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February 21, 2014
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April 18, 1971
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Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/02/21 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210106-5 d'A pv ne ail L. Sy BENJAMIN WELLES ? ; ? Ray S. Cline, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence Research WASHINGTON. EGECAN tell when he walks in the door what sort of a day it's been," says his wife, Cynthia. "Some days he has on what I call his 'Oriental look' ?totally inscrutable. I know better than to ask what's happened. He'll talk when he's ready, not before, but even when he talks he's terribly discreet." The Director of the Central Intelli- gence Agency, Richard Helms, appar- ently brings his problems home from the office like any other husband?at least to hear Cynthia Helms tell it. And these days Helms's job is defi- nitely one of the most problem-ridden in Washington. Successive budget cuts, balance of payments restrictions, bureaucratic rivalries and press disclosures that have hurt the C.I.A.'s public image have all reduced its operations con- siderably. President Nixon has re- cently ordered a fiscal and manage- ment investigation into the Intelli- gence "community," a task which may take longer and prove more difficult than even Nixon suspects because of the capacity of the intelli- gence agencies to hide in the bureau- cratic thickets. Both Nixon and his principal foreign affairs adviser, _ BENJAMIN WELLES covers national security affairs as ? correspondent in the Washington bureau of The Times. HS/NC- 241_ A 34 Lieut. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., Deputy Director of the CIA Healy Kissinger, are said to regard the community as a mixed blessing; intrinsically important to the United States but far too big and too prone to obscure differences of opinion? or, sometimes, no opinion?behind a screen of words. Considered a cold-blooded neces- sity in the Cold War days, the agency now seems to many students, liberal intellectuals and Congressmen, to be undemocratic, conspiratorial, sinister. The revelations in recent years that have made the agency suspect include its activities in Southeast Asia, the Congo, Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs; the U-2 flights; its secret funding through "front" foundations of the National Student Association plus private cultural, women's and law- yers' groups, and, finally, two years ago, the Green Berets affair. The 58-year-old Helms knows all this, better than most. As the first ca- reer intelligence officer to reach the top since the C.I.A. was created In 1947, his goal has been to profession- alize the agency and restore it to re- spectability. In fact, one of his chief preoccupations has been to erase the Image of the Director as a man who moves in lavish mystery, jetting secretively around the world to make policy with prime ministers, generals and kings, and brushing aside, on the pretext of "security," the public's vague fears and Congress's probing William C. Sullivan, Deputy Director of the F.B.I. questions. If Helms rules an "invisible empire," as the C.I.A. has sometimes been called, he is a very visible emperor. While he tries to keep his lunches free for work, for example, he occa- sionally shows up at a restaurant with a friend for lunch: a light beer, a cold plate, one eye always on the clock. He prefers the Oceidental, a 'tourist-frequented restaurant near the White House where, if he happens to be seen, there is likely to be less gossip than if he were observed enter- ing a private home. ' He likes the company of attractive women?young or old?and they find . him a charming dinner partner and a good dancer. "He's interesting?and interested in what you're saying," said Lydia Katzenbaoh, wife of the former Dem- ocratic Attorney General. "He's well- read and he doesn't try to substitute flirting for conversation, that old Princeton '43 routine that some of the columnists around town use." Some of his critics complain that he is too close to the press?even though most agree that he uses it, with rare finesse, for his own and his agency's ends. Some dislike the frequent mention of Helms and his handsome wife in the gossip columns and society pages of the nation's capital. . Yet, If he gives the appearance of insouciance?he is witty, gregarious, friendly?the reserve is there, like a high-voltage electric barrier, just beneath the surface. Helms is a mass , of apparent contradictions: inwardly ' self-disciplined and outwardly relaxed, - absorbed in the essential yet fasci- nated by the trivial. A former foreign correspondent, he observes much and can recall precisely what few Ameri- can husbands ever note in the first place?what gown each woman wore to a dinner and whose shoulder strap was out of place. Nevertheless, no one is more conscious than Helms, who also has the broader role of Director of Central Intelligence, of the strict security laws that designate him the official responsible for set- ting and enforcing security standards throughout the intelligence commu- nity. These responsibilities often create tense moments for him, as Helms acknowledges in a story he tells about himself: He had taken his wife to an alumni fund-raising evening at his alma mater, Williams College. After cocktails and dinner the alumni and their ladies crowded together on small wooden seats for speeches by John Sawyer, the Williams president, and other luminaries. Helms and his wife were seated in the midst of the attentive throne when,, to their bee- (Continued on Page 37) ? THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/02/21 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210106-0 Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/02/21 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210106-0 Tie full name is Helms?Richard Helms--and he is the man at right. Ac head of an "invisible empire," he is not quite a public celebrity, y4t he is known as a man-about-Washington trying to overcome his asency's sinister image. Below are shown some of the numerouf Government intelligence directors over whom he presides. Howard Brown, Assistant General Manager of the A.E.C. ? Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, Director of the DIA. 1177 ?. k . . Vice Adm. Noel Gaylor, Director of the N.S.A. One of Helms's functions is briefing the President on developments abroad. Probably because of his agency's sensitive position, he tries to stick to plain facts without recom- mending policy; in that area, one source says, Helms "tends to hunker down." Here, he is seen, for left, at a meeting with Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State Rogers, Mr. Nixon, Secretary of Defense Laird, and Adm. Thomas Moorer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. APRIL IS, 1971 r Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/02/21 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210106-0 Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/02/21 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210106-0 H?L.--S of the C.I.A. (Continued from Page 34) ror, they heard President Saw- yer begin to laud the next speaker: "I am now going to call on a man who needs no introduc- tion to any cf you," Sawyer began. "You have all followed his career with pride. Your president leans on him in- creasingly in these difficult days." Helm's position makes it virtually impossible for him to speak in public?never ex- temporaneously?and he was looking for a way out when to his infinite relief he heard Sawyer ccnclude, ". . . I now introduce Larry Cattuzzi, our football coach." HELMS wears three offi- cial hats. First, as Director of Central Intelligence (D.C.I.), he is the senior intelligence adviser to the President and Congress. Second, he is the President's representative (and chairman) on the United States Intelligence Board, a loose conglomeration of agen- cies handling high-grade intel- ligence and spending between them more than $4-billion yearly. And third, he is Di- rector of the C.I.A. In some ways, the C.I.A. is the tail that wags the intel- ligence dog. Under the Na- tional Security Act of 1947 which created it, the C.I.A. alone carries out services "common" to the other intel- ligence agencies. This is its charter for such "black tricks" as the National Security Council may order it to per- form, from bugging a diplo- mat's bedroom to overthrow- ing a hostile government. Di- rector Helms, in his triple role, assigns data collec- tion priorities for the com- munity and ? in theory ? screens all intelligence before it passes to the President. The C.I.A. is only a mem- ber, indeed, a comparatively small member of the huge, sprawling, costly, complex of agencies represented on the United States Intelligence Board, which includes the De- fense Department's Intelli- gence Agency (D.I.A.); the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (I.N.R.); the Atomic Energy Commission (A.E.C.); the Fed- eral Bureau cf Investigation (F.B.I.) and the National Se- curity Agency (N.S.A.) which eavesdrops electronically on APRIL 111, 1971 ? The is no New , A t. *ZeIrr71177iTrZsTzr13th bet C&D W -911 ?i Capitol Building NJEKIndepAvsSe 224-3121 Central IntellIcence Agency McleanVa .--351-1100 Employment Ofc 1 0 N FLIgr.,122A,,I; SERML STORY?Beginning on this page (and continuing on the following pages), the adventures of a fictional intelligence agent whose name just happens to be derived from the C.I.A. phone number. And now read on . . . tFOLLOW HIM THROUGH SOME PINE-TINGLING CAPERS THERE'LL BE PLENTY OF SUPPORT DOWN HERE WHEN THE EXILES ARRIVE! foreign government broadcast communications. In addition, the Intelligence Board exercises a vaguely de- fined step-parental supervision over the National Reconnais- sance Program, which runs the spy-in-the-sky satellites, and the National Photo In- terpretation Center in Wash- ington, which studies the reels of pfhotographs that are tossed overboard periodically by the orbiting monsters and col- lected in mid-air by highly- trained Air Force crews. The intelligence communi- ty's size and spending are, of course, secrets, but competent authorities say the C.I.A. em- ploys about 15,000 Americans, plus several thousand foreign agents, and spends slightly less than $600-million yearly., By contrast, according to APRIL 111, 1971 Robert F. Froehlke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Ad- ministration, the Defense In- telligence Agency spends $2.9- billion yearly. Its code-crack- ing N.S.A. at Fort Meade near Baltimore spends more than $1-billion of this and employs 110,000 persons. The satellite program, in which the C.I.A. has a voice but not control, Is said to spend at least $500- million a year. In his role as Director of Central Intelligence, Helms must be constantly prepared to give the President, on short notice, the latest information on what's really happening in such matters as Soviet-Chi- nese tensions, Soviet naval activities in the Caribbean and arms shipments to the militant Arab states, Arab moves against Israel, Chile's neclassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/02/21 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210106-0 Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/02/21 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210106-0 