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April 1, 1972
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SOVIET INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Approved For Relelge 2001/03/06 : CA01312124-0040R001000100008-7 Britain's Secret Service After the Second World War Britain built up a rami- fied secret service system. The leading role in it is played by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) which engages in world-wide espionage, "psychological warfare" and ideolo- gical subversion. The activity against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is conducted by its big- .gest department and the most experienced agents. In the developing countries the Secret Intelligence Service engi- neers plots, coups and other anti-government actions with the aid of the total reactionary forces. A top secret organisation, Speciail Political Actions (SPA), was set up within the SIS in the mid-1950s for such.subversive activity. SIS Ordinance No. C (102) 56, which has since found its way into the press, said the SPA was set up to organise coups, clandestine radio stations and. subversive activities, publish newspapers and books, wreck international conferences or run them, influence elections, etc. In 1969 the SIS was placed in the charge of the Foreign Office. It maintains numerous agencies abroad and its members masquerade as diplomats, correspondents, businessmen, employees of British firms, and so on. Military reconnaissance is directed by the intelligence department of the Ministry of Defence. Electronic reconna- issance is headed by the so-called Government Communi- cation Centre which operates under the control of the Foreign Office. The Centre monitors foreign broadcasts, intercepts radar beams, deciphers codes, etc. The counter-intelligence functions are exercised by the Security Service, which is called MI-5. It has organised quite a few anti-Soviet actions and forged documents to whip up anti-communist hysteria. Last autumn it took part in the provocative campaign against Soviet officials in Britain. It also' spies on progressive organisations in Britain herself. The. British secret service system is directed by the Cabinet's Joint Intelligence Committee. ? It summarises the information obtained, gives assignments to the secret services and coordinates their activity. The Committee is made up of representatives of the leading intelligence services and is headed by a high-ranking Foreign Office functionary. Among the special political actions undertaken by the British secret service one May cite provocations against progressive and 'peace organisations both in Britain and other countries. It has done its best to prevent normalisation in Europe and hamper the socialist countries' efforts to promote d?nte. . During the counter-revolutionary events inCzechoslo- vakia the British secret service encouraged and instigated the anti-socialist elements to step up their anti-govern- ment activities. . In its political activity, the British secret service makes good use of British newspapers and radio stations. According to press reports, there are many SIS-paid agents in such newspapers as the Daily Telegraph, Sunday Times, Daily Mail, Observer, and Financial Times. It has particu- larly close ties with the BBC, preparing many of its foreign-language programmes. The British secret service is also very active in col- lecting information with the aid of electronic reconnais- sance and radio interception devices. Besides "passively" monitoring broadcasts, it engages in "active" reconnaissance, like organising flights along the frontiers of socialist countries and sometimes incursions into their air space. Ships are also used for that purpose. The SIS has a technical operations department which installs bugging devices in other countries' missions and offices abroad. In' the process of Operation Contrary A, the British installed such a device at the Polish trade mission in Brussels. A microphone . was mounted in a Soviet diplomat's fiat in Denmark. The conversations of a Czechoslovak export official in Cairo were listened to. One might also recall in this connection that the British secret service participated together with the American secret service in building a 600-metre long tunnel from West Berlin to the communications lines of the Soviet Military Command in the GDR territory. ? The British secret service makes wide use of all kinds of international contacts for purposes of espionage. Among those it employed, for instance, was a representative of English Electric who had made several trips to the Soviet Union. It also recruits tourists. Last year the Soviet security forces detained several motoring tourists from ? Great Britain who were caught photographing military installations. A number of British tourists were detained when 'attempting to smuggle anti-Soviet literature into the country. While the British secret service activity against socialist countries dates back some fifty years, its strug- gle against the national liberation movement has been going on for centuries. It is especially active in the Middle East. British agents are inciting strife and splitting the Arab countries fighting against Israeli aggression. Such are only some of the activities the British secret service engages in in close contact with the secret services of the United States and other imperialist countries. E. vLADimiRpv Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 WASTI I NG TON POST Approved For Reittse 2001/03/06 ? CIA-RDP84-00409R001000100008-7 13 APR Wz 1 Books -- possibility of landing the 82nd Airborne Division near Rome to defend that city against the Germans. A General's Mind ?- SWORDS AND PLOWSHARES. By Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. (Norton, 434 DP., Illustrated, $10) Reviewed by , mies, large and small, for- eign and domestic. To cope Stuart H. ',wry The reviewer, a fellow at ,the Woodrow Wilson Intern,a- ,tional Center for Scholars, is 'co-author of "The Secret _Search for Peace in Viet- nam." He is currently writing, a book on the American miii- tary establishment in the post- Vietnam War era. Here's a book that tells you just what makes a Joint Chief tick, a book that is a clear self-revelaton of a sen- ior military man's life, thought processes, and per- ception of his times. It's an honest book but, to one interested in the demili- tarization of American for- eign policy, a discomforting one. It's a frank book but, to one convinced that our serv- ice leaders must be soldier- statesmen in fact as well as title, it reveals the difficulty of fusing those two func- tions successfully.' To begin at the end, Tay- lor sums up 47 years of pub- lic service by taking a look at the future. He foresees the United States entering a new Cold War period as a declining power. He writes: "A first step is to recog- nize the new Cold War tech- nique directed