ON 'THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE' FRANK G. WISNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00161R000100170006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 1, 1963
• Content Type: SINT

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The work of one veteran intel-
ligence chief evokes reflections
from another.
ON "THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE"
Frank G. Wisner
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y
p
,
4 have sufficed to deter this effort but for the opportunity thus
a afforded of grinding certain special axes and getting in some
plugs for a number of strongly-held convictions. (Incident-
ally, it may be of interest to note in passing that the prepond-
erance of the book reviews have ranged from favorable to en-
thusiastic, with only a small proportion registering significant
dissatisfaction or hostility.)
Mr. Dulles has written a most valuable book, one which, in
the judgment of this reviewer, should be read and if possible
_possessed by all persons having a serious professional interest
in the subject of intelligence, and hopefully also by a wide seg-
ment of the general public. It is essentially an encyclopedia
of the terminology, concepts, and craft of the trade, abun-
dantly illustrated by cases and anecdotes drawn from the au-
thor's own treasure-house of experience, and highly readable
in form.
Allen Dulles's book, aptly entitled The Craft of Intelligence,'
has been so extensively and variously reviewed by the profes-
sionals of the press and so much wisdom has been reflected in
the more thoughtful of these reviews that it was with the
greatest reluctance and diffidence on the part of the under-
signed that he was prevailed upon to undertake the task of ad-
dressing a further commentary to the readership of this pub-
lication. The evident presumption of attempting to provide
any useful commentary upon a work so cogently and con-
cisely written, and more particularly of venturing views of
possible value to such a uniquel
so
histicated audience
would
One of the chief merits . of the. book from the standpoint of
the public in general is its clarification, through definition
Intelligence Terminology
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and painstaking exposition, of the argot of the trade, which
has sprouted and proliferated in such lush profusion as to have
become highly confusing and dangerously misleading-largely
as the result of loose usage on the part of the considerable
and still growing number of amateurish -exploiters of this rich
vein of literary ore. Newspapermen, the authors of popular
fiction, and, I fear, even a small number of would-be practi-
tioners of the profession- of intelligence have-all made their
can ribution o the chaos, to the point that it was well overdue
for one leading and most revered experts in the-field to
hack a clear track through the tangled undergrowth. In fact,
if it were possible for the intelligence community in general
to accept and conform to Mr. Dulles's definitions and support-
ing explanations for such variously used expressions as "de-
ception," "defector," "double agent," and "counterintelli-
gence," to mention but a few, much difficulty would be avoided
in future; and if as an extra dividend the interested represent-
atives of the fourth estate could be persuaded or influenced in
the direction of adopting these definitions, there would be in
time.a constructive clarification of the public mind and a more
understanding appreciation of the problems of intelligence.
The repeated references in the Western press to both H. A. R.
("Kim") Philby (who recently skipped to Moscow to join his
old cronies Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean) and George
Blake (now serving in England a heavy sentence for espio-
nage) as "British double agents," when in point of fact they
were highly important long-term Soviet penetration agents,
may serve to illuminate the reasons for concern on this score.
In sharp contrast with the large and ever-mounting stacks
of books and articles purporting to divulge the inside story.
of U.S. intelligence and to "tell all" about our espionage sys-
tem and activities, Mr. Dulles does not reveal secrets which
are still sensitive (and many of which must always remain
so) but rather has confined himself to a serious discussion of
the principles and methods of sound intelligence operations.
Whereas the omission of such succulent tidbits has disap=
pointed many of the reviewers and also tends to circumscribe
the appeal of the book to the public, it is.taken for granted
that the members of the intelligence community will under-
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? stand and applaud its wisdom and will value this example of
security-mindedness and restraint. It is in fact an excellent
illustration of the general rule that persons having the deep-
est and most legitimate insights into intelligence matters are
most scrupulous in their trusteeship of such knowledge and
that the penchant for sensational revelations is the near mo-
nopoly of the charlatans and pretenders who scavenge along
the flanks of the intelligence enterprise.*
Classical Espionage
In his introductory recitation of the long historical back-
groid and the more recent evolution of modern int gence,
counterintelligence, and other forms of clandestine opera-
tions, Mr. Dulles has provided some much-needed perspectives
on matters which will be alluded to later in this review. Hav-
ing thus set the. stage for his examination and analysis of cur-
rent. practices and procedures of the leading intelligence serv-
ices of the world, both friendly and opposed, he launches into
an admirably complete discussion of our intelligence require-
ments and collection methods. -
Here he places well-merited emphasis upon the progress re-
sulting from the invention and adaptation to the uses of in-
telligence of sophisticated scientific devices, but he does not
permit the glitter of these technological marvels to obscure
the perduring value of - e c asst al met ico s of procurement.