development under its new Marxist Government, the lat- est Russian advances in weap- onry, and so on. As chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, Helms rides herd on an unruly team. His authority over the other agencies represented on the board, apart from his own C.I.A., has never been clearly defined by Congress or by successive Presidents, and so his effectiveness depends chiefly on his own compe- tence, patience and tact. Al- most every Thursday he takes his place at the head of the table at the weekly board meetings and acts as the Presi- dent's arbiter between con- flicting claims often based on bureaucratic rivalries. (At- - these meetings the C.I.A. is represented by Helms's depu- ty, Lieut. Gen. Robert E. Cush- man Jr. of the Marine Corps.) Helms operates somewhat like a managing editor of a maior newspaper or television network, reviewing the over- all picture, spotting gaps in the coveraee, identifying pri- orities, assigning tasks and weighing the views of his associates. The C.I.A., for example, may have picked up word of sus- picious troop movements in the Middle East. Helms might ask the N.S.A. to listen in to radio communications in the area; possibly he will call on the F.B.I. to "bug" certain Washington embassies for in- formation or will request that the Pentagon assign U-2's to provide photographs of the troop zones involved. It will be Helms's task to coordinate the work of the various agen- cies to provide fast, accurate data. Sometimes it works; sometimes not. In April and May, 1967, for Instance, the C.I.A. and the D.I.A. reported the possibility .of an Arab-Israel conflict and both predicted an Israeli vic- tory in seven days?only one day off. On the other hand, the ceasefire plan between Israel and its Arab opponents, pro- posed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers on June 19 and suddenly accepted both by Israel and the United Arab Re- public a few days before it took effect Aug. 7, brought about an intelligence breakdown. Rogers, who pays scant at- tention to intelligence and wanted political credit for the "victory," did not solicit C.I.A. help. He and his deputy for Middle Eastern affairs, Joseph Sisco, virtually ignored, al- most until the very hour the ceasefire was to begin, the pleas of their own State De- partment intelligence men for U - 2's to provide "base - line photography" that could spot possible violations of the ? truce. Days were spent prevailing on President Makarios of Cy- prus and the British to allow , the U-2's to fly round-trips ? over the Suez Canal from British bases in Cyprus; and more days were wasted sooth- ? ing Israeli fears about such missions. When the flights were finally agreed to, bad weather delayed them further. Ultimately, U-2's and satel- lites began providing proof that the U.S.S.R. and U.A.R. were violating the ceasefire terms by moving more SAM-2 and SAM-3 missile sites into the stand-still zone. But the in- telligence was consistently ig- nored for political reasons: Rogers and Sisco were ? less concerned with violations than with getting a ceasefire under way and maintaining it. In fact, it was not until a ? month later?early in Septem- ber ? when Mr. Rogers re- turned from the summer White House at San Clemente . to Washington and was per- suaded to spend three hours visiting the vast National Photo Interpretation Center, that he became an enthusiast for photographic intelligence. For days and weeks after he would regale visitors with his astonishment over the miracu- lous accuracy of pictures taken 15 miles above the earth. APKIL 111, 1971 HE Central Intelligence ? Agency itself has two major ? tasks: to collect intelligence, openly or covertly, and to evaluate it for the President. The agency's Plans Director- ate (DD-P) collects clandes- tinely and also carries out certain "covert" functions, such as organizing, training and arming anti - Communist guerrillas in Laos. The Intel- ligence Directorate (DD-1) collects open intelligence (it monitors foreign broadcasts and interviews American busi- nessmen returning from abroad), but its main task is to evaluate everything from all sources?overt and covert. The agency: not only ob- tains, analyzes and reports on mountains of information from published sources (there are 20,000 journals published yearly in the world just on the life sciences) but also from State and Defense Department attachds, from such "techni- cal" collectors as the spy satellites and, finally, from agents. The daily input is de- rived 50 per cent from overt sources such as periodicals, 35 per cent from electronics ? ON A CLEAR DAY I CAN SEE THE BORSCHT ON NIKITA'S TABLE! --.-? ABOARD A U-2 OVER RUSSIA... DOCTORING ICHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET DESTALINIZATIONPEECH tk YOU GUYS WANT To READ WHAT HE REALLY THINKS OF YOU NoNALIGNED FINKS? and the remaining 15 per cent from agents. ? A Senate veteran with an intimate knowledge of mili- tary affairs remarked not long ago, "On a clear day we get ? as much from a satellite as we get from an agent in a year." To handle this flow of in- ? formation, the agency has enough analysts on its staff to form a medium-sized uni- ? versity. At least half of them have advanced degrees and a third a doctorate. Their com- bined specialties cover 281 ? major fields. Piecing together the bits of information from a bewildering range of sources into the nation's daily intelli- gence picture is a break with the classic practice of relying primarily on agents' reports. The U.S.S.R., Red China, Brit- ain, France, West Germany and other veterans in the in- telligence business still lean toward the agent, but the United States has been relying more on