REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF USAF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE PROJECT SAMOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000500120005-4
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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I. G%.tneral
General -
-- III. Cene r;11 - etnents
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Csencti. I - Recov:_!ry
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VI1. - .11 -
/VIII,. Data Proc.:.-.. h.,.. - S:11):;yt;tein "I"
IX. LI-1N i R ILvi1N. - Subsytsten. - 1'2 7 F3 '
X.
Ann u>, tk -
Annex n -
Annex C -
Annex D
Annex r_4',
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Pi.Lto2,r p t fornizAlc.t. - Subsy?
RLduu11.1,tut ...tuta, Duo to SL-In KatL - Subsystem
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livettattr 1.ffects - Sunsystern
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BAKER REPORT ON SAMOS
11S/IIC- a9 93
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SUBJEC'1: Rev-i .w and Recommendations of Satellite
Reconnaisnce Project SAMC)5
GENERAL - Back:Jound Information
A. During tne past severhl momhs, deliberations and studies
concerning the various aspects of the ,S.Uv.(),`..; Program have been conducted
by many ::roups and individuals. The national nuture of this program, and
the high importance that the many potenti,1 u->ct s of the product place on
the program indicates that ;.-Lny revie?A mast consider the program as a
whole in order to be mu:it effective. 1.ecently, t i L hs been evidence
of a revised doctrine of the SA MCS Piograrn, obtaiiid in informal dis-
cussions with members of the ()ificn of tie Secretary of the Air Force,
and as seen. in F.uL directives as tie General A ilson letter to the 13MD.
However, in the meantinie national and international atfairs have forced
a new urgency, coupled with a frantic expectancy, for a project whose
technology has been both overstated and underdone, Consequently, this
report has attempted to consolidate various reviews made to date.
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II. ONISRAI, 7 Pelitieal and Nanasement Considerations
A. The universal applications of satellite reconnaissance have not been
fully recognized. World-wide mapping, disaster sad rescue surveys, geological
search, weather anersis and warning, peace-time inspection and disarmament
control, are all possible functions of satellites. Aside from these practical
applications, the scientific results are, of course, &lac of very great importance.
H. International and national approval to conduct operations is, and will
continue to be, a seriftte problem. The situation must be such that the program
will be acceptable politically -- initially, on a V. S. National basis, and
later, on an international basis. This includes favorable indoctrination of the
public, operational and/or executive control by an organization sepabla of
sponsoring both military and civilian peace-time utilization of SANDS, and of
expeditiously and offentivoly exploiting the end results. Whenever politieal
approval is discussed, it must be remeabered that the Soviet Union pioneered
in this area by putting into orbit, with no international agreement, satellites
of various type. (including at least one with photographic capabilities) sad
with no agreement and uncertain action regarding international sharing of infor-
mation acquired.
C. The U. S. cannot afford two R & D programs of this type; and the results
of this program will be of priority interest not only to the USAF and the DOD but
to the entire intelligence community and the nation.
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Political approval to undertake satellite reconnaissance will depend
ultimately upon the degree that the conditions of universal application are net
Vf the 311OS systea.
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The military and civilian requirements are ***stale -- at least, free
ttlAlselat of view and a clearer relation Will *40440 be 0101004.bild
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'AO
E. Rffective and expeditious ern1 itation of the SAMOS material requires
that the data reduction be accomplished simultaneously by or in cooperation with
all interested agencies utilizing reference material from all available sources
and programs. EMphasis by the individual agencies should be consistent with
their priority areas of interest and their respective assigned roles and missions.
This indicates that existing facilities and agencies should be used, or that
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immediate action should be taken_to_prepare_anadequate facility to accomplish
_ , ,
thie task if existing facilities are inadequats,_
F. Program reorientation lsneceseag
organization, but one should use care before starting completely new programs
or_establishing_completely mew oreanizatione. A solution of_existilg,and.,
current problems, on a technical and managment level, is very badly needed,
but the emphasis on new R & D organizations, rev rocket developments, etc.,
tat are not directly_ associated with the_pirimanr missions of the systomi will
trod_to dilute or degrade timely receipt of usable end_products.
Money and effort should be used to clean up, expedite, and improve the
existing program; and greater effort should be placed on obtaining improved end
results, qualitatively and quantitatively.
O. All of the aboveindicates that the program should be under the
executive control of a national organization that has an international growth
potential.
H. Recommendations
(1) It is recommended that the DOD recommend to the MSC that executive
eeponsibility for general guidance operational plans and policies and estab?
ishmert of operational priority, in both the civilian and military applications
41.1.1.011?00110FISIONIMINOMe?
SAMOS, be placed under a mew DOD executive officer (ad hoe) or under an
tin office such as, the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Special Operations.
=mow
II. 2
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(2) The USAir be given the task of:
(a) managing the R & D program
(b) operating the military part of the operational program
either openly or under cover of a civilian mission
(c) making available both the raw and the analyzed data to
all U. S. agencies designated by the EXecutive Office,
whose establishment is recommended under (1) above.
(3) The EXecutive Officer should examine the possibility of accom-
plishing data reduction by a "Jotrt Satellite Processing and Data Reduction
kerliOr."-
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III* MINERAL - Revirements
A. Review
1. The official requirements for reconnaissance satellites have
undergone a most important change in the last year. Before analyzing the present
(July 1960 situation, it is worth listing here for future discussion some of the
interpretations presented by the USAF in official and unofficial briefings,
2* The use of satellites as warning devices was considered basic
until just a few months age. To give effective warning (assuming that this were
possible), a large number Sr satellites (10 to 20) would be required to be in
orbit at the sane time, with practically instantaneous transmission of pictures
required and accompanying large scale data handling effort OU
the ground. (Subsystem "I") (Ref. Annex A).
3. It is 'worth noting at this point that the principle of concurremcy
has been Observed too strictly here: the data processors should be built only
after the work on the collection system has progressed at least to the point ef
defining the basic concepts. This was not done is Subsystem "I" and the conse-
quences of the error are serious.
Z. The effect of weather, of orbit geometry, resolution, and economic
factors have been forcefully emphasized by a number of technical groups and, as
a consequence, the feasibility of the original scheme as a warning device has
been shown to be both problematic from a technical point of view, and almost
imposeible from an economical point of view.
' 5. The disappearance of the warninF function as a fundamental part of
the design basis is an event of recent occurrence. The necessary changes in the
form of instructions by the BMD to the contractual set-up seems to have lagged
the USAF accepted change in doctrine?
6. We Should note here, before it is foryen, that it is this
re tom
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erromeend oemcmgt that pet emnhasis en readout rather than recovery, that brought
about alnrge expenditure en data prooessing devices, vides links, digital
cospnters and se en all of *which mey conceivably turn out to be useless.
7. Unless the change in doctrine is recognised by all responsible
parties as the correction of a previous error, some of the mistakes of the past
will be compounded rather than eliminated.