against the sources of our power as a formidable threat to our na- tional security. This form of threat is not new in its weapons?propaganda, sub- version, power seizures by minorities. But the acute- ness of the threat is new be- cause of the increasing strength and boldness of the Internal revolutionary move- ment and the mind-numbing power of press and televi- sion in their effect on the -critical judgment of ? the public. This threat strikes at It was also an inportarrt one He served as superin- tendent of West Point and Berlin garrison commander under President Truman; as 8th Army Commander in Korea and Army Chief of Staff under Eisenhower; as chairman of the Joint Chiefs under John F. Kennedy; and as Ambassador to Saigon for. with it, we need a new con- one crucial year under Lyn- don B. Johnson, Taylor is a man who clearly did his homework? arriving in Korea in 1953 to take over field command of all Unit6d Nations troops there, he had a piece of paper outlining the mission as he perceived it; returning to Washington a few years later to become chief of staff of the Army, he had al- cept of national security, broad enough to assure that defensive measures . are taken against subversion in this form . . ." As a declining power, he says, the United States can either adjust its interna- tional goals downward, as did Great Britain, or it can continue to maintain its war-making capacities for all-out as well as limited war. He issues this caveat, however: if the nation ever again gets involved in lim- ited war the President should obtain a declaration of war from Congress and then go all out to achieve the goal. "The resources al- located and their use in combat should be limited only by the requirements of prompt victory," he writes. All of this is gloomy stuff, particularly as it comes from the urbane, articulate, widely traveled linguist who was chosen in the early 1960s to be the number one soldier on the New Frontier. The point is that while Taylor extracted lessons from his experienced, he , gives little indication that he applied them. Another ? example: In May, 1961, he conducted a post-mortem of the Bay of Pigs inVasion that led Kennedy to con- , elude that the Joint Chiefs , did not give him advice on a broad enough basis. The fol- lowing October, Kennedy sent him to Vietnam with Walt W. Rostow under or- ders to determine how best to engineer the rescue from disaster fo President Ngo Dinh Die.m. was not asked to review the objectives of this policy but the means being pur- sued for their attainment," Taylorvrii es. "The question was hoe- to change a losing game and begin to win, not how to call it off" ' Even if the President did ready drafted a new pro- not specifically ask for gram for the service. And he views on whether the game clearly studied his lessons: was worth Winning, does not For example, Ile extracts a soldier-statesman have these, among others, from the responsibility to investi- the Korean War: gate a question such as that "A central theme was the and present his views? importance of learning to use our military resources effectively in limited war . . . In combination thee- nemy, the terrain and the weather tended to nullify, the usefulness of much costly equipment procured during and after World War 11 in preparation for an- other world war, presuma- bly to be fought primarily in Western Europe . . . The absence of an enemy air force or navy limited the En 1972, Taylor reveals him- useful employment of much self as a man given to views of our air and n aval somewhat to the right of strength . . . In the absence Spiro T. Agnew. On just one of a naval adversary, the matter, that of the press's mightiest warships of the role and performance in re- world were obliged to con- cent years, Agnew's criti- tent themselves with born- cism appears moderate in barding unimportant shore comparison with Taylor's. targets hardly worthy of their shells." One can imagine Generals William C. Westmoreland or Creighton Abrams, Jr., writ- ing such paragraphs in their memoirs a few years from now. Why did not Taylor, who had great influence on Vietnam war policy, work nore actively to make sure that Korean War mistakes were not repeated in Viet- nam? And one wonders, in considering Taylor's thought processes, why he does not ? the roots of national power, Commander on D-Day; he try to explain to his readers Schooled in the Old Army of pre-World War Ti, sea- soned as a combat com- mander and high-level staff man in Gen. George C. Mar- shall's Pentagon and Dwight D. Eisenhower's , European Theater, Taylor came into his own during the Korean War. To .use today's vernacu- lar, he had all his tickets punched to perfection. His was an exciting ca- reer: he parachuted into Normandy as a Division behind ?or himself?why weapons particularly at our national made a secret trip n2W1403#0q4ogyottn t unity, withApprometinforReleasen a r. . Mussolini government the As '-. professional soldier- statesmen, the Joint Chiefs must be more than advisers on, and devisers of, ways to "counter threats." They must also have a deep un- derstanding of just what the threats are. Nowhere in his book does Taylor show an appreciation for the nature of the Communist system he was so busy containing dur- ing the last half of his ca- reer. Traditionally, troop com- mand has been a prerequist- ite for membership on the Joint Chiefs. Why not edu- cate them as well in cotm- tries perceived as potential enemies?say, as military at- taches or in some other ex- perience-broadening capac- ity? That should be as indis- pensible a ticket punch in a soldier-statesman's career pattern as troop command. A' future Joint Chiefs member who had a real' first-hand knowledge of the "Communist threat," as did say, "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, who never became a Joint. Chief, would ndeed be a re- freshing novelty. to negotiate with the post- n then *MI* R001000100008-7 an easy target for all ene- THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOT REVIEW Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIW*1514849:6b4459R001000100008-7 Maintaining an ernpire?the General explains how Swords and Plowshares By General Maxwell Taylor. Illustrated. 434 pp. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. $10. By NEIL SHEEHAN This book is bad history, but in its own way, a good memoir, for it tells a great deal about Gen. Max- well Taylor and those other states- men of the 1960's who led us into the Indochina war. Taylor's account of some of the events of that period, such as the involvement of the Ken- nedy Administration in the over- throw of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, is so at variance with the documentary record now available to us in the Pentagon Papers and elsewhere that the kindest description one can give his version is to say that it reflects the wish-think reconstruction of the past in which men of power are prone to indulge themselves in their memoirs. That kind of factual truth is not, however, what one ought to expect in a memoir. Rather, one would hope to find truths of character, attitude and perspective. Taylor's memoir is filled with enough of these kinds of truths, inadvertently at times perhaps, to make well worthwhile the task of forging through the occasionally stilted language and the bureaucratic de- tail which interrupt its narrative flow. One emerges from the book see- ing more lucidly the realities of the foreign policy of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, in con- trast to the illusions we held at the time. Maxwell Davenport Taylor and his theory of the use of military forces in the conduct of foreign policy came into their own with the Inauguration of John F. Ken- tnedy in January, 1961. Taylor's exemplary military career?born in Keytesville, Mo., on Aug. 26, 1901, he graduated from West Point in 1922, commanded the 101st Airbdme Division in World War II and the Eighth Army in Korea?had come to a seeming end in 1959 because of his profound disagreement with the Eisenhower Administration's nuclear Neither in Mr. Kennedy's letter, nor strategy of "massive retaliation." in Taylor's memoirs, however, is the In "The Uncertain Trumpet," pub- question ever addressed of whether the United States should be invading lished the year after his resignation as Army Chief of Staff, Taylor had a foreign country in the name of, a counterinsurgency. That question, argued his doctrine of "flexible response" ? the development of Taylor's memoir implicitly makes strong conventional forces to enable clear, had already been answered. the United States to conduct limited The object of Taylor's Bay of Pigs wars below the nuclear threshhold investigation was simply to learn how to do it better elsewhere the as an effective tool of its foreign next time. policy. In his memoirs, Taylor de- fines limited war as "rational war" And that is the heart of Taylor's to achieve "national interests," or memoir. It is the story of a man and "a resort to arms for reasons other his fellow statesmen who, in the than survival." psychological atmosphere and The first task the new President through the ideological forms of the set him to was indicative of the cold war were actually engaged in maintaining and enlarging an kindred minds Taylor found among the statesmen of the Kennedy Ad- American empire through the use of force. ministration and then of President Johnson's. Mr. Kennedy had him Taylor expresses no essential mis- giving over the termination ofetrir take leave from his position as course in the president of the Lincoln Center for Indochina war, with its cost the Performing Arts in New York of 55,000 American lives so to conduct an exhaustive review of far, well over $100 billion and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, a million to two million In- To demonstrate what Mr. Kennedy dochinese dives. He believes desired from the investigation, Gen- that President Nixon has a era! Taylor quotes from the letter of good chance to attain the cen- instruction the new President gave tral American objective of him: preserving an anti-Communist South Vietnam. He concludes 'it is apparent that we need to , take a close look at all our practices that, "Personally I would ex- and programs in the areas of mili- pect the probable gains of vic- tary and paramilitary, guerrilla and tory to exceed its anticipated costs by a substantial margin." anti-guerrilla activities which fall His regrets over Indochina re- short of outright war. I believe we late to how force was applied need to strengthen our work ia there and to the lack of this area. In the course of your stamina the country displayed. study, I hope that you will give "But even in victory we special attention to the lessons cannot completely redeem the which can be learned from recent unheroic image created by events in Cuba." Mr. Kennedy told many aspects of our behavior Taylor that he hoped the General's in the course of the conflict," report would help by "drawing from he writes. "The record of our past experience, to chart a path violent internal divisions, our towards the future." loss of morale, and our psy- As Taylor comments in his chotic inclination to self- flagellation and self-denigration memoir: justifies serious doubts as to "There were several interesting the performance to be expect- points in this letter. One was the al- ed from us in any future crisis most passing mention of the Bay ?an uncertainty which will be- of Pigs, which was to be the primary cloud our prestige and diminish' subject of our investigation. An our ability to influence world other was the broad invitation to events as long, as it lasts." make excursions into any aspect of He blames the news media limited and guerrilla warfare, the and the antiwar movement for first intimation I had received of much of this "unashamed de- the President's deep interest in feat ism" and says they caused these activities later lumped together unwarranted "demoralization for convenience under the heading and lack of confidence" even of counterinsurgency." within President Johnson's in- ner circle. Neil Sh Times Was t ? I Alt I 1 ;Meese 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R0010001000084-t-inuo author of "The Arnheiter Affair." Approved For Re!eat 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-0049001000100008-7 Taylor regrets the tradition- al American suspicion of mili- tary power which "leads to questioning the efficacy of mil- itary forces as an instrument of policy" and the fact that the Indochina experience will probably deepen this suspicion. Future Presidents, he believes, will also have to utilize the "limited war option" to pro- tect our "many interests abroad which are vulnerable to foreign predators. They in- clude the lives and interests of our citizens, our trade and investments, and our Armed Forces and their bases." His counsel to a future Pres- ident who resorts to limited war is to avoid the "gradual- ism" that characterized the Johnson Administration's strut- -egy in Vietnam and to apply force with maximum vigor. He particularly singles out "the restrained use of our air. pow- er" against North Vietnam as a model not to imitate in the .future. ? _."A proper concept of limited war," :Taylor writes, "is one in which the objectives are limited to something less than the total destruction of the en- emy but which carries no impli- cation of curtailed resources or restricted tactics. The re- sources allocated and their use in combat should be limited only by the requirements of prompt victory." How this is to be achieved against an agri- cultural country like Vietnam without finally making the pop- ulation itself the target of the bombs is a question that Taylor does not address. He also advises a President who decides upon limited-war first to obtain a declaration of war or emergency from Con- gress so that the President can "silence future critics of war by executive order" and avoid the dissent that hampered the Johnson Administration. In his concluding chapter, Taylor warns that the tech- nique of subversion developed by Communist powers, as part of their so-called Wars of Lib- eration has now been extended to the United States itself. "This effort to split and defeat us is now in progress, based not on guerrilla warfare but upon the exploitation of our own internal weaknesses coupled with the abuse of such revered democratic practices as freedom of press, speech and dissent." Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7. ? "To cope with it," he con- cludes, "we need a new concept of national security broad enough to assure that defen- sive measures are taken against subversion in this form. Surely. the defense of our national unity merits a dedication of effort at least equal to that which we have lavished in the past on the. protection of our overseas possessions, our coast- lines, and our air-space from overt foreign foes." And so in General Taylor's memoirs, one comes full circle from the creation of an Amer- ican empire in the course of seeking to defend our liberty against the perceived threat of Stalinist Communism, to the counsel that we must now sac- rifice our liberties in order to maintain our empire. El TIO NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIF? Approved For Release 2001/931011 atA2RDP84-0040R001000100008-7 An old Asia hand doesn't tell it all ? In the Midst of Wars An American's Mission to Southeast Asia. By Maj. Gen. Edward Geary Lansdale. Illustrated. 386 pp. New York: Harper & Row. $12.50. By PETER ARNETT Before the Vietnam war turned sour and Americans could still be- lieve in legends, there was an idealized cold-war warrior whose bravery, boldness and common sense were carrying the American Way to victory over Communism in South- east Asia. His legendary exploits and style became the model for the scores of young American operatives dis- patched by various departments and agencies to that arena of big-power political intrigue. Like the idealized cold warrior himself, those operatives were armed with a moral certitude about their mission. It sustained them through the long hot nights in. backwaters like Luang Prabang and Pakse cultivating minor princelings. And it justified their support of the shoddy political accommodations that passed for democracy in Bang- kok, Saigon and Vientiane. Then it all started to go bad. Deeds once thought bold and daring now seem to have been blundering acts of miscalculation that sucked the United States into an unforgiveable bloodletting in Vietnam. Those who had a hand in shaping the recent history of Southeast Asia, however, feel differently from the average American about that his- tory. One such man is the model cold-war warrior of them all, Ed- ward Geary Lansdale, Novelists have tried to put him between cov- ers: Graham Greene made a kindred idealist the antihero of "The Quiet 'American," and he was later featured as the hero of "The Ugly American" by William Lederer and Eugene Bur- dick. Now, the 64-year-old Lansdale, for- mer San Francisco advertising man, oriental kingmaker, frustrated, coun- terinsurgency expert, speaks for himself with, "In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia." But he remains as elusive as the legends, even after 378 pages, and the reason seems to be that his memoirs are strangely abbreviated; the narrative concluded with Presi- dent Ngo Dinh Diem firmly in power in Saigon in 1956, the second Asian monarch helped to the throne by Lansdale. The first was Ramon Mag- saysay of the Philippines. But with all we know of the later dramatic developments of the war, and with all Lansdale knows, his memoirs are like reading a history of the Ameri- can Civil War that ends with the first election of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency. The record states plainly that in 1960 Lansdale wrote a bitterly nega- tive report on the way the war was going in Vietnam, and later dis- cussed his finding with President Kennedy who wanted to send him back to Saigon in a high position. But top Kennedy aides intervened because of his bureaucratic crock- ery breaking and independence. This same reputation apparently forced his retirement from the United States Air Force with the rank of major general at the age of 55. But none of this appears in his memoirs. But if Lansdale is reluctant to eval- uate his life's work or discuss his personal reverses, he has plenty more to say. His pages ring with the evangelistic anti-Communist rhetoric of the 1950's. Lansdale, an O.S.S. officer in World War H, remains an idealist who believes that the United States can prevail in distant, un- derdeveloped lands if she exports "the American way," a composite of "winning the hearts and the minds of the people" and expert leverage of American economic aid. The former operative made plenty of enemies in his freewheeling days as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's personal emissary in Indo- china, but he names none in his memoirs, preferring to rail against the "back rooms of Washington pol- icy makers," which are "too full of articulate and persuasive practi- tioners of the expedient solution to daily problems, of the hoary art of power politics, and of the brute usages of our physical and material means." Lansdale's belief is probably sus- tained because of his first and last- ing counterinsurgency success, the crushing of the Huk rebellion in the Philippines. He teamed with the then unknown Ramon Magsaysay, secre- ? tary of national defense, and mount- ed a drive against the Communist Huks that demonstrated superb co- ordination of political, military and social-psychology strategy and tac- tics. This dramatic campaign, which he details minutely in his memoirs, destroyed the Huks and led Mag- saysay to the Presidency in 1953, with Lansdale's help. By then Lansdale had become America's Number One counter- insurgency expert, and John Foster Dulles sent him to Vietnam to do the same there. In the Philippines Lans- dale had a favorite maxim, "Dirty tricks beget dirty tricks," and in Viet- nam he was given every opportunity to put his skills to use; his mission, among other things, was to launch paramilitary operations and polltioale psychological warfare against North Vietnam a few days after the Geneva accords gave that country to Ho Chi Minh. Lansdale's operatives were the first American fighting men in Vietnam, a fact not hitherto known until the Pentagon Pa- pers last year revealed minute details of sabotage in Hanoi by Americans in 1954, including the pouring of contaminants into Hanoi buses to eventually destroy them. Lansdale men- tions the teams in his memoirs, but he fails to include the con- taminants, or his? association