Though the high-flying Mata Haris QLtoday mawith their
with
glass eves be able to discern the most minute of man-made
molehills from untold miles of altitude, and though their
acoustic . 'b1ings of equivalent acuteness may be able to hear
across continents the rustle of a mounting missile, these are
not and will never become any substitute for the older and
less "exotic" measures which are essential to the discovery
and frus ration of subversive intent. This point is made man-
ifest by Mr. Dulles in his numerous allusions to recent suc-
cesses of the covert intelligence and security agencies of the
United States. He has also called attention to many of the
detections of Soviet secret operatives which have been the
fruit of close cooperation as between the American services
and their allied oppos tei numbers.
*See note p. A16.
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Counterintelligence and the Adversary
The chapter on "Counterintelligence," taken together with
relevant and related portions of two or three other chapters,
viz. "The Main Opponent, etc." and "Volunteers," makes an
unusually valuable contribution toward a better comprehen-
sion of the true significance and vital importance of this
weapon in our own arsenal of defense. For one thing, Mr.
Dulles disposes of the popular misconception that counterin-
telligence is essentially a negative and responsive activity, that
it moves only or chiefly in reaction to situations thrust upon
it and in counter to initiatives mounted by the opposition.
He shows that counterintelligence produces its most valuable
results by subtle but aggressive attacks upon its chief target-
the structure and personnel of hostile intelligence services.
These chapters also bring out the fact that counterintelligence
generates and. delivers highly valuable by-products in the form
,of positive intelligence and the detection and exposure of en-
emy deception, including their. so-called "disinformation" ac-
tivities.
Lastly, but by no means of lesser importance, there are the
frequently significant indicators of Soviet policy and inten-
tions which are provided by our successful operations in this
field. In this way our counterintelligence has been sounding
a much-needed warning that in spite of the ostensible shifts of
Soviet policy from warm to cold and vice versa, the fundamental
and consistent aims thereof are essentially hostile, and that
we must therefore at all times react most warily to Soviet
and other Communist overtures-_packaged in the attractive
wrappings of "peaceful coexistence," "the new' Spirit of Mos-
cow," or whatever may be the sales slogan of the moment.
For example, during the peak of the euphoria which broke out
in certain Western capitals as the result of and in. the wake
of the August treaty for a limited nuclear test ban, and long
before this premature and uncritica ent usiasm was be-
clouded by such recent Soviet actions 2 as their renewed inter-
ference with the Berlin access routes and their handling of
the Barghoorn affair the best available counterintelligence
sources are u i erstood never to have ceased signaling that
the thrust of Soviet policy continued to be aggressively antag-
onistic and that despite all of the fair words at the top there
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was not the slightest diminution in the vigor and intensity of
the Soviet effort at the level of the secret and subversive.
This may perhaps be another way of saying that the French
seem to have had something on their side of the argument in
maintaining that it would be a mistake quite capable of lead-
ing us into mortal danger to believe the test ban treaty to
signify any substantial easing of tensions and that the be-
havior into which the Russians have relapsed most recently 2
is in accordance with their normal pattern-the other being
both abnormal and highly transitory. Be that as it may, of
such magnitude are the power, position, and prestige of the
intelligence and security empire within the Soviet scheme of
things as to suggest that it will be soon enough for us to be-
gin believing in the sincerity of Soviet protestations of peace-
ful intent when we have received satisfactory evidence
that they are muzzling their subversive bloodhounds and
dismantling their apparatus of clandestine conquest-covert
as well as open evidence, for example, in such matters as the
Soviet position, both proclaimed and clandestine, toward so-
called "wars of liberation."
