COMMUNIST CHINA THE PEOPLE S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000300010022-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 22
• Content Type: BOOK

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322 COMMUNIST CHINA
States aggression in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. Shortly
afterward United States troops in Korea showed the intention
of crossing the 38th Parallel and pressing on toward the Yalu
River [China's frontier], and, because of this, the Chinese gov-
ernment could not but warn the United States government that
we would not stand idly by if United States troops crossed the
38th Parallel and pressed on toward the Yalu River. This
warning was conveyed to the united States through the Indian
Ambassador. The United States government disregarded this
warning and United States troops did indeed cross the 38th
.Parallel and press on toward the Yalu River.
"The Chinese people could only take the action of volun-
teering support to Korea in its war of resistance against the
United States. But this action was not taken until four months
after the United States stationed its forces in the Taiwan Straits
and exercised military control over Taiwan, and not until
United States troops had crossed the 38th Parallel and ap-
proached the Yalu River. Truman made many statements during
these four months to explain this act of aggression against
Korea; of course, they were futile. Moreover, he could not
justify aggression in Taiwan, nor the stationing of United States
forces in the Taiwan Straits. Furthermore, Truman failed to
heed China's warning conveyed through the Indian Ambassador.
"After two years of negotiations an armistice was at last
reached in Korea. By 1958 Chinese troops had withdrawn com-
pletely from Korea. But up to now United States troops are still
hanging on in South Korea and will not withdraw. Moreover,
the United States is still controlling Taiwan with its land, sea,
and air forces, and the United States Navy and Air Force are
still active in the Taiwan Straits. Isn't this the best proof that
the United States government continues to pursue policies of
aggression and war toward China? It is not necessary to cite
in addition the numerous military bases maintained by the
United States in Asia and the many aggressive military pacts
which have China as their main target. China, on the other
hand, has not a single soldier abroad, and the treaties it has
concluded with Asian countries are all treaties of peace and
friendship.
"Though the United States committed these acts of aggres-
sion against China, would we use force to settle disputes with
'J The People's Republic of China 323
the United States? No! I declared already during the Bandung
Conference in 1955 that the Chinese people were friendly to
the American people and the Chinese government was willing
to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States
government to discuss existing disputes between the two coun-
tries, though the two countries had not recognized each other
and had no diplomatic relations. This proposal of ours re-
sulted, through the good offices of Britain, in ambassadorial
talks between China and the United States which started
August 1, 1955, in Geneva.
"In order to create a favorable atmosphere China released,
before the talks began, eleven so-called `prisoners of war,' fol-
lowing the mediation of Krishna Menon and UN Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjold's visit to Peking. Why are they
referred to as so-called `prisoners of war'? Because they were
not captured on the Korean battlefield. With the exception of
a few who chose, of their own will, to stay behind, all prisoners
of war captured on the Korean front were repatriated after the
armistice. Later, among those who stayed behind, some returned
also of their own will. But the eleven so-called `prisoners of
war' were on a United States plane which intruded into China's
air space, and were captured after their plane was hit. Both
China and the United States had declared that the Korean War
was restricted to Korea and did not extend to China. This plane
was shot down in China. So China did not recognize them as
`prisoners of war.' Nevertheless, China released them--to create
a favorable atmosphere for the ambassadorial talks at Geneva.
"That was the end of the so-called `prisoners of war' issue.
`Besides the so-called 'prisoners of war,' however, there
were two other categories of United States nationals in Chinese
prisons. First were United States citizens, guilty of such crimes
as sabotage and espionage, or who had in other ways violated
the laws of China. Since 1955, we have released twenty-five
such United States criminals when their terms were fully served
or were granted clemency and released ahead of time for good
behavior. One of the twenty-five chose to remain in China after
his release. Of this category only three are now still serving
sentences in China.
"There are two United States nationals in Chinese prisons
of another category-a very special one. They are airborne
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 324
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COMMUNIST CHINA
secret agents sent by the United States to China, namely, the
very famous Downey and Fecteau. Allen Dulles of the United
States Central Intelligence Agency could give you all the de-
tails, but perhaps he wouldn't want to give the information in
such detail as we would. In early 1955, when Hammarskjold
came to Peking to discuss the question of the United States
nationals in Chinese prisons, even he found it inconvenient to
bring up their case for discussion. These two were in no way
related to the Korean War, but were on a mission of pure
espionage and 'secret-agent activity. If you are interested, I
could show you some portions of the notes of my talks with
Hammarskjold for your reference. The notes have never been
published.
"Five years have elapsed since the start of the Chinese-
United States talks in August 1955. At the very outset, we pro-
posed that disputes between China and the United States, in-
cluding the dispute between the two countries in the Taiwan
region. should be settled through peaceful negotiations, without
resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States blocked
all news of this proposal, but China later published it. Why did
[John Foster] Dulles reject it? Because Dulles realized that
reaching such an agreement implied that the next step would
be discussions-on how and when United States armed forces
were to withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.
"We hold that the dispute between China and the United
States in the Taiwan region is an international question; whereas
military action between the Central Government of New China
and the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan is an internal ques-
tion. The United States has maintained that the two questions
are inseparable. We hold that they can and must be separated.
Since it has been possible for China and the United States to
hold ambassadorial talks in Geneva and Warsaw, talks can also
be held at the same time between the Central Government of
China and the Chiang Kai-shek clique. The former is an inter-
national question while the latter is an internal question. Parallel
talks can be conducted and solutions reached separately.
"_In the tolls between China a11 the and the T UT_i111MU ted
--- ~~?? SLaLCS, agree-
ment on principle must after all be reached first before con-
crete issues can be settled. The two points of principle on which
agreement should be reached are:
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' i The People's Republic of China
"(1) All disputes between China and the United
States, including the dispute between the two countries in
the Taiwan region, should be settled through peaceful nego-
tiations, without resorting to the use or threat of force; and
"(2) The United States must agree to withdraw its
armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. As to
the specific steps on when and how to withdraw, they are
matters for subsequent discussion. If the United States gov-
ernment ceases to pursue the policy of aggression against
China and of resorting to threats of force, this is the only
logical conclusion which can be drawn.
"This is the crux of the dispute between China and the
United States. The activities and direction of United States
policy toward China have been aimed at manufacturing `two
Chinas.' In this respect, both the Republican and the Demo-
cratic Parties aim at the same thing.. . This scheme would
probably be opposed not only by Mainland China, but also by
the Kuomintang in.Taiwan and the Chinese in Taiwan. There-
fore such an approach would lead nowhere, but in the solution
of Sino-U.S. relations it would tie things up in knots.
"We believe that a solution to Sino-U.S. relations will ul-
timately be found; it is only a question of time. But there is one
point: if the United States does not give up its policy of aggres-
sion and the threat of war against China, no solution is possible.
We do not believe that the people of the United States wily
allow their government indefinitely to pursue such a policy.
There is no conflict of basic interest between the peoples of
China and the United States, and friendship will eventually
prevail."
I asked Chou whether the two principles he spoke of had
been the topic of discussion for a long time in the Sino-Americaii
ambassadorial talks held at Warsaw.
THE PREMIER: Yes. The first principle was put forward
by China at the 'end of 1955. The second principle was put
f the forward lu in t1c Autumn of 1958 at Warsaw.
QUESTION: Does the second principle include as well
the question of the time and manner of the withdrawal
from Taiwan?
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