the researcher and the evaluator ever since World War II. "There was a time, if you wanted information on the Turkish railway system, you'd set out to bribe a Turkish railway official," says Sher- man Kent, a Yale professor of history who was recruited by the Office of Strategic Serv- ces (0.S.S.) daring World War II. "Now you'd probably find a 10-volume tome in the Library of Congress. The in- , formation's there. The secret is knowing where to find it." Using such research tech- niques, the C.I.A. helped con- vince President Kennedy that the Russians could not be hid- ing missiles in Cuban caves after the October, 1962, crisis. Ray Cline, then head of the Intelligence Directorate, dis- covered that one of his of- ficers had located a volumi- nous file on Cuban caves com- piled well before the crisis. When Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy continued to worry that the Russians might be cheating, Cline drove to the? White House, dumped on the President's desk a huge file with photographs, and con- vinced Kennedy that there was not a subterranean cavi- ty that the C.I.A. did not know about. COVERT action is gener- ally political and means, in effect, helping friends of the United States abroad. "Some- times it's subsidizing friendly politicians or parties, or run- ning newspapers, or running cover businesses ? in other words doing covertly what the State or Defense Departments can't do publicly," explains one authority. Both covert action and es- pionage sometimes involve no , greater risk than passing funds surreptitiously to a foreign - cabinet minister. At other ( times they involve such com- monplaces of the spy's reper- THE NAY YORK TIMES MAGAZINE Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/02/21 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210106-0 Declassified and Approved For Release a 50-.Yr 2014/02/21 CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210106-0 toire as eavesdropping, now made more efficient by mod- ern gadgetry which permits, for instan, the "bugging" of windowpane vibrations so that speech in a locked room can be overheard; or even of typewriters, from a distance, so that in all important United States embassies abroad there must now be special rooms in .which secretaries type top-se- cret material. Yet only the agent, espe- cially a key agent In a foreign government, can fill in the gaps. Only he knows What to look for. The C.I.A.'s informa- tion on Soviet and Chinese military installations gathered by spy satellites and studied daily by photo-interpreters is immense, high officials say. But while our policymakers must know the Soviet Union's strength, they would rather ? know its intentions. This, in intelligence jargon, is "hum- int"?fh uman intelligence?and for this the agent remains in- valuable. Among its many tasks, Helms's Plans Directorate also runs "disinfcrnnation"?stra- tegic deception intended to keep the K.G.B. (Soviet secret police) off balance. One of the more successful, if little- known, spying adventures of this sort came after Nikita Ithrushehev's celebrated "se- cret" speech of Feb. 24, 1956, to the 20th Communist Party Congress in Moscow. Stalin's death three years- before had left world commu- nism leaderless. Finally emerg- ing as the top man after a power struggle, Khrushchev sprang on a surprised party the epochal "de-Stalinization" speech that was to rend the movement and promote the Sino-Soviet split. Stalin's dis- ciple now publicly rejected the Soviet past, demeaned the na- tional hero, challenged secret- police .rule and forecast a purge of Stalinists. Within weeks dissension and confusion spread through- out Communist parties across the world. Some approved; some condemned; some strad- dled. In Washington, meanwhile, Allen Dulles was offering up to $100,000 to anyone- who would turn over a copy of the document, and three months later, for a considerably lower sum, agents directed by Helms, who was then deputy chief of "CS.," Clandestine Services, obtained one from East Euro- pean sources. Some C.I.A. of- ficials wanted to keep their prize secret and to exploit, by classic diplomacy, the grow- ing rift in the Communist -world uncovered by the speech. Others argued for publishing . this self.indlotment of the So- ?? viet system, and Dulles finally agreed. Four days later, the "secret speech" was leaked in full to The New York Times as a C.I.A.-State Department pol- icy decision. But even as the editors studied and restudied the text, Helms's experts, timing their plans to the an- ticipated date of publication, prepared their own, partly fabricated version. The speech, as delivered by Khruslichev, had contained nothing on So- viet foreign policy. Helms's men, rapidly assembling Krem- lin views on foreign countries acquired through a variety of secret sources, including au- thentic damning statements made by Soviet leaders about rulers and governments in the nonaligned world, made a to- tal of 32 inserts. The real text was printed in The Times on June 5, 1956, and the C.I.A. leaked its fuller version simultaneously, exact- ly as if It had been photo- graphed surreptitiously by'a Minox "spy" camera and then enlarged. It was distributed at strategic spots around the world and for months foreign ministries puzzled over which was the true version.. "Eventually most govern- ments decided that The New York Times version was that which Moscow had 'sanitized' for foreign Communist par- ties," recalled one source. "They decided that the other [the C.I.A.] version with its- damaging references was the real thing. The Kremlin took a long time living this down." DESPITE the global scope of his job, Helms spends al- most all his time in Washing- ton, either