Overt Aspects
It was obviously impossible for Mr. Dulles to cover in ade-
quate depth, in even such a comprehensive work as this, all
of the multiple and complex phases of the subject which
are currently included in the craft of intelligence. Doubtless
each member of the intelligence community reading the book
would desire a fuller treatment of his Qwn pet subject, and this 4S7,
reviewer, in fu1T recognition of the unfairness of criticizing
a work which covers so much ground, finds himself in basic
agreement with certain observations in the most excellent re-
view written by Professor Robert R. Bowie and published in
the New York Herald Tribune, edition afunday, October 13
1963.3 It is believed that the author might himself be willing
to acknowledge the existence of an imbalance in favor of
intelligence tradecraft, i.e., clandestine techniques and opera-
tions, and to the disadvantage of certain of the most impor-
' Written as of 20 November 1963, just before the assassination of
President Kennesiy.
In Book Week, distributed also with the Sunday Washington Post.
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tant functions and problems of the research and analysis
and estimative processes.
Regrettably the experience and background of this reviewer
are not such as to permit him-nor would it otherwise be
either appropriate or possible in this short space to attempt-
to comment in detail upon these apparent deficiencies. How-
ever, in the hope that Mr. Dulles himself will soon find--time
to give us the benefit of his wisdom and close knowledge per-
taining to these areas, it is suggested that more emphasis
should be devoted to the very great reliance which our sys-
tem places upon the open and above-board techniques of
scholarly r-esearph and analysis and to bringing home more
forcibly the weight accorded ao the product of these efforts
in the scientific al.diechnicaLfields, for example. It is further
recommended that Mr. Bowie's review be read by those in-
terested in these spheres of activity and their attendant dif-
ficulties. Mr. Dulles has been both wise and just in the dis-
tribution of his commendations among the personnel con-
cerned in the various departments and agencies of the Gov-
ernment which collectively comprise our intelligence com-
munity. In so doing he has singled out for special praise nu-
merous non-CIA personnel and functions and he has attributed
to "the men and women of the CIA," to whom the book is
dedicated, n o more han"their fair share of the honors. Even
so, some larger measure of recognition for the contribution of
the researchers and analysts would be in order.
In this same general connection it may be worth noting at
this point what has long seemed to this reviewer to 'represent
one of the most notable distinctions between the West (the
U.S. and U.K. in particular) and the Russians in over-all ap-
proach and philosophy of intelligence operation. The rela-
tively greater emphasis and reliance placed by the leading
Western intelligence services upon the results obtainable from
extensive overt collection and expert analysis stand. out in
marked contrast to the Soviet attitude and credo, in which
these measures and methods have heretofore and at least un-
til very recently 'been regarded as distinctly secondary to,
and as valuable chiefly in so far as they served to confirm or
interpret, the intelligence produced by clandestine means-
most notably stolen documentary materials. This fundamen-
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tal difference in approach may be explainable in part by the
origins and character of the two opposing civilizations, Soviet
intelligence having developed and at all times functioned
within a highly secret and conspiratorial political atmosphere
in which intense suspicion of the freely spoken or written
word of the antagonist has been a major hallmark.
Although he has been out of Russia long enough to have
perhaps fallen behind the times, the former NKVD general
Alexander Orlov has provided a most incisive commentary
upon this significant distinction in his provocative afid edify-
ing little book entitled Handbook of Intelligence and Guer-
rilla Warfare.4 According to Orlov, who was certainly in a po-
sition to vw the facts, the Russians regard as true intelli-
gence only that which is produced by secret informants and
undercover agents, and they relegate to a category of far
lesser importance and credibility material coming from overt
and legitimate sources. He explains that in the Russian view
the secrets of foreign states having the most vital interest
for them can be procured only from the classified govern-
mental files of those states or from cooperative foreign officials
and civil servants having access thereto.
Although it is understood from other sources that the Rus-
sians have of late been paying more attention to the values
of overt collection and analysis than they did during the pe-
riod with which Orlov was so intimately familiar, it is never-
theless evident from the very massiveness of their clandestine
collection effort-to say nothing of the rich rewards which
they have to our knowledge been reaping from such sources-
that their main emphasis is still centered upon espionage and
the procurement of secret documentary materials. It is thus
a fair assumption that these activities and functions have not
been downgraded in the Soviet system and that they are not
likely to be at any time in the foreseeable future.
Deception
In commenting upon the techniques and the art of decep-
tion Mr. Dulles has made some very accurate observations
concerning the difficulties of mounting significant deception
'An adaptation was carried in Intelligence Articles VII. .2, and the
book is reviewed-elsewhere in this issue.
