UNIFICATION OF THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS AND POSTWAR ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT TO HON. JAMES FORRESTAL SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00022R000400070022-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: October 22, 1945
• Content Type: STUDY

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79th Congress
1st Session
SENATE 012AITTEE PRINT
UNIFICATION OF THE WAR. AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS AND
POSTWAR ORGANIIATIONFOR NATIONAL SECURITY
REPORT TO
HON, JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy
on
UNIFICATION OF `DIE WAR AND Noy DEP.ARTMENTS AND
POSIW.AR ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
OCTOBER 22, 19145
Volume III
SIUDIES
Chapter II
Intelligence
itary Intelligence
'lige/ice is the produet of collecting, gialyzlng4 evaluating,
and yrthesithig information. Complete, up-tomdete, and accurate intelligence,
and made available in usable tom, is eSSE 1.*L factor
in the effective conduct of the foreign and mill tax7 policies of the United
States, which in turn support our basic national policies. such intelligence
has align been of great im rtance. With our increased international re-
sponsibilities in the postwar world sad the developments, present and
pro spectivo., in the field of new weapons, intelligence has become a matter
of vital national interest, This fact is recognized in the current recom-
mendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an improved intelligence organi-
zation, involving a centralized intelligence agency.
This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT
only, for the use of DCl/HS.
The record copy has been
released to National Archives
under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.
Date HRP d5/- 7? 2
This doctzaent has been
approved for release through
the HISTORICAL REVIE4 PROGRAM of
the Ceottal Intelligence Agiluxl.
Date.
CCW.32
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Collection of essential information is accomplished overtJy, scmetiiiio8
on an exchange basis with friendly powers, or by clandestine means. Attaches,
observers, research experts, and secret agents, as well as the press, repre-
sentatives of camercial firms, and agencies of the civilian departments of
the Government provide the required flow of information. The needs of the
planning and operating agencies determine the scope of this activity.
Analysis, evaluation, and synthesis are the functions of highly skilled
personnel, specie, 5 Ms in military., scientific, technical, industrial,
political, economic* atvi topograptnic matters, who, through training and
experience, are competent to determine the significance or itelvrb of informa-
tion, process it, and present it in the moner required.
Dissemination of the end product, intelligence, is a matter of providing
policy makers, planners, and carmanders 'rah the intelligence they need, viten
they need it, and in a usable form.
In peacetime, intelligence with respect to the resources, capsibilities,
and intentions of foreign pollens is of vital importance. Adequate planning
rewires, also, the maintenance of accurate topographic, bydrographic, and
meteorologic intelligence pertaining to possible theaters of operations, and
obtainable by routine methods only in the time of peace.
In immediate prewar and wartime periods, there arises et additd.onal
need for intelligence of the strength, composition, disposition, and
movements of enemy forces sad the strategical and technical plans of their
commuters. At such tines, the ordinax7 methods of obtaining intelligence
within enemy or potentially enemy countries? slack as foreign-service officers,
attaches, and the press, either cease to exist or are no longer effective.
Intelligence of the espionage systems of all foreign powers is a con-
tinuing neceseity.
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ORGANIZATION AND HAND DM OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNIT
1920.40
During the period 1920-40 the War and Nay Departments,insofar as thedr
intelligence agencies were concerned tended to operate in separate compart.
merits, with limited exchange of information except insofar as routine military
and naval attache reports were concerned. There was little liaison except
in joint planning agencies and, on a high level, in the Joint Board. At
the operating level there was no joint intelligence activity, no integre-
tion of intelligence, and no routine liaison with the State Department.
Available funds were grossly inadequate and there was considerable du.plica-
tion of effort, particularly in the offices of milita.ry and naval attaches.
Few intelligence agents were employed end some of them were of mediocre
ability. Evaluation was largely in the hands of officers untrained in
intelligence technique.
An Executive order of June 26, 1939, directed that the investigation of
all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters within the United States
be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the tali
tary Intelli gence Service, teld the Office of Naval Intell tgence. It was not
until late in 1939 that espionage and sabotage in peacetime were made
punishable wider Federal statutes. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
immediate3y undertook the task of training its agents in these newly opened
fields, but it was unable to reach an effective statue until the latter part
of 1940.
BRITISH SZSTER FOR HANDISNG INTEIIIGENCE
Faced with the bitter and inescapable tasks of war operations inTRinich
the homeland was an active theater, the British developed an organization in
which intelligence was separated from security and police operatioi,s, but
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facilities for the exchange of significant information were maintained.
