 1. Authorise them to call in the head* of other sLenoiee to wit ae members of the AuthoritY on ootbero at particular interest to the agenciees and Xotablish as a *brass? of the Alit matters of Seaurity (a* defined), the T Attorney Ceneral) would be tolled to. .fteg a Mr. 1}ospulin17. Cameo Csdor at the 4at. Department, has eusgestei that it would be desirable to provide for the inolusion of addi tionel departmental heeds in the top Authorit, when Netter* aro under ooneideration which ass he of partieulsr inters* to thee. tiler Correa hos qoestioned the destrehility of inoluding the Attorney Oenerel, the chief los onramment *Meer of the or*1wnt1 in an Authority which would have to deal with alande,tfts activitiee. gzeOt. hea4 of - The first thing. that has to o organise an independent aene with 4 sident and with a separate budget, or t eartswi toner from existina deportmente with an a departoentol omOnxeo. In propoein to *et up an Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000400070020-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP84-00022R000400070020-2 stueet plan to epgrnrast3; des l perky, with e prutSi. and eut1 hie, Various be have etudiad the Direetor et Deree* of the Budget and at the opinion ihst a **steal *goner ooneti dervirtaante is advantageous tor the follow- die es with the of Previdentia ppointeent and en independent budget, thee giving the ivesutive a greater *hence of ancnpudty. 11. ThIP limmutiver balked WI the prestige and anthcritf of theillioto,AkAr of state la foreign affairs, would have few difficulties in the job of oeerdineting the intelligence activities of the morose goverment agencies thee would a Director :rho had no departmentel states but had to refer to the Provident each tiles his antberikrwas questioned. It is suggested that * workable plan meld be put into cUed 172 oo the basis that the initial organisation would be inter'. partmental. This would permit the eeerdinating amehimery, which is needed and will be rood:44**,4w plan is edepted4 to get unbent issCh duly. whereas the orgasioation at an independent sgaosyriey take a considerable time. if, eta months or *year sheathe machinery is in motion, it enure desirable to Lee indapendeat *tato* to the eentral agency, that *en be done. The to Authority will slowil be in * position to ask* that kind at a ehenge. .!!!RgalktltIZJAL1141LtVWAPW4.--!, estimates* is need to mean the map* as the beds for *titian or potter at . At present there are various in- eetinetes on top level matters, and of the Joint Intelligens:* Commit- of the ?Joint Chiefs of 6taff, responsibility for etretegie ear 5. be either t plea - formes The Asite (thou* not neeolo- stiletto* to the oulA vast that Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000400070020-2 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000400070020-2 responsibility in the State Department, which would-dischsrge it by means of a Special Estimates- Staff, functioning under the Depart- ment but including Army and Navy working repreeentatives. The matter of strategic estimates is quite urgent, in view of the maw important problems that are involved in the forthcoming peace treaty negotiations. Those problems fell within the area of responsibility of the State Department for the conduct of foreign affairs, and for that reason it seems logical to vest the responsibility for strategic estimates in the State Department. Here again is a situation that might be dealt with by taking the easiest available course and learning by experience whether a transfer of the function from the Department of State to the centre' agency might be desirable. Conclusion If the problem of representation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be resolved, the. State Department and War Department plans are sufficiently close together to enable the following to be donee a. Setting up the National Intelligence Authority; b. Setting up a State Department repreeentative as Execitive Secretary of the Authority, without prejudice to a decision at some later date to create an independent agency; *. .Putting the coordinating machinery into immediate oper- ation, in order to define our notional intelligence require- ments end lay out a comprehensive and coordinated program to meet them. 4. Selecting a person to head the secret operations and layini the plans for them (It is assumed that execution of such plans will require confidential funds not presently available); e. Setting up in the State Department a Strategic Esti- mates-Staff, which can be turned over to the central agency at some later date if that shell appear desirable. In the interests of prompt action, a solutionalong the above lines is recommended. Alfred Neormack Special Assistant to the Secretary Approved For For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP84-00022R000400070020-2