"` tt'
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operations from the base of "open societies" such as ours in
peace time and the relative ease of such operations on the part
of the Russians, who have all the advantages of the secrecy
and discipline of their police state society going for them. If
anything, he has understated the obstacles confronting West-
ern intelligence authorities in this area of activity; and he
might well have placed more stress than he has upon the free
assists which the opposition receives from a certain class of
representatives of the Western press - who, it would appear,
have been seeking to elevate to the level of a national sport
the ferreting out and public exposure of_fhe clandesFine opera-
tions of their own governments.
Given the intimacy of our journalists with almost all eche-
lons of the G overnmen , execu fve' as well as legislative, and
taking into. account the ex ensive coordination as tween
all of the governmental arms which is essential to the suc-
cess of a significant deception operation, the opportunities and
possibilities for some leak or revelation fatal to the operation
are very great indeed; and frequently the sleuthing is done
for the Russians on a volunteer though doubtless unwitting
basis by those representatives of our own competitive and
"scoop-minded" information media who justify even the most
rep a er'nsible forms of "keyhole journalism" on the ground
that they are acting as. the chief uardians of our most cher-
ished institutions. The freedom _of_ the press and the asserted
right of the public to know all are used indiscriminately to
either justify or condone actions which are damaging to our
national security and the principal beneficiary of which can-
not fail to be our mortal enemy. Thus the fruit that is
available to our side only as the result of our most diligent
and successful professional operations may be expected by the
Russians_ta f .1~ 1 gratis into their lap, and if in any particular
case the branches should appear to require a little agitation,
this is easy enough to arrange by the simple device of plant-
ing a few provocative questions about any policy or program
of ours, either real or apparent, that may be obscur a or per-
plexing to them.
Sharpshooting
Although the roster of Communist methods of subversion
in the cold war provided by Mr. Dulles is very extensive, it
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seems to this reviewer that he omitted__adequate treatment of
one of the most insidious and effective of their techniques.
Reference is here made to the evidence of skillful and in-
creasingly successful attacks upon individual personalities by
the Chinese Communists as well as the Russians. These are
specialized operations targeted against key political and mili-
tary leaders in various parts of the world-not limited to the
softer areas of the so-called uncommitted nations. This
method of subversion embraces the widest variety of ap-
proaches and is designed to capitalize on the vanity, cupidity,
prurience, ill health, hypochondria, superstition, or other spe-
cial susceptibility of ---get individual. It is hand-tailored
for each particular, case on the basis of the most intimate
knowledge and study of the individual, and it depends for its
success upon great !skill and 'perseverance on the part of the
operatives employed.
This pinpoint, not to say needle-point, attack on selected
individuals in positions of power o viously provides tremen-
dous leverage 1 success u , an i s workings are most difficult
to perceive and to combat. Even though strongly suspected
of being under way in a particular case, the proof to and even
more so the persuasion of the subject of this mental massage
that he is being victimized or duped is well-nigh impossible, once
the infection has spread to the bloodstream. It is accordingly
all the more important for those having the responsibility for
guarding against and countering Communist subversive ac-
tivities to be on a special alert against this insidious form of
activity.
One of the most readily recognizable telltales of such an
operation is the sudden and otherwise inexplicable souring of
a leading political or military personality previously regarded
as pro-Western or at least dependably neutral in his views
and policies. -Another indicator is the falling from grace and
departure or removal from office of a number of. subordinate
officials known for their pro-Western and anti-Communist at-
titudes-for this may be the result of subtle and effective "well-
poisoning" against such personages, accomplished through
repea ed insinuations and suggestions to their superior that
they are secretly hostile to him or are otherwise unreliable
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instrumentalities of his will. The Russians may be less skill-
ful in their application of this ancient technique than the
Chinese, who possess all of the subtlety and sensitivity that
comes to. them from centuries of familiarity with its tradi-
tional use. -
To accept as valid and treat with full seriousness the neces-
sity for remedial measures against this form of subversive
threat does not require disagreement with Mr. Dulles's propo-
sition that the Chinese have not yet achieved the full panoply
of subversive tactics which have been developed and assembled
by the Russians. They, the Chinese, are clearly making rapid
strides and may well already have perfected certain special-
ized techniques for which they have a greater natural aptitude
than their Communist competition.
