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November 18, 2003
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October 20, 1972
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tiA.SliiNC-TON STAR Approved Forlitglease 2003/32:10@G-p1e-nDP84-00499T401000100005-0 ucinski sserts 'S y' sed CIA Grain D ta By DON KENDALL Associated Press A Midwest congressman says Centr al Intelligence Agency reports may have been used by a so-called in- ternational grain spy who fed inside tips to a Kansas City trade magazine about huge U.S. wheat sales to the Rus- sians. Rep. Roman C. Pucinski, D-Ill., told The Associated Press that the CIA earlier this year furnished the Agriculture - Department with a detailed account of Soviet crop failures which led to the $1 billion sale of U.S. wheat and other grain to Moscow. Further, Pucinski said tele- phone calls purportedly made from London in July and Au- gust to Milling & Baking News, Kansas City, probably were placed' by a USDA em- ploye who had access to the CIA information. The grain sales, including more than 400 million bushels of wheat, or one-fourth of the U.S: crop, have prompted alle- gations by Sen. Greene Mc- Govern and others that private American grain companies were able to reap windfall profits becauSe of inside infor- mation fed to them by Nixon administration farm o'fficials. A detailed account of a month-long series of phone calls to Kansas City by the mysterious tipster was pub- lished Oct. 3 by the maga- zine's editor, Morton Sosland. The caller, at first identify- ing himself as "Mr. Smith" of the London Financial Times, provided Sosland with details?later proved to be ac- curate ? on the timing and volune of the Soviet wheat pur- chases. The calls began July 17, weeks before the public or the grain industry was fully aware of the size of the Russian sales. Sosland said his magazine delayed reports based on the calls because the informant's story seemed fantastic, but carried the stories later. Pucinski, who is campaign- ing for the Senate seat held by Charles Percy, R-111., said lie is certain the CIA gave the Agriculture Department a full report on the Russian crop sit- . nation, information which Pu- cinski said the department suppressed. Discussing the telephone calls described by Sosland, the Illinois congressman said that of the conceivable possibilities it seemed most likely that the information was passed by a USDA employe. "One of the insiders who had access to this CIA report might have been calling this editor (Sosland) in order to jack up grain prices," Pucin- ski said. "Obviously, the fact that this information was cor- rect would indicate it could have come only from this CIA report." There are other possible ex- planations, Pucinski said. The caller might have been, as he eventually told Sosland, an international grain spy working out of London; an American grain trader who, wanted to leak information to the public; or an agent of the CIA itself. But the possible motivation for such calls remains a mys- tery. Pucinski, however, said he sticks to his theory that the calls were made by an Agri- culture Department employe with access to CIA reports. That theory was disputed by Nathaniel F. Kossack, inspec- tor general of USDA. Kossack told a reporter he had read Sosland's article and thought "it sounded like somebody looking into a crystal ball." He said he doesn't know whether the FBI or Justice Department is investigating the grain-spy calls to Kansas City. He said his won agency has "no jurisdiction" to investi- Approved For Releaule2004M2/03 : CIA-RDP.8 Meanwhile, the Agriculture Department admits it uses CIA reports ? along with oth- er information ? in develop- ing analyses of the farm sit- uation in the Soviet 'Union. Of- ficials deny, however, that re- ports have been suppressed except where information in- volves security. Fletcher Pope Jr. a special- ist on Soviet agriculture in the Economic Research Service of USDA, told a reporter he rou- tinely sees CIA reports in for- mulating estimates about the Soviet Union. Informed of Sosland's report about the grain-spy telephone calls, Pope at first suggested the initial call ? made to Sos- land on July 17 ? may have involved an educated guess based on information made public about then, indicating Soviet crop output was going to be down sharply this year. Also, Pope said, President Nixon announced July 8 that a $750 million credit deal to sell grain to the Soviets had been signed. That called for mostly feed grain, according to the interpretation at the time, with wheat considered second- ary. As it turned out, the Rus- sians by July 8 'already had purchased massive quantities of U.S. wheat from private American firms, including Continental Grain Co. of New York City. It also became apparent lat- er that the Soviets had pur- chased far more grain than specified in the July 8 agree- ment announced by Nixon. After questions over the So- viet-U.S. grain deal began in August, the White House or- dered the FBI to investigate whether some private grain companies may have made large windfall profits. Charges that job-shuttling between USDA and the private grain trade has produced a "cozy" relationship between federal farm officials and the grain industry have been la- beled "bald-faced lies" by Ag- riculture Secretary Earl L. Butz. Some congressmen say they will press for further hearings 4gilitti:160eTtletN9 raised then. tO NEW YORK TIMES Approved FoAllglease 20032112/01T d aRDP84-0049W01000100005-0 Chronology of U.S.-Hanoi Negotiations Following is 'a chronology ' of the recent private nego- tiations between the United States and North Vietnam: Sept. 26 and 27?For the 15th time since August, 1969, Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security, meets privately in Paris with Le DLIQ Tho, a Hanoi Politburo member, and Xuan Thuy, North Vietnam's chief dele- gate to the Paris peace talks. Oct. II?Mr. Kissinger be- gins five days of talks in Paris with the North Viet- namese. According to Hanoi, Le Due 'rho and Xuan Thus' present "a new, extremely important initiative" in the form of a draft agreement. According to Mr. Kissinger, North Vietnam drops its de- mand for a coalition govern- ment prior to a military settlement. Oct. 9 ?According to Hanoi, the United States proposes the following sched- ule: on Oct. 13 American bombing and, mining of ? North Vietnam would be halted; on Oct. 19 both the United States and North Vietnam would initial the text of the cease-fire agree- ment, and on Oct. 26 the foreign ministers of both countries would formally sign the agreement in Paris. Oct. 10--Ellsworth Bunk- er, United States Ambassa- dor in Saigon, meets with the South Vietnamese Presi- dent, Nguyen Van Thieu, for the third time within a week. Mr. Kissin,ger's luggage is taken off a jet at the last minute, and he remains in Paris to continue talks with North Vietnamese-Hanoi says that President Nixon sends a message to Premier Pham Van Dong confirming the completion of the agreement but also raising "a number of complex points." Oct. 11?Mr. Kissinger meets again with the North Vietnamese. According to Hanoi, the United States pro- poses a change in the sched- ule: bombing and mining would be stopped Oct. 21, the agreement initiated Oct. 22 and formally signed Oct. 30. Hanoi says it agrees to the change. Oct. 12?Mr. Kissinger re- turns to Washington to brief President Nixon. In Saigon, President Thieu tells a youth rally of his opposition to a coalition with the Commu- nists. Oct. I7?Mr. Kissinger, in Paris again, is said by Hanoi to have "reached agreement on almost all problems." North Vietnam says only two unspecified points of dis- agreement remain. Mr Kis- singer flies to Saigon. Oct. 18?Mr. Kissinger be- gins discussions with Presi- dent Thieu. In Paris, a spokesman for the North Vietnamese delegation, Ngu- yen Thanh Le, denounces the United States position as "erroneous and intransigent." Oct. 20?Mr. Kissinger con- fers with President Thieu again. Hanoi says the United States asks again for a change in the schedule, to which North Vietnam agrees: a bombing and mining halt Oct. 23, an initialing of .11:e agreement Oct. 24 and formal signing Oct. 31. According to Hanoi, this schedule was never officially altered. Oct. 21 ? Mr. Kissinger again confers with President Thieu, then flies to Pnompenh to brief Cambodia's President, Lon Nol. Oct. 22 ? Mr. Kissinger meets with President Thieu. _Hanoi says that both the United States and North Viet- nam have agreed to the text of the agreement and the schedule. Oct. 23?After another Kis- singer - Thieu meeting, the South Vietnamese President calls in his commanders of ? the four military regions, the 44 province chiefs and many of the 559 provincial counci- lors. Mr. Kissinger returns to Washington. According to Hanoi, the United States cites "difficulties in. Saigon" and demands continued negotia- , tions, but "did not say any- thing about the implemen- tation of its commitments under the agreed schedule," Hanoi contends. Oct. 24?President Thieu, in a speech, declares the pro- posals discussed by Mr. Kis- singer in Paris unacceptable. Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 n/HE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN Approved For FhiaieW331/14k)3 : CIA-RDP84-00499RW1000100005-0 7 !,1 H ;?. y??.) .1 Ar -([0. 1 IA) Prom JOHN GOSHKO, Bonn, Oaober 3 The two . women 'spies ! : exchanged by West Germany for more than 100 prisoners from the East has f 0 an sed attention on a little known aspect of commerce bet'ween the two Germanys ? a lively tragic in human beings. , Such exchanges have bean going on for nine years. Gill- coils here say privately that since 1969 ;they have arranged the release to the West of about 4,000 people held in East Ger- man gaols. Until now the Federal Government was loth even to admit its role in these " buying out '! deals for fear of endanger- ing these -operations, and the i \Vest German public has been i generally unaware of the size of 1 this system of exchanges. ; The practice received II renewed notice a few days ago when Government officials here confirmed nress reports that ItWO SP,i CS, Lane Lindner, and ;Irene Schultz, had been handed over to East Germany in i exchange for more than 100 1 political prisoners. Both women i had been in "iri.S031 30 months, I awaiting trial on charges- of espionage against West Germany. . Mrs Schultz had been the personal secretary to the then Federal Minister of Science and Research, and she allegedly had passed to Mrs Lindner papers describing the private meetings of Chancellor 13rancit's Cabinet. The case was unusual because the Minister for Inter-German Affairs, Herr Franke, took pains to issue a statement confirming the Government's part in the exchange. Evidently he deviated from the usually discreet diplomatic tactics because first reports of the women's release were " highly inaccurate" and handled by the opposition press " in a way that constituted a partisan attack on the Government," Privately Government offi- cials say that the system of "buying out " began in 19113 during the chancellorship of Dr Erhard and was initiated by Dr Barzel, now the leader of the Christian Democrat. Opposition, and an aspiring Chancellor next month. In 3C'63, Dr riarzel was )1inister for Inter-German Af.7airs. STh-co then the exektines have been a regular part of thC uneasy- relations between two Germanys. .Usu;:ly pri? sonars held by the two sides are ; exchanged or West Germany : " buys" East German prisoners ; for goads or cash. One of the more sensational instances was the release in February 194 of Heinz Folfe. S oviei. agent who had infil- trated West German intelli- i gence for 10 years. He was ' released in exchange for three Heidelberg 'University students detained in the. Soviet Union on charges of spying, :for the Cen- tral intelligence Agencv. Dean's view is that the East 'Germans : deliberately stockpile hostages as a bargaining counter to secure the release of specific ,1 agents imprisoned in the West. For this reason senior members of West Germany's security services generally frown on the system on the grounds that the East Germans are better able to recruit spies by promising tem a speedy "buy out" h' they are caught. In spite of such objections,'; the Federal Government has continued to exchange! imprisoned spies' because, as ono official, says, " the advan- tages generally out.veigh the disadvanta,e,es." Most of those exchanged are:: little fish to begin \vh:i. Once they have been cai4;ht and ; identified, their usefulness to - East Germany as agents is ; ended." Most of those held in East Germany have been released by "direct purchase." On occa- sion, this has involved shipping - such commodities as CII Is fruit or medicines. hut for the most Port Gonna:- Marks are paid out to satisf,, East German hard currency demands. Publicity sui_oundling the Lindner-Sethi] Is Jam might depress the chances of l'itr:ner exchanges for a iimo, PAtt. East Germany's need for hard currency and concern for its agents should allow 'business to resume soon. ? Wasbingum Post. Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 446-0 Approved F elease 2003NTRAN -P1-11.1 :r1 1?1 ?.rfa it lit U. ku, e.A. C 11 40(111 ? L.) 6 ? imi '1 ? -00491110b01000100005-0 e Ci) 1,1 rri Ii r 0 0 .11. 71 '1 tb. 11.ekiJa.e, Nc.=-1,./ Delhi Oct. 9, pRIME MINISTER Indira Gandhi refused to day td give Secretary of State %William P. Rogers the prooi he is repo:ted to have requested to sustantiata her charges that ?.th,i) U.S. Central Int,:,_,Iiigence Agency is active in India. cEveryone knows that CIA has been active in Indict csid there is no question cf . proving Ito) the Prime Minister told a natio net convention of her Congress Party in central 1\--,lnuada'r_.,ad city, according to Indian news agencies.. eVirhen any foreign intelli- gence agency comes here, ? what does it do ? This does not need any proof. mr. roger.; . was understood to have E1:A:U(1 1 orelgn Swarm YineTh during a meet- ing in New York last Thur.,y? ' day for proof of charges that ! the CIA was interfering in !India's internal affairs ? a ; charge denied ? by the State !Department. Opposition politicians and ! leading Indian newspapers also have urged the government to back up the charges, which . were first made three weeks ago by the Congress Party President Shankar Al Sharma. Mrs. Gandhi personally enter- ed. the controversy last Tues- day warning partymen in East- ern Bhar state to be vigilant against the CIA. Welcomed assurance She repeated the. warning at the national convention. At the mine time, she wel- comed Mr. Rogers assurance to Swaran Singh that .the 'United States did not want to inter- fere in the interim!' affairs of other countries. ?If this signifies a change in policy, we welcome its she said,? but we must always be Vigilant.? The Prime Minister said that even foreign scholars had been Used for CIA purposes. She did not. elaborate but claimed her government had informa- tion that scholars had been given ?other tasks? beside re- search. The 'Indian Government, with rare exceptions. has stopped Issuing visas to American scho- lars in the past ? several months.? AP. Approved For Release 2003/12/03.: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved *iki Release 201M4/15(P)elA11131D84-00*R001000100005-0 16 OCT 1972 CIA Activity ecomes Issue in Indian oil-tics By Lewis Simons Washinzton,Post Foreign Service NEW DELHI, Oct. 15 ? Not a day seems to go by lately in which every news- paper front page in town isn't shouting about the dire effect the U.S. Central Intel- ligence Agency is having, isn't having or may be hav- ing on India's internal secu- rity. "CIA activities on the rise, warns Mrs. Gandhi," the sober and respected daily Hindu proclaimed yes- terday across four columns hi the middle of page one. There would be "no in- quiry into. CIA activities," countered the equally presti- gious Statesman on . the same day, explaining fur- ther in the sub headline that "Mrs. Gandhi rejects opposi- tion demand?' ' "CIA hand in gramo- phones" was the eye-catcher on a small but widely used item distributed by the Press Trust of India earlier in the week. In the tribal areas of Arunachal Pradesh, readers were told, CIA agents were .suspected of passing out cardboard record players and plastic discs which, al- though they had not yet been translated, "Perhaps carried messages preaching Christianity." The propaganda outbursts against the CIA were started by leaders of the rul- ing Congress Party for as .yet undisclosed reasons. But then, as the government .sought to cool off the issue, !opposition forces sensed an opportunity to embarrass the Congress Party and are not letting the matter die. And, as though conceding the obvious confusion among government leaders, politicians, newspaper edi- tors and just folks, the rightwing Motherland enti- tled its latest offering on CIA: "It's here, it's not here, it's growing." 'Mat "It's here" is beyond doubt. Not even officials of the U.S. Embassy or the most -ardently provatnalist members of the j TO,vedaM.VW or Swatantra parties would ? deny that the CIA is as much ? a fact of American life in India as is the steamy duck pond in the center of the embassy building. But beyond that there is doubt. No one really knows the extent of CIA operations in India except the CIA, and they're not talking. Much of the doubt can be attributed to the on-again, off-again approach Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her senior ministers have taken and their refusal to come forward with any evi- dence more solid than a cardboard gramophone to prove that CIA activities were detrimental to India. "Everyone knows that the CIA has been active in India and there is no question of proving it," Mrs. Gandhi buffed last week. But her political opponents are not willing to let it go at that. During a meeting last Fri- day of the parliamentary con- sultative committee, a sort of mini Parliament in the off- season, three opposition lead- ers demanded that the g.ov- eminent publish a white paper on CIA activities. The prime minister re- portedly refused. According to opposition members who attended the session, she first claimed that CIA activities were under control but later said they "are on the in- crease and we must continue our vigil." Thus the confusion. It all began two weeks ago when the president of Mrs. Gandhi's ruling Congress Party, Dr. Shenker DayaI Sharma, proclaimed that the shadowy hand of the CIA was behind a spreading rash of student rioting, communal unrest and other violence in diverse areas of the country. Initial reaction was divided among those who believed that Sharma, who took over the party just five months ago, was trying to make a name for himself and others who were convinced he was acting on orders from Mrs. Gandhi. Sharma continued to make charges. There was specific evidence, he said. that the ForARelease,(290392/00g: disruptive elements, partic- ularly right-wing, anti-social- ist political parties. But he refused to divulge any ev- idence. Then, during a visit to the Bihar town of Ranchi, Mrs. Gandhi was quoted very briefly as confirming Shar- ma's accusation and saying it was for the CIA to prove it was not operating in India rather than for India to prove it was. The president of the Swatantra Party which, in contrast to the Congress Party's socialistic approach strongly favors private enter- prise, accused. the Congress a few days ago of raising a CIA bogey to divert atten- tion from Soviet ? secret service (KGB) activities in India. The claim that India is becoming a political and economic appendage of the Soviet Union is growing rapidly among rightwing op- position parties. - These organizations lost consider- able strength in this year's state elections and some government analysts claim they are now following a. pattern of fomenting violence in their former strongholds ?with CIA help. The most accepted general explanation for the out- bursts of violence of the last month or so is that people are irate over high food ? ..prices, which have climbed AS a result of this past sum- mer's inadequate monsoon rains. In this view, the gov- ernment needs the CIA for a scapegoat. But sophisticated Indian specialists dismiss this view ?although appealing in its neatness?as simplistic. For example, they note that the so-called language riots now going on in Assam, in the far northeastern corner of the country, are apparently nothing more than a revival of the periodic dispute be- tween Bengali-speaking Mus- lims and Assamese-speaking tribal people. Similarly, violence in New Delhi last month had appar- ently unrelated origins and CeirtRiscipantsmosov4m97eialmiroost . p pm 9Rocioo young men who were prob- ably just looking for some excitement. In fact. the Home Ministry, which is headed by Mrs. Gandhi and ? which controls India's major intelligence organization, said it found no evidence of "outside inspiration" in the New Delhi violence. Howver, expert observers agree, none of this is meant to suggest. that the CIA? or the KGB as well AS doz- ens of other foreign intelli- gence organizations, both Eastern and Western?is not constantly- at work in India. But the activities of these - organizations are believed to be more subtle than the Congress Party and govern- ment allege. "It's in it's a search for 'friends,' it's a contest for influence," commented one senior In- dian journalist during a re- cent private conversation. Journalists, in fact, find themselves regular targets of this "search for friends?' According to several top re- 'porters on leading New Delhi and out-of-town jour- nals, those foreign missions most lavish in their treat- ment of Indian journalists are, on the "Western" side, the Americans, the West Germans and the 'South Koreans. In the Communist camp, it's the Soviet Union, the Poles, Czechs and North Koreans who extend the greatest "hospitality." ,Concerned over the effect such influence may have on newsmen, bureaucrats, schol- ars and others, the govern- ment is planning to pass a bill in the coming Parlia- ment session which will sev- erely limit the foreign "hos- pitality" Indians may accept. The bill would sharply cur- tail press junkets, foreign scholarships and other trav- el at the invitation of all foreign countries. Similarly, the government ? is phasing out foreign vol- untary agencies, including the U.S. Peace Corps, By 1974, voluntary agencies from the United States, Japan, West Germany, Britain, Canada, Sweden and Australia will no - longer be allowed to operate in India. The government contends that activity of certain American scholars are even more menacing than those of some Peace Corps volue- 1 0ijoty54omeof these schol- ars, MI? until the beginning ?? ? Continued AmiN 2 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R00'Th00100005-0 or this year had their stud- ies in India paid for by US: government holdings of ru- pees under Public Law 480, have also been gathering in- telligence for the CIA, the government maintains. _There is a certain irony in the current outburst taking place during a period of un- precedented Congress Party power and government sta- bility. The last time the CIA came in for extensive attack in India was immediately after the 1907 general elec- tions, in which the Congress suffered a major setback.. Some observers see the . present outburst as an ex- pression of India's concern with the Nixon administra- tion's efforts at friendship with China; the resulting feeling that India should maintain its relations with the Soviet Union; and a be- lief here that no improve- ? ment is in sight in Indian- American relations. Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved 4,IftAgiNniElA-RDP84-004160001000100005-0 SEP 6 1972 SEMI-WEEKLY - 5,977 Should CIA tell all? '1?Kirc By CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR. Third District Congressman Legislation with important consequences both for the Congress and for our foreign policy presently is being considered by the Senate Armed Services Committee. The bill, sponsored by Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, proposes the Central Intelligence Agency submit regular reports to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and to the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. This measure would require the CIA to keep the Committees fully and currently informed "regarding intelligence information collected by the Agency concerning the relations of the United States to foreign countries and matters of national security." The bill's provisions were patterned after the Joint Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which specified that the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Department keep the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy fully informed. Proponents of the legislation argue that it is necessary to be kept well-informed in order to deal effectively with foreign policy decisions. The Foreign Relations Committee, in its report on the measure, said a "right to full information and analysis.. would strengthen and improve the operation of our government." "The bill is needed to enable Congress properly to carry out its Constitutional responsibilities for the making of foreign policy and national security." The State Department opposes the plan. It contends such legislation would be dangerous to national security and would allow Congress to overstep its Constitutional bounds. In my view, complete and accurate information is necessary for Congress to reassert its Constitutional role as a participant in the making of foreign policy, and this measure is needed to provide that information. In order for Congress to be coequal with the ekecutive branch, it must have the same right to information that the executive has. Much of what has happened in Southeast Asia is directly traceable to information -in Congress. This bill would be invaluable in avoiding such uninformed judgments in the future. To prevent the disclosure of secret information, the measure would permit only Members of the relevant Committees, and their staffs, to receive the reports. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has already demonstrateci the success of this practice. Th' National Security Act of 1947, which created the CIA, proviikd that information gathered by the agency was to be used 4,nlv by the executive branch. Until now, Congress has received the information only at the discretion of the President. Senator ('per's bill was first studied by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and approved on July 17. The bill then was rl?.rred to the Senate Armed Services for further consideraui,n. I will strongly support this measure when it comes before the House. With a legal right. to CIA information. Congress Approved1FOraWeagte 2010N(100-3 ii1Q1ArriiPitatic00.4.19:9R001000100005-0 Had this bill been passed twelve years ago. our recent history might have bum completely different. ITS/11C- 4R5.1?) Approved For .0041 A3111.SCIA)-(Rb08410499R440 000100005-0 Ni41,16-ct 1912 Author's Query I am interested in obtaining written reports of personal ex- periences of civilians involving the Central Intelligence Agency, These will be published, with permission of the contributors, as part of an anthology con- cerned with the extent to which the C.I.A. is involved with civilian life. L. G. PEDERSEN U. of North Carolina Chapel Hill, N. C. 27514. Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved Form'Release 2P9Aragl130:1CIARDP84-004901R001000100005-0 4 OCT 1972 A Mrs. Gandhi Alleges CIA Activities NEW DELHI, Oct. 3 (UPI) ?.Prime Minister Indira Gan- dhi's attack on the activities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in India raised fears in U.S. embassy circles herd today of further damage to In- dian-American relations. , Mrs. Gandhi told a local Congress Party meeting yes- terday that she had informa- tion that the CIA had become active in India. . She asked the party workers to be vigilant and to counter- act the CIA's activities. Mrs. Gandhi did not say pre- cisely what the CIA was doing in India. "It is not for us to prove that this agency is work- ing in our country," she said. "It 'is for the CIA to prove that it is not active in India." ? Sniping at the CIA has be- come traditional in India. ?. Shankar Dayal ?Sharma, presi- dent of the Congress Party, resurrected the issue on Sept. 21 at a news conference. He, accused the CIA of involv- ment in recent civil disturb- ances here. At the time,- a IT S. embassy ' spokesman said "Such accusa- ? tions are outrageous and havd no basis in fact." But the em- bassy declined to comment on. Mrs. Gandhi's remarks. In Washington, State De partment officials denied her charges. Department spokes- man Charles. W. Bray was asked: 'Are you privy to what the CIA is doing?" ? "We are quite satisfied," he. replied. ----, --1 Tistlic- 9 4"-- --- - pproved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved For_Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 India Swipe at CIA Could Hurt Tres NEW DELHI (UPI)?Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's at- ? tack on the activities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agen- cy in India has raised fears in U.S. Embassy circles of further damage to American- Indian relations, already at an all-time low. Mrs. Gandhi yesterday told a meeting in Ranchi for work- ers in her ruling Congress ? party that ?she had informa- ticin the CIA had pecome ac- tive in India. She asked the party loyal- ists at Ranchi, which is in the northeastern state of Bihar, to be vigilant of the CIA and to counteract its ac- tivities. Mrs. Gandhi did not say what the CIA was doing in India. "It is not for us to prove that this agency is working in our country," she told the party workers. "It is for the CIA to prove that it is not ac- tive in India." In Washington, State De- partment spokesman Charles W. Bray III said that "any implicatihn that the United States government is involved in the internal affairs of In- dia is quite without founda- tion." He said the United States ' would withhold specific com- ment until the exact allega- tions of Mrs. Gandhi are re- ceived here from the embas- hy in New Delhi. 'Old Hat' Issue Sniping at the CIA is old hat in India. Dr. Shankar Dayal Sharma, president of . the Congress party, resurrect- .- -ed the issue Sept. 21 at a Cal- . cutta news conference in which he accused the CIA of involvement in recent civil '..,,? 'disturbances in this country. At the time, a U.S. Embas- -ay spokesman said "such ac- cusations are outrageous .and r'have no basis in fact." The embassy this time declined to. comment on_IVIrs Gandhi's gtved For Release It was considered likely that Secretary of State Wil- liam P. Rogers will raise the issue when he meets in Wash- ington on Thurday with Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh. It was learned here that Washington already has told Indian diplomats privately in the United States that such criticism is "not construc- tive." The Indian diplomats were reported to have responded that India, like the United States, is "a free country" and its officials could say what they pleased. Watch Russians It is generally believed here that the primary mission of the CIA in India is to 4atch the activities of the Russians. Those in a position to know say the CIA has little or no interest in the domestic politi- cal situation in India. The agents are known to have Indian contacts, who pre- sumably are paid and could infiltrate political organiza- tions for reporting purposes. Relations between the United States and India plunged to an all-time low when the United States "tilted" in favor of Pakistan during Decem- ber's India-Pakistan war. (Kuldip Nayar, the Star- News special correspondent in India, reports from New Delhi that after the general elections in 1967, the Indian Intelligence Bureau submitted a report alleging that "fi- nancial assistance" during the elections had come from American sources. It claimed that the ultimate source of funds was the CIA. Two Steps Seen (Two courses of action were then considered appropriate: One, not to permit the work- ing of those U.S. foundations and organizations which were suspected to have originated intelligence agencies such as the CIA. Two, the receipt of donations and other forms of financial assistance from American sources would be subject to more rigorous con- 26ififillighlit6YA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS Washington, D. C., Tuesday, October 3, 1972 (The government of India has already begun implement- ing both steps. Most U.S. . organizations have wound up their activities in India and one of the recent' ones phasing out its activities is CARE Similarly, legislation is being brought forth to enable the government to approve of in- vitations received by individ- uals and organizations from America before they are ac- cepted.) ApprovevlaFor Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-X99R001000100005-0 c>!