The British Secret Intaligence Agency serves all government divisions.
it draws on all military gad civilian agencies for personnel having special
knowledge and aptitudes.
Intelligence agencies of the War Office, Admiralty, Airliinistry.,
Foreign Office, and other governmental divisions process basic informal-
tiom to meet the pecn3iar needs of their parent services.
Over-all strategic surveys are prepared gad published by an Inter.
Service Topographical Department.
The British Security Service consolidates security interrogation,
investigations, and controls over resident, travelers and merchant seanen,
var plaits security, and all other security measures outside of strictly
army, navy, or gir force jurisdiction. It cooperates closely with the
British Secret Intelligence Agency and the several service intelligence
agents.
.police work,.
involving intelligence activity, is performed
by Scotland Yard only upon request of one of the intelligence agencies.
It always has been British policy to supply its intelligence agencies
with ample funds. In the prewar period the amounts available to them
to
exceeded by many times the appropriations -which were made available/cor-
responding United States agencies*
WARTME D)I1FNT IN T1 UNITED STATES
Following the declaration of the national emergency in Septamber 1910i
and prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor, the Army and Navy Intelligence
services reePived increased funds and accelerated their mtivitiees but
lack of trained personnel, incomplete coordination, and absence of facilities
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for the conduct of secret intelligence operations abroad persisted as obstacles
to effectiveness. The impact of war drove home to the War and Navy Departments
the fact that neither service had an esiequate intelligence service.
Necessity forced upon the several departments concerned the eatablish-
ment and maintenance of close and continuous liaison with the Department of
State and with intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of other depart-
ments, with the resalt that subversive and sabotage activities were held to
an astonishing minimum.
The first step toward coordinating intelligence efforts was taken in
July 19141, when the Office of Coordinator of Information, established by
Presidential orde yes authorized to collect and analyze all information
and data bearing upon national security, to correlate such information and
data, and to make it available to the President and to such departments and
officials of the Goverament as the President might determine. One year
later the Office of Coordinator of Information was designated the Office of
Strategic Services an4 placed urder the Jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
The functions of the Office of Strategic Services were to collect and
analyze such strategic information as might be reqnired by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff for military operations and planning, and to conduct special opera.
tions not assiped to other Government agencies, including counterintelligence
and sabotage activities in foreign countries outside the Western Hesnisphere.
Appropriations of the Office of Strategic Services exceeded by many times any
previous allotments for intelligence purposes and large numbers of officers
and enlisted personnel were furnished to it by the Army and the Navy.
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Following the establishvmmt of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, demands
of the Joint Staff Planners for coordinated intelligence upon which to
base plans for combined sea, land, and air operations necessitated the
formation of a Joint Intelligence Committee as ga agency of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. This committee, composed of representatives of the Office of
Naval Intelligence, Hilitary Intelligence Service, Assistant Chief of Air
Staff (Intelligence), Department of State, Office of Strategic Services,
and the Foreign Economic Administration, synthesized intelligence received
from all sources for the use of the Joint Staff Planners and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, furthered joint intelligence activities, and was helpful
in resolving difficulties arising from the uncoordinated efforts of the
agencies represented by its members.
The Joint Intelligence Committee has carried on uch of its work
through the following aubeammitteeet
(t) Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee which coor-
dinates requests for industrial intelligence from United States
Government agencies.
(b) Joint Subcorsaittee on Technical Information which advises
an the release of technical information to foreign powers;
(c) Joint Topographical Subcommittee which assists in mat-
ters of topographical studies, maps, and charts;
(d) Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board which edits
and publishes Joint Army?Navy Intelligence Studies;
(0) Intelligence Archives Section which maintains central files
of incoming intelligence reports and documents pertaining to
captured German equipment and industrial processes.
(f) Meekly Summary Editorial Board which issues a meekly
summary of enemy trends requiring counter-action;
(g) Publications Review Subcommittee which maintains a
constant review of all intelligence publications to eliminate dup-
lication.
In Noveriber 1942 Admiral King and General Marshall directed the
Director of Naval Intelligence and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to
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explore the possibility of merging the Naval Intelligence Service and the
Military Intelligence Service and, as a step in that direction, to detennine
which functions of these services could be undertaken jointly, or by one
of them in behalf of both. Under the stimulus of this directive and with
the aid of the Joint intelligence Comittee, numeious joint intelligence
activities were establiehed and have functioned with effectiveness.
Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies, staffed by specially trained
officers of the Military and Naval Intelligence Services, were set up in
the Mediterrtmeae, Africa-Middle East, India.aurna, and China theaters.
These agencies coordinated the collection of information in the field and
the dissemination of intelligence to theater cammands and to a Joint Intel-
ligence Agency Reception Center in Washington where it was reevaluated,
synthesized, and transmitted tn the Joint Staff Planners end interested
agencies and departments of the Goverment
Th success of the Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies emphasizes
the necessity fox* joint effort in the integration and dissemination of
intelligence to all interested agencies as well as to theater commands.
This need was met by the developnent aid publication of Joint Anni-Navy
Intelligence Studies (JANIS), starting in 1943. The whole field of
strategic intelligence thus becane a collaborative effort embracing the
Office of Nava Intelligence, 1413itary Intelligence Services, Assistant
Chief of Air Staff (Intel igence), Office of Strategic Services, the
Board of Geographical Names, Coast and Geodetic SI-rye's Hydrographic
Offices Joint Meteorological Cornmittee, Office of Chief of Engineers,
and Office of the Surgeon Generals United States Army, as well as the
Weather Service Division of the Army Air Forces.
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Coordination was established in the collection and dissemination of
graphic and photographic intelligeaces the interrogation of prisoners of
\
ear, the preparation of meekly intelligence reports, the collections evalua.
tions and dissemination of technical and air intelligences the analysis of
air targets, the assessment of enegr shipping losses and the enemy oil posi
tions as well as in the exploitation of captured enemy documents.
WEAPCNESMS IN THE PRESENT SET.UP
The joint intelligenee undertakings which stemmed from the necessities
of war indicate what can be done under stimulus of wars and with enPle
funds. However, there is still considerable duplication of effort on the
part of the intelligence services of the States Wars and Navy Departments,
much of which could be eliminated. Moreover, such progress as has been
made-toward unification of effort may be difficult to maintain under peace.
time conditions*
The Joint Intelligence Committ
organizations and the Office of Strategic Services is in process of
liquidation* Intelligence of scientific, tecbnological, and ideological
developments affecting the mar-making potential of foreign countries cannot
be obtained wholly by overt methods. We know of no facilities that have
been established for clandestine intelligence operations abroad in peace.
time.
be considered a permanent
A high percentage of the extensively trained and experienced personnel
now engaged in intelligence functions will return soon to civilian pursuits.
If the importance of an adequate peacetime intelligence service is not
recognized and adequate provision made for the utilization of sufficiently
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trained personnel in the reduced military forces of the postwar era, retro.
gression to the situation whidh existed during the period following World
War I is a likely result
CONCLUSIONS AND =COMMINUTIONS
All of the considerations herein brought forth are, of course, heavily
underscored by the pivotal position which the United States has came to
occupy in world affairs* An the sphere of our responsibilities ban
widened, and our interrelationships with other nations have been extended,
our need for accurate ceMprehensive, ond up.tc-date information has become
more acute*
Complete merger of the intelligence services of the State, War, sad
Navy Departments is not considered feasible since each of these depart-
ments requires operating intelligence peculiar to itself* Intimate and
detailed knowledge of the objectives and problems of each service is ob-
viously indispensable to successful operation* Although each of these
departmental services must be maintained on a highly efficient basis and
supplied with adequate funds, it has been demonstrated that many of their
functions can be performed more effectively as joint undertakings*
In the light of the lessons learned in wartime, it is apparent that
(1) further coordination of intelligence relating to national security is
highly desirable; (2) such activities of common concern as con be more
efficiently conducted by a common agency should be so handled* and (3)
there must be synthesis of departmental Intelligence on the strategic
and national policy level. Manifestly these three functions can be
accomplished most effectively in a comon intelligence agency, provided
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suitable conditions of responsibility are maintained toward the depart.
meats primarily concerned with national defense.
It is, therefore, recommended.
(1) That there be established a Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate
and, as far as practicable unify ill foreign intelligence activities and to
synthesise all intecOlgence concerning military, political, economic, and
technological developments abroad for the benefit of those responsible for
the determination and execution of goternmental policy pertaining to national
security.
(2) That courses of inatruction in intelligence be established at
appropriate levels of military education in order to indoctrinate officers
with the importance of the function of intelligence to our national security.
(3) That only thoroughly trained intelligence personnel be selected for
intiiigen?duties, inC]ncling those of military and naval attaches.
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