The havoc that was wrought in Britain by the Profumo
scandal has been widely interpreted in the Western press as a
triumph of Soviet disruptive design, and even in Lord Den-
ning's fascinating analysis he poses (at page 8 of his Report)
the suggestion that Captain Eugene Ivanov's mission may
have been directed more toward the creation of a crisis of con-
fidence as between the Western allies than to the procure-
ment of intelligence information. Yet it seems as though
Ivanov was a fairly overt and heavy-handed operative, and
that if disruption was his objective, his success was due more
to lucky coincidence than to the cunning of his own contriv-
ances. At one critical Cliveden weekend in October of 1962
Ivanov is reliably reported to have been going so flat out in his
attempts to enlist high-level ? British sympathy and support
for the Soviet position over Cuba as to render himself both
objectionable and conspicuous; and it was just lagniappe
that on the earlier occasion Jack met Christine by chance
encounter at the pool and so swiftly succumbed to her
charms. Moreover, if such was his mission, Ivanov was also
the beneficiary of the most extraordinary series of failures of
coordination. on the part of British authorities concerned, the
security services having been well aware of his significance
and the game that he was playing with the wretched Dr. Ward
as his tool nearly two years before the final explosion.
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Psywar
From what may be a particularly subjective point of view,
it is regretted that Mr. Dulles did not give us more in his
chapter entitled "Intelligence in the Cold War," for example
by pointing up more clearly the essential differences in the
Communist and Western approaches to propaganda and other
forms of psychological warfare. The standard Soviet prac-
tice of constant_ and continuing reiteration of a theme or
thesis stands out in sharp contrast to the generally relevant
practice among Western propagandists, which seems to have
its origins in and to take its main inspiration from press at-
titlzdes toward "news." Even the most productive themes
and theses are quickly abandoned or allowed to sink soon
into disuse once the headlines have been made and the story
has been told.
Consider the contrary Soviet practice, which is well illus-
trated by their treatment of what must have been for their
propagandists the extremely difficult and discouraging sub-
ject of the brash betrayal and brutal suppression of the Hun-
garian freedom fighters in November 1956. Throughout the
non-Communist world and in many areas behind the iron cur-
tain there was at the beginning an almost universal revulsion
of feeling and condemnation for this act of naked Soviet
imperialism. Thus the Soviet propaganda machine was forced
to begin from far behind scratch and invent and fabricate
a whole series of justifications and rationalizations which few
Western propagandists would have believed likely to command
any significant degree of credence and acceptance. Yet in a
remarkably short space of time, by continuing to hammer
away at their bald-faced distortions, the Soviet mouthpieces
had succeeded at the least in beclouding the issues and at the
most in creating widespread belief that the Soviet action had
been justified in the interests of rescuing the Hungarian peo-
ple, from slipping back into a state of "reactionary feudal-
ism." In getting off to their start they enjoyed a windfall
in the form of a strong assist from that self-proclaimed prophet
of neutralism, Krishna Menon, who seemed only too happy
to serve as the Soviet stalking-horse in the United Nations de-
bate on intervention in Hungary and who was able to com-
All
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pletely confuse the discussion by his strident exploitation of
the Suez incident.
Neither the consistency nor the truth of Soviet representa-
tions has ever appeared to be of much concern to their propa-
gandists. They seem to proceed on the assumption that they
can get away with any amount of enlargement and tergiversa-
tion and to operate on the theory that the memory of man
for words spoken and deeds done is very short. Moreover,
they are not unduly concerned about being. caught at and
called to account for even the most transparent of their
canards. The Philby case offers a. good illustration of this
thick-skinned attitude and approach. Those who followed the
unfolding chapters of that case during the spring and sum-
mer months of 1963 will doubtless recall that many assets
of the Soviet propaganda mechanism were marshaled to plant
and cultivate the version that Philby's mysterious disappear-
ance from Beirut earlier in the year was in fact no mystery
at all. He was simply denounced as a British secret agent and
said to be operating in the deserts and mountains of the
Yemen to overthrow the "glorious new revolutionary regime"
there. In less than a month's time following the propagation
of this wholly fabricated story, which incidentally had picked
up widespread belief and following in the West, circum-
stances forced upon the Russians the acknowledgment of
Philby's defection to them, and they blandly announced the
awarding to him of Soviet citizenship. In so doing they gave
no slight indication of dismay, and there has never been any
attempt on their part to explain or correct their previous ac-
count of the disappearance. . And they seem, unfortunately,
to have been permitted to slip off this hook with little diffi-
culty.