8. .Another error, still present in the Project system, relates to the
lack of proper dissemination of Project information. In the early parts of the
program, a,determined and unmarranteo effort wao made to reduce the flaw of
informatien on SAMOS to the intelligence community with improper use of the
need-to-knew security rules. The atteation has improved, but thcre is still
insufficient appreciation that SAMOS is a national rather than an Air Force
project. The USLF ewes to all interested intelligence agencies periodic and
candid reports on_ltg_ietentiens, plans and achievemente. As stated heretofore,
the SAMOS capabilities go far beyond merely _providing intelligence information;
end thie fact contributes further to the responsibility of the Air Foroe towards
U.. information needs other than its own intelligence requirements.
B. The USIB J1421.2f9.2212221E1
.10.6100.0.110?66.1.40.1101.4pWe
On July 5, 1960, the !SIB re-effirmed the requirements for SAMOS. An
analysie of the document brings out the following facts:
(1) The reqnirement for satellite reconnaissance is important and
contincetas4
. (2) he warning capability is expected, rather repeat coverage with
intervals of one to six months; if required, some targets may need to be re-
examinad at oleser intervals. .
(3) Weal resolutions (Subsystem "E") at 20, 5, 1 feet are required
for afferent types Of intelligence information.
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(4) Very flexible FLINT devices (:;ubeystem "F") are desired with
emphasis on 1 & D. The only detailed target requirements given at this time are
those calling for identification, localization and analysis of ke-j electronic
emitters used in anti-ballistic defew;e, missile telemetry and satellite links.
(5) From a visual or optical Satellite two capabilities are needed.
Paraphrasing the USIB notes, the following appear necessary:
(a)
A quick solution of the surveillance problem is needed before
1962 to find missile bases under construction.
(b) A continuous operational capability aimed at the high priority
targets, and both continuous surveillance and a directed
reconnaissance (when the weather is suitatiel are needed.
(6) COMILT collection is not clearly wanted until better data are
available on the capabilities of the system.
C. There will, be a continuinf reeudruncnt for hotcrrrinv,ic and ELINT coverage.
As the state of the art permits and as the accuracy, tynes and numbers of weapons
systems increase, the accurRele:7 and detail riwyjred in the t.nd products will become
increasingly greater.
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TV. GENERAL - Readout
A. The USTR requirements pet a greet deal of emphaeis on an early capability
for the detection of missile bases under oonitruction in the period 19601-196. They
also point out the necessity for a continuine visual surveillance in the years to
come with resolutions of 20'., and 1 foot.
B. The requirement for an early capability does not specify the resolution
necessary, but it is clear that for the detection and identification of missile
bases under construction, the USIB considers 1n(1 resolution unacceptable. Detect-
ion of construction work rather tnan recognition of a base may be the only possible V/
result of 100/ resolution. The necessity exists, therefore, of carrying on simul-
taneously an R & D program and a "crash" program with the hope of obtaining initial
visual information of important current intelligence value. The usefulness of E1
package from an intelligence point of view io, therefore, not comparable to its
value as an initial R & D test.
C. The following sections of the report will be aimed at obtainine these
results. In this introductory paragraph it must be emphasised that the program
suffers very seriously from original conceptual errors, but this report is attempt-
ing to rake maximum use of results already obtained.
D. According to the previeue considerations, the early E2 payloads appear
the only means for obtaining an interim capability of a type approaching that
uired by the USIB. There is a chance that additional types of peyloade may be-
ome available by the end of 1961, but this is not considered as important as the
& D program for recovery which is recommended belowo
E. It is fundamental to this program that the recovery problem be solved
t all costs, independently of my operational take. If this is properly done,
t is felt that a solution can be obtained in time to contribute effectively to
sting the USIB requirement for detection of missile bases in Cl 61-62.
Cod 7.7
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IV. - 1
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F. The photographic readout aspects of the program appear to have been
based on unrealistic assumpticrs as to warning capabilitiea, and the claims
pertaining to system capabilities were exaggerated. However, readout is undoubt-
edly satisfactory for all the F applications excepting perhaps some advanced video
recording capabilities.
G. Other problem areas in the readout system requiring technical studies
to obtain the c,roper answers are:
(1) The "start-up" problem after computer failure and after down time
for normal maintenance, particularly if a number of satellites are used simultan-
eously.
(2) The accuracy of the tracking information to properly program the
camera. Specific oroblem areas are ct.rera orientation, focusing, exposure control,
image motion corpensation, and camera on-off times.
(3) The possibility of jamming and the effects of a high density
electronic environment (Vandenberg T & A station) on the quality of the transmitted
picture.
(4) The possibility of intercept of a continuously orbiting reconnaissance
vehicle and the restraining effects of a strong diplomatic protest.
RET
IV. - 2
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. ALkeccwz
A. The n(Pfit,y of ah.A.yin; retolutions or tAtt,ter inpoGes the imrediate
technical requircment fcr recovery. The present readout srstems limit the possible
ccverage and the resol'Ition.
In contrast to assertonr or last year that Liscoverer recoveries were
either "on hand or on ordfr" t i nece.:.s;(ry to conclude that the recovery efforts
up to now hPve failed completely. Accordingly, it is proposed friot simplified pay-
loads launchable by abundant and presumably reliable. THOR vehicli,s be promptly
/devised for yrolLfic studie:: of hbcct .-ecover.' from orbit; in
e?Na?IIMIN?M
Thee exTerimentz:. 5Ld nvolve both land and water recoveries. They
ought to be charscterized by simi.lr ht reasonably precise 1nstr-Imen+.3.t.13n to
determine the physics and mech;,.ri- :-Jf the sph.r,Ite FAareL- of recovery. Thus, for
instance, deorbitin ',ehavIJr
snol.Ld be clearly distinru.isne fr,mi pre-entry and
re-entry activity. Without extensive technical informeti:ni like this, orderly and
continuous recovery of a ..nsefu.I. rroduct cannot seriously be qnticipated.
We believe thIA ,Inr of toe fundamental reasons wt:' recovery has
not been
successful up to now, and if succ,Asful, unlikely to be c:ntinuously successful, is
the process throuo which the Alr Force has vne in achievin the deslreri result.
believe that the allotment for the blame cPnnot be easily made to one cntractor
r contracting agency. We do believe, 'flowevcr, that ov,r and :over, the influence
n the researcn and develoment recovery firoram ihtroouteA by the necessity for
ome kind of useable results, has blocked the technical proiTess of Lhe main
ontrac tor
F. It is felt that the present prime contract responsibility is being well
I'borne technically. However, the R At D demands are so urgent that additional
assistance, probably on ,a test and engineering scale, is necessary. In this way
such critical issues as parachute and other re-entry facilities can be developed
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without unbalanced effects on the development of the payload itself. It is felt
that a contract situation must be created where the solution of re-entry problems
is reasonably decoupled from modifications in the payload. For instance, the design
changes introduced four times in five weeks in parachute improvements appear to be
mixed up with other problems of signalling retro-rocket activity, position control,
and so /North; while there are inevitable connections among all these, critical
stages at be separated. The rather subtle point is that technical development
experience shove that components of a system Invariably suffer in quality when
they are developed in the system. Only after independent recovery components,
including parachute e or other slow-down mechanisms, have succeeded should they be
coupled into a specific SAWS function. This situation would, of course be different
if anyone hail ever recovered anything. As it is, the present regime resembles
efforts to develop Faraday's capacitor for the first time during the construction
of a giant computer.