-i 2 OCT 1-,172 us. major held by Syria e Special to The Christian Science Monitor Beirut, Lebanon The case of Maj. Richard Barrett, the United States diplomat who has been held by the Syrian Government since Sept. 9, shows signs of slowly building into a couse celebre. The major, who is from Wyoming, is the assistant ? military attache in the United States Embassy in Amman, Jordan. He wan traveling by road from 'Amman to Beirut, to visit his wife and child, when he was taken into custody at the intervening Syrian fron- tier post of Deraa. Nothing was said about the incident till Sept. 19 when the news broke in an Arabic language newspaper in Beirut. The United States State Department then said it had maintained silence because it had been using ?quiet diplomacy to obtain Major Barrett's release. It also then became known that both Italy, which has been looking after United States interests in Syria since 1967, and Lebanon had tried, and failed, to get more out of Syria than a bare acknowledgement of the arrest. ? Syria now has been put off limits for United States officials, And the State Department has twice expressed its concern at Major Barrett's imprisonment. There' are three theories concerning the arrest. The first and least likely is that the major defected to Syria taking important documents with him. This seems very im- probable to say the least. The second theory is that he is being held on espionage charges, and one Beirut publica- tion predicts he will be put on trial as Gary Powers of the U-2 incident was in the Soviet The arguments favoring the espionage ' theory are that the major is said to be fluent in Arabic, a dubious accomplishment that is always likely to arouse suspicion here; that he made unusually frequent trips- by road across Syria, and showed partictiar interest in the frontier area where Palestinian com- mando units are stationed; that, according to one story, he had two passports on him ? diplomatic and ordinary; and that, above all, there was that strange gap of silence of 10 days, which suggests embarrassment in .Washington. ? ? ? The third and perhaps most probable theory is that Major Barrett is being held as a hostage by Syria kVA Pressure Israel Tritr iCttaWS14,14P q 5-01 17 1 ..)N r .111)e)Iii77.67':1`Fri T1 A GTh(rj ?F i Syrian officers who were kidnapped by Israel from Lebanese territory on July 21. ? When Lebanon and Syria took the matter to ? the UN Security Council the United States abstained on a resolution that was passed ordering Israel to return its prisoners. Israel has ignored the resolution, saying that it would liberate its hostages only in return for ' all Israeli prisoners held by all Arab ..coun- tries, especially including Egypt The argument here is that if the United States thus condones the situation where ? country "A" can kidnap hostages from country "B" on the territory of country "C" - to obtain the release of prisoners in country "D," then it is surely permissible for country "B" to take a hostage on its own territory from country "E" (America) to get back its prisoners from country "A." ? Th'e Middle East policy of the United States has been profoundly pro-Israel and anti-Arab for the past 25 years, it is said here, yet United States interests and individual United States citizens have seldom suffered harm from the Arabs. The case of Major Barrett shows that Arab tolerance may be changing. If the major were innocent, the argument goes, would not Washington have been the first to announce the news and to raise a hue and cry instead of leaking the information belatedly to a Lebanese newspaper? 003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approvedliter Release 260h2/08 :'-aA-RDP84-0(44619R001000100005-0 1 OCT i;72 1 S'? - 1! Moscow (Reuter) ? The memoirs of Gordon A. Lens- dale, a Soviet master spy, have run into a mysterious' delay after beginning publica- tion here almost a year ago. Lonsdale, alias Konon Mo- lody, alias Georgi Lonov, died in October,. 1970, while picking mushrooms in the woods near Moscow. _ A professionally edited ver- sion of his memoirs began appearing a year later in the monthly magazine Molo- daya Gyardiva [Young Guard-I, Three installments appeared at intervals, but there have been none since last March. Lonov ? this was his real name according to the maga- zine?was, sentenced to 25 years in prison by a British court in 1961 for his part in a spy ring seeking British naval secrets. He was known in Britain as Gordon Arnold Lonsdale, and he even published what pur- ported to be his autobiography there after being released in a swap for ? Greville M. Wynne, a British businessman convicted of spying against Russia in 1963. "Not our fault" But Lonsdale's story. has not done too well in the country which honors him as one or its most distinguished agents. . A member of Molodaya Gpardiya's staff said the jour- nal hoped to continue publish- ing the memoirs, but it would not be until the new year. Asked why they had been . held up, she explained that "the reasons are complicated .. But one thing is clear, the delay in continuing publication is not ?lir fault." So far the memoirs have described how Lonov went to Canada to establish his cover as a Canadian citizen, then moved to Britain where he set' himself up in the vending ma- I chine business. I The last installment, which' ended on. Chapter 18, told how Lonov met his British contact, airifeea v1ost,o1v Harry F. Houghton, in Loden It suggested that Houghton': friend, Ethel E. Gee, who ob- tained secret papers for Lons- dale, was under the impression the spy was an American naval officer named Alec John- son. Describing Lonsdale's first ? meeting with her, the account said that to judge by all ap- pearances she had no doubt I she was helping an American Inaval officer. I The installment concluded by saying that Houghton was gen- erously rewarded for his services "as Assistant Naval Attache Alec Johnson had promised him when they first met." Houghton and Miss Gee later served 10 years in English prisons. for espionage. The -reason for the delay in continuing the memoirs is not likely to become known, but the following installments could be expected to cover"' Lonov's arrest, interrogation, trial and imprisonment. Possibly the man who has , been putting the memoirs into', publishable form, Trofim Po dolin, has simply failed to turn out the sequel yet, but it is more', probable that it has been held back for other, less easily ex- plained reasons, by Lonov's old employers, the Soviet security forces. da..-01 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 11.2/IIC- 70 , , VIENTIANE, Laos ? Still savoring "They were but I just pinch myself daily when being paid for doing this." ?G. Mclifurtrie Godley WAFTS, IIGTON POST Approved Forlease 2003/11/0C1Afc7-14op84-0049,3941 cool 000050 n't ten deep for the Laos- assignment, I think I'm his cigar after a three-course luncheon washed down with French wines, G. McMurtrie Godley answered the telephone, postponed his tennis game, dashed to his sedan and was driven off at top speed. "Wheatburner 50 to Wheatburner Base," he intoned into the car's radio- telephone, "heading for airport ? ten- four." The rush .mission of American Ambassador Godley on an otherwise sleepy recent afternoon in the Laotian capital turned out to be a false alarm of sorts. There was just a chance that three captured American pilots North . Vietnam had- agreed to release might be on board the regular weekly Aero- flot flight which was arriving from Hanoi ahead of schedule. And "Mac" Godley wanted to be on hand just in case the men accepted his personal - suggestion they disembark and accept r, U.S. government transportation home rather than continue in the company of their antiwar chaperones. ? While Russians in sports shirts and North Vietnamese in pith helmets and business suits streamed off the Ilyu- . shin 18, Godley saw that the pilots were not among the passengers, got back into the ear and headed home to . change for tennis. "Forty-five minutes Is about all the tennis I can take in ? this age anyway." At 55, Godley has been going at this pace for more than three years in Laos and, for that matter, ever since he graduated from Yale, class of '39. Part proconsul, part traditional striped- pants diplomat and part general, God- ley personally directs the no longer quite so secret American war in Laos ,and loves every minute of it. He has no doubts about his job or -how- to carry it out even though his critics suspect he is more Defense Sec- retary Melvin Laird's man in Vienti- ane than Secretary of State William Rogers.' "Call me field marshal if it makes you feel better," he is inclined to say. "I don't care. But please note I've got no troops." ."Uncle Sugar', INVOLVED in undercover work since World War II when he dealt with American prisoner of war prob- lems while based in Switzerland, one of the first U.S. diplomats to work closely with the military, activist am- bassador to the Congo during the "Simba" revolt in 1964, Godley be- lieves in the American world mission In uncomplicated terms uncomfortable to more doubting Americans. So big and burly that Congolese called him "The Bear that Walks Like a Man" when he was ambassador in Leopoldville, Godley maintains, "I think I've had the vApPEgtmstdhEWR!lease Foreign Service" and "if I end up being the fall guy I couldn't care less." in Vie tiane ? By Jonathan C. Randal Washington Post Foreign Service Godley is given to pithy, direct lan- guage of a nature which an earlier age would not have found repeatable in mixed company. Pure product of the Cold War in warm climates, he invaria- bly refers to the United States as "Uncle Sugar," a sobriquet reflecting the persuasiveness of American power in underdeveloped countries. Even with a staff of 1,200 diplomatic, military and CIA men, as ambassador to this Oregon-sized country Godley has his hands full: ? Requesting and approving all American air strikes against North Vi- etnamese and Pathet Lao troops?who numbered over 100,000 just before the Easter invasion of South Vietnam?in northern Laos and along the Ho Chi Minh supply trails leading south to Cambodia and South Vietnam. ? Directing CIA military operations and the activities of some 230 military attaches whose tasks include supplying arms and ammunition to the Royal Lao army, Meo tribesmen and Thai volun- teers in the Plain of Jars north of Vi- entiane and in the southern Laos pan- handle. ? Keeping able neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma in office despite re- peated right-wing efforts to dislodge him, to ensure that the tatty facade on the 1962 accords remains intact for an. other effort to neutralize Laos in the event of an Indochina-wide peace set. tlement, a task even the North Viet- namese and Pathet Lao representa- tives here privately concede he per. formed brilliantly in the past month. ? Maintaining the precarious and ar- tificial Laotian economy within the limits of a congressional aid ceiling of $350 million annually, a far from easy task since most of the money goes for military spending. Indeed, the annual threat of the fall of the CIA's base at Long Cheng on the Plain of Jars is feared less than the economic crisis re- flected by the fall in value of the Lao- tian kip from 500 to 800 to the dollar in the past year. Dropping the Veils ILIOR MOST of Godley's first year as I: ambassador, and indeed since the 1962 Geneva accords were broken first by North Vietnam and then by the United States, American military in- volvement was kept as secret as possi- ble. But in the past year or so, Wash- ington has progressively dropped the principal fiction imposed by the Ge- neva accords which set up the tripar- tite right-wing, neutralist and left-wing government under big power auspices: a promise to avoid any foreign military establishment in Laos except for a small French training mission. As early as 1964, the United States was deeply committed to the Souvanna Phouma government, providing aid, a stabilization fund for the kip and mili- tary help. In return, Souvanna Phouma allowed the United States to bomb North Vietnamese positions on the strength of a verbal understanding which even now remains the only basis for American military operations here. In March, 1970, President Nixon started lifting the secrecy after a Sen- ate Foreign Relations subcommittee headed by Stuart Symington held hearings on 'ins as part of its investi- gation of U.S. commitments abroad. Whatever major mystery was left dis- appeared last December when U.S. of- ficials a guided ur of 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499Reggpfiga put on to LonglOfit0rs of Gen. Vang Continued Approved Forftease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499O1000100005-0 operation," recalled one of dodley's Congo Mafia. "Our military aid started at $3 million and ended up costing $9 million for the entire year 1964." "A Frustrated Soldier" y IKE MANY OTHERS who served Li there, Godley is nostalgic about the Congo and likes to wear a brightly colored print shirt depicting President Joseph Desire Mobutu. Such sentiment is all the more touching since Godley had to have himself withdrawn as am- bassador in October 1966, after he Pao's CIA-paid mercenaries on the rim of the Plain of Jars. The base was in danger of falling to the North Viet- namese and it was apparently deemed wiser to let the press see the base rather than learning about it from triumphant enemy propaganda. The "Congo Mafia" PE RH AP S UNDERSTANDABLY, Godley's staff has drawn heavily on men who served in the Congo in the earl and middle Sixties. Indeed at one point the deputy chief of mission, CIA station chief and several important dep- uties, a U.S. Information Service staffer and several young diplomats all were part of what is known as Godley's "Conga Mafia." Although ambassadors are allowed wide latitude in choosing their staffs, Godley swears he hand-picked only one of his former Congo associates: Monteagle Stearns, until recently the deputy chief of mission, who left a soft berth in the London embassy when "Godley offered him a chance to "rejoin the real Foreign Service." The others, Godley feels, logically ended up here because of the similarity of the skills and experience which stood them in good stead in the Congo. "You look at the State Department's personnel structure and of 1,500 offi- cers there may he 250 with facility in = French," Godley explained, "then 75 without family problems of one sort or another, perhaps 50 who are gung-ho, dedicated and not yellow, and then you choose the best. It's only normal that two out of three have been in the other, similar area," In the Congo, one of the most sue- ? cessful ? some would say just plain lucky ? exercises of American. mili- tary and political power, the United States was instrumental in holding the country together. From 1960 to Janu- ary 1963, the United States provided the muscle behind the United Nations effort to repress rebellions in the cen- ter, northeast and southeast of the country. But less than 18 months after the United States helped the U.N. troops scatter mercenary soldiers, end the se- cession of copper-producing Katanga province and send its leader, Moise ? Tshombe, off to European exile, he was back again as prime minister of . the entire country in July 1964. Faced with a Chinese-backed uprising which I spread across the country, Godley backed Tshomhe, brought in CIA-paid Cuban pilots to fly T-28 fighters, World War II B-26 bombers and U.S. Air Force C-130 transports which flew Belgian-financed white mercenaries around the country. Within a year of its inception the re- bellion collapsed AtcprovedrigineRelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 U.S.-Belgian paratroop drop on Stan- ? leyville which rescued hundreds of Eu- rnnaari rofIlopac "Ti wng st Simpctrincr grounded the Congolese air force to keep Mobutu from napalming rebel- lious white mercenaries in Stanley- vile. G-odley rates his Congolese experi- ence as "invaluable" in teaching the practical application of limited mili- tary and diplomatic operations. He fig- ures he spent 20 per cent of his time on military problems in the Congo but now devotes as much as 70 per cent of Ins efforts to them here. Only part of his long days is spent with large war maps on the walls of his windowless ground-floor embassy office. "I'm a frustrated soldier," Godley concedes in noting his active military service is limited to two years' naval duty from 1939 to 1941, when he went into government work. But for Godley, who admits to being intrigued by such weaponry as M-79 grenade launchers, doing his job is "getting the hell out into the field. You cannot do anything sitting behind a desk and reacting." Flying in helicopters and light planes of the U.S. government-chart- ered Air America or Continental Air Service, Godley likes to put down on, dirt strips and see for himself. "I try to get out as much as possible, partly for morale purposes to see my field hands who risk their lives--and to en- courage Laotian officials to do like- wise," he said, "but, also because I never go out without learning some- thing from the military attaches and .CIA teams, some of whom have been here 8, 10, 12 years." Godley's appreciation of the military dates back to a tour as first secretary in the Paris embassy in the early Fif- ties, where he worked on NATO infra- structure and on securing French agreement for American bases to be built for the alliance in the then French Morocco. Back in Washington in 1958 after a tour in Cambodia, he was involved in planning the U.S. land- ing during the Lebanese civil war.' "I was horrified by the vacuum be- tween both sides of the Potomac," he recalled. He later was instrumental in - setting up an exchange program for State and Defense Department offi- cers. 2 An Earlier Breed BOTH IN THE CONGO and Laos, he believes the United States has ' been successful in "careful orchestra- tion of U.S. military might under tight. political controls." ' "With a minimum of equipment and. zero commitment we are killing 30 North Vietnamese a day," he added, as well as tying up large enemy units which otherwise could be used against'. South Vietnam. Yet with much of the- air support coming from nearby bases in Thailand, Laos remains a sideshow to the South Vietnamese theater and there is no really independent Ameri- can pc licy for Laos. Even critics among the Laotians and his fellow diplomats credit Godley with smooth crisis management al- though they decry U.S. policy here and throughout Indochina. "A classic diplomat couldn't and wouldn't do this kind of job," said a diplomat in a backhanded compliment: He described Godley's role as falling somewhere short of the total powers of a Marshal Louis Lyautey who built French Morocco with a free hand, or a Lt. Gen. Sir Sidney Clive, who ex- panded British power in India unfet- tered by the restraints of modern in- stant communications. But there is something of an earlier, breed about Godley and the men who work for him here. A Congo veteran who also served in Vietnam took a perverse pride in the Nixon administration's attitude to- wards Laos. "Here we've done more with less," he said. "Maybe some places have had too many assets for their own good." Godley works with Congress looking over one shoulder. "We cannot afford to jettison a single rocket pod here without accounting for it under the Symington restrictions," one American' . said. Moreover, the Laos war is conducted with strange ground rules under which the North Vietnamese hold much of the country?if not the population' but do not seek to take over the rich. plain around Vientiane or other cities further to the south along the Mekong, River. Hanoi's forbearance is appar- ently based on fears that Thailand. would intervene were its borders along the Mekong threatened. bbntinued Approved FoNagilease 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP84-004994001000100005-0 "I Pinch Myself Daily" dABSERVEES BELIEVE GodleY'S .j main problem is less defending the Long Chong base?which once again under threat of enemy capture in the upcoming dry season?than in stabiliz; ing the increasingly critical economic situation. His critics complain that- more than a decade of American lar-. gesse has produced a thin crust of Mercedes owners but overall pauperi- zation, corruption and no sign of effi. cient administration. But even an am, bassador who opposes Godley eon- ceded that "given American policy here I don't think he has had much choice." The critics worry that Godley's close relations with Souvanna Phouma have caught the Laotian leader in a vise: "Souvanna Phouma uses American support to bolster his own bargaining power, but that means his government is dependent on the United States? quite a tightrope act." Yet on a recent Sunday, in between playing with his wife, Betty, and their two adopted young Greek children,' Godley managed to confer twice with the premier, read four hours of reports , and discuss the military situation with an aide. Godley is not one to reflect on the justifications of United States policy? at least not in public. But a man who .worked with him in the Congo put it in one-dimensional terms that so many Americans have come to reject in -the., past decade. "It sounds corny," tho man said, "but those of us here be- lieve in our country and believe what we are doing is right for the world." . For Godley, there are more nuances. "They weren't ten deep for the Laos as- signment," he said in characteristically admitting he bucked for the job, "but I just pinch myself daily when I think_ I'm being paid for doing this." Approved For Release 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 6.?* NEW YORK TIMES Approved For114elease 2003/1 000100005-0 Tribesmen's Drive in Laos Slows By FOX BUTTERFIELD Special to The New York Times LONGTIENG, Laos, Sept. 27 ?Maj. Gen. yang Pan's irreg- ular army of hill tribesmen has opened its 'annual rainy-season offensive against the Commu- nists around the Plaine des Jarres. ' But despite some successful thrusts behind the enemy's ? lines, American. officials here are concerned that the irreg- ular's campaign has stalled, bedeviled by exhaustion after ;many years of war and un- usually stiff North Vietnamese resistance. As a result, these Americans fear that when the rains stop in another month, the North Vietnamese will still be in a good position to threaten the important .base at Longtieng and the 132,000 refuges who live in valleys just to the south. "Militarily the loss of Long Tieng wouldn't mean the end of the war," said one high- ranking American officer at this once7secret center for the irregular army, "but it would be a major catastrophe for the hill people who have been re- treating for four or five years and would have to move on, again." Farther south lies only the hot, humid and already crowd- ed Vientiane plain, which the hill people, mostly members of the Men tribe, consider unin- habitable. The chief hope of the Lao- tians and Americans is that, when the roads become pass- able again in November, the North Vietnamese, preoccupied; by their offensive in., Southu Vietnam, will not sul,itially reinforce the estimatem 6,000 troops they have ...v-attered around the Plaine tie Jarre and just north of Long Tieng. Last spring the Communists wiithdrew one of their two di- visions?the 312th?from the fight for Long Tieng, transfer- ring it across the border to Quangtri Province. "If the North Vietnamese, don't bring in a lot morel and Fears for Base Rise troops we can hold Long Tieug," said another American who has watched the Communists gradually push General Van., Pao's forces south over the past five years. "It all depends OD Hanoi." Long Tieng itself, nestled in a narrow mountain valley 83 miles northeast of Vietntiane, has been largely rebuilt since Long Tieng has ended, Ameri- cans here still use only faci- tious names and newsmen were not allowed to photograph them. Foreign military aid to Laos and the presence of for- eign troops or advisers is banned by the 1962 Geneva ac- cord on Laos. The irregulars' offensive be- the devasting three-month ?an North Vietnamese- siege last in mid-August with four separate task forces totaling about 5,000 men being lifted by helicopter onto the heights the tribal soldiers have re- around the plain des jarres, "supplies which lies 20 miles north of turned after being evacuated. Americ aand Continental Air . Long Tieng. Their objective Planes belonging to Air was to cut in behind the en- I d North Vietnamese fac- Services bring for the ing Long Tieng and force them irregulars. A squadron of tinyto retreat. T-28 fighter planes manned by ' ' But General Vang Pao's Royal Lao Air Force pilots alsotr??Ps reportedly exhausted by use the paved airstrip, which last spring's fighting and afraid spring. General Vang Pao once again has his headquarters here and many dependants of ends abruptly in a series of jagged limestone cliffs that look like the scenery in a Chi- nese landscape painting. Because of the Communists' offensive in South Vietnam, American air support for the fighting here in northern Laos has been drastically reduced, authoritative American sources say. It is down from an average of 200 sorties a day last year to only about 20 sorties a day. of the Communists' newly in- troduced 130-mm. long-range guns, moved slowly. In one of the columns, Amer- ican officers say, almost 500 men had to be evacuated with trench foot after they had failed to dry their feet during the monsoon rains. Another column lost its commanding of- ficer on the first day. Even more disastrous, the There are still a number of I North Vietnamese did not pull Americans here, agents of the back this year as they have in Central Intelligence Agency, the past to shorten their sup- which finances and helps train; ply lines during the torrential and direct General Vang Po'. rains. Instead they have clung forces. Several could be seen to heavily fortified positions in today during a visit sponsored the mountains and blasted the by the American Embassy, irregulars with their artillery. some of them in jungle camou- General Vang Pao appears flage uniforms carrying M-16' as energetic and determined as rifles and boarding helicopters in the past. Despite years of with the irregular troops. ?, bitter fighting and defeat, the Although much of the se- crecy. ; that once surrounded,: sturdily built 43-year-Old me. leader spends almost all his time these .days at Long Tieng and gives his officers a tongue.- lashing over lunch in his quer- iter, Americans who work with. him report. But the number of Meos among his 30,000 soldiers has steadily decreased as they have been killed or became disillu- sioned. They have been replaced by other bill tribesmen; particu- larly upland Loa, and by _so- called volunteers from Thai- land, who are also paid and, equipped by the United States:! The number of Thais is a closely guarded secret, but one well-informed source estimates that ther are "wellover" the 4,800 figure used in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee re:, port last year. Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 WASHINGTON POST Approved For lease 2003/12/031:Rt-IME84-004994e1000100005-0 STENOS/TYPISTS: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAS INTERESTING POSITIONS IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA No interviewing for winter openings $5828-$7319 TO START All Normal Government Benefits Interested candidates should call 522-7759 for appointment An Equal Opportunity Employer Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 WASHINGTON POST Approved For%Jai:lease 2003/12/Q3 ? CIA-RDP84-00499$1001000100005-0 7 7 qI) 1972 he Moratagnar s: fir By Thomas W. Lippman - ? Washington Post Foreign Service - AIGO N?South Vietnam's moun. tain, tribesmen--the primitive and gentle folk known collectively as the Montagnards--are losing two wars.. One is the war against the North Vi- etnamese,- who have occupied Or de- stroyed hundreds of Montagnard vil- lages seized their lands, used them as hostages to American bombs, forced them into ?service as laborers and killed them in combat. . The other is the war against the South Vietnamese, themselves victims of war and privation, who are steadily encroaching on the Montagnards' tra- ditional lands and forcing them to con-. front a harsh 20th-Century reality for Which they are ill prepared. Throughout the Montagnard home- land in the Central Highlands of South -Vietnam, there are people fighting a rear-guard action trying to help the tribes keep their families, villages and way of life intact. The U.S. Special Forces soldiers, who developed a close relationship with the Montagnards and. for whom the Montagnards retain an affection they dot not feel for the Viet- namese, have all gone home. But there remain medical missionaries, volunteer nurses, U.S. Agency for International Development field workers, a few trained Montagnard civil servants and a handful of Vietnamese who have dedicated themselves to the interests of the tribes. The Montagnards, however, are a ,dark-skinned ethnic minority, they are primit iv e and unsophisticated, and they control a .disproportionate amount of land in a country where there should be more than enough to go around but the dislocations of the .war have created a shortage. As a result, any contest between the .tribes and the Vietnamese?whether over policy matters in Saigon or over the ownership of a few acres in the Highlands?is unequal. These conclu- sions which confirm the findings of many other journalists, anthropolo- gists ana sociologists who have looked into the problem, are the result of a four-day tour of the Highlands and in- terviews with U.S., Vietnamese and IVIontagnard officials there and in Sai- gon, as well As.skajks w..14 umgficial es famili M IRPi PYVAY rte5hse9# on. rs Montagnards was the French term for the group of more than two dozen linguistically distinct tribes and groups who lived in an arc running from Quangtri Province south through the sparsely populated Central Highlands to within about 50 miles of Saigon. Many of the men still wear breech. clouts and many of the women still go barn-breasted, as they have for centu- ries. That, is part of the reason for the low esteem in which they are held by the Vietnamese, who regard them as almost prehistoric. They are smiling, pipe-smoking and friendly, and the Americans who know them well praise them for their honesty and forthright- ness, in pointed contrast to the Viet- namese. A government decree signed five years ago was intended to ease the dis- satisfaction of the Montagnards and give them both a special semi-autono- By Joseph Mastrangelo?The Washington Post Historically, the Montagnards have trog.i6ggcogOozei) in thiee provinces. mous status and representation in the central government. But improvements on paper have done little to alter the basic situation. Even if the Saigon gov- ernment genuinely desired to protect the Montagnards and their land, to let them live in their ancestral homes and farm in their traditional ways and attend their own schools, this is a na- tion of Vietnamese at war, not moun- tain tribesmen at peace, and the Viet- namese interest comes first. By government statistics, 100,000 Montagnards, or more than one of every eight in the country, were driven from their villages by this year's North Vietnamese offensive and the massive bombing raids that came with it. For some, it was the third or fourth dislo- cation of the war. Thousands more, ac- cording to government officials in the Highlands, were killed or captured. Most of the refugees are barely sub- siding on government allotments and private donations in stark, barren, muddy, disease-infested camps where the mental suffering is worse than the physical. Officially, they are waiting to go home, but in fact most of them are to be permanently resettled far from their native villages, which are in areas the Saigon government does not control. In the Highlands, as elsewhere in the country, there have been com- plaints that even the meager allot- ments of rice and fish to which the ref- ugees are entitled were not being de- livered in full because of corruption along the supply line. In Darlac Province, for example, a senior U.S. adviser who said that "in general the government here has done a pretty good job of giving them the benefits they are entitled to, and then some," went on to say that there had been "no systematic shortchanging" of the refugees, just. random incidents. Y Jut Buon To, a Montagnard who is the ethnic minorities service chief for the province, said he instructed the people at one large camp to refuse one shipment of rice because all the 1,000- kilogram sacks weighed in at 100 kilo- grams each. He also said that there were four camps in the area and only- one?where a Montagnard was in charge?was giving its refugees their full allotment. From the others, he said, people were forced to go into the streets of Banmethout, the province capital, to beg, Losing Men- and Land BESIDES the new wave of refugees, about 40,000 more Montagnards - are living unhappily in bleak resettle- ment villages to which the government 001043010000eaDist their will a year and a half ago for security reasons. nnntinued Approved FilisRelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00411141001000100005-0 Montagnard militiamen, who were - supposedly exempt from service in the -regular South Vietnamese army be- cause they arc in the military and be- cause they . are members of an ethnic minority, are being grabbed up to fill the depleted ranks of some South Viet- namese divisions. The request of Monta.gnard leaders that they be allowed to form their own regiments, instead of being dis- persed among the Vietnamese, has been -turned down, a fact ?attributed by some authorities to a lingering suspi- cion in the Saigon government that the ? tribes, who. rose in armed revolt in the ? mid-1960s, remain less than fervent in their ideological commitments to South Vietnam, A land reform law enacted five years ago to give highland villagers title to their traditional lands?in other words, to give them on paper . what they always had in fact until President Ngo Dinh Diem allowed eth- nic Vietnamese to begin moving to the Highlands 20 years ago?has had only scattered success. Many of ?the lands involved are no longer controlled by South Vietnam, and in the more secure areas, close to cities and along principal highways, ethnic Vietnamese moving up from the ? crowded, -refugee-swollen coast ? have begun to take over, - The result of all this, according the gloomier sources among those inter- viewed, is that the Montagnard waY of life is doomed to extinction. - Three Montagnards have earned U.S. college degrees, and a handful were trained for the French civil serv- ice. Almost 200 are enrolled at the Montagnard Training Center in Pleiku, a kind Of community college for the hill tribes. But most still spend ?their lives in the inefficient, land-consuming slash- and-burn agriculture that is part of the problem they face in their struggle to keep their traditional territories. In the fertile Mekong Delta, the gov- ernment estimates that a peasant can produce enough food for his family on 71/2 acres, which is his maximum allot- ment under the land reform program. But a Montagnard family needs up to 50 acres because of the semi-nomadic farming system that leaves parts of each family's land fallow all the time. That is why the Montagnards, who seem to have so much land, are so ap- prehensive about encroachments on it and about plans to concentrate them in smaller areas than they now consider theirs. In the words of a Montagnard civil servant in Darlac, "there will be blood- shed over land before the issue is set- tled." Frequent Relocations TAY LUETT, a Montagnard who is the government's minister for eth- nic minorities development, said. in an interview that "all that you saw, .all you tell me about what you heard in the Highlands, is true." President Nguyen Van Thieu, he said, "has instructed me to push Very hard" to meet the demands of the Montagnards and carry out programs designed to help them, but. "the per- centage of.Vietnamese who really want to 'assist the Montagnards is very Small." ?Furthermore, in .Luett's view, "It will be very hard for the people ever to go back into the hills" as they de- sire to do. 'They must be where they can escape bombs, escape death." Luett said he hopes to Move all Mon- tagnards out of the country's four northern provinces and resettle them, along with refugees frOm Communist- held parts of Kontuin province, in three provinces of the Highlands: Pleiku, Darlae and Quangduc. That is an area the size of Vermont with a cur- ? rent permanent population of less than half a million. Bananas, coffee, rubber, . vegetables and upland rice grow there in abundance. a But as maps on display in govern,; melt offices in those provinces show, there are already Vietnamese who. have begun to farm large tracts in the secure arcas--"Vietnamese with their tractors," as one official said?while the Montagnard refugees remain hud- dled in their camps waiting for their allotments of land. "Without land the Montagnards can- not live," Nay Lima said. But he did not deny that the dwindling amount of land still available is being taken over by the Vietnamese while the Montag- nards wait helplessly for the 'flood tq recede. Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 HOUSTON. POST Approved Forraaielease 2003/y/ft:61101F84-0009111601000100005-0 \Sovie By DONALD R. MORRIS Post News Analyst Evgeniy Sorokine, 24, an emtiloye of the GRU Reziden- ' tura in the Soviet Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, has defected to the United Stales. - According to AP and UPI reports, Sorokine and his- wife ' Tatiana were posted to Laos In 1971, where he was as- signed duties as driver and ?French interpreter for COI. :Vladimir P. Gretchanine. Gretchanine was listed as a Soviet military attache. In the early 1960s, Gretchanine was ?posted to Washington, and 'was expelled in the course of a quid pro quo reprisal for several U.S. diplomats ex- 'pelted from Moscow at the time: ON SEPT. 10 Sorokine's car Was found crashed into a tree ...halfway between the Soviet Embassy and Vientiane Air- Imre That evening he re- quested political asylum at *f44-11 assv e the IIS. Embassy. and the following day he was flown out of Laos, probably on a chartered Air America flight Sorokine is now reported to be in the United States. Ta- tiana Sorokine ? remains in Vientiane. These are the bare outlines of a story that will not be ex- panded - on ? by official U.S. sources, at least for some time to come. Several con- clusions, however, may be drawn. Sorokine was an employe of the Soviet military in- telligence service, the GRU; he was not attached to the KGB. All personnel attached? to the Soviet military attache office are employes or offi- cers of the GRU, and never of the KGB. Gretchanine is, and always was, a GRU offi- cer. softomme WAS, most likely, not an officer, but an employes whose dillies were exactly as given; driver-inter. propr to Ccl. Greteho nine, whose rank indicates he was probahly the GRU Tlesident ? the officer in command' of the GRU Rezidentura. Although -riot an agent han- dler. Sorokine will he no- netheless valuable. He will he able to provide a complete breakdown of the GRU Rezi- dentura, including those offi- Post analysis 131 Ye defects cers under other covers out- side of the Military Attache Office. Ile will undoubtedly be ahle to identify a goodly pro- portion of the KGB Rezi-. dentua as well. His duties would also have enabled him to identify a number of GRU agents, developmental cases and spotting leads as well. Several aspects of the story hint that Sorokine may be. something of a handling prob- lem. More than twenty offi- cers of :ie Soviet intelligence services have defected to Western countries. It is the art of a deeply maladjusted man, R misfit in his own society ho is, by cutting off : his entire past life with no hope of return, in effect, tak- ing what may be the only al- ternative to suicide open to h i m . For complex psy- chological reasons, defection almost never occurs before middle age, and Sorokine, at 24, is quite possibly the youngest GRU defector to reach the West. Laotian Foreign 711inistry the same day he was flown out ol the country. They dropped their standard garrthit in such cases, which was to charge that the defector had ab- sconded with the embassy petty cash fund and should he treated as a -common crimi- nal. Either they placed little reliance in the Laotian police, or they knew he was out of the country when they report- ed his absence. THE CIA Is to be com- mended for the _ speed .with which Sorokine was evac- uated; even in Laos such op- erations pose administrative problems, especially with a sudden walk-in. Over the years, they have been able to count on such a defection ev- ery 18 months or so. to imple- ment the knowledge gained front their independent pen& trations of the Soviet services.- - Sorokine, in far!, may be astonished to fihd that. his :hosts know niore ahout the GRU than he does.: It has happened before. THE CRASHED car in- dicates further agitation and at spur-of-the-moment deci- sion::Under no circumstances _ Would this be some form of window-dressing to mislead the Soviets; the CIA eschews such James Bondish dramat- ics, Sorokine's desertion of his wife may be still further evi- dence of disturbance; had the defection been planned in ad- : vance with CIA assistance ? she could easily have been evacuated as well. (But sev- eral 'detections have been triggered by the urge to es- cape an impossible marital ; situation.) Tim Soviets reported that Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : trAk-RIDP64-1013499R001000100005-0 Approved Far. Release 2003/O2r: I(ZIPIRDP84-004080001000100005-0 20 SEP 1972 By ERIK BERT fir the last few years "dissid- ent" Soviet authors have found a good market in the United States. Their books are assured uni- formly of favorable reviews, and these conduce to larger sales. Sales are helped along by a good press which is provided by the U.S. corps in Moscow. The bureau reporters for the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, as well as visiting firemen, make sure that every squeak, or snarl. of a "dissident," every onion-skin manifesto, is reported at length. In the absence of a squeak or snarl or manifesto, some enterprising re-porter can be counted on to sug- gest one. This leads to other things, among, them to Radio Liberty headquarters in Munich, West Germany, whence the U.S. Cen- tral Intelligence Agency broad- casts anti-Soviet propaganda to the Soviet Union. The story of this broadcasting is told in the Library of Congress study of Radio Liberty, made pu- blic earlier this year by .Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee. The study was prepared by Jo- seph G. Whalen, a CIA agent in 1951 and since then an employe of the Library of Congress. He has made anti-Communism hig life's work. "Dissident" books and their authors offer important possibili- ties for exploitation by the CIA. But books are, in the nature of things, long in respect to broad- casting technique. Nevertheless the CIA has used them. Since May 1969 Radio Liberty has broadcast, in "unpublished Works of Soviet Authors," works by Marchenko, Bulgakov, Plata- nov, Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn, and N. Ya-Mandelshtam, according to the Library of Congress study. During February 19-24, 1971, Radio Liberty broadcast Andrei Amalrik's "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1934?" in six parts; from March to Jul Boris Pasternak's "kuppygicia r melease 2003/12/03 16 parts; from July to Decem- II o r p n afti ,0 her, 1970. 1970, Aleksandr Solzhe- nitsyn's "The First Circle," and in late 1971, Solzhenitsyn's "Aug- ust 1914," in 62 parts. Solzhenitsyn's "First Circle" was read over Radio Liberty three days a week over a five-month, period. One of the 'brightest lights in the "dissident" firmament is An- drei Sakharov,. Soviet.'physicist, who burst on the U.S. and inter- national scene with publication of his "Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom." Between August 5 and 13, 1971, "Progress, Coexistence and In- tellectual Freedom" was broad- cast by Radio Liberty's North -Caucasian Service in the Russian, Karachai, Ossetian and Avar lan- guages, according to the Library of Congress study. The CIA and its broadcasting technicians are not convinced that broadcasting "dissident" books in their entirety is the most ef- fective use that can be made of them. This was discussed last year at a meeting of Radio Liberty's "Russian Service" in the Munich headquarters. Robert Tuck, director of RL's Program Operations Division, "suggested that books of this na- ture should be an-alyzed, discus's- ed and reviewed extensively in broadcasts, rather than being read in toto." In the "dissident" market, lite- rary standards are .secondary to political criteria, of course. Most notorious in this area was the award of the Nobel prize for lit- erature last year to Solzhenitsyn. His literary quality was not the reason he was chosen. The sub- sequent anti-Soviet brush fire set by the U.S. press about Solzhe- nitsyn's receiving the award show- ed that literature was low on the list of its concerns. Literary judgment has become a matter of controversy on occasion even within the CIA broadcasting fraternity. The Library of Congress study of the CIA's Radio Liberty oper- ations reports that an "incipient issue began' to emerge in Octo- ber (1971) over the handling of Solzhenitsyn's novel 'August 1914'." "Some staff (in Munich--EB) did not share the enthusiasm of some Western observers over the high literary quality of this work. At an informal discussion the issue arose in the form of a question as to how RI, should , report these mixed views. . "Our group felt that negative observations should be reported: another group . . . felt this would be unfair to Solzhenitsyn." "Moreover, it was pointed out that it would be .counterproduc- tive to RL's purposes to report sharp criticism of Solzhenitzyn's stature in the eyes of the Soviet people..." . With the publication of Saklia- rov's book in the summer of 1968, "the parameters of dissent ex- panded" and the "movement en- tered a new phase." the Library of Congress declares. The reasons for the CIA's in- terest in Sakharov's "freedom" cry are simple: "The publication of criticisms by Sakharov . was the first pro- grammatic document that brought into question some of the basic tenets of the Soviet system." The non-literary, anti-Soviet cri- terion for judging 'dissident' lite- rature has its quirks. Thus, Ar- thur Miller, playwright, writing in the New York Times, Dec. 10, 1971, complained: "Solzhenitsyn's works never brought charges against the cur- rent regime but only against that of Stalin." : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 "continued Approved For Atase 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-004991461000100005-0 The following day David Sidor- sky, professor of philosophy at Columbia, replied (his letter to the Times wasn't published until Dec. 26) "... how limited is Ar- thur Miller's interpretation of Solzhenitzyn's writings as not against the current regime but only against that of Stalin.' " ? The criterion is clearly not lite- rary, on either side, but an argu- ment as to whether Solzhenitzyn is an enemy only of Stalin as Miller complains, or of the whole Soviet system, as Sidorsky insists and Miller demands. Another problem arises for the CIA in broadcasting "dissidence." What will the Soviet people think of books about the Soviet Union broadcast by the CIA, even if the authors are Soviet citizens? Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved For Release2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R0014Q0100005-0 FRENCH SECRET AGENTS SAID TO BE SPYING FOR CIA L'EXPRESS Paris in French 11-17 Sep 72 p 49 X [Text] In addition to drugs, the H SDECE now risks becoming involved in an affair concerning the sale of some special photogrAphs. An in- vestigating committee has just arrived in Tahiti, where it has been discovered that French secret agents responsible for keeping an eye on distinguished visitors to the Pacific Nuclear Test Center were al- so working for the American CIA. A number of cameras camouflaged in hotel rooms..made it possible to photograph certain persons while in the company of female companions as the former profited by their stay in Tahiti to cary out "research" that had nothing to do either with the national defense or nuclear energy. This kind of operation is not new, but about a month ago, the SDECE correspondent in Washington found out that his American colleagues were also receiving copies of these photos. Some 15 agents belonging to various services are the subject of the newly opened investigation:. Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved FollIrlaelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-0049*601000100005-0 11????????00?.???=0...ramose m???????????..???mmwm?????111?11t CHICAGO, ILL. NEWS -- 434,849 sEr23 197 COMPANY MAN ,1i1.-3i)e lag- gto (Putnam, By George Harmon THE late Alien Dulles, quar- terback of our World War Ii spies and later chief of the CIA, scoffed at the notion of the American diplomat or spy being a closed-mind blunderer ? too cynical to play by any rules but his own. He criti- cized such novels as Graham Greene's "The Quiet Ameri- can" and Burdick and Lede- rer's "The Ugly American" for promoting "mischief-creat- ing prejudices." Dulles wrote that he pre- ferred "taking the raw mate- rial which we find in America ? naive, home-grown, even homespun ? and training such a man to be a good intelligence officer, however long ihe pro- cess lasts." Those homespun 11S/I1C2- 1._ x4NA anan's boys, if we are to believe re- cent news accounts, are trav- eling much farther afield than Dulles seemed willing to send them. THE BACKBONE of CIA ac- tivity apparently remains the clandestine listening posts and purloined letters which Dulles so loved. But. now the charge is often made that the CIA tries to foment change rather than merely report it; in Uganda, for example; in Chile, In Laos. So much is being written about the CIA, in fact, that its argot is creeping into Ameri- can slang: a spy is a spook, to kill is to "terminate with ex- treme prejudice." Now arrives Joe Maggio, a mercenary-turned-writer, who says he worked off and on for the CIA in places like Africa and Laos. Ms novel tells of Nick Mar- [mated -Hail egg tin, a sort of comic book super- hero and former Green Beret A "home-grown" boy whom Dulles would have liked, be is recruited off a Florida campus by "the Company" (in-group slang for the CIA), and works part time, training Bay of Pigs invaders and shooting up Africa and the Tonkin Gulf. There is enough bad writing to fill three pulp magazines ("steel split the . air over- head"). BUT MAGGIO'S book has an aura of authenticity about it, and few readers know enough about the CIA to dispute him ? even though the question al- ready has been raised: Is Joe Maggio the Clifford Irving of the barracks set? W. E. Colby, executive direc- tor of the CIA, disputes the publisher's contention that "Company.Man" is "a novel of facts," proclaiming it a "taw- dry fabrication" filled with "lurid writing and innate con- tradictions." He denies that the CIA ever has carried out assassinations or has traf- ficked in drugs, as Maggio as- serts. Colby also says Maggio was "terminated for cause" during a six-month CIA training pro- gram and never went overseas for the CIA or undertook any of the "assignments" Maggio says he performed. But Mag- gio has obtained a government letter quoting the CIA as say- ing that he worked for the agency on contract. In any event, Maggio writes enough like a soldier to con- vince the reader he has been one. Ile has produced an un- professional but good example of thriller fiction. George Harmon is a Daily News editor and writer. ?4..4001 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved FAbgetrasignaCklin(OWEBSIMRDP84-004kilif001000100005-0 SEPT 1972 r1,,A Dq- '-w A virtual news blackout has been deelared by the nation's press concerning the major legal challenges that have been launched against' the Central Intelligence Agency. The August 10 filing of a suit in Wash- ington against CIA Director Richard helms and other-government officials was a mat- ter of court record and easily accessible to the news media. In addition, a news re-' lease containing essential facts about the - story was hand delivered to the Washing- ton Post, the Evening Star, the Associated Pres.s.and United Press International. A week later, not one line concerning it had appeared anywhere in the country. 11161%4A1 V L.. ,,46V \dr. sca3 *Special to the Virginia Weekly America's "invisible government,'' the Central Intelligence (CIA), owes its exist- ence to a piece of legislation that is uncon- stitutional. This is the likely import of 'recent ac- tions in Federal Courts in Washington and Philadelphia. In a suit filed August 10;in the' U.S. District Court for the District of Colum- bia, three Washingtonians challenged the secrecy of the CIA:s funding and account- Approved For ReleaserMatitt2ier3PIcei*-ROPWRWM*001000100005-0 .funds." ?we Etsm Earlier'this year on July 20, an import- ant decision in the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals guaranteed that the CIA would be brought to court on a challenge that had been in process since 1968. America'S greatest newspaper "of record" the New York Times, igno. red the story, as did the Washington Evening Star and most other papers. The Washington' Post i? carried the story as a small item on page ten. . It was confirmed that editors were well aware of the story and its importance. A call to one of Washington's two-dail- ies produced this comment from a leading reporter: "Yon can call it a 'press con- spiracy' if you like, but we're not going to print it and Prn-sure no one else is either."- The Washington suit followed closely a trail-blazing decision on July 20 of this year by the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia. In that decision a majdrity of the court held that there was a serious legal question concerning the 'constitutionality of the CIA act of 1949'which established a secret procedure or financing the agency. A VIRTUALLY IGNORED CLAUSE Both court cases are based on a virtnally ignored clause of the United States Con- stitution specifically requiring that "a. regular Statement and Account of the Receipt and Expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time." The CIA act of 1949 just as expli- citly states "....Sums made available to the Agency may, be expended without ? The spy agency receives somewhere between four and twenty billion dollars each year in public funds (how much is a closely guarded secret) that are carefully hidden _throughout the appropriations figures for the entire federal government. The new suit also asks for a state-by- state and nation-by-nation breakdown of CIA expenditures, as well as separating the money into, categories by functions. CIA Director Richard IIelms and Eliot Richardson, Secretary of the Department of IIealth, Education and Welfare are brought into the local suit. cant insuod Approved For Rase 2003/12/03 :.CIA-RDP84-004991411t1000100005-0 C1) 5111 S. . The National Security Act whiCh created the CIA states that it shall not have "police, subpoena, law-enforcing powers or internal security functions." The CIA has been operating in violation . of this law for at least fifteen years and probably longer. . ? In early 1966 Richard Helms, the Direc- tor of the CIA, in testimony to the Senate, Foreign Relations Committee stated flatly that the CIA does not operate in the Uni- ted States. Yet in 1964 in a coda case involving ? two Estonian emigres the CIA presented to the court a secret document authorizing it to engage in certain domestic activities. This authorization was in the form of an executive order which seems to be in direct violation of the act creating the CIA. ? As a matter of fact the domestic opera- tions of the CIA were so large by 1964 That that it set up a Domestic Operations Divi- sion with headquarters at 1750 Pennsyl- vania Avenue, about a block and a half from the White House. Major breaks in CIA secrecy in 1966.. and 1967 resulted in disclosures that the CIA was very heavily involved in financ- ing all types of programs .at such major .universities as Michigan State and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.. . In addition, it was revealed that the CIA had subsidized mliny dornestic.organi- zations including the major American student organization, The National Student Association. CIA money also found its way into at least twenty foundations, as well as Radio Free Europe, a large publish- ing house, and various other organizations. have the CIA's domestic operations . ceased? A simple inspection of telephone books discloses that today the CIA has offices in at least twenty American cities; Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 2 Approved Fcirsjitelease 2003/12/03 CIA-RDP84-0049a10001000100005-0 MAN' s MAGAZINE September 1972 -41 THE OLD WORLD WAR TWO C-46 bounced But he managed to drop down ana ? and yawed in the violent turbulence as contour fly the valley floors, below the s twin engines strained to maintain 160 ." . Red radar, and just after dawn they its American pilot gripped the 'landed back at their base. They climbed controls with every ounce of strength he ,from the plane, their gray uniforms 'could muster, arid his eyes ached from soaked through with sweat, and the pilot the strain of searching the darkness- s:`. muttered for the thousandth time, "There's gotta o avoid the towering Himalayan he an easier way to make a buck." mountains on each side. The C-46 was ancient, but its skin had been polished ey'd taken off from a secret base over to shine like a mirror. Back toward the tail were three hours ago and were threading small blue letters that spelled out "Air America." The heir way east of the Tibetan capital of -. , only other identifying marks were the fresh , - Lhasa, long occupied by the forces 7mrn.holes in the left wing panels. of Red China. Their mission: drop ents and supplies to a band of Tibetan? . guerrillas who were still fighting . ? the Communists. . e copilot, sweating over the air chart in his lap, tried to guide them to the in the gray Air force-type uniforms, crushed caps, ro Pzone that a mysterious American : _ . ''.- ?cowboy boots, with pistols hanging at their i ., civilian" at their base had earlier ' - sides. They can be found raising hell in the Suzy .described. "Hold your course," he .--,l, s ''' _Wong section of Hong Kong or racing motor elled.,:"Another,twO minutes should bikes along Tu Do Street in Saigon or joking with the put us right on." - _ : girls at the Vieng Rattay Club in Vientiane. hey're the pilots of the cloak and dagger Air rnerica, one of the world's least known airlines. ' - -, Many are "old China hands" who first began flying for the "outfit" back when mainland ' .China belonged to Chiang Kai-shek. They're hroughout Asia, people have come to recognize these strange aircraft and their even stranger meric.an pilots Especially the pilots. You learn to spot them wherever you are.-TheYre the guys &pilot reached up: flicking on the get-ready light to alert the Tibetan 'agents who'd be jumping, and the lane crew who would kick the supplies t .-"Go!" he yelled and switched on the buzzer, the last of that breed known as soldiers of fortune, List as the last chute opened, the old - ,and these devil-may-care Mercenaries will lane was suddenly rocked by deadly ommUnist 37rnm antiaircraft fire and. ,-the pilot cursed to himself, "Goddam? continued `ambilgt513ilfiQuallittMlkelW6g4003/itiip3 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 ,.bzstartds?were waiting for us:' y cl_Fpr Rill,...ase,;093/1Z/03,,:.PIA-RDP84-00499^ 000100005-0 2 s a wou s oc any ordinary airline. For instance, every time CAT ' they were bund d ed n flew avnicinfiitryoof Pobry R t Arthur, hu w planes: Ironically, they were American- made Bell P-63s given to the . Russians during World War Two under Lend Lease. In return, the CAT boys would take on a load of 500-pound bombs and "just happen to lose" them over enemy ? land. There was no such thing as standard . procedure, and the pilots learned to sur- vive any way they could?like the time Captain Bob Rousselot lost an engine on his C-46 over the mountains of central China. He ordered his crew to kick the cargo out to lighten the plane enough to 4 t Vi SAt, ' : ' ? tt It looks like any other plane, but that Air America marking spells one thing: CIA." 'CIA'S WAR continued , - ',literally, fly anything, anywhere, anytime --if the price-is right. And they earn every penny of their tax-free paychecks. "Sometimes no one can tell if a site is closed or open," one of them explains. "You get there and circle the place, look- ing for any suspicious sign. If no one shoots, you take your chance and land and keep the engines running until a friendly face glows up." The planes are usually unidentified ex- cept for the discreet "Air America" mark- Now , that the Air Force is doing it, they think they need all kinds of armor plate gain altitude on his sivle good engine ? and fighter cover. Of course, they were all Out went over 40 bales of Chinese cur- bonus flights for us. We were paid pretty rency, worth $4,000,000. . well." Felix Smith used to fly out of Shanghai's The pilots average $25,000 a year, tax =- Hungjao airport, hauling ? medicine 'to free, for their hair-raising work and claim,Kumming in the interior. He regularly "So long as we get paid, we don't care returned with .50 caliber machinegun holes what the customer puts in the back or in his wings and fuselage, a tribute to the where we have to haul It: skill of Mao's gunners. , . A list of "typical" Air America jobs reads like a page out of Terry and the Stuart Dew was piloting his C-47 to Pirates?airdrops of ammo, artillery spot- Lanchow in northwest China when it tins, insertion of saboteurs and agents, became so cold that his engines simply flying a fresh group of concubines to a froze solid on him. lonely Asian warlord, transporting super- But thefl favorite story among CAT secret prisoners, refugee hauling (often. pilots concerns Sterling Bemis of Mel- plucking them from under Communist rose, Mass. Running into a blinding sand noses) and, recently, lifting Thai troops storm over an unexplored area of the into Laos to reinforce the Meo General, Gobi Desert, he was blown off course Vang Pao, and ran out of gas. Forced down, he If it all sound like an unusual role for a figured he'd bought the farm until he stumbled across a hut and inside found an Army field phone! "Man, that was the hairy part," he remembers. "I stared at that damned phone for 10 minutes, wondering if it was connected to anything, before I ings, but they've been around long enough to earn the nickname "CIA Airlines" be- cause of the type of jobs they take. Officially, 'Air America is a private air- line operating in Asia under charter to the . . government, but the bulk of is operations, are, to say the least, closely connected with the CIA's spook opera- tions. Officials say only that the outfit ?does "government contract flying," and when one 'of their planes is shotown, the release typically reads, "Names are beingwithheld by authorities until the next of kinar uy notified. Spokesmen de- clined to disclose the plane's point of .origin or destination." Behind all this official double-talk is the most colorful, mysterious and roman- tic airline. 