in his C.I.A. head- quarters at Langley, Va., or before the Congress, to which he is often summoned to brief committees, or in the Presi- dent's "Situation Room," the global communications center in the basement of the White House. Helms's first exposure to Congress was a near-disaster. On taking office, June 30, 1966, he found on his desk and incautiously signed a pile of letters, prepared by an aide, which thanked various well- wishers for their congratula- tions. In one letter Helms thanked the editor of The St. Louis Globe-Democrat for an editorial entitled "Brickbats for Fulbright" that had re- joiced because the Senate had just overwhelmingly defeated Fulbright's first demand to be admitted to the senatorial watchdog committee on the CI.A. then headed by Richard Russell of Georgia. The vote, said the editorial, was a "comeuppance for the crafty Arkansan." Its adoption would - THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE have meant ". . . the end of ? the C.I.A. if, the agency were subject to the claws of the militant doves on Fulbright's committee." The C.I.A. letter, expressed Helms's "pleasure" that the Globe Democrat had [printed] the news "impartially Without regard to party poli- ? tics." The letter was mailed, and his pleasure was short- lived. Before long Senator Eugene McCarthy, a leading critic of the C.I.A., was reading the letter to an astonished Senate. Helms's missive, declared Mc- Carthy,- was "entirely out of place" and smacked of "in- volvement in domestic poli- tics." Helms, he said, owed the Senate an apology. Promptly, the Senate club began drawing together. Sen- ate Majority leader Mike Mansfield declared acidly that he was "more than a- little surprised" by Helms's act. 'Senator John Stennis, an in-' fluential C.I.A. sponsor, called ? the letter "very unfortunate." Lyndon Johnson, chagrined by his protege's blunder, told Helms to consult with Attor- ney General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, whose own tact in Congress had done much to help pass important civil rights legislation. Katzenbach recommended that Helms ad- mit his gaffe and apologize -for it. Helms promptly tele- phoned Massachusetts Sena- tor Leverett Saltonstall, an- other C.I.A. patron, and of- fered to apologize to the Sen- ate either in person or in writing. When Saltonstall told - the Senate that Helms had ad- mitted the blunder, the , air began clearing. An admission of error and apology from a Director of Central Intelli- gence was unprecedented in the Senate's memory. Over the past four years Helms has worked hard to improve the C.I.A.'s standing with Congress and most in- formed observers would agree that he has made headway. He is a good witness who tells the "watchdog" committees in Congress everything they want to know and alerts them to ' coming events. "There are constant rumors that Nixon --is about to can Helms and put a Republican in his place," said an experienced Senate staff official not long ago, "but I discount these. Helms is great with Congress. He admits when he doesn't know something. He never lies. He tells them Ile per cent of what he knows is going on ?and he somehow lets them guess the remaining 10 per cent." And Fulbright, whose be- lief In the need for a C.I.A. Is at best lukewarm, told the Senate last November, after Ifehns testified with Defense Secretary Laird on the A.B.M.- MIRV controversy: "[He] has given the committee . . . the best available information. That Is what inspired in us gested to an Inquiring report, a half-dozen potential souro for an article. "After thost he said, "you'll find you're rt sucking any oil." In such ways, Helms cot treys precisely what he wan{ ACH I NOISY GROUNDHOGS!! n .4 0.41 A TUNNEL To EAST BERLIN TO TAP THE PHONES... - r- YOU CAN'T?) BE IN MY PLACE (fsf: WITHOUT i ENCOUNTERING / TREMENDOUS PROBLEMS! hohnujigh eirt ? SOME ADVICE ON DISPOSING OF A VIETNAMESE DOUBLE-AGENT trust and confidence in the integrity, honesty and judg- ment of Mr. Helms." !ALL, slender, his hair still dark and only beginning to recede at the temples, Richard Helms gives the impression of a man totally under con- trol and at ease. The open, mobile face is often creased by a broad grin, for Helms has an irreverent, irrepres- sible sense of humor. He Is a smoker who carries bat- tered cigarette packs from Which he flicks cigarettes di- rectly into his mouth and often, when talking, will crum- ple a matchbook in his long fingers. His language reflects the current Government jargon. Once when asked whether the late Ho Chi Minh was respond- ing to secret American peace approaches, for example, he laughed and replied casually, "Ho's got our telephone num- ber. When Ho tickles our feet, we'll know' it" He once sug- ? to convey and no more. With his own staff he is a stickler for tight writing, correct spell- ing and punctuation ? and punctuality. His precision and concentrative powers have surprised technical advisers called on to brief him on com- plex details of missilery or nuclear science. Helms has no scientific background ? "he can't put a washer on a fau- cet," his wife once joked? but he absorbs detail. The efficient sang-froid is balanced, however, by a, hu- man concern for the hundreds and thousands of Americans In the C.I.A. whose lives are closely controlled?and often hidden--by their chosen ca- reer. He watches closely for signs of strain among his sub- ' ordinates. For instance, he tries to see every returning C.I.A. station chief, from the largest to the smallest capi- tals, and studies them closely. - "When people live, copulate, die, you can't be in his place without encountering tremen- THE-NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE THE NEW YORK IIMES MAGAZINE rlarlaccifIPCI And Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/02/21 CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210106-0 Declassified and Approved For Release dous human problems," said considerable privilege. 