a.:*1.7:RET
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VI. WATHER
A. Bad weather and darkness negate the possibility of obtaining photo-
graphic coverage, utilizing either readout or recovery systems. As pertains to
darkness, the time of year and the latitude will determine when photographic
coverage can be obtained. As pertains to weather, the studies that have been
conducted were based on statistical averages and can only be used for long-range
planning purposes. Based on these studies, any conclusions made, relative to
the amount of coverage or the length of time to obtain total or specific area
coverage under actual operational conditions, are invalid. Weather is continually
changing and there is no assurance that a continuously orbiting satellite will
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be in the right place at the right time. Large areas free of clouds, haze, and
_
smoke occur infrequently (once or twice a month dependent on the season of the
year), and persist for relatively short periods of time (approximately two te
firee days). The sms readout system is not capable of fully exploiting large
loud-free areas because of its narrow swath and because of its readout limita-
ons. A recoverable panoramic package launched at the proper time and recovered
at the and of 48 or 72 hours could fully exploit the good weather area. In
addition, studies have indicated that a 70-mm panoramic camera recovered in 24
hours will show a gain of coverage of 6 to 18 times over the E-2 aystem,
operating for the same length of time, because of readout limitations. In terms
of information content, the gain is between 260 and 850 times depending on the
width of tna film used. In the ca ec of areas that are cloud free only one or
two days a year, the advantages of ene reccvernhle package Launched at the
appropriate time ae compared to a rumb..r of continuously orbiting readeut packages
are apparent. On the other hand, the loss of coverage during cloud free areas
slay result in a delay of months before t.hc opportunity would exist again.
'RET
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B. A comparison of the affects o: weather and the number of days required
to obtain coverage uning various types of orbits and different swath widthe in
shown in Annex E.
'RET
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4.0' WEI
VII. Gra 03KAPRIC
1. The erenteculer nublicity vrn tr tee SAMC6 prOgram, 8nrt
the exaggereted claims as to capebilities have seriously
jeepaedieed the utility of the system.
21, Education of tn ptthlic, releases conc3rning nrograra Status on
a delayed and pre-...Ahmed basis as well as releases concerning
the current atate of the art meet be; therouehly st;a.11ied, agreed
to end inderstood by aepreprtate Depe.rtment of Defense and
Department ce' State officials. The resaltine plan must be approved
?et the Executive level fano strLetl edher t) by r.11 lower ecnelons.
3. problem of long ,itandine eud considered enprepriate to the
S.AleCti program, particularly as perteine to the is to design
the cenfie;uretion or the vehicle t3 aceortmodf.t.,: tee primary
mission caeLbilite or to dein the brtmry rnsion ce:)ebility
to fit the vehicle, regardless ce' camerontises.
L. It is felt tbet tee., !Yuen enrtlani!I ha -1,rt2n giv.m ',o tne caesule
requirement and rot enough to the ea:,:load requirement. Ae payloads
become more seehistieeted i ur.dir to meet, the 11E-J2 regairerie.ht.s?
the above prohlert if not resolved in favor of the primary Jaission
capability, may prevent or cel e; acrorellehment.
Any follow-on or back-up p'regram to the should repreeent
cifelit7icent imercrvements in cove-e, reeolution or scale, and be
ready for R&D testing in mid CY-19610
A contimois worry in the ;,,nalysis of SM( 6 has been the effect
that the clamer for early intelligence take has had on the. orderly
conduct of the program. A multitude of new techniques required,
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the interference wtt,h rc-...sarch and development has had
,,ortus ,ffects. 7r1 order to ialstrate the difference
between research and deltJlooment concepts and operational
C oncepts, tha followlnr !2x3mo10 lr
- consi.ler the
case of an S-1 2afl.,le coldt for the "'ire: time.
Itr.om the point of view of research and develo-rment this is a
mejor stepning i :rt?.-rir i.3 otk,ained from it
I s of' t?lie etetobt imp ur L8 C c. ironz tie t0.LA
L 31* V ,i)011 Of
i%telligence, the 10011 resolation is insufficient to make
the results of particular significence. For this reason, one
coald state that 95% of he asefulnens of the mission would be
acquired if the lens nnd file of the camera were subjected to
a winking light and did not view the terrain. In fact, the
first g-1 satellite wL11 carry film exposed and developed,
ftbn exposed but not developed, and fillL to be expoeed.
Information obtained by the readout system on these films re-
presente more than 90% of the information recluired from the
research reld developent point of view. The fact that one
could els? look on the cuteide and get sore incidental intel-
ligence from the terrain below, eppeers to a research develop-
ment minded organization en interesting but not overly important
by-product of an outstanding II/41) achievement.
gra. 11. S-1 =Tat
,
1. The r.;-.1 is a !trio camera with a 604 focal length lens designed
? to operate at 260 statute titles. With the 70 10111 format *rid
100 11/ene AWA R (Ay. weighted area resolution) it is reasonable
to expect a basic ground resolution of 1001. To realise this
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100' the IPE must be witi,in 5% because cc the loni: exposure time
of 1/25 second. Since the orbit will !'ie el2.12t1c4i , this point'
snould be studied carefully.
2. The L-1 system is lass C omniaX P nd much more workala then the
E-2 system. Its desicn 7iskes it a coverage tool (100 mi. wide
strip). It is felt that it hAs limited "seeing* canability since
arter readout th.! ..ecogn4..tion of ot,jects will onti:nis'Acally be
limited to 300'. Strip cameras P re.nr04-, useful for mapping but
aporminate meamirements of mall objeca datactcd are possible.
Barring weathcic considerations, thi3 cntellite could cover Russia
in about ten dnys. This is not o very meaningfAl statement, but
weather and da-kness play vitally imnortant
3. The quantitative annacts of the readout problem are not as critical
in the E.-1 as in the E.-1' eyst,.m. The qualitatJvc ssnects in terms
of degradation due to tralsmLssi on, rJoroduction, ard system
complexity (relisbilit;') are the same as for the L-2.
I. Thera is an WiP advahtare or carry-over value from E-1 onto E-.2
in that the imar!e forv,tion, proceesinF, scanning, trans-
mission, etc., tne name. The degree of success of the L-1
prorram will def'..Tri3 better than arty Gtn4r system study the final
destiny of resdi1 programs.
5 . The questionable resolution of toe end results obtained from this
system are great need for reconraissance-irtelligence information
from satellite vuWeles for evalo.ti on purposes sad fltsre
guidance ure considered to be the major problem areas.
6 The Z-1 peckage is part of the coeconont test vuhIcla and uill
be tested simultaneously with the F-1 package.
r'
...4
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7.
Niro' ,01*
E
*el
There is limited bo?s,:r p'1j v ? la (annraximate.ly 15 &is
denendinr on the amount of operation plPnned for each package).
R. The film of the. Fr-1 when 1aunenr.;c1 will be in three dirferent
conditions:
(1) exposed and processed
(2) exposed and nt nrocessed
(3) not expoeed and not nrocessed
This vi11 alloar for the systematic vaJji ti on of tne three Maj or
functions of the system in flio,ht.