with the Central Intelligence Agency revealed by the Penta- gon Papers. Lansdale's main contribution to the history of Vietnain was his success in propping up Ngo Dinh Diem, the obdurate Viet- namese nationalist appointed Prime Minister by the French in a power play in 1954 and. saved from political extinction by Lansdale who saw in him the makings of another Magsay- say. Dulles, in April, 1955, had already agreed to a demand by his special envoy in Saigon, Gen. .Y. Lawton Collins, that Diem be dumped in favor of a coalition of Saigon politicians and sect leaders, when a dra- matic cable arrived from Lans- dale stating that Diem was suc- cessfully surviving a military reitg:M4sMesgrWieg001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R0010001009308O4 Vietnam. aft Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 coup. Dulles changed his mind, and Lansdale helped Diem to victory in a Presidential elec- tion. But Diem was not a Ramon Magsaysay, and this was be- coming clear to Lansdale as in 'his daily meetings with the roly poly President he saw the trappings of democracy fall away to reveal a tightening dictatorship. The special opera- tive was not even informed of Diem's disastrous decree ban- ning the traditional village self - government elections in favor of appointed leaders. "The disbelievers of this world may find it incredible, but I learned of this decree only long after I had left Vietnam," Lansdale writes. In a postscript, Lansdale writes of the overthrow of Diem in 1963, which he viewed from Washington, and says, "the coup and murders in Sai- gon seemed incredible." But the irony of that remark, one of the many ironies of Amer- ica's Vietnam venture, is that the generals who so brutally overthrew Diem were the same who had fought to place him in power. And the American C.I.A. agent relaying the win- ning play from rebel head- quarters was none other than Lansdale's former top aide and Hanoi saboteur Maj. Lucien Co- nein, who had worked closely with Lansdale on that busy day in April, 1954, when Diem's ascendancy to power was clinched. The lesson seems too obvious to restate:. We were out-intrigued. El Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 2 W.P.SHIIIC;TON POST L Approved For Rer6se 2001/0..quo .AP13 -RDP84-002K9R001000100008-7 uper Spy, Strange . Books GEHLEN: Spy of the Century. By E. H. Cookridge. (Random House, 402 pp., Mu8trated, $10.00) ii i, t, . Reviewed by Arthur M. Cox The reviewer, a former .Senior relloin at the _Brook- ings Institution and a spe- cialist on THE GENERAL WAS A SPY: The Truth About international -eoln- nrunisin, is a consuitant, General Gehlen and His Spy Ring. By Heinz Hohne writer and lecturer on for- & Hermann ' Zolling. Introduction by Hugh Trevor- eign affairs, - Roper and Preface to the American Edition by Andrew Tully. U.S. policy by the fact that Reinhard Gehlen was a ',first Vlassov's propaganda Gchlen was selected fOr this leaflets promising good Nazi general with an obses- treatment to deserters and role, But there can be little . . sive hatred of 'communismemployment in the Vlassov doubt too that given Stalin's ' -who. May have had more in- movement produced massive aggressive moves the U.S. fluence on the course of the defections, but soon Hitler's would use the only available Cold War than any other ruthless treatment of the source of intelligence. Prob- . man. Soviet articles refer to Russians brought an end to ably the revisionist histori- him as a fascist warmonger that. Had littler not been a ans of the Cold War will be who was the biggest single maniac, it is conceivable debating for years the es- factor in the prevention of that Gehlen's plans would sem ce of the conclusion E. H. an East-West detente, These. have provided the basis for Cookridge reaches in his two 'books tell his extraordi- a German victory in the book: "Whether we like it or nary story. . East, certainly a substantial not, Western democracy - . From late 1941 to the end prolongation of the war. must be prepared in times of the war Gehlen was Hit- . Gehlen remained loyal to of danger to accept such ler's chief of intelligence for Hitler, hut seeing how the strange allies as Reinhard the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu- war would end he made Gehlen in defense against rope: Then, having arranged plans for his -future. Ile ar- totalitarianism." to be captured by the Amer- ranged to have all his intel- According to Cookridge, leans, he soon emerged as ligenee files on the Soviet who is a British author of the principal- source of CIA Union packed 'in 50 steel many, fine books on estrio- intelligence f r 0 01 the corn- eases and hidden- away until nage, the CIA pumped over munist world until 1955, he could be captured by the, $200- million into the Gehlen when he became Chancellor u,S. Army. As Stalin's ag- organization. But the results Adenauer's - chief of intern- gressive program in Eastern more than paid off. Amot.ig gence for the West German Europe, the Balkans and its sensational exploits were Republic. ? . Iran began to unfold, it was the accurate forecasts of the . Gehlen was one of the apparent to the Americans East German uprisings in planners of "Operation Bar- that they were totally unpre- 1953, the Hungarian revolt ?barossa," the 1941 German pared, without intelligence in 1956. and the Soviet inva- attack on the Soviet Unien, about the Soviets. But Geh- sion of Czechoslovakia in. which sent Nazi divisions six len was prepared and had 1968. hundred-miles . into the soOn negotiated a remarka- Gehlen secured the text of U.S.S.R. in seven' weeks., ble deal in Washington giv- Khrushchey's secret speech placing 50 million Russians ing him authority to estab- denouncing Stalin, and gave under Hitler's rule. When lish an all-German intelli- it to Allen Dulles. His intel- Gehlen became chief of in- gence apparatus with corn- ligence operations exposed telligence for the Eastern plete control over its per- sonic of time most successful Front,. he immediately sonnel. Soviet, secret agents. His began organizing a Russian In the little village of Pul- plans led to the 600-yard. Artily of Liberation among lach outside of Munich in tunnel the CIA dug into anti-Communist prisoners of-- a large housinpment Berlin, where the main came more effective in pen- etrating his organization and planting fake informa- tion. But the greatest blow to G-ehlen wag the discovery in 1962 that his chief of counter-intelligence, Heinz Felfen,.was a Soviet double agent. The Felfe Affair, combined with changes in German political leadership and the new technology of spy planes and satellites all contributed to the fading impact of Gehlen. He re-, tired in 1968 at 65. Gehlen probably was the. "spy a the century," but his, rightist ? proclivities and rigid anti-Communism proba- bly contributed to prolong- ing the most dangerous pe- riod of the Cold War and may have slowed