BRIEF STATEMENT OF CIA PUBLICITY POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00161R000100180011-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 4, 1957
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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October 4, 1957
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BRIEF STATEMENT OF CIA PUBLICITY POLICY
In a government agency, a good public relations policy calls for:
as Favor_-:ble mention in publicity media to the end of presenting
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the aspirations and achi'vements of the agency in such a way that it will gain
public and Congressional approval.
b. Good relations with representatives of publicity media through
cooperativeness on the part of the agency, inviting cooperativeness on the part
of the media.
2. These should also be the ai4s of the Central Intelligence Agency, but
CIA is limited with respect to such aims bys
a. Laws which provide that CIA Mg (exceptions to the usual open
dealings required of the Government) and protection of sources and methods)
operate in secrecy.
The exegencioe of in4ellligence work which dictate that secrecy
must always be preserved or preservable.
The fact that CIA has no control whatever over t''e press or any
about iteilf lies in its own refusal to elicit information
her publicity medium, so that its oftly protection against misuse of information
d. The fact that CIA cannot trust publicity media not to misuse
n no matter of what security implications, not because the media are
ort,hy, but because their business is to make pubUc without exception
whatever they consider to have news or entertainment value.
For these reasons, CIA is denied the luxury of fully cooperative re-
lations with publicity media. It must either refuse to cooperate at all or must
adopt some from of compromise policy.
4. There are serious limitations on a compromise policy in that:
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se what appear to be revelations about CIA in print*
a. The press and public, having been led to believe that the secs
nsitive" agencies like CIA is sacrosanct, are literally shocked i&en they
Bach such revelation (invariably believed to have been fostered
des for special treatment in security matters.
} weakens the faith of the press and public in the genuineness of CIAts
So far as the media re concerned, any revelation about CT1
eagerly taken up as a precedent to justify demands for further revelations
d. War pressure from such precedents, CIA might find itself
ultimately in a position where it would either have to release info tion that
should not be made public, or become vulnerable to accusations of censorship and
interference with freedom of the press.
5, Because CIA cannot be completely cooperative or even adopt a compromise
policy aimed sqqx'iWJ apPrOXIMting complete cooperation, CIA will always
adopt non-cooperation as its standard. This absolute standard can
tempered to a degree, depending neon discretion o d in individual cases
cm of current situations.
Such a policy is now in effect in CIA. It has worked surprisingly well
for five years, Under this policy:
CIA has no public relations officer or office: matters having
to do with public relations are directed to the office of the Assistant to the
Director.
b. Normally, CIA replies to press inquiries with "No comment" whose
pal vi.ue is that it avoids the risk of confirmation through denial
c. CIA. declines to have itself associated publicly with newspaper
stories, books, television serials, and the like.
d. CIA will w amine scripts offered to it and form a judgment
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to their implications for the national security; but only on agreement that
e will not be divulged and that no attribution to CIA will be made.
IA gives assistance and guidance to media r Pr sentetives under
ces approved by the Director.
CIA is time able to keep up satisfactory enough relations with
tentatives to be able to expect favorable treatment In return,
go any further t'lan this-'in particular to go to any length at all
irg the publicity policies of the FBI and the military services-
risk grave consequences. Principal Ong these would be:
Lass of public confidence in an allegedly "hush-hush" agency
3d to permit itself to become identified with cheap publicity
b. Loss of Congressional confidence, with the possibility of
Congressional reprisals
Loss of confidence among CIA employees, many of whom feel
and betrayed each time they see public mention of matters they have
personally striven to protect
d. Lass of confidence abroad on grounds that an FBI type of
ublicity onscious intelligence organization must be too o histicated to be
seriously.
sk of a serious security breach, originating frog.. well.-
e of supposedly "favorable" publicity..
8. The case of the proposed 2 television aerial is one in point.
or not CIA allowed the proposed attribution to CIA in these films to be
considered official, such an attribution would be so considered. The occasion
would be taken by all other television interests and by public relations media
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iit,general to constitute a sufficient precedent for any new demands on CIA that
they chose to make. The successful CIA public relations policy just described
would become imppssible to maintaing. It would be difficult if not, impossible
to prevent CIA from becoming just another government agency in publicity
matters. All risks enumerated in paragraph 7 would then have to be assumed,
along with all the implied possibilities of disaster.
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