90 Three ccasaporrsnt test venicles R,'C' scheduled Ps follows:
September 1960 Janri 1961, :3nd March 1961
Vu0 C. 1; -2 SYSTili
1. The Ls A stri? 7imera; with a 36" focal length lens d3eigned
to operate at an al2titude, of (D stetute miles; and ih a 70 iron
format and 100 11Aral sr.....tem resolution, it ts reasonable to expect,
e. ground resolution of 20 uet. i review of the Lockheed EnFinearing
Analysis Report promp'..ed concern at the distinction between re-
solution and recognition (tnnex P). It is felt that 50-90 feet for
recognition is a realic,tic fir. nt, wldth of ti.. g-riznd coverage
obtained is 17 miles an thn InformPtion is transmitted electronically
to the groand, eftf?^ p,otof7=ip1ic pr)reIn3 ant: scvning Insrsacq ?
;There are two different prolActsas ?:.,o which the E-2 is directed'
(a) the problem of covering IA ant re tturasian lend seise
(b) the problem of seeing a oartic4nr target.
The coverage obtained by a read-out 9ystssra is limited by the speed
at wadi fiL cqn be scanned, the number or grour.d etati one ? the "
ifipt. ? ET
4:7 t
VII 0-14
?
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Noe
bandwidth of tha re id-out system, hc weather, and the resolution
define the overall answer. Total coverage with an system
becomes econqmica4.1y unsound, in terms or the number of satellites
required, thu elaborPte ground system requirea, And the complexity
of totb (Annex C nnd D). For a sinele satellite to ccp1iah the
job, Q p pr oximAtely 50.0 days would be required. Taking weather and
stir angle into consideration, this vou,ld be increased to years.
In order to Obtain covera-e of a 9Articu1ar target on the ground
with the S-2 camera capable o oaii ri coverafT, 150 miles on
either side of the nadir point, Gpproximatelzi 10 Oays would be
required. (I. PP F) 0
3. Genera ly tue 2 camera system, vi_ewed iron techniral advances
to date, is Obsolete. It impo3es such opQmtio-m1 liritations
(swath-width and read-alt) to make satellite t.loe rlprationa
economically and polivic-,Lly unTcr!entabit:. T.,Y.treme zensitivity
of the photographic rfstem, the ver Li complexity, and the
extremely close tolerances inv,Avad 1-cate that the possibility
of obtaining the technical goals and Ohjlctives mentioA in the
inrineerin7 Analyses Reoort i3 (...At:m 40
'VIT. J. S7Sr2l
la Try' lens of ti:e camera hes an F/5 aperttare, and a focal length
of 66 inches. Minimm operttioval groun0 re5o1ution o: 5-10 feet
with recognition for objects of 15-30 feet ere expected, including
dagradr.tion due to unccwrerbeiitad liege notion :au vehicle stehiln-
zatie&residual. (155 11/mm at 155 na. mi.) FilP capacity is
250 pounds (15,000 feet) standard bnse or 22,000 feet of thin balm
VT1
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*ego'
f-mr. The d,?s1 pi! s cR11-41N,,e riolifiee to accept.
pounds. The orbit i.zire is 30 flhys with selected tax;;ets on
derrn0,, Coverare r,f") cucr! ne wit& t:le
capaM.lity of atoreo 1, degner fore i,cid aft.
? Thc ip^orr?.,!,:rried to -be boosted irito orbit by the ATLAS &Gait
Ji. This is di.ctatd by trot reciliremorlt to kee-1 tho vehicle in
Orbit for 30 ter:1 ti:ir+,ec P.rx 0rbital altitIde of'
180 riiies, 1ch ii. tarnestz' L!..nit2.7.; A minimum 1,:etrht tYie
lens ,i.larameterE of F/5, t!-,e 4'ocr-11 .1..!nx,th oC inches land the
defirPhiliti 0.* e horiTortal confi 7umi,1on (in addition, the F/5,
nporture is requ ired to r int in fiero..th of f..x:.:r). The rem,i tent
weight of the s..-ster., incluninr: filn,1.S 1,._100 t L,:50 noanr!s.
3. A riesigTi that a3sumes a 1.-) day life ripe H not 3?;c7. to .o well
"matched" to weather cs n1d4t.':OrIS arle 1.1:`,-,ellirer?c, 'rementf
nouldbo obtail,d wi F/5 p?cloge pt 1U miles altitude
or from a 5L?Incn FP; Tx?ckare usini: 75 feet of filr. Ths woule
he more concist.e:'t t4,e weiktho.r (coverare of 1r-re clod f,ree
areas in 2i4-72 hou--;), poiticai T-,reblerns (psycii.;10.7-tchl eefot
of a c'ontiITxou1 orbitIii r,2coniv.i3sr,eo vehic.1,--.: over or
periods of 'dime) and reguirJmenta ts,reviouslyo
The launch schedult. for ti-L 2,-5 is one per month
CY 61 ? September and December
CI 62 ? March, Ma!, Jane., s.Ttember, enc.; Noverter
time to o-otain total covera,Te rilove 33 degraes (not
providing Thr weather or nun angle) is approximatelj twenty days
and Minimum time to fly wi thin range ce ny tarret is approximately
throe days. (caxera is capable or roil steering and sety be roiled
up to 300 for specific objective torgetting).
" Vnp
*
V 11
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- ??3 4 ? ET,
Neof
5. The dovelonent of Kr, Ind rvrocezising nnd re'uction equipment
for rar7,.fers)e re'loads nrrears to oehi.nd the developmcInt of
the vehicle system. Of nneciflc cncor ii this area are the
devnloprehts of resttlti,,nal orinterr, aderuate mensuration
equirm,mt, and the Auturltic 01.imiNtioh of r'tdandant material,
and/or informon.
E.
E-1
1.
That the existin ;1-1
nr yr, 5
edeqA.ate
c. That the pro7ram r,,main as nr2scntly -.0rifikired and
^
scheduled and F-1). In the ,Ivont that one of the systems
malfunctions, thc other ::,stem ms, yield useable Ftkr, results,
smi, to obtain experirce in ipunchinc (4,L141 payloads for cover
purposes.
That, if possible, the inlnch schedule be expedited.
. That the ri-inrit: ,.ema'r on the 'hot o :'s r., 6.,:t not at the
expense of thh ferr4t e:stem.
ST.TBSYSTilf
It is recommended thst the pT?opiam be limited to a Maxim'
of fair vehicles and 1.e t.erminated at the end of CT-1961. It
is felt thtt a total of seven readout packages (3 Z-1) is
sufficient to obtain +Ala it,ccD objectives and receive sufficient
material to eva Ida t.e for futu ^e RED. i idance in this area. It
is felt that this will allow sufficient overlap with the recovery
program to insure operP'.i.onal readiness of the latter.
1111111111111110MY
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4
.0t1'
6. It is recommended that t;te.dics lnd technical developalent programs
rat .
be initiated in the ref4dout ores thst ,+511 allow fcr an adequate
readout system in the fhture if required.
7. It is recommended that the reduced effort in the readout area be
reflected in increased emphasis on the early availability of a
recoverable system, and in the proper reduction of emnhasia in
the appropriate ground processing, reproduction, and data
redaction aye tem.