the evolu- tionary political process in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu- rope. A proponent of revolu- tion not evolution, he be- lieved that all communism. was bad and dreamed of war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. He had no sympa- thy for national commu- ? nism, Titoism, and revision- ism. He didn't seem to be- lieve that the political proc- ess in Moscow and Eastern Europe would allow for a"' struggle for power between . the rightist Stalinists and the anti-Stalinist revision- 'Isis. Even after the advent of Khrushchey his opera- onsfi continued to. give weight to the arguments of those Communist .leaders who most feared the Ger- mans and who were most op- posed to relaxing the Stalin- ist tactics of tyranny and terror. Both of these books are lively reading, well docu- mented and cover essen- tially the same events. The Cookridge book is better or- ganized and better written,, -, war and partisans. By the S develo spring of 1943 he had organ- formerly for SS officers telephone trunk lines lead- but spy buffs may enjoy the ,ized this army under Soviet Gen. Gehlen built a walled- ing to Moscow and other operational detail of "The was sPY nine 'Gen. Andrei Vlassov, who in headquarters for what capitals in Eastern Europe General Was A Spy" by viding' the CIA with 70 per successful operation was di base of the Cold War, pro- months until this incredibly man newsmen who write for Der Spiegel. had been captured 'by the Hohne and Zolling, two Ger- soon to become the were tapped for s- -Germans and turned against Stalin. Vlassov and Gehlen. estimated that there were cent of its intelligence on covered. In June, 1967, CIA hundreds of thousands of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu- Director Richard Helms was anti-Communist Russians rope. Thus, in a matter of .able to make high Marks -prepared to join with the months Hitler's chief from President Johnson by ? Germans in the overthrow Soviet spy had become the prediction the exact date of . 'of Stalin. Soviet expert for the United the six-day .Tsraeli attack in But Gehlen's plans ran States. the Middle East. His source: head-on against There can be little doubt Gen. Gehlen. - view that the Slays were that the Soviets, fearing the Tt wasn't until he became: sub-human beings who Germans more than any head of German intelligence i es n,hi?, hp. should be ,:fan to have Approved tgorReleasee2001/03006 RDPg41,00489R001000100008-7 eneed in ther asssment of ror and mass execution. At cesses. The Communists be- ? Approved For Refeese 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-0041e9R001000100008-7 ST. LOUIS, MO. POST?DISPATCH E ? 326,376 S 541,868 APR 7 1972 - ore CIA Americans seem to be the last to learn what the Central Intelligence Agency is up to, and . now they' aie learning about the CIA's role in Cambodia from a Caml,odian who had a part nit, Prime Minister Son N'goc T.hanh told a British interviewer, before attaining his present post, that the United States paid millions of dollars after 1965 to train his own rebel troops. He said 'CIA:agents assigned to him ("they have three names a month," he added) assured him of help ?if the existing government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk were overthrown and the rebels came .under laftwing attack. The government was overthrown, in 1970, and that led to a leftist counter-attack joined by, Sihanouk, and that in turn led to a massive ? American-South Vietnamese invasion of Cam- Iffeddijno. bodia. So the Southeast' Asia war ennlfecl Cam- bodia, as it had Laos, where the CIA also was involved with its private army. The results of all this insIddling have been to spread a war without gaining a vestige of victory. If the med- dling alone were not bad enough, the disasters following it made it worse. So far the CIA seems ,to have done better in its strictly intelligence operations than in its paramilitary and covert actions, but not evren Congress knows for sure. Congress might be ex- . pected to approve a standing proposal to require . that the CIA report to it as well as to the ' Executive branch. Instead, Congress is voting what amounts to a blank check, and getting reports on Central Intelligence Agency activity through the prime minister of Cambodia, Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 Approved For Reretise 20 ( ole Dispatch News Service, the source of the following article, .was the first news agency to disclose details of ' the killings at My Lai, South ?' Vietnam. By RICHARD A. FINEBERG Copyright 1.972 Dispatch. News Service hitereetional WASHINGTON.?The Cen- tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a crucial role in en- couraging the coup that top- pled Prince Norodom Sihan- ? ouk and plunged Cambodia into the Indochina war, ac- cording to Cambodia's re- cently named prime minister, Son Ngoc Thanh. Describing Sihanouk's over- throw in a series of interviews last year with Oxford Univer- sity- scholar T. D. Allman, Thanh said that CIA agents promised they would do "ev- erything possible" to help if the Cambodian plotters suc- cessfully mounted a coup and then found themselves under attack by pro-Sihanouk and Communist forces. , Shortly after the March 1970 coup, Thanh's own forces, trained by U. S. Special Forces in Vietnam, were dis- patched by plane to Phnom Penh, where they played a vital role in defending the Cambodian capital for Gen. Lon Not. THE WHITE HOUSE main- tains that ? the U. S. had no prior knowledge of the coup and that "no American mili- tary or civilian officers" were ever involved officially or un- officially with the plotters. Si- hanouk's ouster "surprised no nation more than the United States," President Nixon said after the coup. Sen. Mike Gravel (D., Alaska) said on Tuesday that White House denials of U. S. involvement in the 1970 coup arc "incredible" and he called for full disclosure of the U. S. -004/19R001000100008-7 tired in Sihanouk Ouster PRINCE SIIIANOUK . . . toppled by CIA role in Cambodia prior to the coup. "It is incredible to take the position?as the White House has done?that the U. S. con- ducted continuous clandestine incursions into Cambedia, hired and trained members of a sect avowedly dedicated to Sihanouk's overthrow, and still did not know that a coup was being planned," Gravel said. ALTHOUGH THE Sihanouk regime was faltering, Gravel said, "It i; doubtful that the prince could have been bver- thrown without clandestine U. S. support for the coup." According to Son , Nftoc Thanh, CIA agents assigned to Thanh's staff were kept aware of developments concerning the coup including secret' meetings between Thanh and aides of Gen. Lon Not. ? At that time, Lon Not was Sihanouk's prime minister, while Thanh, who had been sentenced to death by Sihan- ouk, , headed a rebel sect known as the Khmer Serei ("Free Cambodia") from a jungle post near the Viet- nam- Cambodia