'in the world, complete with enough shady deals, "dragon ladies," and international intrigue to keep their sheet- metal repairmen busy patching bullet holes. Try as tit?), may to remain secret, more is becoming known about these airborne Soldiers of fortune. Air America's very size makes it difficult to conceal. It is one of the world's largest airlines, ranking between National and Northeast in num- 'ber of planes and personnel. All told, it operates some 200 aircraft, employs about 600 pilots and, in an average year, these daredevils will haul 27,000 people and 6,000 tons of cargo, as well as air drop millions of dollars worth of supplies to anti-Communist troops behind enemy lines all over Asia. ? "We air drop so much rice in Laos," . says one of the pilots, "there's a whole generation of Meos who are going to be surprised when someone tells them rice doesn't grow in the sky." Another Air America pilot told this author in a Danang bar one night, "Hell, we were doing the dirty work over here before Uncle Sam would even admit there was a Vietnam. Back in the early Sixties, we used to y search ancLrescue missions into North Wtl cUleRei lecit$10/ 2 and nothing but an MI6 for protection. "civilian" airline, remember that Air America's father was the famous Civil Air Transport founded ? by Flying Tiger General Claire Chennault. Chennault originally went to China to forge an air force for Chiang Kai-shek and got the nerve to pick it up." ? formed the Flying Tigers to fight the Bemis was lucky and found himself Japanese- before the United States got talking to an operator who connected him Involved in World War Two. The deal was simple?join up as a mercenary, get $600 a month and $500 for every Jap plane you Shot down. After America entered the war, most of the Tigers joined 'Chennault's 14th Air Force, swapping their Chinese insignia for Uncle Sam's and ran up a kill ratio of about 16 to 1. After the war, Chennault retired from the service and returned to China as a civilian. There, the real war was just beginning as Chiang and Mao began their massive battle for control of the country. ' Chennault saw that the Nationalists need- ed dependable air transportation more than anything else, and he quickly stepped in to fill the gap. With Chiang's blessings, he gathered a small group of his ex-Flying Tigers in his office at Shanghai's Broadway Mansions Hotel, and Civil Air TranspOrt was born, with CAT in ?Lanchow. His convenient "phone booth" turned out to be a remnant of Chennault's wartime early-warning net that had never been disconnected. In site of the hazards, the pilots wouldn't have worked for anybody except' CAT. In many ways, they were misfits, men who couldn't stand military discipline or the spit and polish demanded by state- side airlines. Others were on the run from nagging wives or pregnant girlfriends. Many had served with Chennault during the war and were still drawn by his per- sonal magnetism and the glory and adven- ture of it all. Whatever the reason, all of them were more than happy when payday rolled around. They earned a base pay of $800 a month for 60 hours in the air and $10 for each additional hour. In CAT lingo, a city was "$20 away." ? Certain runs.were dangerous even for CAT and became buaus flights. One of Quickly dubbed CAT, his planes became these was CATs famous Taiyuan airlift a familiar sight throughout China, and in which they kept that north China even today the stories of his pilots are industrial city completely supplied for legendary. To keep beleaguered National- nine months as the Reds drew a siege line ist troops supplied, most of the CAT routes tighter and tighter around it. Old Marshall were flown over Communist-held tern- Yen kept building airfields for the CAT ,? tory, and all the CAT men were on the planes and the Communists kept capturing Communists' list of wanted war criminals, them. BY the end, they had run through with a price on their heads (Bob Buol was 15 landing strips, each one closer to the captured by ChiCom troops and held ' heart of the city, and were making 30 prisonerfor five years. Six months after his flights a day into the place, all dangerous 003 2/03,:c0tAdilDEM141404099R0010001i00085r-Derved as the model for the 'ire, Jig died a broken man). - enough to warrant $100 bonuses (the oper- than any other company, but under con- Berlin airlift). ? To add to thea ? si 4rikiVAtitiirase-3102/ called on to set ? I .or to make last-minute evacuations. Bill ;77..;.: Severtrecalls his last days as CATs station manager in Mukden, Manchuria. "I was on the last plane out, and the lead Chi- Corn troops were already in sight on the airport road. Men offered fantastic sums in American money to get their families out." The, plane crew had to blind the crowd with a spotlight to get their C-46's hatch shut. Then ,"they tried to drive a truck in front Of us to block our takeoff. We gunned our engines down the runway, leapfrogging. Chinese who knelt in our path, still wringing their hands and plead- ing to be saved. Anyone who stSends time in Asia will hear tale of CAT pilots auctioning off "tickets" on the last plane out of any city and making hundresds of thousands of dollars on a single 'refugee flight, but these stories have never been proved. , The Communists steadily pushed ahead, and in 1949 the "world's most shot at airline" began evacuating Chiang's forces to Formosa. In Shanghai, pilot Felix Smith salvaged an old Navy LST from the bottom of the Whangpoo River, load- ed her with CATs machine shops, and set sail for Formosa where she still sits today. The last official CAT flight from the Chinese main- land was on Janu- ary .15, 1950, when they flew the final t, load of tin from ? the Mengtze mines in,Yunnan to Hai- phong. Since that time, CAT and Air America have fre- quently returned "EARTHQUAKE' to Yunnan but in flaming end a very unofficial ' manner. At that point, it looked as though CAT was doomed to go broke. Formosa was primitive, with only five motor vehicles on .? the whole island, and CAT was an airline 'raise 'the necessary financial arid diplo- Russian dancing girls in a poker game and without routes or passengers. Then war matic support, he took CAT to Indo- finally tapped the admiral's electricity to broke out in Korea and CAT was back in China to fly cargo for the French in their light his all-night parties. business hauling military cargo for the UN war against Ho Chi Minh. The Foreign forces. They eventually flew nearly 30% Legion was bottled up inside of Dien The official CAT hana?out was Pop of all the Korean airlift and were back on Bien Phu and the French desperately Gingle's bar in Hong Kong. Pop had taken their feet. ' needed CATs cargo-carrying talents to his Navy retirement there years ago, got into a poker game, and woke up with the During this peribd, CAT. also went supply pilots them. Twenty-four CAT p deed to the joint. Anybody who ever met landed, at Haiphong's Cat Bi Airport to deeper into the spook business for both do the "dirty work" for $3,000 a month him said that he looked like Sidney Green. Uncle Sam and Chiang Kai-shek. It is plus bonus. Their planes were C-119 Fly- street?fat, heavy jowls and squinty eyes, said that Richard Fectean, recently re- ing Boxcars whose U. S. Air Force Panama hat and cane. He always had leased by Red China, was on a CAT vlane insignias still showed through the hastily steaks, beer,' baseball scores and country shot down while attempting to deposit brushed on gray paint. music for his CAT boys, and Chennault's CIA and Nationalist agents on the main- picture F hung in the back room. But Mc- land. ? , , . It was here that CATs most famous Goon was his favorite; some claimed that When the Nationalists had evacuated pilot, James B. McGovern, ran the show. Pop was the only man in all of south China to Formosa, their 93rd Division had been A huge, 300-pound mountain of a man, who could beat Mac in .a belly-bumping cut off in southwest China and they fled he was called "Earthquake McGoon" (after pontest. McGoon usually parked his enor- south into Burma. There, they remained the Lil Abner character) by one and all. mous bulk in an easy chair in Pop's back intact as a'. fighting unit, due to Chiang's A booming extrovert openly contemptu- room, drinking gallons of beer and direction from Formosa and, they say ous of anyone timid, McGoon was no threatening, "Someday I'm gonna quit CATs clandestine supply flights into aboa stranger to the Orient. As a fighter pilot coming here and ruin your business." doned World War Two airstrips. By P, 'oc? Chennault, he had been one of the Mac almost made good on his threat CAT had resupplied them to the poir uar's last prop aces. Instead of going when he ran out of gas over, Communist they were able to launch a 12.0Vd-man c me to Elizabeth, New Jersey, he went lines in December, 1949. His feet were al- raid back into China's Yunnan Province. work for CAT when if was first formed ways bothering him, as if complaining Chennault continually worried about and rented a house in Tsingtao, next door about the load they were forced to carry, the Communist advances throughout Asia te dmiral Badger, CO of the US 7th and he would tell Bill Welk that he'd and, in 1954, tried to form an International FI As reported in the Saturday Evening "never bail out because I'd only have to Volunteer Group similar to his old Flying P _? he first stole barrels of the admiral's walk." True to his word, he rode his C-46 Tigers, to wage an air wag against the Reds driaking water to fill the swimming pooldown onto a dry riverbed and was immedi- caA1130I'VNTICif kWatge 11561/112/13111: rAl5 gal-b al 9 90(501 a lalcata0 inued ? Film still depicts downed U.S. pilot captured by VC, a fate met by many, CIA airmen. on a strictly ? i20013/4211r: latztopg44010499ritletriffset long months as Approved For std aouble flying this t ing.ph ' ter see-sawing ? a 'a t o u ar . ' all over the sky on his trim tabs, he made it back to Haiphong to tell his ground crew, "Now I know what it's like to ride a , As soon as Pop heard about it, he raised $100,000 and gave it to Chennault with instructions to "Use it all if you have to, but get my boy hack." No one knows if it was Pop's ransom money that did the trick or not, but six months later, Mac walked into Gingle's screaming for a beer. He didn't remember until 24 hours later to notify CAT that he was all right and that "the goddarn Com- mies couldn't afford to feed me." As the news flashed:, throligh the Orient, beer glasses were raised from Tokyo to Singa- pore- . ? a' , ? ? ? The` firit to volunteer for Ind;-China, Mac and? Eric Shilling flew into Haiphong together and calmly wheeled an icebox out of their C-46. "After they said, "you got to haveeblci beer if you're going to fight a war." ; SO fat that he couldn't pull' the yoke all the way back, Mac was known for his tail-high landings, but twice a clay he squeezed himself into a C-1 l9 to deliver sevpn-ton loads of ammo to General De- Castries. It was 'a 90-minute flight follow- ed by a couple of minutes of sheer terror as they went into "the slot," a gauntlet of Communist anti-aircraft fire, and dropped their loads from 'only 1500 feet to insure 'getting them , into the.' ever-shrinking F.-Tench lines. ' - At night, the CAT crews hung out at paiphong's La Marseillaise bar, unwind- :in g from the day's runs and trying not to .think about their mounting,casualties. .;.Although they were supposed to stick to flying cargo, they began to feel for the French troops on the ground and on April 20954, they loaded one of their C-119's with napalm and used the lumbering cargo 'plane for a dive bomber to drop their deadly load on the Communist lines dur- ing a particularly crucial battle. One day toward the end of April, Mac 'looked over Wallace Buford's flak-riddled plane at Haiphong and joked; "Somebody most have been carrying a magnet," A week later, enemy machine-gun fire 'severed McG oon's elevator controls as he flew through the slot, and he called over ' kangaroo." ? Buford met him with a grin and asked, "You borrow my magnet?" The afternoon of May 6, one day before Dien Bien Phu fell, Mac took off in Bird 2 of a six-plane flight. His copilot was Bu- ford and Mac couldn't resist telling him, ."Now maybe we'll find out which one of' us carries the magnet." Steve Kusak, called "the Polock" by McGoon, was first through the slot. Just as he looked back to check on Earthquake, Mac called out, "I've got a direct hit. Where the hell are the fighters?" ' His port engine was out and the leading "e.dge of his wing was torn up. A second shell exploded against his right tail boom and he called to Kusak, "Steve, tell me .which way the mountains are lowest." , . "Turn right. Can you make it? Bail out." , "No sweat," Mac answered. "We'll ride her." . He headed for a valley along the Nam Dinh river, fighting for control of his shot- up plane. Then, slowly and horribly, his. C-119 skidded toward the hills, and Kusak heard Mac say, "Looks like this is it, son," His left wingtip dug into the hillside and the ? plane turned a perfect cartwheel before bursting into a ball of flame. Less than an eighth of a mile ahead was a clearing where. - he could have safely put clown. When Pop's phone rang just after mid-. , night, he answered and said, "You don't have to tell me. It's Mac, isn't it?" down over the Plain of JPars. The copilot ?-? After Dien Bien Phu fell, most of the turned out to be the son of C. Hollington ? planes were shifted to flying anti-Corn- Tong, Nationalist ? China's ambassador munist refugees south to Saigon, but a' to Washington, a ? young CAT pilot named Richard Pope Air America quickly became the un- was packing to leave. War correspondent official air force of the Laotian govern- Richard Tregaskis had ridden the slot ment for a few reasons. The Laotians didn't several times With Pope and asked him have a prayer Of forming an air force of where he was going now. ? 'their own, and Americans can't serve in "I don't know. I guess I'll ,do a little the armed forces of a foreign government , tiger hunting," he answered. A few mlonths without losing their citizenship. Also, if ' later, it became apparent what kind of an American military plane is shot down "tigers" Pope and a handful of other CAT ' over a hostile country, the enemy has a , pilots were hunting, They turned up in an ,marvelous. "incident" to publicize. If a .'anti-Communist rebellion in Indonesia,. "civilian" plane goes down, the enemy flying B-26 bombers for the rebels. Pope can't complain to anyone but the corn- Most people speculate that it was about this time that,,the CIA stepped into the picture. Among other things, CAT was' reorganized to give birth to the offshoot called Air America. The old CAT stayed legitimate for the most part, flying corn-, mercial passenger traffic throughout the Pacific, and Air. American took over the undercover part of the operation. The ; whole operation is such a tangle of phony. corporations that it's hard to tell just who controls what, but it appears that both the Nationalists and the CIA were involved for a while and one rumor even has it that Madame Chiang,. has a, ;personal interest in the deal. . ? . ? Chennault died of cancer and Control , passed to a group- of ex-Pan Ain pilots headed by George Doole in Washington ? and Hugh Grundy in Taipei. Air America got deeper and deeper into the secret wars' being fought .in Southeast Asia . and, in 1958, North Vietnam began 'complaining about civilian planes invading their air- space. It is' claimed that these were Air America C-47s on CIA missions. At the 'same time; China complained of U.S.- - supplied Nationalist Chinese special forces camps in Yunnan Province. Again, Air America is mentioned as their, source of men and munitions. ' -? In 1959, retired Admiral Felix Stump took over as board chairman of. Air America and moved the operation into Laos, where a new war was starting to brew. As far as is known, the .first Laos casualty, for the -company occurred in . 1960 when one of their lanes was shot pany. The easiest 'solution to the whole 'mess was to hire the Air. America gang, do?anything as ,Iong as ? the price -was right.' ? ? ,'? ' ? . Things really got spooky in Laos and the Company had a hard time maintaining ",their civilian cover. They flew a large fleet .,of choppers and one of their pilots 'Plaims, -"Most of ray missions were given a to Me directly by CIA agents in Vientiane." As the scale of operations grew, the origina group of former CAT pilots had moo. ,apusiness than they could handle and the Ompany began recruiting pilots.. Or, as Fane say,, shanghaiing pilots. , ?1, was a Marine chopper pilot based on Okinawa," explains a blond, 30-year-old Air America man. "CAT came through, lookingbrn for flyers;! thought I was going to ( ecoe an airline pilot when they hired me. - I 'resigned my commission, went to Taipei full of dreams about being a civilian jet jockey, and a couple of weeks later, found myself hedge-hopping a Sikorsky through Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-0049901a01460 I orfet6541 Vientiane. Sure, I ,.could have quit on my three-year contract, but I came .out Of the service broke. s^ here; t. stay, fl ngAthgrOi*dWiirafie ordered.", ? , Laos is a strange place, populated by different tribes who all believe they came out of a pumpkin thousands of years ago. The country's major exports are gold and opium, and palace revolts are so common, the pilots often don't know who will be paying them. ? ? ., One of the old CAT men tells, "Half the time when we heard shooting, it meant combat. The other half was for local' festivals. I Woke up one morning in Vien- tiane with all hell breaking loose. I grab- bed my .45 thinking the Pathet Lao (PL) had finally taken the city, but it was only the start of the three day Boun Banx festival. Naturally, both sides completely slopped the war to celebrate it. And the Army'fired thousands of rounds of star shells to illuminate the festivities, It al- most would have been safer flying against PL flak."- ?The really strange Thing is that, at one point, the Russians were also flying trans- ports into the Plain of Jars to supply. the .PL side, and they'd often pass Air America planes along the way'. On one occasion, an Air America pilot was searching for a hole in the monsoon cloud cover to make his drop when he spotted ai Russian doing the same thing. The American spoke a little Russian and asked them for an altimeter setting. They willingly gave him a reading and both went on to make their drops so the troops below could kill each other for another day. Wattay Airport outside of Vientiane began 'to look like Air America head- quarters until part of the operation was shifted to the Long Chieng base of General ? Vang Pao. An Air Force officer who flew in there once told this author that some of the planes he saw on the strip had sets of insignia and the crews swapped ahem like license plates on a car so that the plane could claim any of several identities. The Air?Arnerica crews have done their best to make themselve at home in this out-of-the-way spot. The Vieng Rattay bar has good booze and the city is full of lithe, young prostitutes. "Even if you had a mission in the morning, you drank be- cause you knew that at least the booze was pure," says one veteran of the scene. "The local drinking water from the muddy Mekong was so lousy, we paid a dollar a quart for imported, tinned drinking water. Everything in town closed up by 10 PM except bars and opium dens." On' duty,. even the country itself is an enemy: Mountains are often a thousand feet higher than the charts show and sud- den monsoon" storms spring up out of nowhere. Pilots, regularly have to cope with shot-out engines, emergency evacua- tions, and making takeoffs while 2,000 pounds overweight with an es ping Lao general, his staff and Concubines and PL mortars, hammering the strip. ? _ ? One pilot trying to get out of Ban Nam Boc was horrified to find a PL artillery barrage open up just as ha began to taxi. The Lao ground troops panicked and rush- ed the plane trying to get aboard. "We had to taxi right through them to get out," he says. The chopper pilots earn their pay the hard way, often flying behind enemy lines to rescue people. In the early days, they used old Sikorsky HAllaaalasafaka FiWo iRgi had already worn out before they got them. The book says that the 11-34 can go to 4NritIPENVAIV5M01104- o PniVIAMIntrgegytfrgrs. pay much attention to the book. Joe Maggio, a fiercely aggressive ex- "I've had my bird up as high as 14,000 CIA spook and Congo mercenary, claims feet," says a nervous, chain-smoking pilot, Ito have been part of a team that was trans- "and as many as 20 guys in the cabin. I ported into North Vietnam by Air America Sometimes, the only way I could get in the early Sixties. "We were taken in by airborne was by bouncing the ship ups, like one of their choppers, and after we'd com- a kid getting higher and higher off a pleted our mission, they picked us up and trampoline. I constantly flew with engine took us. back out," he says. "Those guys RPMs way past the red line. were flying all over North Vietnam in, "It's no wonder we lost so many ships unarmed choppers and old C-46s." ? in Laos. Our navigational checkpoints used to be 'this crashed sopter here' or 1 erryWolkerstorfer, an ex-Special Forces that one over there.' captain with two tours in Vietnam's delta, "When we hauled troops in, they'd pile talks Of the CIA-run Special Operations out with rifles, machine guns, sacks of Groups, bands of spooks made up of both rice, cooking pots, loaves of bread?while U.S. and foreign agents. "They carried the PL fired away at us. It was a helluva Swedish K submachirii-guns with silen- job, let me tell you." cers and were, hauled around behind the Even refueling is ticklish in this part of. lines by Air America. The whole outfit is weird. They say that one of their agents the world. They use C47s to spot 55-gallon fuel drums at all the isolated strips. If you cracked and went over 'the hill 'a while back. He completely disappeared. But. a must put down at one, you have to hand few months later, an?Ain America guy was pump the gas into your bird while local tribesmen watch. . and yoti wonder, are doing a job in the Congo and spotted this deserter working there as a mercenary. He they friendly or enemy? Are they civilized or are they some of the head hunters that knew too 'much to be running around still roam the region? loose; so they quietly kidnaped him. and ? Casualties -have mounted as the Corn-' shipped him back to the States. =mists teach the PL to sit on mountain- When Air America began recruiting tops with 20-and 40-mm AA guns and Pilots from the military,. they added new fire down at low flying Air America planes. skills to the "company" that were put to Their instructions are "to kill the metal Work in the Laotian fighting as far back as birds." ? 1964, At that time, the U.S. still wasn't officially involved, and sOme Of the Air Of the many Air America crews listed America pilots' abandoned their cargo among the missing, only one is known to planes to fly T-28 fighter-bombers in corn- have survived.capture to return. In 1961, bat for.the Laotian government. . Ed Shore's plane developed engine trouble Perhaps the most interesting "work" and went down near Ban Vieng San. They that Air America has undertaken, how- were quickly captured by the PL and led ever, was their involvement in the rebellion off to .a jungle prison where they were kept in Tibea Bob Miller, an old hand in Asia, tied to posts and displayed to the natives told this author, "As recently as 1966 the for 15 months. . CAT-Air America boys were regularly "We were treated like wild animals, lock- running to Tibet in C-46s to resupply, ed in stocks, and held while Meos fired rebels there that Chiang had stirred up. their guns at our cell for amusement," re- The recently published Pentagon Papers calls one of Shore's passengers. . ? confirm this story. General Ed Lansdale, Finally released at Wattay Airport dur- an experienced Asian CIA man, said, irsig a truce, the Air America men were "CAT has ... more than 200 overflights of quickly hustled aboard a plane 'for the mainland China and Tibet..." It appears States and have never talked about their that .the Nationalists grand scheme was to ordeal. . a coordinate and lead twin rebellions, in ' Tibet and Yunnan. Although Air America is highly visible The deeper you look, the more you wherever you go in Asia, its pilots' most realize that the Air America organization daring exploits are cloaked in official is into almost every aspect of Asian air secrecy: Yet, if you hang around that area operations. They provide plane crews for long enough, you begin to put the pieces Air Vietnam, and columnist Jack Ander- together. An Air Force officer speculates, son claims that the planes of another "North Thailand is dotted with airstrips Asian outfit, Southern Air Transport, that are beautifully maintained. I wouldn't are actually Air America craft with a new be surprised if they were flying right into China from some of them." paint. job. Most Air America planes are old C-46s Although some 23 years have passed, ? and C-47s built during World War Two, the shadowy Chinese Nationalist General butthey re beautifully maintained and Li Mi still commands several thousand troops from his old mainland 93rd prized for their durability. Others are . Division. They operate in the triangular specially built jobs that can land on grass strips only 250 feet Ion C-123 cargo area formed by the junction of ? Burma, planes of the type used by the Air Force, Thailand and Laos and are regularly a fleet of.Huey helicopters and a recently accused of crossing over into China's spotted iour-engine Constellation with Yunnan Province (remember, they are "strange humps" in the fuselage that looks officially still at war with Mao) and raiding very much like the electronic spy plane ChiCom camps?with Air , America the Navy uses. Unusual- aircraft for a support. . civilian airline Experienced observers go even further D le has just been replaced as head of ' in their listing of Air America activity, Air Zmerica but before he left, he hedd crediting the,rn with flying agentS in and his answers 'ce when questioned about -his out Of North Vietnam, putting U. S. company's business. "I don't know all of Special Forces teams behind the lines in our customers' private business and re- ealeelt20 2103:3 MARDI:454-604199R061,0001011005V0 carry people and boom., an suppiyiiig a myriad or secret things?whatever the customer has for us." base camps along toe North Vietnam? . , . ? ? continued 5 Approved For Rase 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499RM000100005-0 Others in the company are less cagy about what they do. Saigon station chief E. J. Theisen says, "I guess we carry about everything except bombs under our wings." Even-that is doubted by some, but Theisen does, admit that the super- secret SOG groups use Air America for their in-country transportation. These are the guys you see getting out of a plane on some God-forsaken strip, dressed in uni- forms without insignia, and carrying gun bags that take a form suspiciously like that of the Swedish K. Vietniane station manager Jim' ,Cun- ningham will only say, "We operate on a you-call, we haul basis. We don't, go into details.", ? ' Oe, . trangely, one of the1 member of Air America's board of directors is, a very ? prominent . Boston lawyer. Ah ex-Air Force officer, he says that he "got to know some of the CAT operating personnel and was invited to join the board, Air America handles mostly CIA charter work.,, it's a, very well run airline." Evidently, it's a damned' well run airline. They supposedly show a $10,000,000 profit every year, , So America's flying foreign legion flies on. In fact, as the official U.S, pres6ice in Asia shrinks, Air America is stepping in to fill the void in its "unofficial" manner, and they're busier than ever before. , Wherever, they, go, whatever, they. do, they earn their keep by doing what nobody. . else would touch with a ten-foot pole. In Taipei, a statue of the "old man,". Claire, Chennault., looks out over New Park 'and, he has a satisfied look on his face as though he knows that the outfit he left behind will always live up to .its motto: "Anything, anytime, anywhere--;professionally:" , A Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 WaRLD pt:Felt Approved FoSPI6leas2 ?0Ra/diffl : CIA-RDP84-004901000100005-0 Typical of the battles over land N.'vas a proposal to create a 230-acre park out of , some wooded green hills along the Vir- ginia bank of the Potomac River near ? Washington, D. C. ? The tract was owned by the Federal. Jlighway Administration, which wanted to retain the land for future expansion of its research laboratory. Opposition to the . plan also was expressed by the Central Intelligence Agency next door, which, preferred to keep the public as far away as possible from its headquarters. Under the compromise finally reached, some of the land was transferred to the National Park Service for public recrea- tion, while other portions were divided between the highway Administration and the CIA. ? In Virginia, woodlands adjacent to the Central Intelligence Agency recently were turned into a public park. Surplus '!property in 39 States has been acquired for recreation areas. Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 RADIOAipvvglatt*sg.2Q03/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-0049W01000100005-0 ? !Nu, 4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016, 244-3540 FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF PROGRAM Eyewitness News DATE August 24, 1972 5:30 PM ? STATION WTOP TV CITY Washington, D.C. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR CIA EMPLOYEES MAX ROBINSON: Twenty-two-year-old Joseph Hamm was fired from the FBI in April because his hair is too long. The American Civil Liberties Union fought for his reinstatement with the Civil Service Commission. And Ramm has been ordered back to work. Eyewitness News correspondent Steve Gendel reports. STEVE GENDEL: Joseph Hamm was a night fingerprint clerk with the FBI. He rarely came in contact with the public. as part of his job. But FBI officials said his image, which does not conform to their standards, could lessen public confidence in the FBI. Hamm. was fired when he refused to cut his hair. In ?a letter to the Civil Service Commission regarding this case, the FBI defended its hair-grooming requirement, saying the American public compares agents against "Inspector Erskine" of The FBI tv series. .The ACLU said this ruling infringes on basic constitutional rights. They filed a grievance with the Civil Service Commission, who. ordered Hamm reinstated. MAN: What is basically involved here is a right of an individual in the absence of some compelling governmental interest to be let ,alone, to decide how he will dress, how he will conduct what is essentially his private life. GENDEL: The FBI is in most circumstances exempt from Civil Service review. Hamm's case was an exception because 'he's a Vietnam veteran and entitled.to protection under the Veterans Preference Act. But ACLU attorneys.say this is the closest thing to a precedent, breaking what they call FBI operations as a separate [risiiic- Vo Approved For Release 2003/12/03.: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 OFFInr IPJ, vvent-iirstn-nn?d n ? Iflfl awJetr, 1,0M ? NIVW ...onnie ? nc.1-zat-fs, ? lb..m.uu et,arai A ton ? e.g..", An eh., Approved For Pftase 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499A1000100005-0 enclave insulated from constitutional requirements. The ACLU says if asked to do so they'll try and extend' the principle won here to FBI special agents themselves, and possibly the military and the CIA. This is Steve Gendel, Eyewitness News. . 