$UBSYSTD1
8. That efforts be placed on the development of smiler camera
packages with higher resolution, and smaller dual na:-loads
(effective stereo for better target recognition, at-A measurements,
as well as for political and weather conmiderations). Utilization
of all government orgahim.',Ions an('. ae1lities havinc! orimary
misSian responsibilities in reconnaissance shoalC be utiliaedo
It im recommended that every of fort be made to orovide the users
with adequate ground croce,sing and data reduc%ion equipment in
sufficient tim to have it operationally ready upon receipt of
the recovered film.
?Sdnce the Primary mission of tnc. ,rogram is photographic
reconnaissance, it Is recommnded that the vehicle be designed
in such a manner that it does not complicate and/or coMpromine
the design and operations of the camera.
VIL008-_
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'4101e 4%10
4
impreseion has been created by the meager amount of
information Mailable en Subsystem 'vs that partieipation and knowledge by the
ire intelligence community and by the other contractors im the SAWS Peeples
been limited, perhaps because it is net recognised as important by the ?SA7.
4
situation' has apparently resulted in a lack of coerdinatiom which has hampered
grebes desigm. In addition, it has been very difficult for cognisant governmest
cies to eatemine in detail the procedures, the program, and the hardwere of
tem "I'.
There is ne doubt that the principle of concurrency When applied to
. a groued data handling system of this type is a very diffisult principle to fellow.
Meeameendations were node by this and other reports regarding a shift of emphasis
betweenireadent and recovery; these reeemmemdations eorrespond to a radios' change
in the means of colleption and may well make neat of the system 'obsolete after the
. first few flight*.
-
?-?
? wa.
There are serious worries created by many briefings and discussions as '-
Aa,?pk..-
..7 to whether the interface between the collectiea and the analysis has been properly
-
during an R & Djohase, and confusion has been created between the need at handling
taken Jets account.
As a result of premature initiation of hardware work, the state of
the art has surpassed aortas Sebeyatem "I* components while at the same time the
changes in the,overail system coneopt have made ether components of mall Woe.
There has biome insufficient analysis of the essential requirements of Subsystem "I"
R& D intelligens, 'take" and the need fer developing the necessary facilities for
.an evental operational SAES system.
A substantial number of new preblems must be assessed dahng the R & Ir
phase. These include the type of information collected, the radical difference
VIII - 1
74 I
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w
belie.* recovery and readout requirements, the continuously varying information
rate., +males and scope of coverage, and the problem of correlating the information
with the orbital time. It is evident that a carefully eentrelled experimental
program is neeessary to solve these troblemo and it is very likely that interim
solution Will be necessary to handle se of the R & D intelligenoe *take.
Om the ether hand, it is by no means clear that the program has been
handle, on this basis; rather, the impression has been created of a large scale
offer.t-temard heavily automated consoles. Also, uniquely new digital coup:tors
have been developed "per se" rather than in answer to a particula.L.122to...blem.,?,?.,
The Change in the operational concept between a warning system and in intelligence
system Should have had early and profound influence on the work of Subsystem "Is.
TheJune 1, WO letter from General Wilson to BMD is a late recognition of this
fast andisay not hare been properly implemented yet.
Included in the development of Subsystem "I" Le an elaborate simulation
program that seems not to have involved the use of actual intelligence data. This
elaborate simulation program may have led to wrong conclusions regarding the quality
of the equipment because of the &velem and very serious differences between
'toasted and real material. Substantial differences in esti.mates of the expected
signal environment by various contractors is one example of this possibility.
VIII. B. RECOMENDIATIONS
(1). It Is reconmended that further work on Subsystem "I" components be
preceded by immediate test and evaluation work to classify the sub-
projects into the following categories:
a. Items which we, or appear likely to be, better than similar
devices already available for general use. These should be
completed and made available to systems other than MM.
b. Items which are, or appear likely to be, indispensable and
available to supply a rn' ni mum r:ap tbility for the interpretation
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, r vfte
%we
,41
,of the interim data that will be furnished by E2, should also
Is eimpleted.
0. Items which appear indispensable for future handling of recovery
'payloads should be continued, if already initiated, provided they
are general in scope and do not limit the ultimate system performance.
d. Items which do not meet the (a), (b), (c) criteria and those that
appear to be limited to the handling of !LINT data should be
suspended. ELINT data from more than three payloads are unlikely
to become available in the next two years, and the relative
importance of analog and digital data is still under question.
Items that do not met the above criteria and the ELINT portions
should remain suspended pending discussions betwen the Air Force,
the different contractors, and the ultimate users, aimed at
determining to what extent special purpose facilities are actua.11y
required.
(2). It is recommended that simulation programs be based on realistic rather
than idealistic concepts, and that the purpose of these programs be
one of actual evaluation of the equipment, as it will operate in the
future, rather than of displaying data and training operators on an
=realistic basis.
(3). It is recommended that the entire intelligence community participate
in all aspects of the Subsystem "I" program, and that evaluation of
the system take into consideration all other programs, both special
and conventional.
.....gagouramwermamessiiiimerimemmermilemsemoops
VIII - 3
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'44--SECRET
I. It is felt that the following concept of operations can be used today
as a guide life& of future R&D work (and is therefore subject to future amen&
Beate before being acceptable for actual operational use). This plan is drawn
according
to the rules set by the USIB document either explicitly or implicitly.
1. Surveillanoe of Fino-Soviet territory will be a primary task
of any future operational ferret eubsyrtem.
2. Examination of the rino-Soviet territory for all appropriate
frequencies once or twice a year must be assumed for the cold
war period; R&D work will aim at muoplying the correeponding
capabilities rind reliability.
3. Specifically directed reronnalasence flights with special (RC
missions will be required at irregular intervals averaging twice
or three times a yeer, (This concept IS not explicit in the
USIB report but is the necessary nsequence of the requiremert
particularly as related to anti-ballistic missile detection.)
R&D work should be conducted to permit the future use of WC
procedures and tc develop the techninues required not only for
long term surveillance but also for short term reconnaissance.
2. STMV221 *Fg JAP PV-2,14V
A. The orderly development of a satellite ferret capability must take
into account the need for early evailability of devices capable of meeting the
urgert requirements listed above and plan toe work toward s more complete,
reliable and flexible device capable at a later date of meeting missions of
lnraer scope.
B. A number of problems present themselves and the work should be planned
towards their early solution.
I Lcaszli.3.T4;11..1111 premeat env iro_Pio&nt?
The problem of selertirr ertl-bnl3ist!c niss11e rederr from a derse
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f'4 ?
**3? Le
signal environment is not readily polvable. Presert prof/rams have stnrted in the
correct direction but insufficient attention wan given th the proolem until recertly.
The detection of satellite?Aimed chit-win fmd nC grollnd-to-miusile
guidance channels has not been properly studied er(1 no T-Tv.rir!il Pcfn-r. hos been
Initiated.
(3) ialliLkti.,t4-:hniqvsxid loratIl3jlars3zar.i.