Exchanges
'I'lill current incident arising from the imprisonment
by the Russians of Yale professor Frederick C. B4Mljo,Qrn,
taken together with the mid-October event of the exchange
of two American prisoners-Walter Ciszek. .anal-Marvin Ma-
kinen-for two Soviet espionage agents picked up last August
by the FBI, provides timely corroboration for Mr. Dulles's reser-
vations concerning the wisdom of establishinga pattern of
thi is ype of prisoner exchange. At page 119 Mr. Dulles ob-
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serves-and without the benefit of these two late develop-
ments-many of the risks which are inherent in such traf-
ficking in the persons of real or alleged espionage agents. If
our Government is going -To play at this game it should at
least do so with eyes wide open to the hazards which are in-
volved, including the possibility that the Russians, who are
very old hands at this form of enterprise, will be the gainers
in the preponderance of any such sus as may be engineered
or acceded to by them.
It would certainly appear that in the Ciszek-Makinen ex-
change the Russians gave up nothing of value to themselves
in releasing a middle-aged priest held since 1940 and a youth-
ful student, whereas they realized a very significant gain in
recovering two well-trained and experienced operatives-who,
ey been hel an su sec e o e pressures and un-
certainties which are the inevitable concomitants of convic-
tion and heavy sentences, could very conceivably have ended
by providing information and leads of the greatest value to the
security services of the United States and presumably other
Western allies. Irrespective of what may have been the con-
trolling reason vfor..the arrest of Professor Barghoorn, and it
is anybodys guess whether th& Russians Fwere mainly moti-
vated by. a desire to retaliate for the immediately preceding
arrest of their own agents-or to discourage the further de-
velopment of cultural contacts of this order-or simply to put
out of action a scholar who has long been a cinder in Khru-
shchev's eye because of his expert knowledge of the Soviet sys-
tem and record of exposing the myth of "Soviet legality," it
is evident that he was quite innocent of the charge of es-
pionage for which he was claimed to have been arrested and
imprisoned. Moreover, if this incident had not backfired
with unforeseen violence in the faces of the Soviet policy mak-
ers, Barghoorn could have become "very large wampum" as
a bargaining counter, to be held in reserve for coaxing out of.
us the release of one or several of their intelligence officers
or Agents caught in flagrante by the FBI.
Actually, as previously suggested, the Russians have been
playing at this game of "exchanges" for many years and have
on numerous earlier occasions shown themselves to be com-
pletely brazen and unscrupulous in their connected tactics.
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The Kindermann-Wolscht affair, which in 1924-26 resulted in
an impasse in Russo-German relations so serious as to have
threatened to sever diplomatic relations between the two
countries, furnishes an excellent example and a most reward-
ing case study of the underlying Soviet motivation and meth-
ods employed in arresting foreign persons innocent of espio-
nage and holding them for ultimate exchange in return for
their own professional spies and saboteurs.
That case began with the arrest in Russia on patently
trumped-up charges of espionage of two young German stu-
dents (Kindermann and Wolscht) as an offsetting deterrent
to the trial which was about to commence in Germany of a
number of Chekist terrorist agents for planning and attempt-
ing to promote in 1923 a revolution to overthrow the then
very unstable German government. It did not conclude be-
fore the highly reputable German diplomat, Gustav Hilger
(who was attached to the staff of the German Ambassador
in Moscow), .had been charged with aiding and abetting the
students, and until after most of the ranking governmental
officials on both sides had become deeply embroiled in the
controversy.
In the end, the Russians got. back their boy (Skoblevsky),
a personal pal of Stalin who had been dispatched by Trotsky
on his revolutionary mission, in return for the two obscure
German students who had been guilty of no crime in the first
place. For the fuller details of this highly illuminating study
in Soviet motives and methods the attention of readers is in-
vited to an article prepared by Professor_ ___Lamar Cecil, until re-
cently of John Hens University, and published in the
Journal of Central European Affairs, Volume XXI No. 2, July
1961.
The Trumpeting of Casualties
Early in his first chapter Mr. Dulles observes that "intelli-
gence is probably the least understood and the most misrep-
resented of the professions," and in the concluding chapters
he advances the most persuasive arguments in support of his
appeal-which he clearly appears to be making on behalf of
our intelligence community as a whole-for a better under-
standing of the difficulties and for a more sympathetic ac-
ceptance of the inevitable percentage of reverses which must
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