0 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 AijoiiN, TEX, AM-En:CAN M 48 05u Approved Folelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-0049,001000100005-0 , AMERICAN-STATESMAN 9 - 76,680 AUG 2 019721 ko-t One Trench Coat Austin By DAVE MA YES Staff Writer You almost have to do -a little cloak-and-dagger work yourself to find the Austin office of the Central Intelligence Agency. Go to the Federal Building on East 8th and you won't find it listed in the office index. Neither will you see its name posted on any office door. As in most spy thrillers, however, the nlystery can be solved if one does the unexpected but .obvious thing. In this case look it up in the telephone book. , A woman will answer your STATI NTL DCT . ffiee Has 'Low Profile)i call by repeating the phone number, but don't be uncertain you've found it. - "We try to maintain a low profile," began William B. Wood of the CIA. It's his name that appears in the index at the Federal Building and beside the door of Room 520. The door, complete with peephole and nightlatch, opens into a green-carpeted two-room office share'd by Wood and his secretary. But here the James Bond scenario ends. The impression quickly registers that neither of these CIA folk has ever clicked a picture with a camera hidden in a cigarette lighter, or smuggled microfilm anywhere. They probably don't even own trench coats. Wood, An' at f able, well-polished man, is one of. the dozen CIA representatives, in the country who does recruiting for the agency. The CIA tries not to be obvious in Austin, he continued, because as a recruiting office it has no reason to be otherwise. ' "We don't really have to advertise ourselves," lie said, because the agency has never had to worry about getting enough applications. It seems the CIA is more concerned with caps and gowns than cloaks and daggers. Wood Said he receives resumes from many people with backgrounds in law enfcircement because there is a popular but mistaken notion that the CIA is some kind of law enforcement arm of the government. He maintains that the CIA has no such duties, in fact has no domestic responsibilities, but works exclusively in gathering foreign intelligence for the National Security Council. Consequently, the CIA is looking for people with highly-developed intellectual skills in virtually all fields of social and physical science and technology. The most fertile grounds for recruiters are the university graduate schools, Wood said. For this reason, the agency in 1965 'located its recruiting office in Austin where the University of Texas maintains the largest graduate School in the South.. Wood's recruiting territory includes Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and part of New Mexico'. , The recruiter said he prefers to work with applicants on a one-to-one basis, in an effort to make a "personalized analysis of an individual." If the applicant seems promising and does well on a test similar to the graduate record exam, he fills out a lengthy application, goes , to Washington, D.C. for further screening, and undergoes a thorough security check. "The entire process may take between four and six months," Wood said. The number of - people employed by the CIA is classified, but Wood characterized it as on of the "smaller" ? go v or nm en t agencies:. Most of them work at CIA headquarters in Washington, he added. Wood points out with pride that the CIA has the lowest turnover rate of any government agency, attributing this to the "esprit de- corps" that exists among staff members. Himself a career CIA man, Wood joined the agency in early 1950's, not long after it was created under the National Security Act of 1947. The University of Texas graduate said he specialized in Russian studies before becoming a recruiter in 190. "The CIA is a unique place in which to work, he said. "For an understanding of the total dimensions of a foreign problem, there is no other pin to get it." /SO Approved For Release 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 _ Approved Foht6ease 2064/*2Y0?114-RDP84-00499a801000100005-0 1? AUG 1972 HS/HC- , Attempt to hide role of ex-CIA agent " WASHINGTON?The revelation that an .ex-CIA ? agent is on the payroll of Action, the government agency which includes the .Peace Corps, was deleted from a Senate Foreign Relations Committee re- port after a personal plea by Action direct& Joseph H. Blatchford, United Press International reported. ppoved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved NMI Release 2smrsIA-RDP84-0439R001000100005-0 U 1g7 r-DOMINICANS UNDER. CIA SURVEILLANCE ? SANTO DOMINGO, Dominican ? Republic ? The U.S. Central In- tellignce Agency (CIA), which maintains.a- network .of espionage in the Dominican Republic, is centraliiing its or eraticns in the postal service and in Las Ameri- can International Airport, accord- ? ing to news media here. The CIA, say these sources, uses traffic inspectors in post offices and national guard agents in the airport, commanded by Lt. Jose Ramon Gomez Quezada, who formally apcears as a representa- tive of IN'PERPOL (International Police). ? The postal "inspectors" censor correspondence entering and leav- ing the country, and confiscate books, magazines and newspa- pers. KThe airport team is official- ly stated to be fighting the drug traffic, but its basic concern is to watch those suspected of opposing the regime of President Joaquin -Balaguer, and censor correspond- ence and literature. It is estimated that at least 10,000 letters fell into the hands of these agents in the past 14 monthsin the airport alone. The Goinez Quezada group be- gan work nearly tivo years ago.. The Dominican press has re- ported that most Dominicans liv- ing abroad prefer to send their mail through friends. ? Compiled by Jose Perez Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 ( . Approved 1:446,Releavea0SMIOPOSIUDEMEN/D049441001000100005-0 30 July 1972 Denounces AID Link With CIA By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR. , A Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch WASHINGTON, July 29?Sen- ator 'Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, denounced Saturday the A g en cy for international Development's involvement i n Laos with the Central Intelli- gence Agency. "The activities and funds of these two agencies in Laos are now so mixed," he said, "that it must be impossible for Lao officials to know whether they are dealing. with AID or with the CIA." Symington, chairman of the S en a te foreign relations sub- committee on security agree- ments and corn tn t men ts abroad, made the statement in a preface he wrote for a declas- sified version of hearings over which he presided last April 13. He criticized the Executive Branch , of the government for making extensive deletions in the hearing record, made public Saturday. He said the deletions were made "on alleged grounds of security." T h e hearing transcript was scissored so- severely, Syming- ton said, that his panel was at first reluctant to make public what remained. Ho w e v e r, it was decid e d that the report would add to information avail- ? able about Laos. Roderic L. O'Connor, co-ordi- nator of AJD's bureau for sup- porting assistance, appeared be- fore, the subcommittee in re- sponse to a letter Symington wrote March 21 to John A: Han- nah, administrator of the Agen- cy for International Develop- ment. Symington's letter had asked Hannah a series of questions about the relationship in Laos between AID, which adminis- ters foreign assistance, and the CIA, which finances irregular troops fighting Communists. In' a separate statement is- s Ire d Saturday with the cen- sor ed but now declassified hearing r e co r d, the Missouri Senator said the facts now com- ing out "raise serious questions; about the legality of some Unit-. ed States expendituresin; Laos . . ." The facts also disclose, Sym- ington said, "a pattern of de- viousness, if not actual decep- tion, which has characterized the conduct of our policy in Laos for the last decade." O'Connor told the subcommit- tee that AID was not now fi- n a n ;e i n g, and never had fi- nanced, military or intelligence operptions in Laos, as such. He conceded that AID's assistance had helped the royal Lao gov- ernment carry its defense bur- den. In fiscal 1972, the witn eSs said, the CIA is reimbursing AID in the amount of $2,500,000 for medical services and sup- plies for paramilitary forces or their dependents in Laos. O'Connor said AID supplied certain services in the health and humanitarian f ie Ids for "anybody in Laos who is ill, sick, or wounded." S. r tr pproved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 nal INION PQST Approved FOr Rkik',ease 20Ci312fit:Via-RDP84-00499%0000100005-0 ,Court to Act On, Secret CIA Costs PHILADELPHIA, July 21 1(AP)--.The Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ordered a three-judge court set up to decide the constitutionality of a. law exempting the Central ,Intelligence Agency from re- vealing its expenditures.: In a 4-to-3 decision, the ap- peals court told the U.S. Dis- trict Court in Erie, Pa., to em- panel the special court. The ruling Thursday was made on a request filed, by William B. Richardson, 52, of Greensburg. He charged the government's failure to dis- close CIA expenditures- vio- lates the constitutional require- ment for ah accounting of all government financial dealings. Richardson appealed to the Circuit Court after a District Court judge in Erie rejected his plea. In the appeals court deci- sion written by Judge Max Rosen, the court said a citizen' has the right to know how his tax money is being spent. The CIA Act of 1949 ex- empts the agency from "the provisions of. law and regula- tions relating to the expendi- tures of government funds." Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 RADIOArilnPvP4EihroNirisSNIMMO3 : CIA-RDP84-00448P001000100005-0 4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W.. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016, 244-3540 FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF PROGRAM CBS Evening News STATION WTOP TV DATE July 28, 1972 7:00 PM CIA REPORT CITY CBS Network Washington, DC ROGER MUDD: The propaganda war over allegations that American bombs have destroyed North Vietnamese dikes heated up today on two sides of the Atlantic. In Paris the North Vietnamese charged Mr. Nixon with trying to elude responsibility when he denied yesterday the dikes were being bombed deliberately. But in Washington the State Department backed up Mr. Nixon's . denial when it took the highly unusual step of releasing a report com- piled by the super secret CIA. MARVIN KALB: Senators began to. leak details of the report, so late today the State Department under increasing pressure, released it, but without any photographic evidence. The report claims that only 12 of North Vietnam's major dikes have been struck by American bombs, presumably since the air war inten- sified last May. The 12 dikes are all located south and southeast of Hanoi in what is called the Lower Red River Delta, the same area which experienced severe flooding last August when approximately 600 persons died. The report further claims that damage is minor, no major dike has been breached and there has been no flooding. Hanoi claims 58 dikes have been hit, part of a systematic American campaign against the entire dike system of North Vietnam. ? US officials say that is .a total fabrication. There is no syst- ematic campaign of that kind. The report says in an almost plaintive way that there are so many dikes in North Vietnam, 2,700 miles of them, that any major air campaign al- most inevitably results in damage to some of the dikes; officials adding that if North Vietnam hopes to avoid major flooding next month it had best repair the dikes now. '1141' ? late yesterday It was shown ate to Senators Fu annd b1y2. to OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON. D. C. ? LOS ANGELES ? NEW YORK ? DETROIT ? NEW ENGLAND * CHICAGO Approved For RAIftse 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R0,000100005-0 2 ? the CIA. Today the leaks began. The report was sprung. And there is little doubt the dike controversy will continue. Marvin Kalb, CBS News, the State Department. Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 IIIS/HC- Approved Nizri>Release 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP84-004VR001000100005-0 PHILADELPHIA, PA. INQUIRER M - 463,503 ? - 867,810 ralt .2 2 1972._ fluting Asked On Secrecy in CIA Spending Tfinrd U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals here has ordered that a three-judge court be set ,up to decide the constitution- ality of a law that exempts the Central Intelligence Agency from revealing its ex- penditures. In a 4-3 decision, the ap- peals court told the U.S. Dis- trict Court in Erie to empanel the special court. The ruling Thursday was made on a request filed by William B. Richardson, 52, of Greensburg, Westmoreland County. lie charged the gov- ernment's failure to disclose CIA expenditures violates the Constitutional requirement for an accounting of all govern- ment financial dealings. Richardson appealed to the circuit court after a district court judge in Erie rejected his plea. In the appeals court deci- sion written by Judge Max. Rosen, the court said a citizen. ?has the right to know how his ' tax money is being spent. The CIA Act of 1949 ex- , empts the agency from "the . provisions of law and regula- tions relating to the expendi- ? tures of government funds." Approved For Release 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Ea XcaK TIgES Approved FAcitelease 20013612H.:19f-RDP84-004?60001000100005-0 Key Egyptian-Soviet Moves Since '55 .y United rren Intern& t lonAl Following is 'a list of major events in relations between Egypt, and the Soviet Union: Sept. 27, 1955?Premier Ga- mal Abdel Nasser an- nounces that the Soviet Union agreed to supply Egypt with weapons in ex- change for Egyptian cotton and rice. March 14, 1957?Soviet Un- ion announces agreement to deliver 500,000 tons of oil in exchange for Egyp- tian goods. Nov. 19, 1957?A communi- qu?t the conclusion of a visit by Egypt's Defense Minister, Field Marshal Ab- del Hakim Amer, to Mos- cow reports agreement on matters of political and economic cooperation as well as on military mat- ters. . April 29 to May 15, 1958? Mr. Nasser, then President, visits Moscow for talks on the Middle East situation. Oct. 23, 1958?The Soviet Premier; Nikita S. Khrush- chev, announces Soviet economic and technical as- sistance in the construc- tion of the Aswan Dam. Jan. 28, 1961?Sdviet Union agrees to contribute almost $30.5-million toward con- struction of steel-rolling mill and other factories. Dec. 12, 1961?The Egyptian press reports shipments of submarines, destroyers and other warships from Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. June 18, 1963 ? Marshal Amer ends official visit to ,Moscow, and a communi- qu?nnounces Soviet agreements to provide further industrial credits and economic and military aid. May 9 to 24, 1964 ? Mr. Khrushchev. arrives for in- auguration of first stage of Aswan High Dam. Mr. Nasser announces ' that Moscow has agreed to lend Egypt nearly $280-million for a second five-year plan. Aug. 27, 1965?Mr. Nasser arrives in Moscow on of- ficial viAit. New trade agreement is initialed. May 10, 1966?The Soviet Premier, Aleksei N. KOsy- gin, and a high-level Gov- ernment and party delega- tion 'visit Cairo to hold talks on economic and other assistance. June 21 to 24, 1967?The So- viet President, Nikolai V. Podgorny, talks with Mr. Nasser in Cairo, and a joint communiqu?ledges both nations to "further collaboration" against Is- rael. Sept. 29, 1970--Mr. Nasser dies in Cairo and is suc- ceeded as President by An- war el-Sadat. Mr. Kosygin remains in Cairo after the funeral for talks with Mr. Sadat nd the new Egyptian leadership. May 27, 1971?Mr. Sadat and Mr. Podgorny yign a 15 year, treaty of friendship and cooperation in Cairo. Feb. 3 and 4, 1972 ? Mr. Sadat visits Moscow ,and Arab reports say that he sought more military aid. Feb. 18 to 20, 1972-A joint communiqu?ssued after the visit to Egypt by the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Andrei A. Grech- ko, says that Moscow agreed to increase Egypt's combat capabilities. July 15, 1972?The Egyptian Premier, Dr. Aziz Sidky cuts short a scheduled three-day visit to Moscow . after one day .of talks with leaders. July 18, 1972 ? *Official ? sources in Cairo report . that Mr. Sadat asked the Soviet Union to withdraw all military advisers from Egypt. Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 WASH je06`11 Approved Figs,ReleaseRMA/64 CIA-RDP84-00414Z001000100005-0 tali le 19i:4''6it Pe ce E By Tim O'Brien and John Thorner Washington.P,ost Mat! Writers The Seahorn "Initiative" Between junc, 1961, and June, 1965, J. Blair Seaborn, the Canadian member of the international Control Commission in Southeast Asia, met five times with North Vietnamese ? officials. He :carried, according to the official diplomatic history of the .period, "unusually substantive and dramatic" messages. ".-.. . The main subject stressed repeatedly by each (side) was its determination to do and endure whatever might be necessary to see the war to a conclusion satisfactory to it. "TO the extent they believed each ?: other, the two sides were amply fore- warned that a painful contest; lay ahead. Even se, they were not in- clined to compromise their way out." Accordingly, nothing came of the .Seaborn missions. * 'Project Mayflower - In May, 1965, President Johnson ? ordered a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam in an effort to per- suade the North Vietnamese to take Their tions for (a) solution" could be cre- ated if the U.S. would accept the "Four Points" or North Vietnam's announced position. There was no reply from the Americans until August, 1965, when Edmund Gullion, a retired foreign service officer who is now at Tufts University, was sent to Paris to talk with Mai Van Bo. They met four times and their discussions, the diplomatic history says, represented "the most serious mutual effort to resolve matters of substance be- tween the U.S. and DRV before and since:" Gullion (known as "X") and Bo ("R.") discussed the possibility for reconvening the 1954 Geneva Con- ference on Southeast Asia and :seemed to be heading toward agree- ments on some of the Hanoi "Four Points." Then suddenly Bo failed to show up for a scheduled meeting (Sept. 7, 1965) and the initiative ended. The diplomatic section of the Pentagon papers called the epi- sode "as mysterious in its ending as it was fruitful and suggestive in its beginnings." * * * Pinto,: the Rangoon Contact some reciprocal action toward de- On Dec: 24, 1965, the U.S. began escalation. U.S. Ambassador Foy a 37-day bombing pause. It came Kohler in Moscow was instructed after Soviet Embassy Counsellor to inform the North Vietnamese Zinchuk in Washington told White Ambassador there that the halt House aide McGeorge Bundy that would be indefinite and could lead Hanoi was unlikely to respond, al- to .."a permanent end to . . a attacks though a pause might possibly im- on North Vietnam." prove the atmosphere for the long run. During the pause, the U.S. met with the North Vietnamese counsel general in Rangoon, Burma, and sub- mitted an aide memoire. No reply came until 12 hours after the bomb- ing was resumed. It amounted to a rebuttel of the U. S. position, * * The Ronning Missions Retired Canadian diplomat Ches- ter Henning visited Hanoi in March and June of ,1966. Henning had friendly relations with the Chinese and was known to be critical of U.S. policies toward China and Vietnam, but the U.S. nevertheless gave its formal support. During his first visit Ronning was unable to sway North Vietnamese leaders from their 'insistence on the tween May, 1965, and February, previously announced "Four Points" 1966. :as the only basis for settling the The first contact was through the war. Pham Van Dong did tell him, French government o '64 ON, ektfrolioRotra0a200c3namsotAliRD The French notified U.S. that to enter into some form of prelim- Ho believed that "favorable condi- inary contact with the United States The Ambassador of ? the Demo- cratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) refused to transmit the message to Hanoi and suggested it be turned over, to the Soviet government. The Soviets refused to act as intermedi- aries and "lectured Kohler at length upon the U.S. misconception of the conflict in Vietnam." The failure of this initiative had been anticipated by the CIA and other Administration officials but was regarded within the, government as a productive gesture toward world and domestic opinion even If it failed. * ,* * The XYZ Channel Mai Van Bo, head of the DRV delegation In Paris, had three con- tacts with the U.S. government be-' ? ode N If the U.S. \you'd cease bombing and- all other acts of war against North Vietnam. Neither the U.S. nor North-Viet- nam was enthusiastic about a return trip but Henning did arrange to visit Hanoi again in June. He was not permitted to see Pham Van Deng this time, and was told by a lesser official that there would be no mil- itary reciprocity for a U.S. bomb- ing halt. ? - *. * Marigold:- The Polish Channel Marigold was the code name for negotiating efforts that involved Janusz Lewanclowski, the Polish member of the International Con- trol Commission in Vietnam. These efforts began in June 1966 in Sai- gon and also involved the Italian Ambassador there. Lewandowski made several visits' to Hanoi in succeeding months, carrying with him a 10-point formu- lation- of his own interpretation of the American attitude. toward a settlement. , - North Vietnam agreed to meet a U.S. representative in Warsaw, but canceled all further discussion of the matter after U.S. bombing raids on Hanoi. ? The Pentagon history concluded that -Marigold gave each side a glimpse of possible areas of negotia- tion. It added that the Poles "acted as friends of Hanoi, not neutrals" and "applied pressure in good faith by the ever-present threat of dis- closing their version of the matter to influential world leaders or the public at large." Nothing came of the Marigold exercise and it did leak out to the world. * * * * Packers: The Romanian Channel From October 1966 through Feb- ruary 1968 the Remanians made ef- forts to take a part in the negotiat- ing picture, Acting on the suggestion: of Ambassador Averell Harriman; Deputy Foreign Minister Gheorghe Macovescn went to Hanoi in Decem- ber, 1967, and came to Washington early in January, 1968, to convey North Vietnam's position. In an ef- fort to seek clarification, he return.' ed to Hanoi in the third week of, January ? just before the Com- munist launched the Tet Offensive., His report reached Washington often, Tet. In hindsight, according to t h e.. P44060499RINYI NO Olt rs' the Romanians were 'very. poor re-.oont imied porters; they did not pick up distince tions such as talks, 11:etApictrantecicforffaime NPit1glit3Niritkr13DP84-004991001000100005-0 settlement terms. . . It is likely that cially interested in Algards initial Hanoi did not take the Romanians report that the . North Vietnam- seriously," ese were prepared to be "very * * . flexible" in any negotiations and a Aspen: The Swedish Channel later report from Loan that reunifi- From November, 1966, through cation of the two Vietnams could be. February, 1968, the Swedish govern-, "postponed to an indefinite point of ment (Aspen) played "a continuing time in the future." though minor role" in attempting to The Pentagon papers say that bring about a settlement of the war. while the Nerwegian role was not The Pentagon papers said "The treated with great importance by. Swedes were more active over time Washington, "in retrospect the ex- than any other. intermediary?and changes between Algard and Loan produced .the least amount of in- were probably the most reliable of formation." all . ? ? Algard seems to have been a ?, At one point in May of 1967 Aspen careful note-taker, and his messages. went so far as to say it would "take look like he *as using Hanoi turns responsibility for a position they of phrase." felt convinced about" ? in other * Words, to be a broker as Well as a Pennsylvania: Henry Kissinger message carrier. But the Pentagon and the Frenchmen historian concluded that the Swed- ' The Pennsylvania channel w a s i.sh role was dominated by that na- activated in June, 1967, by Kissin-- tion's domestic politics. Finally on .ger and two Frenchmen -- Herbert Nov. 4, 1967, the Swedish govern- Marcovich and Raymond Aubrae. ment publicly denounced U.S. policy Aubrac had personal ties to the in Vietnam. North Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi . * * Minh, which enabled the two. Sunflower: The Wilson-Kosygin Frenchmen to visit Hanoi and set up Channel a channel of communications in From February 7 to 13, 1967, an Paris. intensive round of talks involving There was hope on the American British Prime Minister Harold WI' sidethat Hanoi might accept the- son and Soviet Premier Aleksei terms for halting the bombing Kosygin took place in London. which were passed to North Viet- Through the British, "the U.S. ad- nam through the Pennsylvania van(eecl) 'various de-escalatory pro- channel in August, 1967. The hope ? posals, none of which (were) accept- was frustrated and in October the ed." channel was closed. The key proposal was a halt in The Pentagon papers say that the 'US. bombing of North Vietnam in exchanges "seemed to have been return for a cessation of North Viet- handled with great care and accu-. ?namese infiltration of men and sup- racy. While the two Frenchmen . plies to South Vietnam. A halt in the were clearly committed to getting U.S, military buildup in South Viet- the U.S. to stop the bombing, there nam also was contemplated. is no evidence that their reporting, At a critical moment in the pro- or message carrying, was adversely cedings, the United States changed affected. Kissinger for the U.S. the wording of the final versison of handled the play with consummate the proposal. The effect of the skill, clarifying points and making change was to require North Viet- interpretations that could lead to a nam to stop its infiltration be- continuing dialogue. Both Hanoi fore the bombing halt, rattier than and Washington treated this chan- merely give assurance that infiltra- nel as a major one and yet little tion would stop after the bombing was accomplished . . ." halt took place. The British, as the * * * * Pentagon papers note, took "strong Killy: The Italian Channel exception" to the change. Giovanni cl'Orlandi, an Italian Hanoi had not replied to the pro. diplomat, met with the DRY Ambas- posal by the time Kosygin left Lon- sador to Czechoslovakia in Prague don and a ,temporary U.S. bombing in Febrary and March, 1968. suspension ran out. After the bomb- According to the Pentagon Pap- ing was resumed, Hanoi rejected ers, the North Vietnamese sought the plan and broke off DRY embassy out d'Orlandi who had played a contacts with the U.S. in Moscow. major role in "Marigold," a role- The Norwegian .Contacts respected by both Sides. The history notes that d'Orlandi believed the ? Norwegian Ambassador to Peking, two sides should negotiate about the 016.:Algard, met six times with the future of South Vietnam?the es- Wirth Vietnamese Ambassador .to sential issue ? rather than focus Peking, Ngo Loan, between June, solely on cessation of U.S. bombing. 1967, and. February,' 1968. In early "Only when the future of South March 1968, Algard went to Hanoi Vietnam could be foreseen, d'Or- and met several times with North landi argued, would the two sides Vietnamese- Foreign Minister Ngu- sit down and genuinely and serious- yen Duy Truth. A final meeting be.. ly negotiate. tween Algard and Loahr ndibsiMieg took Place in early ApYrr.-19-68.--- -For Release 2063/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 WASHINGTON FOST Approved FqrmAelease 2003/1=XU4149FEDP84-0049014001000100005-0 Lain" March 2, 1965?Sustained .U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam; code-name "Rolling Thunder," begin: - - March 2, 1965?Two U.S. Marine Corps battalions sent ashore at Dan- ang, South Vietnam, for "limited se- curity duty." Jan. 31, 1966?President Johnson an- nounces resumption of air strikes after 37-day bombing "pause," saying Hanoi failed to respond to peace cam- paign. - ? , June E, 1966?Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon begins secret meetings, code-named "Marigold," with Polish envoy Lewandowski and Italian [Ambassador -d'Orlandi. e ;rt. C S I \V lenrn faaarniet Dec. 2-5, 1966?U.S. bombers begin intensive air attacks in Hanoi region; Poles quickly protest that "Marigold" diplomatic track is endangered. Dee. 13.14, 1966--American planes pound targets around Hanoi. China and Romania later claim their Hanoi embassies hit. Feb. 7, 1967?Secret talks code- named "Sunflower" start in London with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygirt, during bombing "pause." Talks col- lapse on Feb. 13. July 21, 1067?French scientists Her- bert Marcovich and Raymond Aubrae arrive in Hanoi with U.S. messages transmitted to them through Henry A. Kissinger?operation "Pennsylvania." Aug. 3, 1967?President Johnson an- nounces authorized ceiling of 525,000 troops in South Vietnam. Jan. 30-31, 1968?Communist forces launch TeL offensive in South Vietnam. March 31, 1966L?President Johnson announces cessation of all air and - naval bombardment of North Vietnam above 20th Parallel. April 3, 1968?North Vietnam offers to meet U.S. representatives to dis- cuss "unconditional cessation" of all "acts of war" against its territory. Oct. 31, 1968?President Johnson an- nounces cessation of all air and naval activity against North Vietnam. ? Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved For Release31i0iiiiii-RDP84-00499R00100100005-0 2 5 JUN 1972 Trn 5 o1 * ,,.- gs ti, 1auiltes k9 .13111 9. and Herter for Fall of Cult) BY GEORGE BEEBE [Knight NewsPaPers) ESTORIL, Portugal, June 2-1! Keeps Mind Alert ? ormer Cuban President ? He keeps his mind alert by Fulgencio Batista is still puz- zled and resentful that "the three sick men in Washington" ignored his warnings that Cas- tro was a dangesous Commu- nist. .; President Eisenhower and Secretaries of State John Fos- ter Dulles and Christian Hert- er thought "I was crying wolf, and now the wolf controls Cuba," he said at his hillside villa here where he has spent most of his exile since 1939. He noted that all three Unit- reading eight daily newspa- pers?in four languages, Poe- toles?, Spanish, English, and French. He and his attractive wife, Marta, live a comparatively quiet life in this Portuguese resort community. - When they go to their apart- ment in Madrid every few week, they are swept into a social whirl that includes many other Cuban exiles. Batista once again empha- sized that he is retiring from ed States leaders were preoc- politics. eupied with physical ailments "I am too old to have any and "showed not one bit of political aspirations. It is time interest in what was happen- now for young leadership ing in the Caribbean." -among the exiles." The former Cuban leader U. S. Arms Embargo -? 