A cownward lookihv telirigur is u:7e0. t'orrutinp from 8 SEit011ite
almilAr in many ways to that ured for vim 1. bc,rvpt'or. 1,;h11e the Idea apper:rs
gond in principle, no ground or fligtit todt an r;Vf 9 siti.:le::-tn-y rwAluntiln.
The usA of pertly planned Fl, '/-2, and F3 in orbit would rive a partial answer
regarding the validity of thn
(4) asaaficallia_slts.' QS& oja ii.rta,345 .
A. number of unenrvnrtional phenomena may be jidPovered of whose
existence we now have no information. Thr tritipo(lz1 focu2ing oe 40 Mc discovered
with r.putnik II in orbit is tyripnl of such bhrnomens. Use of satellites in
indispennable. Fl, F2, nn d will rive a .7.41rtial answer.
(5) MatirAg_intejm, rlyct,Lons orrirlank_elgagasxj.-
vions 0
Some problems D,iMis tyre antinted, canecially b,:oause of thp
different response of the main and inF.ibit oolarivntionP.
The rffect of lonospherir refleptiP-q nri cimiler phenomenh (-annot,
be anticipated.
17'
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'RET?
(6) In-flipt satellite calibration.
This has never been attempted before. Aircraft tests could be
used to test the technique.
(7) ai.ece signal environment.
Vide band exploration of the spectrum has not been made outside
the earth and outside the auroral latitudes, however, nothing special is expected.
At auroral latitudes, some of the lower F3 bands may reveal unexpected sigma's.
Satellite tests are obviously essential.
(8) High gain antennas stabilised to earth.
This is an essential characteristic of many catellites of the recon-
naissance and communication types. We need to prove the technique; there seems to
be no reason why difficulties should appear: satellite tests are essential.
(9) Realtise _zyi___tlosd adustrearttocorrecterrorsortosvitchin
alternate units.
The requirement for reconnaissance rather than surveillance missien
will put a premium en payload adjustments that can be made without hours or days
delay. In this region, F2 and F3 will give decisive answers. Aircraft rather
than satellite tests could be employed to prove the practicality of this technique.
(10) Satellite OOMINT.
This collection requirement is not now a part of the present equip-
ment program. A sensible R & D test should be made in a suitable and likely
frequenoi band to determine whether the collection method is effective; whether
the take could be used if available on a regular basis;
re. 40e. en my
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S EC ET
(ii) Overall reliabilit of satellite take.
A comparieon of the received data with the knomn parametere of
eighals frem.U.S. radar, navigation aids and other emitters will be essential as
a means of establishing overall reliability of the data. Without this knowledge,
nm eenfidence er validity factor can be established.
(12) Feasibility and procedure212221.mlmq_b7 Subsystem "I".
There is little doubt that "subsystem I" will, more than any other,
ba influenced by the results of the early flights and R&D techniques in collection.
The elimination of errors, of redundant data, of inhibit errors; the accuracy of
location, the check with calibrations; the feedback to subsystem F; are problems
that are not likely to be correctly resolved without intense BO trials on actual
satellite data take. Fl data is essential here, F2 data will be much better, but
still insufficient. knaleg data handling requirements are very unclear; the
ability of 88/1 to abstract useful results from partial data; the future extension
of !LINT procedures to CCHINT; are all open subjects for investigation and
development.
C. In addition to these technical problems, a number of operational ques-
tions need to be answered before such requirements as those netted by the USIB
can be met; this is, of course, always the case with any electromagnetic collection.
The enemyts technic/see, characteristics and tactics are fundamental in determining
the changes necessary in our original plans to achieve operational success.
few of the pertinent questions are listed below:
1) Do the Soviets track our satellites?
2) Do the Soviets have a space surveillance system?
3) What is the power, gain, and character of all the ground-to-
satellite links that can be interceated?
4) What new frequency bands will be revealed as employed by the
Sino-Soviats?
L .
irsv "NA
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R ET
la importamt tI note that the SANDS egaipment, as pruriently plannma,
diespc44:414 apart -.R. and, a small part at that -. of the work that the RD-lats
ba* boil en along the periphery of the western world. If the miseione
alrepli.ed bry' these reconnaissance airplane* are essential to the country --
end igylrieorY flights were to become politically emaeceptablel, the present
conemt fret SAWS subsystem would have to be robstantialli modified.
4. 3. anamm Tv RECOMMENDATIONS
A. 'It is recoumended:
1. That since the amount of expenditure allocated to the boosters is
out of all proportion with that allocated to the payloads, that greater emphasis
be Igacood on the payloads, the ground sport equipment, airplane and ground
tests and test data processing.
t. That the mumber of Atlas Agena boosters be reduced and as many
satellites as poasible be based on the use of Thor boosters (with or without
elnatering Sergeant missiles) for R&D tests.
3. That of the three F1 payloads currently available, as ma oy as are
smeary, be flown singularly or in combination with an Ea payload, at the
earliest possible date, to achieve one successful orbiting ferret collector
(for at least 36 hours).
4. That at the four F2 payloads now under construction, as many as
necessary be flown with ?hers boosters to achieve successful orbit with two
5. That in order to newt specific requirements mentioned in the NIB
ent, a vigorous R&D program be initiated:
a) to develop modifications to the F2 design or of the special
test payload package to develop an early capability for the
soliensilliMONOW0001111011
I . - 8
r7. CRT
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50X1
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\46re-
S E;RET-
NA14k)EMNT 'Creo:5
A. It is recognized that UR manarrerseht of a program of this type ic not
an easy task and that the 1,ohnioe1 difficulties are compollJed by the clamor for
early intelligence in a variety nf irms, by the multiolicity of ray:Loads and by
the national importance oivon to s:olca prolects. In adrEtion to these
serioas errors in judgment rngardir, vorning rqu1rint jwx A) and the
controversj regardinc, th,: relative i.nportance of in early resalt v.3. an orierly
n proFram infoerCerd No?ry seri- ) sly with the r4anaoement of ti:o oroora-.
B. Forthor problemo worn intr)laced by the assigtment of the manarement
of ";AMO3 to a groop that, erinenti:o :occeseful in the edminietraton of I';3M,
eoctendod the sPrte techoluoes to;- 4
f-7orent project. Tho fl,t tat tl7e r D
techniqies for this projoc+., hoc to very different was ro-,t, and I still not,
fully recognized. T'oo 1-noioloc4:e n recormoissance techniiu,o; and systems in 'JED was
limited to h verf smell numbir of oeonlo. ?or this reaco?n in portictlar, the
manaerent, Jrodi, found it oiff!_colt to establis'r p()S: tion of leadershi;::, Ind became
respons-ioe. to a nomoer of (.,_:tsicin forces.
C. The fact is tat, within tne there aro officers and civilians with
hh degree of teohn4cal othripetonce whose 3crvi.cc5 were neither s...w;ht nor
welcor.e. There is tlso a well-developed D :lanacesleht capability for
projects of this
D. For the above reasons, it le viewed with alarm the creation of a new
orranizatiou, e.i U r outsioc or. wioein the Air iOrce, that does not tso talents
available at 1..oLEP),nse Ai.)t; and ?3;.O-'. it world also be of concerr it' 'oh
confidorce -wore ?)l000d opoi 11liLf of an iirorerv aPoi not btaffed orranication
like ro opace in estatliehing i.omediately Pn efective onolooering
soperv'.slon over the pro:toct. It ir thrt cvors.1 loonths w1l be ner.s.e.sary
before Aerospace's influonce should be reckoned with and that this time w'll bn
R ET
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NW' Not
E T
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required to staff the organizatton -and to trr.in its pers7nnel. i..nto a new .'1 1d
- of endeavor.
