SURVEILLANCE DEVICES; LACK OF PROVISIONS FOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000700150025-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2002
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: August 1, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

App?oved For Wease 2002/a8TZ`1. 61AA 84-00499W960700150025-7
(Mice' Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO
FROM
SUBJECT:
ADSO DATE: 1' August 1949
COMMO
Surveillance Devices; Lack of Provisions for`
25X1A
Reference: (a) Air Pouch
1 -1
(b) SES Memo to EXO,
dated 28 July 1949
1
1. In making an analysis to determine why the opportunity
described in reference (a) was missed, a certain amount of back-
ground must be set forth.
2. In the basic charter for CIA, the fact that a corvnunica-
tions organization would be established is set down. However,
.the existence of an engineering laboratory and its functions is
not dealt with. It is probable that the existence of a laboratory
and its responsibilities and functions is not well known nor under-
stood throughout the Agency. The engineering group.has accepted,
at the direction of the communications chief, the tacit responsi-
bility for solving all'problems for OSO in particular, and CIA
in general, which are described as "Electrical," but are more
properly "Electronic." These problems range from the development
and planning of base radio installations through various kinds of
communications devices to and including recorders and other elec-
tronic aids to be used in surveillance work. This responsibility,
to repeat, has heretofore been tacit and not at the direction of
any other responsible officer, and has boon in the field of dev-
elopment and manufacture. The operational responsibility has
boon more confused. Into this picture come Inspection and Security
in the continental U:. S. and, SES or other offices when foreign
opportunities present themselves. Heretofore, it has been SES
and the foreign branch desk together who weighed the requirements,
and then called in the Communications Division liaison when techni-
cal equipment of an electronic nature was required.
3. Most of the models, suggestions, and test demonstrations
thus far offered for desk and foreign office personnel have been
arranged to show the "thinking" and "possibilities" which might
be realizod'if it were feasible to describe the situation or to
move a man well versed in the techniques of electronic surveil-
lance when an occasion arose to use such aids; further, to in-
form the lab staff when a need suggests itself to the foreign
staff; finally, to caution potential users as to security risk
in. the use-of such equipments, and to warn-them that others might
.try such equipments against our staffs.
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ADSO -2- 1 August 1949
4. In the past no reliable moans has been arrived at by
which the degree of priority applicable to those special aids
can be determined as against the basic communications responsi-
bilities when a conflict of requirement exists. No special
staff has been assigned to control surveillance matters, and
ready movement of personnel from the U. S. to care for such
needs does not appear practical due to travel arrangement
problems.
5. The purchase of the particular item which appeared
suitable for the subject problem was authorized and procurement
begun in late 1948. (Note security hazard paragraph 7.) It is
not unusual to find that from suggestion to the manufactured
article, a period of from one to two years may elapse when
commercial manufacturing facilities are involved.
6. In reviewing the file on this specific case, it appears
that Communications was not immediately informed when the situa-
tion arose. We were not informed in sufficient time that our
own technical representative was on the scene.
7. It was ignorance of these last facts which led to the
cable referred to in reference (a) as to the suitability of the
8. The Communications Division might have been able to
deal with the problem by making a "crash project" manufacture
of another lab unit in anticipation of delivery of the manufac-
tured project. However, this was at a time when Engineering
was besieged with contract procurement work.
9. In order to guard against repetition of such occurrences,
the following recommendations are submitted for action as follows:
(a) Define the exact responsibilities of the Communica-
tions Division in electronic surveillance, both developmental
and operational.
(b) Establish a relative priority of equipments in
each instance when two or more projects occur.
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25X1A
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1 August 1949
(c) All desks inform Communications promptly and
completely, both home office and overseas ax'ea offices,
V1hen such situations develop.
matters which involve Communications support.
(d) Within the Communications Division a specific
staff be developed to service the requirements for techni-
cal support both in the United States and abroad; this
staff to be of sufficient size to permit rapid dispatch
of a surveillance specialist overseas on short notice.
(e) The Communications budget to include adequate
funds to service the entire agency with these electronic
devices from stock and travel funds to be available for
the rapid movement of personnel as required.
(f) An official directive promulgated that branch
ch ry "ve_the-responsibility for re-routing all cables