'shows no bitterness. He be- The State Department dur- :lieve.s he brought considerable ing the Eisenhower adminis- progress to his homeland in tration in 1953 slapped an the pre-Castro years. arms embargo on the Batista government, 'while making no effort to halt the flow of arms to the Castro insurgents. "It is. unfortunate that the United States in its attempt to help defend the world against the spread of Communism has gone so far from the Western Hemisphere to do so," Batista said. He implied that the U. S. effort in Viet Nani would have been better spent on Cuba. . The one-time army sergeant who became Cuba's strongman when President Gerardo Ma- chado was overthrown in 1933, and who twice was his coun- try's dictator-president, still is a powerful man physically. Batista is robust and vigor- ous at 71. A daily exercise PC. vied is part of his unchanging .schedule. have kept my weight at -180 pounds thru the many ? - He said that he has given up lhope of ever visiting the U. S. -again. His previous requests for visas have been denied. "But if I did go, I fear my friends and followers would think that I had come with a ' magic plan to restore Cuba to the people," he said. ? "What would I say to them? I would not want to raise their hopes for I do not have the answer." Nostalgic Note Batista disgressed briefly with a nostalgic note: - "I greatly miss Cuba, and. particularly the friends with , whom I have .lost contact? perhaps forever. No one likes to die outside the country he loves. This is soniething you can't comprehend until it hap- ? pens to you. It is difficult to spend the .last years of your life away from the land of your birth.'" He keeps well informed -tears," he comments ?441), pfs /4141e6eit wiwi? -00499R001000100005-0 note of achievement. PPr9vtut naruraTly entafb mei oirtr: rect word for inside Cuba." It is obvious, that if Premier Fidel Castro dies that another Communist will take his place Fulgencio Batista: "I was crying wolf, and now the wolf controls Cuba." . "and conditions will be the same, or possibly worse," he said. Batista has written three books since his overthrow by Castro, Ile now has 70 chapters completed on the history of Cuba. "But I doubt that I ever will finish it. This is about the country; not about my memo- ries. Unfortunately, I do not have access to the documents that would help me ? finalize such a volume."' Approved F-Silielelease 2003/12/03 ?: CIA-RDP84-004*9 001000100005-0 EPIIRATA, WASH. GRAUN.T CO. JOURNAL JN 2 2 1372 SEMI-WEEKLY - 3,439 uvuovvvyvymuxivt, ....... .............fvvUvuOuvuuvuAyvvuol.vvvvyw ..... Secret Documents Shouldn't Hide Stupid Blunders ?...LLULLSISULSULULUSL2.11112.31.. The illegal release of the Pentagon Papers and the more recent use of secret documents by columnist Jack Anderson has re-opened the problem of what should and should not be classified. During a conversation a few' years ago with the late Senator Richard Russell I asked why the CIA reports on Lee Harvey Oswald's tralIefrfiMaxico had to remain classified as Secret and why they had to stay secret for amity years to come. ? The senator was at that time, and had been for more than a decade, chairman of a special appropriations ? sub-committee which con, trolled all CIA funds. There wasn't anyone who was in a better position to answer the question than Russell. .He gave me a plausible reason for the secrecy. The senator noted, and it's true, that we have people in every country in the world who are friendly to the U.S. and though not citizens of this country they often supply our intelligence people with information. Some are businessmen, some fishermen, artists, students and so forth. They are basically loyal to their own country, but still willing to help us. The CIA report on Oswald's travels in Mexico contains not only the facts about his movements in that country but the names of the individuals who provided those facts. If the report was made public at this time some of the contacts would end up, facing a firing ? squad and if they weren't shot or imprisoned, they would no longer be of any value as contracts. Their future services would be nil. Since they are still needed it makes good sense to keep their identity unknown. But what about thirty years from now? This 11S/IIC- is the time frame being recommended by the National Security Council as a reasonable time to keep papers secret yet there are opponents around who want the lid to stay on far beyond three decades. That's pretty hard to buy even from the individuals who claim diplomatic or military secret codes can be endangered by releasing thirty year old data. It seenis illogical to assume that -code's aren't changed in more than thirty years and even more illogical to believe any nation can keep a code unbroken for thirty years. If this is happening it is' a first for all time. A recent rash of non-fiction books have pretty well dispelled the idea that unbreakable codes exist. If a man or woman can conceive them sooner or later another man or woman will be able to unravel them. Anyone who reads my columps very long knows I am pro-military, but I've long been aware of the military's inclination to 'nark anything and everything secret and keep that tag on forever. In some cases this practice can be defended, but not for 50 or 100 years. While true military secrets should be carefully guarded military blunders should not. Time doesn't erase stupidity, but it hides it and that's wrong. During World War II many a bulletin board was so plastered with memos that it was a standard joke that if one dug deep enough he'd find a KP order from Valley Forge still tacked up. If one could actually dig deep' enough in Pentagon records there's a chance that some of George Washington's actual orders are still* stamped secret. In a free society that's no joke. Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved Foi*klilease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-004990601000100005-0 CiiiCAGO, ILL. TRIBUNE M - 767,793 S 1,016,275 JUN 1 5 1972 mand ? Y, WAYNE THOM IS [Aviation 'Editor] ichicago Tribune Press Servicel SAIGON, Viet Nam, June 14 ??Hanoi broadcasts infrequent- ly mention "works of sabo- teurs" in North Viet Nam's panhandle, and Saigon's ver- nacular press occasionally re- port odd little aircraft acci- dents with nonmilitary planes in mountainous regions of :Laos, Northwestern South Viet --Nam, and sometimes in North- eastern Thailand. These are mere peeks by the general public at a tremen- dous submerged "iceberg" of clandestine operations continu- ously and now increasingly carried out against the Com- munist North. These actions probably nev- er will be disclosed in full de- tail but it can be said respon-, sibly that today they constitute an important phase of this Southeast Asia battle. It is a silent war, It is car- ried out by special forces and by mercenaries. It is a hit- and-run war in which units are - airlifted or sea borne deep into North Viet Nam for demolition Missions, for seizure of prison- ers, for probing forays, and?it now is understood?for accu- mulation of information on American prisoner of war camp locations. This type of action has been taking place in the North Viet- namese panhandle f r o in the Demilitarized Zone to well north of Vinh during the lag 60 days.. An increasing series of such raids have come from the sea- coasts and from helicopter air- bridge links in Laos and Thai- land to paints wherc damage can be done or information oh- tamed from the North Viet4 namese, it was learned from reliable sources. Communist broadcasts from Hanoi in ,the past. have used "saboteur" in an ideoligical sense. Now they are referring to actual dynamitings by these raiders. They specialize in tar- gets which are too difficult for bombers to identify from the air, or are too well hidden to be spotted by aerial photogra- phy.' They also carry out a traffic in agents not otherwise possible under present condi- tions. Size, Duration Vary ? Reports filtering from Cen- tral Intelligence Agency and associates military establish- ments indicate such raids may vary from 20 to several bun- died men. They may stay in North Viet Nam from a few minutes to 24 hours. . ? Mercenaries enlisted for such secret actions include Europeans, Chinese, Malays, Japanese and Americans. T h e oerations are car of u 11 y planned and surrounded by the tight security. The CIA now believes the large-scale American attempt to free prisoners from a tamp near Hanoi a year ago failed because of a security leak T 1U. 2 which resulted in a prisoner shift. The raiders are heavily, ar- med. Not one operation has failed, and none of the raiders have been trapped, according to informed sources. Casualties among these spe- cial forces have been low. Pay scales are said to be "quite high" and morale among these specialists in demolition, elec- tronics sabotage, and interro- gation is very high. The men regard themselves, as an -elite corps. Financed by CIA The mysterious, CIA4inanced Air America civil flying fleet seems to operate on a super- national basis across Cambo- dian, Thai, Laotian, and South Vietnamese borders. It has had a part in some of this work. However, much of the work is being done by mil- itary detachments, temporarily 'misted to the special forces. . The military establishment here generally - attempts to suppress mention of this side of the war for a number of reasons, with security against enemy knowledge being the least important. The North Vi- etnamese are fully aware of the nature of the CIA-directed and financed --special opera- tions. It is known that ,after each such raid all civilians and mil- itary personnel in the North: who have had contact with the raiders are subjected to rigor- ous and lengthy questioning by Communist secret police and commisars. The U. S. forces seek to hide the clandestine side of the war to prevent embarassment to Thai, Cambodian, and Laotian governmental departments. It is recognized by American -leaders that such concealment is merely "token" but is re- quired in certain diplomatic relationships which the coun- tries fringing South Viet Nam maintain. ? Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 vit3FINGTON 20S1 Approved For heease129036V/R2 CIA-RDP84-00499l000100005-0 Air.Drops Asian Guerrillas Saboteurs Raid N. Vietnam By D. E. Ronk enecial to The,WaEhington.Post VIENTIANE, Laos, June 14?Use of Laotian territory ;and spegially recruited, As- ian mercenaries for CIA- sponsored espionage a n d sabotage missions in North Vietnam has been confirmed here by American sources close to the operation. : The missions are originat- ing from a number of small mountaintop sites in north- ern Laos within 30 miles of the North Vietnamese bor- der, The guerrilla "troops are transported by unmarked ,Air America planes, The existence of the guer- rilla mission. inside North Vietnam was first reported in Saigon earlier this week. Such missions were known to have been initiated in early 1960s, hut were not re- garded at the time as very effective and were apparent- ly suspended after the 1968 bombing halt. Highly trained mountain tribesmen from northern Laos and some Thai mercen- aries with long experience in special operations are said here to make up the teams. Most , of the guerril- las are said to speak Viet- namese, some fluently. Officially,. the Air Amer. lea management in Vienti-; ? ane is unaware that the com- pany's pilots or planes are flying such .missions. Air ? America is a quasi-private ? airline under contract with U.S. government agencies. Pilots used On the espio- nage-sabotage mission flights are carefully selected and re- ceive special pay for hazard- ous duty by a "white envelope system." This means that the money received is not account- able or traceable, even for tax purposes, sources say. , Official U.S. spokesmen in Vientiane decline to comment on the operation, hut informa- tion pieced together from American anch r here indicates Wt. I inaccessible r CIA - maintained bases in Laos are used to train, house, and transport the guerrillas. Nam Yu, the CIA's most se- cret base in Laos, situated in northwestern Laos near the town of Ban Houel Sal, is re- ported to be the primary train- ing center. Nam Yu was formerly a base for intelligence 'teams being sent into South China to report on telephone and road traffic, a program dis- continued last year when President Nixon accepted an invitation to visit China. From Nam Yu, the guerril- las are moved to the Long Cheng area 80 miles north of Vientiane where they continuel to train,- -making forays into the surrounding mountains in- side Laos on lower-level recon- where they conduct sabotage, espionage a n d propaganda missions in that country's least inhabited and defended areas. Precise information on targets, and types of guerrilla action is not available here. It is known, however, that the CIA is distrustful of many claims made by the guerrilla infiltrators and frequently equips the units with cameras so they can photograph them- selves at targets, The photo- graphs prove the missions were carried out, and provides intelligence data for CIA analysts. Each mission uses at leastl one specially equipped twin-,1 engine Otter plane, said to ' carry half a million dollars worth of radio and electronic gear for pinpoint navigation and locating of ground forces. naissance missions for season- Because of the twin Otter's lug and practical expprian'ae virtual silent operation as it in avoiding capture and inflict- Passes close over the ground, ing, narrn on Communist its short take-off and landing forces, capability, and the load it can carry, its basic function has . Many -of the potential North ! been the clandestine inser- Nietnamese infiltrators are tion, pickup and resupply of "weeded out" during this' guerrilla missions. training period, sources say. There are also reports of , Resident newsmen here have i been unable to visitLong gtieeirn?ryillas being snatched from eli Cheng in recent months. occupied territory by a Jump-off points for the hook dangling from rescue guerrillas are considerably aircraft. The guerrilla on the ground inflates a large balloon east and northeast of Long C with lighter-than-air gas, at- Cheng, according to the sour- taches it to a thin line which ces, most being tiny hilltop is then attached to a harness positions hardly known to . he fastens to himself. The res- exist. A major point of de. cue craft passes over- the bal- parture is said to be at Bouanl loon, hooks on and hauls him Long, sometimes called "the up. fortress in the sky," about 40 :Qualified sources here say, miles northeast of Long Cheng," a base the Communists have meantime, that they believe that such espiowe missions never been able to wrest from I its Meo defenders, will be increased at northern Laos, and may be resumed ' Practica1 training exercises inside China itself, to sabotage are also connuctect at Bouam Long. Communist radio broad- casts frequently note the pres- ence, capture or killing of commandos from Bouam Long in the Sam Neua area of north- east Laos, Caves in nearby mountains contain the head- quarters of the Communist- supported Laotian rebels. The highest priority, how- ever, is given to missions that war material that?because of the mining of Haiphong?is expected to flow increasingly. through China's Yunan Prov- ince and the Laotian Province of Phong Saly on its way into North Vietnam. -RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 ..c Approved ?all(Release 20072/1:011eik i4TOTAAAMCRIF00005-0 1 "u8fDA, L.Ani-au 11E-a p ulf \ 6 'rt.\ by Colin fileGlashart He was his adopted country's Minis- ter of Industry, and a roving ambassa- dor for revolution, but he was no ? statesman; for one thing, he could never hide what was on his mind. Addressing the U.N. General As- sembly, he mixed a new anger with the familiar cold analysis of colonial- Faded newsreel" film: 7iTinost rue only evidence of Che Guevara's secret visit to the Congo in 1965 ism. "Western civilisation," he told them, "disguises under its showy front a scene of hyenas and jackals. That is the only name that can be applied to those who have gone to fulfil 'humanitarian' tasks in the Congo. Bloodthirsty butchers who feed on helpless people . . The free men of the world must be prepared to avenge the crime committed in the Congo." Three weeks later, on January 2, 1965, as Cubans cele- brated the sixth anniversary of their revolution, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara was in Brazzaville planning his second war: the battle for the Congo. The stakes were high. Like Bolivia, the Congo was the key to a continent: its borders touched nine nations. Victory would throw a socialist girdle around Africa. The rebels against Moise Tshombe's cen- tral government had lost Stanleyville in November to Belgian paras and mercenaries in U.S. planes, but still controlled most of the northern half of the country, an area twice the size of France. The big powers were quietly moving in for what looked like the start of an African Vietnam: the Congolese Air Force acquired some elderly fighter-trainers and B-26s from the U.S., with the CIA's Cuban exiles, veterans of the Bay of Pigs, to fly them, plus herf?copters and 14 huge C-130 transports with American crews. Russian and Chinese arms were coming by sApplromed vile, in Ilyushin transports from Algeria, in trucks through the Sudan. At Heliopolis, outside Cairo, 3000 Congolese trained under Algerian in- structors; others trickled home from Havana and Peking. Guevara toured the diplomatic and physical boundaries of the grow- ing struggle: Ghana, Guinea, Al- ' geria, Peking; and met rebel leader Gaston Soumaliot in Dar es Salaam for a tour of bases and supply lines around Lake Tanganyika. On March 15 Fidel Castro embraced Guevara at Jose Marti Airport in Havana; but the exact date on which he joined the struggle in the Congo is un- known; he may have spent several months as a_strategist, away from the con fl-;?.--: .. tot---trebruary on, Tshoree.' ric-.17;iiet- a, ,''w deter- mi d esistarte in the"nA-east; , r, . c ,. l: -, ruary 9 tkilumn of GO..,: on- ?fete troors'6J'trli0V men\et - ries ls[repeclly_ambed widl f, ,,avy casualties by rebels with bazookas who came up close and stood their ground. A week later 750 government troops were chased out of a small town. For the first time, roads were mined, and Tshombe's River Congo supply lines thrown into chaos by the sabotage of marker buoys. Armoured cars fell into pits that had let lighter traffic pass over them, a classic trick from Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare. But the struggle in the north-east was waning: supply lines were being closed, Nasser was losing interest. In June, Guevara secretly joined Soumaliot's rebels in their last stand in some of Africa's most savage and inaccessible country just ti the west of Lake Tanganyika. The rebels had plenty of arms, but Congolese army gunboats, with U.S. advisers, were harassing supply lines across the lake; Colonel Mike Hoare was moving north with a strong new force of mercenaries. No account of what happened has been published, although Tshotnbe's forces found a Cuban's diary, and the Foreign Ministry in Havana is said to have two rolls of film that Guevara took at the time. The official biographies leEttillk 204311126118d:iCREIRE4L0 mention- the Congo struggle. At the start, some determined ambushes car- ried the signature of the Sierra Maestra, but by September it was as good as over. Nasser, almost certainly following CIA pressure, stopped arms shipments to the rebels. Guevara probably returned to Havana in November to tell Castro Cuban sup- port should be withut,..w.: What went wrong? Ciro Roberto Bustos, the Argentinian captured with Regis Debray, was later to tell the Bolivians that Guevara had said of the Congo rebellion: "The human de- merit failed. There was no will to fight. The leadens were corrupt." The' way the rebels treated prisoners dis- gusted him: the butchers were not all on the other side. In a last message - read to the TricontinentaI confer- ence in Havana in April 1967 - he wrote: "There are no great popular upheavals. In the Congo these charac- teristics appeared briefly ... but they have been losing strength." The Congo rebels had controlled half the country; for guerrilla theory and its leading practitioner it was a little- known but disastrous defeat. Cohn McGlashan, who has visited Cuba, has written articles on guerrilla warfare. 499Roco9oolbo465-o BOSTON, MASS Approved For?lVelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-0049,461000100005-0 GLOBE JUN 41972' - 237,967 S - 566.377 Ex-CIA man will give White By Fred Pillsbury "? ? liaison with police _;,Globe Staff WASHINGTON For Months Robert Kiley, a 37- ;;.year-old former Central ing that lircsupported the Boston and it didn't hap- (Intelligence Agency (CIA) National Student Associa- pen." Today, Boston's po- man turned police expert, tion of which he was vice lice force still has a Z. has been shuttling back President. "strong neighborhood tra- , 1: and forth between the P0- "I suppose if I were ?a dition," which is just the t. lice FoundaHall. tion here and student today and heard sort of thing police admin- 'Boston CR about it (CIA fund sup- istrators are adVocating Y - Tomorrow morning he port) I would react with today. Other cities, which horrori" he said. "Howev- centralized, are rebuilding, '^ - will move permanently into an office down the er, in the 50s government while Boston, Kiley feels, ? corridor from Mayor White help was the popular, has a good foundation. " where he will start a new democratic thing. ' When people talk to him ? career in city government. He describes the CIA as, about the police in Boston, ? Kiley will be a key as- a "first rate government Kiley said, they inevitably iistant to the Mayor. Un- bureaucracy." But it was a ask him about police cor- . ? like the other six staff per- bureaucracy, and last year ruption He does not feel it ? .knowledgeable enough to sound white x e E,n t 1 Y he decided that, "leaving make an assessment at this point, but his guess?is that police corruption is a prob- lem, as it is in many other big cities were far more important. ? He lists only three or He went to work for the four large American cities Foundation, which funnels ? Los Angeles, Kansas Ford Foundation money to City, Cincinnati ? as hay- police departments, as ing clean police forces. sociate director and since "The corrupt list is much then has acquainted him- longer." self . with polieemen and But a lot depends on police departnients one's definition of corrup- throughout -ale country. tion, he pointed out. For someone who has is the city's chief re- "A businessman would hired, 'he will also head a 0.^ department the Office ' I?.of Public Service, which administrates ' Whit e's - k...'proudest innovation, the ? tittle City Halls. ' ? ? His assignment as Public t ? Service. director, however, ? re,' .will be second in impor- tance to his duties as a link ?' between the mayor and the ?? :police department, al- though $25,000 of his $32,- - 000 salary will come from !.Public Services. -? aside moral judgments," the Vietnam war was wrong and that the coun- try's domestic problems never lived or worked in cruiter for a new police think nothing of being commissioner who will Boston he appears to have taken out for lunch," he a fairly detailed impres- I said. "but there are some take over the job recently vacated by Edmund L. Mc-,sion of what the depart- people who would say that ment is like, Na'mara: He will also work ' if a policeman accepts a closely with the new corn- Boston may have ? the cup of coffee, he's corrupt- missi oner in? bringing oldest police force in the ing himself. On the other about a substantial over- country (sergeants average hand, we can say that haul of the police depart- about 51), and it has few there is one man in a de- ment. blacks or Spanish-speak- partment who is -involved ? ing officers. Kiley made in any drug traffic, and if Why would the execti.- those points and then he. tive assistant to Richard said that Boston was lucky 'Helms, the CIA director, that it has resisted reforms decide to get involved in of the 50s made by so citk government? ' many other big cities. Kiley, who studied gov- The vogue, he said, was ernment at Harvard for to centralize police opera- two years after graduating tions, "but, somehow, the -from Notre Dame, talked wave just washed ?ovel:.,! about it In his Washington office. He became invAlyptoved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 with the .giaoafttrlearn- there is knowledge of his actions, the whole depart- ment stinks. There has, been evidence of that going on in New York." . The police of the future, and he specifically means Boston's police, must be- come -involved in new areas. They must also be- come involved in fighting "white collar" crime. Boston's police force he hopes, will also be young- er, employ more blacks and be better educated and more specialized. However, Kiley said that he is "delighted" that White "is trying to under- . stand the role of the police in the city." Kiley has been sending , police professionals and. experts "ostensibly" to give him the benefit of their opinions on what the new commissioner should be and which direction the ; department should take. It is quite possible, he ad- mitted, that an adviser could become a candidate. "Unless we go inside the city, that's probably how the commissioner will be chosen, Kiley said.. The list of candidates with the proper qualifica- tions is short, but the mayor has not ruled out choosing somebody from within the department, he said. Vtird Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499*1000100005-0 ? Saturday eview ress Fall Books Patrick J. McGarvey CIA: THE MYTH AND THE MADNESS This important new book by a veteran intelli- gence agent shatters the myth that the CIA is a super-efficient organization, capable of con- ceiving and pulling off every imaginable kind of trick and strategy. Plagued by the same problems that beset all large organizations, the CIA is acivally a bureaucratic morass deluged in paper and sorely out of touch with both policy-making and reality. In CIA: The Myth and the Madness, Patrick J. McGarvey shows how the various intelligence agencies duplicate each other's efforts, often ? competing with each other and refusing to share information (the Pueblo affair was a classic example). He protests the unnecessarily massive accumulation of raw intelligence data in quanti- ties far beyond the capacity of the analysts. And he explores for the first time the human side of intelligence work, picturing the strain, the broken marriages, the trauma of exposing child- ren to danger in foreign outposts, the overwork and tension that can lead to ulcers, even death. McGarvey believes that intelligence operations are imperative for the safety of the country, but believes that our agencies need a complete over- hauling. His carefully considered but impas-. sioned analysis not only examines the major . problems but also offers some sound recommen- dations about what can be done to correct them. Pairick McGarvey was a member of the United States intelligence community for fourteen years. ? October Non-fiction ISBN 0-8415-0191-2 $6.95 256 pp. 51/2 x 81/2 Index COBE Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS Approved RSibP:telease 2003/140,MplerP84-004%0001000100005-0 9 Stateak-ad Do- fi d Don About Attaaking Eraiphong DOCULlientS from Nixon's secret Study of the War; National Securitygtudy Illemora QUESTION 28d What are current views on the proportion of .war-essential imports that could come into North Vietnam over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were 'denied 2ind a strong effort even made to interdict ground transport? What Is the evidence?. The IDefense Department's Answer Land Import Capacity In 1968, NVN imported an average of 6,800 STPD (short tons per day); 6,000 STPD by sea, and 800 STPD by land. Imports by land were higher in 1967, amounting to about ? 