E. It is felt that Lockheed i'.1D in the rtsin ha o foll.owed rnd
many of its apparent errors sho,i1:71 i.rF^e i tsrlec to determine tho e.t.'fort of ".11,7D
direct4.ve3 on contrac tor' s decisl ors .
F. The present kno-dedre of 3 '-- 11 iLo7 ..nchincs, A... I , d3orly.l.tIng
and recovery does not admit -th ri r;echanisms imposed tie ? Also,
the intenigence requirerents rol t'lat h.ive horn :JJ ive1 t.his ;at least
since 1957. aro unnial and con.fqaing. t;rin foreseeable fture rna.4.or exner.imental
letivity shoal] center on exp-r.ms !7}, icarly to expand the :n 110 noted
above. PropF:rt.ies of pay1o.,.1..,ud .1.1v - Jo-eat of opti:o.ut nhotlgrL-hic. ar.d
mechanisms should procoed ;.21 relatively ndependent
FeermIend.,,t.: ens
1. Despite the errol-s of the ')na,?tar.t F manaEement tti3 felt
. _
tbat 1,?ssona have ')-an learned and thrt --n..1-ement has impro.ir,d asid will improve
fi-rther. It. is recommended that evcry fCort?E? made to rt-..,.kr. 1.he existin7 orcani-
atiLms work rather than make' radierl c:.dnren at this time.
2. It is recorinendr,d 'cr: reinforced w11.11 nbre
fficers vrith recornataarr.;--_,. tl'at the :,::s ..tions occu7ied on thr 3taf:7
oe consistent vri.th the high ?,.,riority of the Project.
3. 1.1., L3recr);-a .ond3..1 at- -hai ti oris ani *. ' rolz,:ht
into the r.':irect manarement dtructure, th.t thetr advice be iven much weicht
than in the pdst "Pnd that 2rirtnistr^.tt.ve -,-;ronedures r,vised to pernit ren,)onso
to epecial projr.cts on n timely oasL. Octsi appeRrances leer" one t concl,Ide that
1) has sometLmes avoided asking for advice Iron and and somet.es reversed
ec 1-4mendations in a direction that l.t r 1`.? '3 (an n the 7,..-?nF-2-cient of Subsystem I)
roved wrong. If 1.:,e above rcooramfinciati-in un:,.crop-Cable, it recarxended that
OA 7114.) cl
RET
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17-
? ..0 fi ET is,
?161
the appropriate staff sections of theze organizations be reassignel to D.
4. rt ii-iecommended that, in the deliberations concerning Lockheed ,orp.,
the contractor's acttonS be judged taking into aecoant the policiez, guidance and
decisions made by *.]5AF authorities that may have been crimary or seccndary causes
of these actions.
,
?
1.11110111MINEMNFINIMINNOPIR
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!IOW :00
kriet A
WARILIV
1. The nAture of the warning problem As such th4t It chould not be allowed
to confuse, justify, or e:( !rt technical influence or the reconnaissance satellite
system. The various deKrLe.-. of war not emly imply, but are ,iependent to a
large degr.e on the known intentions of any potential Rnern. Therefore, it cannot
be designed for. Or the other Ilan-, the imnorimnce of early and reliable warning
to the national defunsiv and ofr,Insive efforts is recognized. In order to
insure the highest quality results, the indicatorr of the imminence of hostilities
should be derived from each And all of the following intelligence categories:
(2) scientific and technical, (h) ocoromic, (c) pc1tidd, (d) military (air,
ground, and sea), (e) sociolorical, (f) geogranhic, (g) transportation and
telecommunications, (h) biographical.
2. This, in tarn, becomes a national long-term(days-months-years) problem
involving all intelligence agencies. Close coordination of all activities and
compatibility of all systems is mandatory In order tor rovide on a timely basis the
contributions that SANCC may make to the above intelligence categories. The
urgency of a threat of any situation is dependent on the degree that it is
supported by all of the above factors in addition to the extent that counter
actions have been taken during the build-up of the situation.
3. The question of timeliness as narta:Ins to the "valuation of the SAWS
mid products should be studied very careful14. As pointed out previously, the
advantages of satellite reconnaissance are such that in a very short pPriod of
time it can satwrate any and all data r?duction systems tnat are now in being.
Complete automation of the data reduction process could very easily hinder and
slow down the decision process particularly as pertains to the short range -
short term proLlems. Data reduction on a select basis and effective method to
eliminate redundant material is required.
SECRET
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i
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11
CA E .
Owls. Plio?c9RAPKWrifti MICE
741
*
......
aretem7Resolutiems: '.i.; ..
7-4,--, ? . ..A... .
. ,. ?
__,,?..4.,
.aretenls performance ie-queted at 200 lineal per mn high Cons:mem
? ? .. .$/ 'i-
,,? , . 0 I . ? .... s , ,
liihat400.14hes per um low Contriat.- Conversion to,miasuremont in objAct spit6trrryp4ti
. , .. . ,
4ilefepandiee in the anticipated 20-foot recognition ground resolutielp., AL.441,11
, .coniiiket target (l00a) at 200 lines Rer mm jrields a detectable anensiOn'Of6.7'
faekor approximately 9 feet an the :ground at a scale of 5240001 ow statute
miles). Howner, it is generally aceeptod that to recornize an object, it must
have from 3-5 times the letection geoattion. Therefore,t-..his (b.7) 9 foot
dtmension (detection) will be approximately 25-45 feet in size before recognition '
level-ls attained. Operationally One i5 always dealing with low cOtiergote
(and accepting the stated figure of 100 Lines per mm), the acceptmd ground Object.
recopition threshold is not less than 50-90 feet. Therefore, it is more realistic
to think of this system as a 50..90 foot system than a 20 foot system when it is
required to identify and recognise objert.. Puz, ofor e corsiderithe E-2 am a
50.490 foot system., it shvald also be whasized tnst the above conditicwas *re
bas,3d upon a staio relatioal.hio or camera to grbund. Thk crcc4 Of s)'stoll
nbrnmios during the period of time far cxposure further affoct these nlimbers and
are discussed in the body of t:iis Annex.
K final consideration of a numerical deLcription of the system deals
with photoFranhs taken obliquely and the resultinK imape uegraLiation.
Camera Urientation Problems:
1hP camera ia basically a s-5rio camera. The slit is oriented petpendicular
- to the taightpath. The 70-mm film is then fed in a path parallel to the flight line,
aid at a velocity equivalent to th.: T%liative ,:round velocity. Object and image
planes are thereby. synchronize, and exl-osed rivnns of a iit in the focal plane.