1st a friend. "You've got to have ternal grandfather, Gates an open door for persons In. Garrah, was a leading inter. tragedy. ? Dick can detect tional banker and his fat) changes in people; he doesn't Herman Helms, was an Ali just sit on his hands." executive who moved i.-. r.?0ME who have known ties. Helms spent a format Helms well consider him a year at the fashionable deeply democratic man who is Rosey School in Switzerlat constantly concerned lest his learning French and Germ ? agency's clandestine opera- and how to move arno tions overstep the 'boundaries young nobility and the scio of morality. He has said that of international wealth, t murder and torture, for in- also studied in Germany. stance, cannot be condoned, Upon the Helms famili not only because they are im-. return to the United State . moral but because they are he entered Williams, grade's in and unnecessary. ine in 1935 with an outstan That is what he told news- i - ng record. He was Phi Bet men when the C.I.A. was ac- Kappa, president of his clot cused of having a hand. in the ..most likely to succeed," ed murder of a Vietnamese dou- tor of the class newspaa ble-agent by the Green Berets and?prophetically ? "cla C. 3 sly to Europe in the mid-hrl in 1969. Helms said that politician." his men had advised the Be- rets to turn the man over to Armed with a liberal art South Vietnamese police for - degree and two foreign Ian disposition. guages,. Helms found a ja Former Green Beret Robert as a cub reporter in Europ F. Marasco claimed recently with the former United Press that he had killed the suspect Hitler was rapidly rising it after "a vaguely worded exe- Germany and Helms soon woc cution order" was passed to the commendation of his so his superiors in Saigon by a periors by obtaining an et "C.I.A. operative." Marasco elusive interview with du said his anger over the Calley Fiihrer. This period made a big conviction moved him to make impression on Helms, for 'he the disclosure, but C.I.A. has never lost his preoccupa sources had another interPre- tion with the potential fa tation. They noted that it co- 'good or evil in the German melded?perhaps on purpose? character. with the publication of a novel Even as Helms was begin. about the sensational case fling to gather momentum as a entitled "Court - Martial" and foreign correspondent, how. ? written by Henry Rothblatt, ever, personal and financial one of the defense lawyers, problems forced his return to and Robin Moore, author of the United States and he The Green Berets." Helms, when told of Maras- co's confession, reiterated that the C.I.A. had no authority to order the killings and, more- over, cannot give the Army orders "even in Vietnam." Unhappily for Helms, the story of the Green Beret epi- sode first leaked out as a re- sult of one of his infrequent luncheons with newsmen. His explanation of the C.I.A.'s role was supposed to be "deep background"?not for publi- cation ? but reporters who were not there, and did not feel bound by the rules, broke the story. "Goddamitl" Helms exploded to his luncheon host over Use telephone, "I can handle security In my own agency, but I expect you peo- ple to handle it at your end. This is the last time I'll ever meet with newsmen again." Helms has, of course, met with newsmen since; and he . will continue to do so. He is too skillful, too wise a bureau- crat to think that' the C.I.A. wound up as national adver. Using manager for The Indi- animas Times. At the same time he married Julia Bretz. man Shields, a young horse- woman, sculptor and heir- ess to the Barbasol shaving fortune. A son, Dennis, now a lawyer in New York, was born of this marriage, which ended in divorce. (Two years ago, after a long, painful separation from his first wife, Helms married Cynthia McKelvie, an attrac- tive English redhead who was formerly the wife of a promi- nent Washington surgeon. The present Mrs. Helms has four children of her own?two boys and two girls, all of either col- lege or post-college age, with whom Helms gets along well.) World War II altered the pattern of Helms's life. As a naval reserve officer, he was called to duty with the East- ern Sea Frontier headquarters In New York where he was put to work plotting the pasl- can, or should, operate in a tion of German submarines In total news blackout. the Western Atlantic. Eager ..17R1CHAND ?11,tedAltitAff ation switched to the newly for more dynamic xvorle, he HELMS was born ,at St. created O.S.S. in Washington David's, Pa., Into a world of (Continued on Page 52) THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE 6 50-Yr 2014/02/21: CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210106-0 (Continued from Page 28) and there, in the planning di- vision, he became absorbed with espionage as a career. At the war's end he found himself in Berlin as part of the remarkable team of that remarkable man, Allen Dulles, the father of modern Ameri- can espionage. Working for Dulles, who became Director of Central Intelligence in 1953, taught Helms a great deal. Dulles's contagious zest for life and interest in people of all kinds?at all hours?im- pressed Helms. Yet an anec- dote about Dulles that is men- tioned in the training course for all new C.I.A. agents con- cerns an occasion when he did not have time to see some- one. As a young intelligence attache in Switzerland during World War I, he passed up a tennis game with an importun- ate and unknown visitor who turned out