1,100 STPD. flow- ever, the land lines of conimunication from China were not used to capacity. It is estimated that the two rail lines from. China have a theoretical uninterdicted capacity. of, about 8,000 STPD and the road network could provide an additional 7,000 STPD during the dry season (normally June-September) and about 2,000 STPD during the poor weather months. The combined capacity of the land, routes (9,000-15,000 STPD) is more than enough to transport North Vietnam's' total import requirements of about 7,000 STPD. If all seaborne imports were to come through China, considerable logistic problems would have to be solved by the Chinese regime. Interdiction of Imports from China ' If seaborne imports can be denied to NVN, her ability to successfully pursue the war in SVN would be dependent on :land imports from China. A strong' effort to interdict road and rail transport from Communist China through North Vietnam would require a concerted and coordinated air interdiction campaign against all transportation:. mili- tary support; petroleum oil, and lubri- cants power; industrial; air defense, and communications target systems. The inter- relationship of the effects of destruction of targets in one, category to the effec- tiveness of others is such that a cumula- tive impact is achieved. The air campaign would be conducted in such a manner as to be free of the militarily confining constraints which have characterized the 'conduct of the war in the north in the past. The concept would preclude attacks on population as a target but would accept high risks of ckmu.cootobrinR ordet to achieve deTtViglion a war- ndum No.1 North Vietnam supporting targets. ? An interdiction campaign as described above, when employed in conjunction with denial of sea imports, would, in large part, isolate Hanoi and Haiphong ,from each other and from the rest of the country. Isolation of Hanoi, the focal point of the road and rail system, would be highly effective in reducing North Vietnam's capability to reinforce aggres- sion in South Vietnam. Importation of war-supporting material would be seri- ously reduced. Road capacities would be reduced by a factor well in excess of the estimated 50 percent believed to have' been accomplished during the summer months of 1966 and 1967. Over time, North Vietnam's capability to cope with the cumulative effects of such an air campaign would be significantly curtailed. Has repaired all major road and railway bridges, constructed additional bypasses and alternative routes and expanded the railroad capacity by converting large segments from meter to dual gauge truck. These improvements would make even more ?difficult pro- longed interdiction of the overland lines of communication. We currently fly approximately 7,000 sorties per month against two primary roads in Laos without preventing through- put truck traffic; the road network from China has 7;10 principal arteries and numerous bypasses. Finally, the mon- soonal weather in NVN would make it difficult to sustain interdiction on the land lines of communication. Poor visi- bility would prevent air strikes during 25-30% of the time during good weather months and 50-65% of the time during poor weather Months. Thus, it is not possible to give a definitive amount to the question of how much war-essential imports' could come into NVN if sea imports are denied and a strong air campaign is initiated. A , /Attention would also have to be given to interdiction of supplies coming into SVN from Cambodia. Over the past 2' 'years, the enemy's use of Cambodia as a. supply base and a place of refuge has become more pronounced. During the period October 1967 to September 1968, 10,000 tons of munitions transited Sihanoukville and a're suspected of having been delivered to enemy forces in the Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam border regions. This , amount represents - more than enough ordnance to satisfy the arms and ammunition requirements. for all enemy forces in South Vietnam during the same period. Thus, the act of sealing off the enemy's Cambodian supply lines must be considered as an integral part of any plan to prevent supplies from reach- ing enemy foices in the Republic of Vietnam. ? The State Department's Answer The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that resumption of an interdiction campaign similar to that carried, ,o-ut in Route Package I between July and 1 November 1968 would assure almost total interdic- tion of truck and waterborne movement of supplies .into the demilitarized zone and Laos. Naval blockade offshore and interdiction of Regional Package II to Thanh Hao would further enhance this effort. Commitment of B-52 forces following heavy and ? unrestricted suppression of defenses by fighters, could reduce the amount of time to accomplish the above. Although the North Vietnamese have established a significant by-pass capability, the transportation nets remain vulnerable at many key points. The locomotive population could be attrited quickly if all buffer restrictions were removed near the, Chinese border. There is not sufficient data available at this time on either the cost or the effectiveness of an air campaign against' these land lines to reach a firm conclu- sion as to the chances of isolating NVN from her neighbors. Past attempts to eut rail, road, and water networks in NVN have met with considerable difficulties. It has been estimated that a minimum of 6,000 attack sorties per month would be required against the two rail lines from China. Even at this level of effort, the North Vietnamese could continue to -use the rail lines to shuttle supplies if they were willing to devote sufficient man- power to repair and tran;thiprnent opera- tions Interdiction of the road system OIARIS@e2Q913/4a0411iICK-RWEtlic ? bombing halt north-of 19? in April 1968, The crux of this question is the defini-, tion of "war-essential imports." There is room for considerable disagreement on this subject; but in our judgement, the category of war-essential imports should include most of the economic aid pro- vided by the Soviets and Chinese, as well as nearly all of their purely military aid. ligaVbilcdOitoelotir, ntaonmtiethaaind military aid in keeping North Viet-Nam a "; ff going concern. (During 1968, economic kriss"' tually unlimited 'capacity for this It shou" e noted, .in conclusion, that aid- totaled some $340AppErawhia Efar Eve20@atilV034iCIAADP84-G04$ 1100(10080690the advisa- tary aid about $540 million). In fact, it ical considerations of transport capacities bility ? of closing Haiphong, nor the ques- can probably be assumed that all North and did not give adequate weight to the tion of the Soviet and Chinese responses. Vietnamese imports in the past few years very real difficulties the North Viet- These matters, clearly the most central have been directly related to the war names? have experienced in handling im- problems, lie outside the terms of refer- effort. The regime would not have used ports even when Haiphong was relatively ence of Question 28 (d). its sparse funds and credits, or burdened untouched. It is true that these diffi- its .strained transport system, with non- culties were overcome; but to our knowl- essential goods. edge there is no evidence that Hanoi Food imports constitute a growing would be able to deal as. successfully with percentage of total imports, in 1968 the closing of Haiphong and heavy All of the war-essential imparts could be brought into North Vietnam over rail China. We therefore believe that inter- largest category of imports. This reflect. lines or roads from China in the event diction of Haiphong and heavy attacks on . the steady decline in crop acreages and that imports. by sea were successfully the rail lines from China would over time yields that began in 1965 and has denied. The disruption to imports, if prevent North Viet-Nam from receiving continued through the present. The. P. seaborne imports were cut off, would be sufficient economic and military aid to importance of food imports can hardly be widespread but temporary. Within two or continue the war effort. But it would be overstated; even with them, North Viet- three months North Vietnam and its allies difficult to quantify this, since it depends Nam. has been forced to strictly ration would be able to implement alternative. on the type and intensity of interdiction. -foodstuffs on the official market and procedure's for maintaining the flow of On. the other hand, one important progressivelY to reduce the composition essential economic and military imports. point should be kept in mind. The North . of the rice ration so that at present it The uninterrupted capacities of the rail- Vietnamese surprised many observers, and consists .60 percent of rice substitutes such as domestic corn ? and imported confounded many predictions, by holding the North together and simultaneously wheat. In -addition,, a thriving black sending ever-increasing amounts of sup- market has grown up, dealing in food- personnel into the South during stuffs (and other 'items as well) and plies' and 31/2 -years of bombing. It is clear that the . involving large numbers of D?RV. lower bombing campaign, as conducted, did .not level. officials and cadres, as well as live up to the expectations of many of average citizens. ? proponents. With this experience in Economic aid has been essential in its mind, there is little reason to believe that keeping North Viet-Nam afloat; under new bombing will accomplish what pre- ? present conditions it is extremely doubt- new bombings failed to do, unless it is ful that Hanoi could dispense with any conducted with much greater intensity substantial portion of this aid. and readiness to defy criticism and risk The question becomes, therefore, of escalation. . "Could North Viet-Nam continue to re- aid and nearly all of the military aid it is T ?ccive and distribute most of the economic his brings us to .the second part of the question, "What would happen if now obtaining from foreign suppliers if Hanoi could not obtain sufficient war- Haiphong and . other keY ports were essential imports, as defined earlier?" closed and if the road and rail lines from Here again, there does not seem to be ? China were heavily bombed?" A second any quantifiable answer; we- are reduced question is: "What would happen if it ,to educated estimates. If we arbitrarily could not?" that . 'nearly all military aid To begin with, it must be noted that assume reached North Viet-Nam (because it is In practical terms it would be impossible relatively compact and? could be trans- to deny all imports by sea. Even if the ported by a small number of freight cars one principal port (Haiphong) and the or a larger number of trucks, and because two secondary ports (Cam Pha and lion it a high priority) but that only. Off Gai) were closed, there would still be of the economic aid did, we think- that twelve minor ports as well as numerous strenuous exertions and considerable coastal Aransshipment points suitable for by belt-tightening the North Vietnamese over-the-beach off-loading. , Lightering could continue on their present course operations would permit an indeterminate for perhaps at most two years more. amount of supplies to enter North Viet" for that time, barring a ceasefire or Nam from the sea. It is nearly certain, protracted lull in the fighting in South however, that these minor ports and Viet-Nam (either of which would greatly transshipment points Could not handle ease Hanoi's burdens), we would estimate imports anything like the present volume of that Hanoi would be forced (1) to make going into Haiphong. is concessions e..ions to the US in order to get estimated that '85 percent of the total aid Haiphong reopened, ? or (2) at least to to Hanoi arrives ? by sea, i.e., through reduce the scale of the war in the South Haiphong. Almost all of this is economic to manageable proportions, perhaps by aid,. since military supplies are generally reverting to .political struggle backed by believed to come overland via China.) terrorism and selected guerrilla operations We do not believe that the capacity of vs,hich did not require' Northern aid 'and the DRV-CPR road and rail network is personnel. Of course, other factors such great enough to permit an adequate flow as manpower shortages would figure in The CIA's Answer replacing general cargo as the single attacks on lines of communication from road, highway, and river connections with China are about 16,000 tons per day, more than two and a half times the 6,300 tons per. day of total imports overland and by sea in 1968, when the volume reached an all-time high. Ex- perience in North Vietnam has shown that an intensive effort to interdict ground transport routes by air attack alone can be successful for only brief pe'riods because of the redundancy of transport routes,' elaborate and effective countermeasures, and unfavorable flying weather. Almost four years-of air war in North Vietnam have shown?as did the Korean War?that, although air strikes will destroy ' transport facilities, equipment, and sup- plies, they cannot successfully, interdict the flow of supplies because much of the damage can frequently be repaired within hours. Two principal rail lines connect Hanoi with Communist China, with .a ? combined capacity of over 9,000 tons a day. Eight primary highway routes cross the China border, having a combined. capacity of about 5,000 tons per day. In addition, the Red River flows out of China and has a capacity averaging 1,500 Cons per day. An intensive and sustained 'air interdic- tion program could have a good chance of reducing the northern rail capacity by at least half. However, roads are less vulnerable to interdiction, and waterways even less so. In the June-August 1967 air attacks?a previous high point of US interdiction efforts against targets in the northern part of North. Vietnam?the transport system Was able to function effectively.* Strikes. in August 1967 against the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line were effective in stopping through service for a total of only ten days. Strikes during this period against the highways that parallel the Dong Dang line showed no insignificant [sic] or sustained reduc- of supplies in the face of an intense da ? tion of capacity. The Hanoi-Lao CM rail Y the same time-frame. and night bombing ApprovedinForrRelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499001,0004100130840on of the view, earlier analyses which have claimed 1-nue'd ? . .4 or parachuted operations agai-- the Soviet Union. HeApjareivactE dispatched a large team of agents .into Hungary when Imre Nagy took power in October, 1956, accompanied by "a well-armed shock unit from the CIA's private army in Germany." During the 1953 uprising in East Germany, ac- cording to Cookridge, Gehlen directed the movement of his East Berlin agents from street to street by radio. He used tire facilities of Radio Free Europe, both the staff and the equipment, for bis own purposes whenever it suited him, with the diligent ? support of American. officers from the "Office of Policy. Co-Ordination." He spied elab- orately on Britain and France and, through American military installations in WeSt Germany; on the United States itself. ' Mr. Cookridge takes a robust, un- 'critical view .of the cold war. If the Reds get it in the neck, he cheers, and, being a sportsman, he gives some applause to the best-managed triumphs ? of the other side. This approach misses some points. For instance, he gives a dcsagreeably lip-smacking aecount of the huge sentence handed out to Teodor Szczendzielorz, a member of a Polish spy ring who was the first agent to be tried by a West German court. It would have done Mr. Cookridge credit not to have gloated over this case. The agent, like his master Colonel Kowal- ski, was a noncommunist Pole who had been in his country's service before the war. 'Wet Germany was rearming with the declared intention of seizing back a third of his country's territory. In such Circumstances, Szczendzielorz and his colleagues deserve . some . honor or at least understanding for what they did. But .in the later Fifties, Gehlen's outfit began to show signs of age. The East Germans methodically infiltrated and rolled up his best networks there, and agent after BND agent appeared?at East Berlin press conferences to con- fess , his sins. Gehlen's reports became wilder and less reliable, and his organi- zation became dangerously cozy (Pro- fessor Trevor-Roper, in his preface to Time General Was a 'Spy, points out that all intelligence services require constant change and renewal if they are not to fossilize). There followed two _disasters. In 1962, as Defense Minister, Strauss arranged for the arrest of the Spiegel editors for alleged disclosure of mili- tary 'secrets, and had the Spiegel building searched. Gehlen, who disliked Strauss, had to sonhe_ still cliippted degree been in touMPRFRIYeV- moreover, an emissary from head- ease 2008/1112/03 halArgQ&'84T90.1910PCRIlig01PRPP50 blamed for authors with the series of articles in everything. Allied spooks, who after all question. ?Adenauer had Gehlen put him at the head of the BND, have brought to Bonn and, in a moment of been almost equally hysterical about fury, ordered his arrest. Cehleta, stut- the Soviet menace and the Ostpolitik. tering with terror, managed to argue Not long after Gehlen retiree, the CIA his way out of this, but his relation. asked Pullach for surveillance on Her- ship.with Adenauer never recovered. bert Wehner, a senior Social Democrat The second disaster was the dis- minister whom the CIA supposed to be covery that Felfe, one of ,Gehlen's a KGB agent (the request was thrown senior desk officers at Punch, had into the shredder, which at least shows been for years an East German agent. that the BND's sense, of political Felfe was a German hero of his times. realism Is improving). And when the He and his accomplices, Clemens and Social Democrats came to power in ? Tiebel, were old SS men from Dresden, 1969, the Allied intelligence services now in the East, who regarded both temporarily ' stopped sharing informa- half-states of Germany as impostors tion with the BND on the assumption with fat wallets. In his long career as a that the new government would leak it double agent, Felfe sold the East to East Berlin or Moscow. Suggestively, Germans tens of thousands of secret that story appears in the proof copy of documents (confirming one's suspicion Hohne and Zoning's book, but has that both Germanies know so much been removed from the bound copy. about each other that they are unable Part of the trouble lay in the to make sense out of the mass of original deal with the Americans. They information, a common intelligence allowed an intelligence service to be paradox). His trial in 1963, with its headed by a professional who was revelations of corruption and incom- politically illiterate. This did not mat- petence, and its suggestion that Pullach ter, perhaps, while the CIA used was a nature reserve 'for old Nazis, Gehlen simply as a source Of raw brought the whole liberal press down information. But when he became on Gehlen. Ad en auer's full-blown intelligence The Felfe affair was a terrible blow, chief, this weakness was catastrophic. from which Gehlen's reputation never Much extraordinary information came recovered. While the BND continued to to Gehlen in the. postwar years, only subvert Middle Eastern scientists, pre- to be evaluated by .middle-a,ged,...gentle- pare "glowing pictures of Latin Ameri- men whose outlook on the world had can military dictatorships," and send been formed in the service of the the government intelligende digests full Third Reich. One of the sanest coin- of information that ministers had al- ments on the cold war' is, that such feady seen in their morning papers, the evaluations could seem reasonable to decision was gradually taken that Geh- the leaders of the West. len must go. This itself turned into a long, dirty fight. Chancellor Erhard threw the BND men out of the Chancellery, where they had lodged themselves like bats in an 'attic. Chan- cellor Kiesinger ordered a full report into the BND, which revealed among other facts that Gehlen had given no, fewer than sixteen of his relations posts in the service. The old man's intelligence career drew to an ignomini- ous close. Ambitious to the end, he now runs a Protestant church mission in Catholic-Bavaria. Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 0 . HARPER'S Approved Fc$1446lease 26TYMATCIA-RDP84-004S401000100005-0 DI LOMATIC NOTES The Ten Commandments of the foreign-affairs bureaucracy by Leslie H. Gelb and Morton H. Halperin Ill HE AVERAGE READER of the New U. York Times in the 1950s must have asked: why don't we take some of our troops out of?Europe? Ike him- self said we didn't need them all there. Later, in 1961, after the tragi- comic Bay of Pigs invasion, the readvr . asked: how did President Kennedy ever decide to do such a ? damn fool thing? Or later about Viet- nam: why does President Johnson keep. on -bombing North , Vietnam when the bombing prevents negotia- tions and doesn't get Hanoi to stop the. fighting?- ? Sometimes the answer to these questions is simple. It can be attrib- uted squarely to the President. He thinks it's right. Or he believeslie has no choice. As often as not, though, the answer lies elsewhere----in the spe- cial -interests and procedures Of the bureadcracy and the convictions of the bureaucrats: If you look at foreign policy as a largely: rational process of gathering information, setting the alternatives, defining the national interest, and making- decisions, then much of what the President does will not make sense. But if you look at foreign. policy as bureaucrats pursuing orga- nizational, Tessonal, and, domestic political interests, as well as their own beliefs about what is right, you can explain much of the ,inexplicable. In pursuing these interests and be- liefs, bureaucrats (and that means ?everyone from Cabinet officials to political appointees to .career ? civil servants) usually follow their own version of the Ten Commandments: 1. Don't discuss domestic 'pol- itics on issues involving war and peace'. . . On May 11, 1948, President if ? Truman held a meet PPRYV r r ?ssst.t.., t. ------ 7 1 new. state of Israel. Secretary of State George Marshall and State Under- secretary Robert Lovett spoke first. They were' against it. It would un-' necessarily alienate forty million Arabs. Truman next asked Clark Clifford, then Special Counsel to the President, to speak. Arguing for the moral element of U.S. policy and the need to contain Communism in . the Middle East, Clifford favored rec- ognition. As related by Dan Kurzman in Genesis 1948, Marshall exploded: "Mr. President, this is not a matter to be determined on the basis of politics. Unless politics were involved, Mr. Clifford would not . even be at this conference. This is a serious matter of foreign policy determination . . ." .Clifford remained at the meeting, and after some hesitation, the U.S, rec- ognized The moral merits of U.S. support of Israel _ notwithstanding, no one doubts Jewish influence on Washing- ton's policy toward the Middle East. And yet, years later, in their memoirs, both Truman and Dean Acheson de- nied at great length that the decision to recognize the state of Israel was in any way affected by U.S. domestic ? politics. A powerful myth is at work here. It holds that national security is too important, too sacred, to be tainted by crass domestic political considera- tions. It is a matter of lives and the. defend themselves? Yet the myth makes it bad form for government officials to talk about domestic poli- tics (except to friends and to repor- ters off the record) or even to write about politics later iii their memoirs. . And what is bad form on the inside would .be politically disastrous if it were leaked to the outside. Imagine the press getting hold of a secret goV- enunent document that said: "Presi- dent Nixon has decided te visit China to capture the peace issue for the '72 elections. He does not intend or ex- pect anything of substance to be achieved by his trip?except to scare the Russians a little." Few things are more serious than the 'charge otplay- ing politics with security. Nevertheless, the President pays ?a price for the silence imposed by the myth. One cost is that. the President's assumptions about what public opin- ion will and will not Support are never questioned. No official, for example, ever dared to write a scenario for President Johnson showing him how to forestall the right-wing McCarthy- ite reaction he feared if the U.S. pulled out of Vietnam. Another cost is that bureaucrats, in their ignorance of Presidential views, will use their own notions of ?domestic politics to screen information from the. Presi- dent or to eliminate options from his consideration. safety of the nation. Votes and in- 2. Say what will convince, not fluence at home should count for- what you believe. nothing. Right? Wrong. National se- In the early months of the Kennedy curity and domestic reactions are in- Administration, CIA officials respon- separable. What could be clearer than sible for covert operations faced a the fact that President Nixon's Viet- difficult challenge. President Eisen- nam.trodp reductions are geared more hower had permitted them to begin to American public opinion than to training a group of Cuban refugees the readiness of the Saigon forces .to for an American-supported invasion 3(iR lidaset243031121/001 .141.4A5-RDIa844304991I(Cr 161?6510 order to carry irt e House .to discuss recognition .of the national-security hureauaraci. proval from a skeptical new President Institution and form fir f theout t p an, they then had to win ap- 4", ? whose entourageNitliffdivedornikeffie d'ablagoitymbioatix loAdRumat4,o0449" ogoldootistike was "in feasibljf' mend rejection because it will lead to a Communist victory in Vietnam. Option B?Bomb a little more each time and seek negotiations (even though the bombing was preventing negotiations). Turn more of the fight- ing over to the 'Saigon forces and send more U.S. troops (even though the American buildup obviated the need for the South Vietnamese to shoulder more of the burden). Press Saigon for reforms and give them all they want for the war effort .( even though aid without conditions gave Saigon no incentive to reform). Op- tion B triumphed. Option B solves a lot of problems for the bureaucrat. Bureaucrats do not like to fight with each other. Op- tion B makes everybody a winner (by letting everyone do the essence of what he wants), preserves the policy consensus, and provides ultimate comfort to the bureaucrat?deference to his expertise and direct responsi- bility. Very few will be.so dissatisfied as to take their case to. the public. Unfortunately, while this process allows the President to keep his house happy, it also robs him of choice. The alternatives he is .given are of- ten phony, two ridiculous extremes and a jumbled, inconsistent "middle course." Unless a President knows enough and has the time to peel off the real alternatives from within Op- tion B, he ends up being trapped by the unanimity of advice. erals" likely to oppose it. The CIA director, Allen Dulles, and his assist- ant, Richard Bissell, both veteran bureaucrats, moved effectively to iso- late the opposition. By highlighting .the extreme sensitivity of the opera- -Lion, they persuaded Kennedy to ex- clude from deliberations most of the experts in State and the CIA itself, and many of the Kennedy men in the White House. They reduced the ef- fectiveness of others by refusing to leave any papers behind to be an- alyzed; they swept in, presented their case, and swept -out; taking every- thing with them. But there remained the problem of the skeptical Presi- dent. Kennedy feared that if the operation was a complete failure he would look very bad. Dulles and Bis- sell assured him that complete failure was impossible. If the invasion force could not establish a beachhead, the, refugees, well-trained in guerrilla warfare, would head for the nearby mountains. The assurances were per- suasive, the only difficulty being that .they were false. Less than a third of the force had had any guerrilla train- ing; the nearby mountains were sep- arated from the landing beach by an almost impenetrable swamp; and none of the invasion leaders was in- structed to head for the hills if the invasion failed ( the CIA had prom- ised them American intervention). Kennedy was told what would per- suade him, not the truth or even what the CIA believed to be true. Bureau- crats like Dulles and Bissell are con- fident that they know what the na- tional security requires. The problem is to convince an uninformed and busy President. To do that you do not carefully explain the reasoning that leads to your position, nor do you reveal any doubts you may have. Rather you seek to figure out what the President's problem is as he sees it and to convince hip that what you want to do will solve it. ? 3. Support the consensus? Option B. Vietnam policy under President Johnson exemplified the concept of Option B. The papers to the President ?went something like this: Option A? Use maximum force (bomb Hanoi and Haiphong and invade North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia ). Rec- 4. Veto other options. *Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, summoned by President Kennedy to join the Executive Com- mittee of the National Security Coun- cil debate on Soviet missiles in Cuba, favored a "surgical strike," a limited air attack designed simply to destroy the missiles before they could become operational. Each time the military was asked to come in with a plan for a surgical strike, they asserted that a limited air strike could not destroy all the missiles?despite their having the capability to do so. Instead, they pro- duced a plan for their favored optien ?an all-out air assault on Cuba cli- maxed by a ground invasion. Their plan had something in it for each ser- vice?the Air Force and Navy would pound the island by sea and air, the Marines would storm ashore as the tit part because they assumed that Soviet missiles were "mobile" (i.e., capable of being moved in a few hours) rather than "movable" (i.e., their actual capability of being moved in a few days). Kennedy was intrigued by the surgical-strike op- tion and met with the commander of the Tactical Air Command. 'When the commander solemnly assured the President face-to-face that the option was "infeasible," Kennedy with great reluctance abAndoned it. "Infeasibility" is one technique to disqualify an option; demanding full authority is another. Early in his ad- ministration, Kennedy confronted a deteriorating situation in Laos. He was reluctant to commit any Ameri- can forces, but neither was he pre- pared to have ?Laos overrun. At a critical White House meeting he asked the military What could be done with various levels of force. The Joint Chiefs' answer was clear. They would not recommend any landing of American forces and couldguarantee nothing unless the President was pre- pared to authorize the use of nuclear weapons whenever, in their judg- ment, that use was required. Kennedy reluctantly decided not to send any forces' to Laos. 5. Predict dire consequences. With the Chinese Communist guns firing at the. tiny island of Quemoy three miles from the mainland and an invasion' expected momentarily, President Eisenhower's principal ad- visers met to frame a recommenda- tion. The problem, as they saw it, was to formulate an argument that would. persuade the President that the U.S. must defend Quemoy. The advisers resorted to the prediction of dire con- sequences, recognizing that only if the alternative could be shown to be 'very adverse to American interests would Eisenhower agree to the use of, force. They warned the President that, in their unanimous judgment, if , he permitted Quemoy to be captured, "the consequences in the Far East would be more far-reaching and cata- strophic than those which followed when the United States allowed the Chinese mainland to be taken over by the Chinese Communists." Did Eisenhower reject this predic- tion as absurd? On the contrary,- he ommend rejection on the ground that Aria rratroopers descended----and acce ted it and defended Quemoy. the Soviets anhaPiRPM iNRPsqI; A 113IPA44IPWRI?liEtalle9Q49AR0011 1iK1495ricIties of international respond. Option C?Immediate uni- . as they chose. The military insisted politics are so great that it is difficult nedy authorized Air Ktwiegbf eiriAe Soviet ships. And despite the Presi- dent's order to halt all provocative in- telligence, an American U-2 plane entered Soviet airspace at the height of the crisis. When Kennedy began to 'realize that he was not in full control, he asked his Secretary of Defense to see if he could find out just what the Navy was doing. McNamara then. made his first visit to the Navy com- mand post in the Pentagon. In a , heated exchange, the Chief of Naval Operations suggested that McNamara return to his office and let the Navy run the blockade. Bureaucrats know that the Presi- dent and his principal associates do not have the time or the information to monitor compliance with all Presi- dential orders-. Often, the bureaucrats can simply delay or do-nothing, and no one will notice. If the President is actively involved, they may find it necess'ary to obey the letter, but not the spirit, .of his orders. As Henry inger observed to a journalist the problem is not to know at to do,. but rather to figure out how to get the bureaUcracy to do it. 9. Don't tell likely opponents about a good thing. The cOmmandments discussed thus far have all dealt with relations between ' the gepartments and the White House. When issues get that far, one of the. fundamental rules has already been violated: keep issues away from the President. Bureau- crats prefer to be left alone to do their own thins. They Will not voluntarily bring issues to the attention of the President (or senior officials) unless they conclude that he is likely to rule in their favor in a conflict with an- other agency. Consider the case of surplus and long supply arms trans- fers to other countries. One of Secretary McNamara's goals in the Pentagon was to reduce the level of militziry assistance, par- ticularly to countries that did not need the weapons and could -afford to pay for what they needed. A prime objective was Taiwan. McNamara and his office of International Secu- rity Affairs engaged in a yearly bat- tle with the State Department and the military over the level of aid to Taiwan. The White House was drawn in because a number of influential Congressmen were Atrorrisa o mprteisei Of to Taiwan. un year in the 1960; a battle raged over whether ? elkalia,200/3M/P $fIliAnRIDR84-00.4,4140%101/4111111005vOre not persuasive million in military assistance. During either, but he did not resign over? the ? same Year, the military quietly Vietnam and did not take his case to shipped to Taiwan more than $40 the public. No one resigned over Viet- million worth of military equipment, nam policy. Indeed, there seems to be. which the Pentagon had labeled "ex- no evidence that any civilian official cess or long supply." No senior has resigned over any foreign-policy civilian .official was aware of the fact matter.sinee World War II. that these transfers were taking place, The only officials with a record for and no junior official aware of what resigning are the professional mill- was going on felt obliged to report tary. Generals Ridgeway, Taylor, and up. Thus while senior officials argued Powers are notable examples. What is over irrelevant ceilings on expendi- more, they toui? the hustings, write tures, Taiwan got more aid than any- books, and complain out loud. Mili- one realized. tary officers feel strongly about the Observers sometimes assume that interests of their military organiza7 the bureaucracy bucks the hard tion and often believe that if the choices to the President. Nothing people of the Country only knew. "the: could be further from the truth. Left truth," they would support the mili- alone, the bureaucracy will settle as tary's position. With this record on many issues as it can by leaving each resigning and going to the public,- it organization free to act as it chooses, is no wonder.' the military has been so When and if the President learns of influential in Presidential decisions. an issue, bureaucrats will try to in- But again, it is the President and corporate current behavior into "Op- the nation who ultimately suffer. If- tian B." the President remains confident that- ? none of his civilian advisers will re- sign and take their, case to the public, he has little incentive ever-to question his own. assumption's. 10. Don't fight the consensus and don't resign over policy. If . an official strongly disagrees with a . consensus or dislikes a key man behind the consensus, he might chance-a leak to the press. But frontal rpm TEN COMMANDMENTS POSE a assaults on a consensus happen only serious problem for a President, rarely. In the summer of 1965, who is after all the one who got Undersecretary . of ? State George Ball elected . and has the responsibility. wa$ among the first to confirm this Truman understood the problem but fact with respect to the poliey of feared that Eisenhowd would not. bombing North Vietnam. Ball thought But evidence abounds that ,President -U.S. bombing of the North was folly Eisenhower, precisely because of his ?and worse than that, would only background in Army politics and in- stiffen Hanoi's will: But he did not ternational military negotiations, was propose a unilateral cessation. In a far from a novice. President Kennedy TV interview last year, Ball explained, was quite expert and- attuned .to the himself as follows: "What I was ways of the bureaucracy?especially proposing was something which I after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. His fa- thought had a fair chance of being mous calls to State Department desk persuasive . . . if I had Said let's pull off cials made the point well. Presi- out overnight or do something of this dent Johnson was a master of such kind, I obviously wouldn't have been maneuvering. Even as he stepped up persuasive at all. They'd have said the bombing of North Vietnam he 'the man's mad.' " would ?say, "I won't let those Air Ball's remarks express at once the Force generals bomb the smallest out- futility of resisting agreed policy and house north, of the 17th parallel With- the bureaucrat's concern for his per- out checking with me. The generals_ sonal effectiveness. Ball knew he know -only two words?spend and could not convince anyone if he re- bomb." vealed. his true beliefs. He knew. he The Nixon-Kissinger team is wonld have been dismissed as "mad" second to none in its sensitivity to and would not have been in a position bureaucratic behavior. The elaborate to argue another day. So, he tem- National Security Council decision- pered his arguments and went along, making apparatus they established is T ag Aatilygowea,4fAa_kpliy8k_o66499Brabwa, ptiv,k4kti,White House con- preserve his drat weness. Imene bytifMaIley. Their system As it turned out, Ball's More mod- is designed to neutralize, narrow or- nt) 4- to disprove any ippriliokied FniAr20&3912i103UCIA4RD14440049 puts the President in a bind. If he troops would be to risk political dis- fails to act and things go badly, the overruled advisers are likely to leak their warnings. In fact, much of the dialogue within the government is in terms of worst cases. An advocate who does not warn of extreme con- sequences is often viewed as not seriously supporting his prediction. 