The slit width and film volkit:: t'.e f-KI,oFure timr, with the forward
motion of th- vtfnicle proviHiln;- "soanu motion. IV- rarra is supported in a
MAW
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sw, SECRET
ward
3-axis gimbal system so that the Opticial axis may be directed + 150 miles of
the vehicle nadir for preselectid tarrA. area.
This preselection and aisting are considered to be very difficult problems.
The transverse dimension of the Mat reps.:seats for this focal length a total
angular field of 3.2 decrees. Assuming a safety factor of 5Ui, a target mist,
therefore, be angularly aeterminec within a :rtrip of l.o der?o,s ,?rom a vertical
height of 300 This represents an accuracy of appro)dinately one part in
16.5 in each axis. It should be rerarsaberad that this accuracy roust be simul-
taneously maintained in all three axis to hit, tro target. the 1.60 must, therefore,
be considered the 3 sigma limit or at worse the 2 sigma limit rusensbering at the
2 sigma point 27f (1-. 9 x .9 x .9) of the targets will already oe missed. The
stabilization systom which is usually specified in rms (or the 1 sigma point)
will have to be good to .5? rms or epending on how narr: targets one is
willing to miss. The stabilization system specified in $W03 does not meet
these requirements.
One must further keep in mind that oil of the above pre-supposes no error in
position alone the orbital trsck. Such assumptions should not be allowed to stand
in an active orogram.
It should be mentioned that both of the above difficulties (strict stabili-
zation and position along the track) are overcome by scanninF across the track
rather than along it, as is the case in other panoramic toe cameras. In panoramic
type cameras, the entiro section is scanned and errors in position along the track
can be minimized by starting the cavoq.ao early. This insures target coverage
with a pFnalty in film wei7ht proportional to the stabilization and track position
accuracies. The trade offs when viewed from a panoraoic configuration are clear.
Since the panorarrdc method is superior to the present E,2 method, the 3,2 method
should be changed. Da addition to accuracy, t is also interesting to examine
stabilization system rates, they are:
A IP AMT
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;It' '-.P ''' -.7f "...' ? ''' . .. 7#0; - 4 .; .' ''.' m ,?, - :: ? ' .,---
t NW(
?" ?.1 " L' 't .
w ? 7 Y .....f ..? ? ' )..---.. ... , " .. 4- - - .., ? tE 1; R1E 11
(., ,..
- '? ,.,* in; )A s - " '4 ? -' ? . ', '4' +4' ' -4 ..- .
? ,,Ar :r ?:,k
i? -...?, ,i4,,,,, .
I?
^ ?A ,, ' , ? ?- ,E. " ....;flaswas ' sAiripika4 ??,.. , .
..?rve . ? . . , .
.. ' '''' . - ? tart * iimiduo . , ,.,.? , .
wb ' ? .__?,g. ? '
1-.,.? ',I
^ '11. Mal *toy or 249adseitt corresponds to a motion of 126 aro seconds/seddiiiiz ice'
-,,,,,-- ,..?
ego seconds in an eaposui;e'ef 0.01 second. The 1.24. ars seconds repritaittp.r.:
. , ?
..?-1'"`"' '?
C
":"PleiluAd 111z4ion of apprailbastely 9.6 feet which already borders on deterimiiiiiktn
fr.,. 745
or suppeited 21.?"?etxr ,rootOluttou, for this represents the blnr component along the .
4 ' . 4113tOrellOWI Slit' axis. Notice the itrition is not correcte.d by DTI' Itin' nittnt/7.
? it?
...., stilt4.1isatqn zsotion. ? V the ease token, the pitch axis component ,colirpiutes te
a not corrected 17 Die, abic." io turn contributos about 10 Nisi t4 Jamie
..,
blur intthe film feed diatietd.om. ?
?*,
? ,v
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?ot
?
? 444'
4
?Alltowed *norther way, a izteety (20) foot ?bloc:ton the nadir
.34?Cd.les represents an'Inage on the film of 0.0004, iuchse; or
a mn attitude
micron's. AeOlappitto
. . .. . .. .
!:ttir the acment the criterion of 604 image motion compensation, the tivigitA
.., ,., ?
%???.?
actoeptable blur iS but 4 microns. This means that in 0.01 **con?), the stabilization
? _. , ,...
?
tkripment mast nat contribute as inaoh as 4. urLarons of motion.
This degree of Autocracy. is not presently available in the &-2 SYStalas
1.E.ECoioular stabilisation required is approximately 0.59/minute.
?? bl.atter Prob.fts:?,
.-?
C4100101,
ts the teet that ranch data exist retoarding cloud covert no true
operatiOnalleYMI Of performanee is stated for tho 3-.2 system. tne
?
,peiforms.noe sectd on, does not mention the effeet of haze (industrial or .
'ea* affect end performance.
Fro* available weather data, it has boen determined that appreltivsately .7
of jte area of the WWI is cloud covered most of the time. At least 40% of the'''.
remaining areas are determined to be partially oland covered. Only 20% of the -
entire area is considered open and clear, and this on a rather sporadic ,basii
3
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"toe
SECRET
related to moving cloud pattern.
The Z-2 system operates on a basis of pros elected target areas. Thereare
no sensors aboard which provide recote cound indication for th(1 presence of
cloud cover. This is a problem of special importance in the E-2 photographic
system, because tne angular field of ite film record is just 3.2 degrees square.
It is, therefore, not at all inconceivable that cloud cover can completely ?
obscure the full field angle of J.2 deerees.
Moreover, this may occur even when a normally usable condition for coverage
of 0.2 to 0.3 cloud cover exists. There also exists the problem of narrow angle
lenses obliquely related to the cloud cover. Solar position under these condition.,
is important too, for the sun at the 7:ncorrect angle to the cloud openings will
provide undesirable shadow on the ground scene below the opening. Such a condition
makes it difficult to get overlapping photography. The probability is quite
low that one can accerately locate a single exposure through the cloud opening.
xposure Criteria:
High resolution photoera*ic se-stems are particularly subject to qeterioratien
as a result of motion. The greater the resnlutien, the more rapid the detlrioration
in the environment of motion. A3 the photographic scale oecreases (smaller image
size) the reduced contrast also contributes to a lowered performance of recognition.
The slit camera does have one unique characteristic which sets it apart from
all other cameras--a non-dynamic shutter capable of very short exposure. There
ij no cheaper or more reliable means for minimizing the effects of motion than
fast shutter speeds. This important and useful characteristic of the slit Shutter
has be compromised by rnoosing a ver: slow amulsion, which has high resolution
capability to be sure, but forcing complex and exectinc compensations (effects
described earlier) to make a strin camera useful at exnotIlJres of 0.el second.
Next exmeine the problen of eJra ,?xnosure control. The zariora is :)rovided
a Fials :,late in the u pLAnc a on whicil motllized slits artl plated.
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? ' A.14:
,
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litfift!
method *as employed to minimis* the psObles'ot
4 1
? .t
parallelism at narrow separation*, The slit Ahta is sdogble ay.*
4
!vs.
'
',. eking * itatighi Of Slit widths to provide esposuretontrOts,
. x ?,?
-' ?
.at tmAtemi#Pinine, and is subject ta.ve-prOgranmed cehmeind
-and ground4over. This system canhot, however, provide thCmeeessari
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