to be the revolu- tionary Lenin. Thus, he per- haps lost a chance to influence the course of the Russian Rev- olution.' BY the nineteen-fifties, ? Helms was a deputy to the head of Clandestine Serv- ices, Frank Wisner. In this ca- pacity he supervised an in- genious scheme in the divided city of Berlin that marked him as a man on his way up. On a snowy morning in late April, 1955, an alert Russian guard in the Soviet-controlled Eastern sector of Berlin might have noticed a curious dark streak. running through the snow about 500 yards be- tween Rudow, a suburb of West Berlin, and Alt-Glienicke, a suburb of East Berlin. Light snow had fallen, dur- ing the night: and closer in- spection might have revealed that the snow had melted in a line as straight as an arrow. But neither Soviet nor East German patrols happened that morning to notice the phe- nomenon. Twenty-four feet under- ground, teams ' of United States and British engineer troops were completing a tun- nel: the purpose of their mis- sion was to tap the main I Soviet telephone trunk lines connecting Moscow with the East German Government offices, the Karlshorst head- quarters of the K.G.B. and the Russian Army Command. At the tunnel's mouth in Rudow, Helms and his colleagues had 'built a warehouse in which to pile the shoveled dirt; they informed Soviet authorities that it would eventually house "radar" installations to help guide civilian air traffic into the United States sector. Since the weather had turned sud- denly cold, blowers were in- troduced into the tunnel to keep the hard-digging troops comfortable. The difference in temperature melted the snow directly over the tunnel, but soon thawing weather had ob- literated the telltale streak and saved the project from detection. For the next 11 months and 11 days, the C.I.A. eaves- dropped on Moscow's conver- sations with its proconsuls in East Germany and Poland. Finally, as the C.I.A. tells it, an East Berlin workman look- ing for a routine fault struck his pick accidentally into the Allied tap, and the game was over. The Soviet press erupted ? in outraged indignation and for months Russian and East German authorities ran guided tours to expose this example of Allied "perfidy." Both Wisner and Helms had deliberately cut their visits 'in Berlin to the minimum so as not to attract Soviet curi- osity. But Helms had been the project chief Washing- ton, personally supervising the tunnel operation from start to finish. Along with such smashing successes, Helms has had a few setbacks in his career. Dulles passed him over for promotion to head of the Plans Directorate in favor of Richard M. Bissell Jr., a bril- liant former Yale economist who had attracted attention as deputy chief of the Mar- shall Plan in Paris. Both Bis- sell and Dulles, the men most, responsible for the Bay of Pigs, were retired by Presi- dent Kennedy. His new Direc- tor of Central Intelligence, John McCone, spotted Helms and in 1962 promoted him to DD-P. In 1965 when McCone resigned he recommended that Helms succeed him, but Lyn- don Johnson selected Admiral William Reborn Jr. Even this proved a boon. "It would have been a disaster had Dick succeeded McCone in 1965," said a colleague. "Reborn made him look great by com- parison." Appointed Raborn's succes- sor by Johnson in 1966. Helms served a tough apprenticeship under a mercurial, secretive and often domineering boss. Then, after the 1968 election, President-elect Nixon named a secret task force, headed by Franklin A. Lindsay of Itek Corporation, to investigate the C. I. A. and recommend changes. Lindsay's task force recommended, among other things, leaving Helms as Di- rector of Central Intelligence for another year. Now that two years have passed one can reasonably assume that Nixon values his services. HELMS'S predecessors came to the D.C.I.'s job from outside the C.I.A. and with national reputations, personal fortunes, political influence, or all three. In contrast, he lives on his salary ($42,500 a year) and before being named D.C.I. was unknown to the public and only slightly though fa- vorably known to leaders of Congress. The easy, friendly manner, the quick smile?too quick, some think ? that greets important Senators, Congressmen and officials, and the Government jargon that conceals what he wants to conceal, arc perhaps conces- sions to his vulnerable posi- tionie . i can be stubborn, though, when he believes the national interest is involved. In 1967, for instance, he began to question euphoric Air Force claims about the efficacy of its bombing of North Viet- nam. He also, grew increas- ingly dubious about glowing reports of the success of the pacification program in the South.I In time Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara also be- gan to weigh Helms's reser- vations against the claims of the Air Force; and McNa- mara's own conversion?a shift which deeply angered Lyndon Johnson and helped pave the way to McNamara'S ouster?is said to have stemmed in large part from Helms's analyses. His views on Vietnam also brought him into increasing conflict with Walt W. Rostow, whom Johnson had chosen to succeed Bundy as his chief foreign affairs adviser. Ros- tow's passionate belief in the use of force to halt spreading Communism in Southeast Asia was exceeded only by Secre- tary of State Rusk's. He kept in intimate touch with a C.I.A. task force on Vietnam, headed by George Carver, from whose reports he would ex- tract items likely to confirm President Johnson's confi- dence in his own policies. These items were passed not only to the President but also to friendly columnists. One day Helms read in a nationally syndicated column that the C.I.A.?and, by impli- cation, its Director?were "ap- peasement-minded." Charac- teristically, he said nothing to the President but quietly visited Rostow in his White House basement office; what happened is known only to the principals, but the press leaks alleging C.I.A. "defeat- ism" ceased. RESIDENT NIXON. who has known Helms for some 20 years, is said to respect him, although he treats him in the same arm's-length, bloodless way that he treats most sub- ordinates. Helms can exercise his statutory right to see the President on urgent business but, being experienced and ? THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/02/21 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210106-0 Declassified anCIA-WI:i.:Wed-F8'ii4"6-50.