6. Argue timing, not substance. Although the advocates of the Bay of Pigs landing had convinced Presi- dent Kennedy that the invasion of Cuba was worth a try, they recog- nized that they were not yet in the cleai: they still had to persuade the President to act immediately. Presi- dents arc, in the eyes of bureaucrats, notorious for putting off decisions or changing their minds. They have enough decisions ? to, make without looking for additional ones. In many cases, all the options look bad and they. prefer to wait. The Bay of Pigs plan called for .an effective "now or never" 'argument, ? and the CIA rose to the occasion. The agency told Ken- nedy that the invasion force was, at the peak of its effectiveness; any de- lay, and it would decline in morale. and capability. More important, it warned the President that a liast.ship- meat of Soviet arms was on the way to Cuba; the Castro forces would soon have such superior weapons that sub- stantial American combat involve- ? ment would be necessary to bail out the anti-Castro Cuban invaders. Faced with these arguments, Ken- nedy gave the order to proceed. ConyerSely, when a President wants to act, bureaucrats can stymie him by arguing that "now is not the time." President Eisenhower re- ported. in his memoirs that he came into office believing, after having served ? as commander of the allied forces in Europe, that the United States should withdraw most of its forces there; he left office eight years later still believing that the U.S. had far too many troops assigned to NATO. Seeretary of State John Foster Dulles knew better than to argue with the military substance of General Eisenhower's position. In- stead he argued timing. Each time Eisenhower raised the issue, Dulles pointed to some current NATO diffi- culty. This was, he would argue, a integration. The moment for troop withdrawals never arrived. To this day, pressures for some American withdrawals from Europe have been headed off by the same ploy. 7. Leak what you don't like. We had a glimpse of this phenome- non last January with the publication of the Andergon Papers, in ,which we read about Henry Kissinger warning his State, Defense, and CIA col- leagues: "The President does not be- lieve we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise." And, "The President is under the 'illusion' that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely be- ing kept apprised of affairs as they progress." The President's subordi- nates disagreed with the President's policy toward the India-Pakistan crisis. They were undermining him by resisting his orders and then by leaking his policy. He knew it and did not like it; but apparently could not do much about it. Although leaking the. texts of many documents, ..a la Pentagon and Anderson papers, is relatively rare; much classified information regularly makes its way into the press. Presi- dents are surprised not when some- thing leaks but rather when any hot item remains out of the press for even a few days. Providing- information to the press?whether in press confer- ences, backgroumders, or leaks?is the main route by ? which officials within the executive branch bring their supporters in the Congress and the interested public into action. Only bureaucrats with potential out- side support are tempted to leak. In some cases, it is sufficient to leak the fact that an issue is up for decision: in others, what is leaked is informa- tion on the positions of key partici- pants. In many instances sufficient factual material must be leaked to convince Congressmen and others to join the fray. Presidents don't like leaks ? by others and complain, about them whenever they occur, often asking the FBI to run down the culprit. Such efforts almost always fail. ? 8. Ignore orders you don't like. critical moment in the life of the alh- On March 20, 1918., President ance in which one 4PRE91,10 filArliaelEIMPry2M-YriCgs-AATAR1845901.9 country was experiencing a domestic. 9a"RIVIRR?and began scan- ning the morning newspapers. He ,was astonished to read that his am- bassador to the United Nations, War- ren Austin, had told the Security Council the previous day that `.`there seems to be general agreement that the plan [for the partition of Pales- tine] cannot now be implemented by peaceful means." Truman had agreed to no such thing. He was firmly com- mitted to partition and on the pre- vious day had reiterated his support in a private meeting with Chaim Weizmann, the leader of worldwide Zionism. Austin and the Arabists in the State Department did not know about the meeting with Weizinann, but they knew that the President wanted partition and believed that it could be carried, out peacefully. Aus- tin and his associates had no doubts about what. the President wanted; they simply felt no obligation to do what he wanted them to do. At the end of his term in office, Truman was acutely conscious of the limited ability of Presidents to .have their orders obeyed; and he worried about his successor. "Poor Ike," he was heard to muse, "he'll sit here and say do this and do that and nothing will happen." And so it continues. During the first week of the Cuban missile crisis, in October 1962, an adviser warned Kennedy that the Russians were likely to demand that the United States withdraw its mis- siles from Turkey in return for the Soviet withdrawal of its Missiles from Cuba. Kennedy was astonished. Months before, he had ordered the missiles removed from .Turkey and could not believe they were still there. Most students of the Cuban missile crisis have emphasized the qegl..ce to which Kennedy controlled every de- tail of what the American Govern- ment did. However, a closer look by Graham Allison, in Ms book on the crisis, Essence of Decision, has shown. that the, bureaucracy was behaving' otherwise, choosing to obey the orders it liked and ignore or stretch. others. Thus, after a tense argument with the Navy, Kennedy ordered the blockade line moved closer to Cuba so that the Russians might have more time to draw back. having lost the argument with the President, the Navy simply ignored his order. Unbe- knownst to Kennedy, the Navy was 94kboaltooffemcfmr..big Soviet sub- marines to surface long before Ken- ed A Approved Rao Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00410/12001000100005-0 ganizational interests (meaning the viewpoints of State and Defense), force the bureaucracy to suggest real alternatives and provide more accu- rate information (meaning, as has. been done, to centralize the intelli- gence functions around Kissinger). While this new system has been an improvement in some respects over The past, it has decisive costs and limitations. It has totally demoralized the State Department. The Depart- ment's expertise has been for naught, and its exclusion had led to a rash of pointless leaks from disgruntled Foreign Service Officers. With all its reins on the bureaucrat, the new sys- tem did not prevent part of the bureaucracy from tilting the "wrong way" (meaning against the President, as revealed in the Anderson papers) in the recent India-Pakistan crisis. The problem, then, boils down to this: given the fact that the President cannot either chain the system or en- tirely work around it without serious costs, and given the judgment that a President strong enough to collar the bureaucracy would be too strong for the good of the n'ation, is there a better way to make foreign policy? The answer is yes?probably. The President, we think, should make a determined effort, to use the system. The personal and organizational in- terests of the bureaucrat are a reality. So are the different viewpoints on what is good policy. Tic President's main 'theme of operation should be to force bureaucratic difference out into the open. Pick strong and able men to lead State and Defense. Let them use their judgment and be advo- cates for their organizations. Encour- age debate and contention rather than asking for agreed upon recommenda- tions. Such tactics may be the only way for the President to ferret out hidden or conflicting information and to leave himself with real choices. Perhaps, in tbe. end, neither this suggested system nal' any system will produce better kcisions. Perhaps better decisions really depend on be- liefs and events .and guesses. But a fuller, more honest and open treat- ment of the bureaucracy might make .for more honest and open treatment of the American people. Presidents might be less inclined to spend a good deal of their time denying differences and hiding policy. This would mean less deception and IARIVo4d1ftosnRelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 What better reason for trying it? 0 WORM REPORT Approved Fotrtilkelease 2003/12/0 :ZU-1413?)84-0040a1001000100005-0 HOW. U. KE N 'THE R Thanks to aerial surveillance and space-borne cameras, the world is now virtually an open book to U.. S. They've become vital tools of American policy. ? President Nixon, directing war moves in Southeast Asia and peace moves with Russia, has at his -fingertips a major weapon brought to a peak of reliability during his Administration. The weapon is this: a constant flow of aerial photographs providing, in minute detail, the kind of intelligence informa- tion that no previous President was able to Count on. ? Over. North Vietnam, reconnaissance pilots flying at altitudes of 10 miles or more are able to. take pictures that can distinguish between tank models, show the types of trucks and artillery pieces, expose troops in camouflaged bunkers? and even count rifles. Over Russia, reconnaissance satellites orbiting at 100 miles up?or more. than 300 miles?can detect the construction of rocket sites- and the firing of missiles. From .their pictures, aircraft at- landing strips can be identified. The most ef- fective cameras, from 100 miles, can depict objects two feet' in diameter and show the writing on billboards. "Silent army." Such surveillance intelligence?when properly interpreted ?is seen as a major key both to the fight- ing in Vietnam and the possibility of an arms-control pact with Russia. Behind the information fed to the President is a silent army of intelligence specialists using ricw advances in photography, aeronautics and space technology. Southeast Asia, these technicians depend heavily on reconnaissance planes and pilotless drones for the pictures they aced. Space satellites are used for back- up material. Worldwide, however, the important business of keeping tabs on the Russian and Communist Chinese nuclear-missile build-up rests primarily with the space satellites. Aircraft give better pictures at lower cost. But, since the incident in which a U-2 spy plane was shot down over Russia, . aircraft reconnaissance of . the Soviet Union has been ruled out. How they work. Reconnaissance planes and drones have been flown roti- S TABS RLD ed States first began bombing North Vietnam in 1.965. The drones have their cameras turned on to take wide-angle pictures contin- uously while in flight. Reconnaissance pilots, after studying earlier drone pho- tography, can pinpoint their cameras on suspected military activity for closer, more detailed pictures. The photos are analyzed within min- utes at U. S. bases in Southeast' Asia. Jr some cases, the photos are also sent to Washington?cither by air or by radio beam, depending on whether the priority is secrecy or speed. Over the past decade, the U. S. has kept watch on the Soviet Union and Red China with a series of "search and find" satellites whose, very names are classi- fied. They are equipped to phoT tograph and radio back to "Sky spy" model is readied for testing. Satellite cameras can photograph most of the world, ground stations prints that be put together to depict entire country. Ground stations for receiving these pictures are located at New Boston, N. II.; Vandenberg Force Base in California; Oallti Hawaii.; Kodiak Island, Alaska; on Guam; on the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean, and in Ethiopia. In addition, six ship- board stations, each with a 30-foot an- tenna, can be deployed around the world to fill blank spofs in the network. The photos are radioed from the satel- lites and wind up at Sunnyvale Calif. can the Another series of "close look" satel- lites is used to focus on known or sus- pected subjects of military significance. These photos, of a much higher quality, are dropped by parachute to be re- trieved and seiit on to the National Photographic Interpretation Center in Washington, U. C. What's ahead. New and improved reconnaissance satellites, officials say, are in the offing. One, dubbed the "Big Bird," is expected to have an orbital life of several- months and to carry a quantity of film packs that can be re- turned at frequent intervals. Success of the sky spies has been credited with removing an important hurdle to a U. S.-Russian agreement on limiting arms. Without the satellites, it Gemini V photo shows African airfield from 100 miles up. Sky spies give much more detail. is argued, no significant agreement could be possible because of the Kremlin's steadfast opposition to on-site inspection teams to enforce a treaty. Even before arms-control talks started, U: S. officials say the satellites have helped to stabilize relations between' the U. S. and Russia?through increased knowledge?and at the same time have. significantly reduced U. S. defense spend- tinely over Southeast Asia since the Unit- ? or in Washington for interpretation. ing to protect against the unknown. IEND] Approved-For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 ALBANY, GA. Approved FcXelease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-004,0001000100005-0 HERALD taf 1972 E ? 30,407 S 31,092 WHO MISJUDGED IN VIETNAM? For months in advance of the savagely successful Communist offen- sive in South Vietnam, American military and diplomatic and intelli- gence sources had been predicted that an enemy blow would fall. For months these sources noted a buildup of hien and supplies in this staging area and that -- of North Vietnam, of Laos, of Cambodia, and even in the demilitarized zone. Our planes were assigned the task of interdic- tion, and they bombed away, ton aft- er ton after ton of high explosives. flow, then, did the enemy gain. the advantage that lies with major tactical surprises on the battlefield? How did he advance for virtually the first five days unimpeded and seize the entire province of Quang Tri, in- cluding the provisional capital of the same name? No one is saying at this juncture; of course. Too many faces are too red at this point -- and in Washing- ton no less than at the American military headquarters in Saigon. The question that no official is discussing openly is this: Were we Caught with our intelligence down? Generally speaking, there are two ? schools of thought on this score. The first is to the effect that, on the contrary, intelligence reported all too accurately what the enemy was doing where he was massing, with what armament, et cetera. This data, in turn, was relayed to the higher commands, and from the higher com- mands to the area of the policy- makers in Washington. What the policy-makers made of this intelli- gence ? or what they failed to do This theory, if it in fact fits the reality, validates the general philos- ophy of intelligence-gathering as ex- plained to the members of the Amer- ican Society of Newspapers Editors in April 1971 in Washington by Cen- tral Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms. It is not the task of the intelligence community to make policy and, indeed, it eschews this . role altogether, Mr. Helms stressed. The CIA, and its military and other counterparts throughout the Federal Government, must operate like a well- drilled newspaper city room, it un- earths facts, it reports them ? but as a reporter does not make policy kir. a newspaper, neither does an in- telligence agent do so for the Gov- . ernment of the United .States. The second school of thought about our Vietnam intelligence is a .contra view. It argues that our in- telligence failed utterly, because while it may have known of the enemy con- centrations, it misjudged the direction .which the Communist thrusts finally took. That may have been because the North Vietnamese divisions, com- mitted to fighting set-piece battles with tanks and infantry and co-ordi- nated artillery for the first time since the American intervention, dropped all pretense at "infiltration" and - struck boldly down main transporta- tion arteries. . In this case it was coastal Highway 1. Nor, says the second school of thought, did intelligence estimate cor- rectly the vast' stores of huge and complex weapons and their firing sys- tems which the enemy succeeded in emplacing and deploying.. The fact that the North Vietnamese were able with it ? was noteth ?to lob 2,000 artillery shells into the resnonsibi iiv rovea rorircelegfAi290/114/(niegtA-RW4-9p4RF001000100005-0 of the intelligence establishment. -Loc in a 'single day quite obviously astonished not only military intelli- gence but the Abrams' headquarters in Vietnam. And all this despite the presence in the American technologi- cal arsenal of such devices as acous- tical "sensors," sky-spy aerial tech- niques, infrared ,photography and who knows what other super-snooper devices and systems. So sophisti- cated have the North Vietnamese be- come in warfare that they actually employed counter-measures which the Americans, to say nothing of the South Vietnamese, did not know they Possessed, As a consequence, whether Amer- ican intelligence was at fault, or whether Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's National Security Council intelligence Committee failed to anticipate the enemy's movements and his strength despite good intelligence, the result on the -battlefields of South Vietnam has been the same: Once again,, we have grossly underestimated our fo' For that error, we?are payil price. It is high indeed. WAVINGTON STAR Approved FoiSkielease Ad3/140100031A-RDP84-0049NR601000100005-0 r rep By MICHAEL SATCHELL Star Start Witter Three Marine Corps corpo- rals have been charged with " trespassing after breaking into the Central Intelligence Agency compound in Langley- and getting to within BOO feet of the power plant. , Some authorities say they think the Marines entered the highly guarded spy headquar- ters on a dare. But Richard Helms' CIA director, said he did not rule out the possibility of a sabotage attempt. , The incident occurred be- tween 2 a.m. and 3 a.m. on ' May 6. Security guards spot- ted a car ' parked on George- town Pike near the CIA head- quarters and requested assist- ance from Fairfax County po- llee. After a search of approxi- mately 45 minutes, according to a police sergeant who par- ticipated, the Marines were found and arrested. ? FAIRFAX POLICE identl- god the three arrested as Lar- ry, Peter Kreps, 21, Charles 'Stephen Huff, 24, and Terry Wayne Weatherly, 22. In a letter to Dr. William S. arines Seize un s Hoofnagle, chairman of the Fairfax Board of Supervisors, CIA boss Helms wrote in part: "I have been informed of an incident which occurred early in the morning on 6 May 1972 a n d involved unauthorized physical penetration of this agency's headquarter com- pound. Although the case is still under investigation, a re- view of the facts available to us now does not rule out the possibility of sabotage." ? The letter goes on to thank members of the Fairfax police department for their assist- ance. An officer who participated in the search said the Marines were carrying a flashlight and a pair of pliers. They had scaled a four-foot outer fence and then had climbed the main perimeter fence, which is eight feet ?high and tipped with barbed wire. They were climbing a third inner fence guarding the power plant when they were captured, the efficer said. ASKED HOW three men would have penetrated -z.o far into the compound and re- , mained undiscovered for near- ly an hour without being spot- ted by security guards, a CIA spokesman said yesterday. the intrusion was not regarded as a major breach'of security. "The whole tring was mi- nor," said the spokesman. "Nothing happened. The Marines were taken by Fairfax police to the McLean substation and charged with trespassing ,on federal proper-. ty, a state offense. They were released on $1,000 bond each, police said. The men were questioned at length by federal authorities but no federal charges have been filed. A Marine Corps public infor- mation officer said the men were members of A Company attadhed to battalion head- quarters at Henderson Hall in Arlington. . "They have been returnedto a normal work routine and they are under no restraint," the officer said. "It is a civil matter at this point and no Marine Corps action is antici- pated until after the civil ac- tion is completed." Weatherly was reached by telephone yesterday but re- fused to discuss the incident. - ? _ Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 Approved %Wr Release 2003A 2/N)ICVAIDP84-0a7K9R001000100005-0 Convict in Spy Case Slain In Prison by Visiting Son LEWISBURG, Pa., May 19 ?A former Army sergeant serving a 25-year term for con- spiring to give secrets to the Russians was stabbed to death Thursday by his son who vis- ited him at the federal peni- tentiary. Robert Lee Johnson, 56, was brought into the prison's open visiting quarters to see his son for. the first time in years, prison officials said. As be en- Aered the room, his son, a Viet- nam war 'veteran, lunged at his father with a knife, stab- bing him in the chest. ? Johnson died an hour later in the emergency room. at Geisinger Medical Center. Robert L. Jr., 22, of Green- wood, Ind., was disarmed im- mediately by prison guards He was taken to Williamsport, Pa., by FBI agents where he was arraigned on a first de- gree Murder charge. "It was just one of those things," Warden Noah All- dredge said. "It happened al- most instantaneously. His father came into the visiting room and the incident oc- curred right then. "I don't know a lot about the man. I do know that he hadn't seen his son for a long time and he didn't get Many letters from him." The warden said visitors were never searched, and rooms for them were set up in- formally. "It's just like meeting in a living room, very informal." Alldredge, who described Johnson as a model prisoner, said to his knowledge this is the first time "anything like this has ever happened at a federal penitentiary." As a Pentagon courier In. the sixties, Johnson collabo- rated with. the Soviet govern- ment in a scheme which in- volved embarrassing the U.S. government by baring out- dated American defense proj- ects. The Soviet KGB intelligence service "disinformation" 'sec- tion obtained the plans from Johnson.and James Alan Mint- kenbaugh, once a real estate agent in Alexandria, Va., .and leaked them to the West 'Ger- man news publications. - The document that attracted the most attention was known as "Plan 10-1." It detailed a purported Defense Depart- ? ment strategy to drop atom bombs on German cities in the event of a nuclear war. The Pentagon never acknowledged - the authenticity of the docu- ments. Mintkenbaugh and Johnson both pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to commit espio- nage and received ? identical . 25-year terms in July, 196& Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 .1r21.55 Approved FiNIII4elease 260:8/M53197SIA-RDP84-00400001000100005-0 Alleged Spy May Return to Russia NEW YORK 01)--A U.S. district judge in Brooklyn ruled Friday night that Valeriy I. Markelov, a Russian accused of trying to steal plans for the Na- vy's neNV supersonic fight- er, may return to the So- viet Union while his case is pending. Markelov, a translator in the U.N. secretariat, was arrested on espionage charges Feb. 14 outside a Patchogue,. N.Y., restaur- ant. A federal indictment ac- cuses him of trying to get plans for. the F-114A fight- er from an engineer at the Grumman plant on Long Island where the plane is being .cleveloped. In a two-minute hearing held after nermal court hours, Judge Mark A. Con- stantino extended the travel limits' of Markelov's $100,000 bail to include Russia. . "I don't want this yelled from the rooftops," the .judge *added. Approved For Release 2003/12/03: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 7rawka.i.aul-yri Approved For*elease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-0049N601000100005-0 1 9 MAY 1972 Son Held in Killing Of Red Spy in Prison ? LEAV1SBURG, Pa. Al') ? A former U.S. Army sergeant who was serving a 25-year 'prison term for passing gov- ernment secrets to the Rus- sians was stabbed to death in the U.S. federal penitentiary here, allegedly by his own son. ? An FBI spokesman said Robert Johnson, 22, of Green- wood, Ind., has been charge-0 with murder in the death of ?his father, Robert Lee John- 'son, 52, of Alexandria, Va. The son was held without bail in Wilhamsort, Pa. Prison officials said the knif- ing occurred yesterday in the prison visiting room, just 100 feet away from the warden's office. As a Pentagon courier in the 1960s, Johnson collaborated with the Soviet government in a scheme which involved em- barrassing the U.S. govern- ment by baring outdated American defense projects. The Soviet KGB intelligence service "disinformation" sec- ? tion obtained the plans from Johnson and James Alan Mint- kenbaugh, an Alexandra real estate agent, and leaked them to West German news publica- tions. ? The document that attracted the most attention was known as "Plan 10-1." It detailed a purported Defense Depart- ment strategy to drop atom bombs on German cities in the event of a nuclear war. The Pentagon never acknowledged the authenticity of the docu- ments. Mintkenbaugh and Johnson pleaded guilty to charges of espionage and conspiracy and received identical 25-year terms in July 1965. The government claimed during their trial that Johnson was recruited by the Soviets while serving with the Army in Berlin in 1953. He in turn enlisted Mintkenbaugh, who was also an Army sergeant at the time: The younger Johnson is a veteran of the Vietnam War. Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 WiU?Jjii.L7S AMERICAN 111 MNI 1972 Approved Sai Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-0b8tR001000100005-0 Whose Intelligence Failed? ? . NOTHING beats hindsight when choosing where to kick for making a mistake?the mistake in this in- stance being wrong about where, when and with how much the North Vietnamese would aitack. The military intelligence community says that Washington's strategists?meaning the National Se- curity Council led by Henry Kissinger?took the in- telligence reports and decided an attack would come, if it came at all, west from Cambodia to cut South Vietnam in half. U.S. intelligence flights were curtailed. The elec- tronic surveillance devices employed on the ground couldn't tell a truck from a Soviet-built tank. But our intelligence: knew that something was moving on the supply trails and that the North Vietnamese had strengthened their forces north of the demilitarized zone. ' Intelligence reports predicted an attack in Feb- ruary or March. When it didn't come some credibil- ity was lost. When it did come?in April?from an. unexpected direction with unexpected force,. Wash- ? ington was stunned. ? It's difficult to run a war from the banks of the Potomac, 9,000 miles from the battlefield. But if in- telligence" reports are weighed in Washington and the decisions are made in Washington, the. blame be- longs n Washington. As the long-distance strategist, the NSC took responsibility for the conduct .of the War. ?? If intelligence. officials are correct in claiming that we were .caught off guard .because of NSC mis- interpretation of their reports, it doesn't take much hindsight to know exactly where to kick. Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0 THE LONDON Approved For Release 2003/12/03119V ?A I MiNifig00100005-0 , By. DAVID FLOYD and STEPHEN CONSTANT HARDLY A MONTH goes by with them will be condemned in the Soviet Union without for ? all time, during their life the official celebration of some , and after their death." kind of anniversary, jubilee'or The institute is in fact under Centenary. , the orders of the ,K GB, the Rut only a brief . un- secret police. Gen. Pyotr Grigar- . ' cnko, the 'prominent Russian . signed article in the Soviet campaigner for civil rights, journal Socialist Legality just described in an account: which , published revealed that last reached the West how, when he ' --;year was the 50th anniversary himself was being kept at the of the Serbsky Institute in institute, he saw the notorious .11/loscow, or to :give it its full head of department, Prof. Lunts, :official title, the Central Scien- arriving tO work in the uniform ?tific Research Institute of of a K G B colonel. But inside the building he changed into a , Legal 'Psychiatry, named after white. coat. He also, saw other Professor Serbsl