-Yr 2014/02/21 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210106-0 wise i c matters, he reports normally to Kissinger, through whose brain all in- telligence for the President is screened. Whatever may be the consensus of the six- agency intelligence commu- nity, it is Kissinger's interpre- tation, say members of the White House staff, that Nixon listens to. Some shrug this off as understandable; others find it potentially dangerous. Kissinger is a former Army counterintelligence operative who served in Germany dur- ing World War II, as well as a recognized authority on So- viet policy, Western Europe, nuclear strategy and disarma- ment. Thus he understands intelligence and consumes large amounts of it daily, though much of it bores him. He often condemns as bland, and sends back for revision, the magisterially researched National Intelligence Esti- mates, which are prepared by pooling the input of the en- tire intelligence community on such topics as Soviet missile development. At the same time Kissinger, whose intellectual respect for the foreign policy views of the Secretaries of State and Defense is reportedly limited, gets along well with Helms. Both he and the President ap- preciate Helms's "succinct lucidity," which Rostow once cited as the reason he first came favorably to Lyndon Johnson's attention. Current- ly, Helms's close ties with At- torney General John Mitchell ?they share a high regard for each other?have helped keep the C. I. A.'s primacy among the intelligence-gatherers in- tact. Nixon went out of his way last May 8 to emphasize Helms's role as one of his chief advisers before a national television audience. Asked during a news conference whether the Secretary of State or Dr. Kissinger had op- posed his incursion into Cam- bodia, the President replied, "Every one of my advisers? the Secretary of State, Secre- tary of Defense, Dr. Kissinger, Director Helms?raised ques- tions about the decision." However, Nixon carefully skirted disclosing whether or not his advisers, including Helms, had supported or op- posed his strike into Cam- bodia last year, purportedly to capture the Communists' secret headquarters for the war in South Vietnam. It is significant that he made no similar reference to Helms in his public comment following the abortive Sontay raid into North Vietnam on Nov. 21. Government sources who talked to Helms soon after the Sontay bungle say he was "in- formed" by Laird not long be. fore the operation but not "coasulted." Asked. what Helms's reaction had been, one source responded with a chuckle, "He looked the other way." In any event, Nixon's citing of Helms as a close adviser in May only partially explains the true relationship. Rogers, Laird and Kissinger are "pol- icy" advisers; Helms is not. Ilelms is a nonvoting "ad- viser" to the National Secur- ity Council and, through it, to the President, its chief. He carefully avoids recommend- ing policy. He virtually always leads off N.S.C. meetings at the re- quest of the President (oi? of Kissinger, if the President is absent) with an intelligence briefing. Laying out the in- telligence picture in each of the world's hot spots, he pre- dicts the reactions of the U.S.S.R., China, North Viet- nam and other "hostiles." He raises questions but there he stops and, as one source notes, "tends to hunker down." IS reluctance to offer policy advice is not always appreciated by policymakers faced with tough decisions who, as one source recently put it, "like to glob around intelligence as a comforting hand in the enveloping gloom." Still, he points to the neces- sity of having an impartial agency winnow the millions of words flowing into Wash- ington daily and evaluate them objectively for the Presi- dent. In the U.S.S.R., he has ob- served, there is no such sys- tem. Each intelligence agency reports to its own political patron: the K.G.B. to the Com- munist party chief, Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Armed Forces Intelligence (G.R.U.) to De- fense Minister Andrei A. Grechko, and so forth. No- where in the Soviet Union, Helms has told Congress, is there "a bunch of guys with no ax to grind and beholden to no one sitting down in a back room and deciding what the raw intelligence means." Yet there are those who suggest that the President himself may 'feel that Helms's objectivity does not always fit into the Nixon political program. Some shrewd ob- servers suspect that Nixon appointed his former aide, General Cushman, as Helms's deputy to keep an eye on the Intelligence community. A few go so far as to say Cushman was put there to keep Helms aligned to the Administra- tion's support for the A.B.M. system and to prevent him from telling Congress, for in- stance, that no available intel- ligence from the U.S.S.R. would justify spending $40- billion or more on the system, despite pressures from the in- dustrial-defense complex for lucrative contracts. U THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/02/21 : CIA-RDP84-00161R00040071n1 nR_n