border. According to Thanh, begin- ning in 1965 the U. S. paid "millions of dollars" to train, arm and support his forces, most of whom were recruited from the Cambodian minority living in South Vietnam's Delta region. Thanh told Allman, who was on assignment for the (Man- chester) Guardian, that in 1969 a U.S. agent assigned to Thanh's staff gave assurances that the U.S. would support a two-pronged invasion of Cam- bodia by Thanh's partisans. THE PLEDGE, Thanh said, came from a CIA operative identified only as Fred. "They have three names a month," said Thanh referring to his American collaborators. "We never knew their real names." The plan, Thanh said, was "to penetrate the country" from the South Vietnam and Thai borders. "Our hope was that the Cambodian army would rally to us. We would ndgotiate with Sihanouk, to avoid bloodshed. He could ei- ther leave the country or agree to become a constitu- tional monarch." ? Large-scale Khmer Serei defections to the Cambodian ? government were reported in 1969 and may have been part of Thanh's invasion plan to overthrow Sihanouk. Accord- ing to reliable sources, the re- patriated Khmer Serei units were serving in the royal army under Lon Not and spearheaded political demon- strations in Phnom Penh just before the coup. Thanh's invasion plan was shelved ? "overtaken by events," as Thanh put it ? early in 1970 when Lon Nol's aides sought Thanh's support in the event of- a coup. THANII TOLD Allman that Lon Nol's officers asked him "If the Vietcong attack Phnom Penh the way they attacked Saigon in 1968, could Lon Nol expect the help of Son Ngoc Thanh's forces in defending the capital?" After checking with his "American friends," Thanh committed his U.S.-trained and financed forces to the Lon Nol coup. The CIA, he said, promised that the U.S. would do "everything possible" to help. The 63-year-old Thanh was named prime minister, by the ailing Lon Nol on March 21. A devout Buddhist and an early Cambodian nationalist leader, Thanh was prime minister for a brief period in 1945 when he staged a coup prior to the Japanese surrender. He was quickly arrested by British oc- cupying forces, however, and exiled \to France. Thath returned to 'Cam- bodiaAin 1951, and joined the militaot Issarek (Independ- ence movement. At that time he allied with the Communist Vietminh to oppose Sihanouk. whose strategy of cooperation with the French to achieve in:. dependence was too moderate for the militant nationalist. From that time until the March 1970 coup, Thanh en- gaged in anti-Sihanouk guer- illa efforts from rural Cam- bodia, Thailand and Vietnam. In July 1970, Thanh re- turned to Phnom Penh to be- come an advesir to Lon Not. ? By that time, Cambodian left- ists had become allied with Sihanouk and Vietnam Com- munist forces to fight ton Nol, the combined U. S.-Saigon forces had swept into Cam- bodia, and the war that had raged on its borders for two decades finally engulfed Cam- bodia. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 xpia: aquEs 5 APR 1972 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-0041)9R001000100008-7 Congress and C.I.A. The. Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted ? bearings last week on a bill requiring the Central Intelli- gence Agency to provide the appropriate Congressional committees with the same intelligence analyses it regu- larly furnishes the White House. This legislation, intro- diaced last year by Senator Cooper, ought to be expedited in the interests of strengthening the machinery of foreign policy. As Congress reasserts its rightful role in the foreign' policy process, it is essential that its members be as fully informed as possible. The respective Congressional committees are entitled to share the fruits of intelligence- gathering operations for which the American taxpayer Is billed up to $6 billion annually. These fruits include assessments which sometimes sharply challenge Execu- tive policies, as the Pentagon Papers revealed. There is ample precedent for Senator Cooper's pro- posal. A former C.I.A. official testified last week that the agency has been furnishing highly classified intelli- gence on world atomic developments to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee for fifteen years, 'with no security. breaches. Even now, senior agency officials provide oral briefings to other committees on request but only with White House approval. Congress could better discharge its own constitutional responsibilities in the foreign policy field if it had full and direct access to this information. Beyond the Cooper bill, it is high time Congress revived its languishing effort to establish closer scrutiny of intelligence operations. In a move designed to side- track legislation with this aim, the Foreign Relations Committee in 1967 was invited to send three members to the C.I.A. joint briefings held by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, which are ,currently responsible for overseeing intelligence activities. But no4 meetings of this group were called during all of last' year?an "oversight" of frightening dimensions. ? It is not enough for Congress to know what the C.I.A, is saying. Itcis also essential that at least key members of the legislative branch, which provides the funds for worldwide intelligence-gathering and other undercover operations, keep informed about what, in general, this secret arm of the United States Government is doing. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 WAS/M(1'1'01i STAR Approved For Relegge 2001M706127CIA-RDP84-004941R001000100008-7 Sleuthing for Clues About No subject of modern times Rtissia in S ace combines more romanticism and frustration for the layman ? at least for this layman ? than man's exploration of space. The romance comes in the inevitable fascination with pi- By GEORGE SHERIVIAN ? ? Star Staff Writer oneering adventures in con- quest of the unknown. The frustration sets in when the work-a-day civilian sits down and tries to decipher the mul- titude of technical detail which sustains the space adventure. Here is where this book makes a welcome contribu- tion. It is comprehensible, scholarly yet thoroughly read- able. Mr. Daniloff has set him- self a dual task ? not only to THE KREMLIN AND THE COSMOS. By Nicholas Dani- loff. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 258 pages, $6.95. write about the space age in simple readable prose, but also to unravel the carefully guarded secrets of the Soviet contribution to that age. AS A RESULT, he has ac- complished a notable first ? a book which sets in perspective the "space race" of the 1960s between the American and So- viet superpowers, by tracing the Russian efforts from their origins in the late 19th century to the present day. It was not an easy task. The author makes unmistakably clear with numerous examples that he considers himself more the expert sleuth in search of clues than a straightforward researcher of published docu- ments. "The book is less a chronicle or, a pleasant narrative than an effort to strip away layers of secrecy and uncover some beginnings," concludes Mr. Daniloff in his prologue. "Some might argue that it has been a chancy effort be- cause of the relative paucity of available information. I would claim the opposite: the mystery has made the search all the more compelling." The author is well qualified to conduct the search. Born of Russian parents in Paris, he later spent six years in Mos- cow during the 1960s as a cor- respondent in the United Press International Bureau. Having studied at both Harvard Uni- versity and later at Oxford University, he therefore has the academic, cultural and writing background to meet the challenge of his subject matter. For the average American, names like Konstantin Eduar- dovich Tsiolkovsky, the 19th , century space theorist born in old Russia and destined to be the father of the Soviet drive into the cosmos, come as a revelation. More to the point for modern times, perhaps, Mr. Daniloff spends a long chapter ? based on painstak- ing research ? identifying the Chief Designer of the space program under Khruschchev Sergei Pavlovich Korolyov. THE BOOK devotes much space to Soviet-American ri- valry in space, from the im- mediate postwar effort by Sta- lin to gain and perfect offen- sive ballistic missile power to the all-out race for the moon in the 1960s. Mr. Daniloff shows how the Russians com- bine military, scientific and political imperatives in their space effort. Most interesting of all, he returns constantly to the Sovi- et ambivalence over whether to compete with President John F. Kennedy over a manned-lauding on the moon. It is the author's thesis that Khrushchev wanted to take up the challenge, that he pres- sured Soviet- scientists ,te cre- ate the wherewithal for land- ing a Soviet man on the moon first, but that Soviet rocketry was simply not up to the task. By the late 1960s, concludes the book, the Soviet leadership under Kosygin and Brezhnev had retreated from Khrush- chev's more grandiose schemes and had definitely settled on automatic devices for exploring heavenly bodies, confining the activities of cos- monauts in space to work on a manned orbital station. The book ends on a cautious note of hope. While the U.S. and the Soviet Union were un- able to establish any real co- operation in the early phases of national competition in space, the author finds signs that the two giants are now settling down to less spectacu- lar programs of exploration. With this more sober assess- ment of costs and capabilities is dawning the realization that both sides have more to gain from cooperation than rivalry Mr. Daniloff does not offer any dramatic shifts today or tomorrow ? he merely sug gests that the imperative of reason, which his book era braces, may ultimatel3 triumph. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 Approved For Rerfftillig0010031061: CIA-RDP84-0046eR001000100008-7 2 APR 1972 ' Congress and the CIA No more useful piece of foreign-policy legislation has been drafted since Congress got its dander up than Senator Cooper's bill requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to share its reports "fully and currently" with the military and foreign-affairs committees on Capitol Hill. "I contend," said Mr. , Cooper, opening hearings, "that the Congress, which must make decisions upon foreign policy and national security, which is called upon to coin- mit-the material an4 human resources of the nation, should have access to all available information and intelligence to discharge properly and morally its responsibility to our government and its people." Meaning to end the practice of arbitrary CIA brief- ings, he would require the CIA to keep Congress as well as the Executive informed, Just as the Atomic Energy, Commission and Defense Department have been required to keep the Joint Atomic Energy Committee informed in that field since 1948. dt4,11 It seems to us Mr. Cooper is quite right to regard the CIA?at least, that largest part of it concerned with intelligence?not as a beast needing to be tamed, RS many of its critics do; not as a baby needing to be coddled, as most members of the congressional "oversight" committees do; but as An agency of disinterested specialists providing a necessary and valuable product, intelligence, which Congress has reason and right to share. Such an approach accords with the CIA's known capabilities And it accords as well with the political realities: efforts to tighten legislative oversight have tradi- tionally failed. Mr. Cooper has taken an undogmatic approach :to such essential Questions as what part of the CIA paper factory's product should be made available, by what procedures, with what security arrange- ments, and so on. He hopes to avoid a constitu- tional challenge, noting that since Congress created the CIA, it can direct it to share its output. No substantial question of executive privilege is in- volved, in his view, since Congress would not be asking for the advice the President receives from his lieutenants but for the information on which the advice is based. Further hearings will explore these sub-issues. C4.11 The overriding point remains that Congress can- not make good decisions if it does not have good and timely information. The CIA is the logical place to look: it is charged with collating all intelligence produced within the government and, unlike the Executive departments which deal in the critical fields of weapons, military aid or arms control, it has (in those fields) no operational responsibilities and hence no incentive to shape its intelligence to fit its own departmental programs. The exemplary record of Congress in dealing with atomic energy makes it untenable to claim that Congress can't keep secrets. Anyway, everyone knows that it's the Executive branch which does most of the leaking. Regular provision of CIA information to Congress would probably tend to limit the practice of self- serving Executive leaks. We trust the President will look sympathetically upon this bill introduced by one of the most re- sponsible and experienced , members of his own party and realize its potential advantages to the Congress and to the nation as well. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 Approved For Release 2001/03/06: CIA-RDP84-0199R001000100008-7 NEW REPUBLIC 1 APRIL 1972 CIAid Senator Edward Kennedy released March 19 a "sani- tized summary" of the third in a series of reports he had asked the General Accounting Office to write him on the effectiveness of US humanitarian aid to Southeast Asia. The summary, "sanitized" to purge secret information contained in the full report, deals primarily with medical aid to Laos through the Agency for International Development (AID). Unavoidably it stumbles on something that has long troubled Kennedy and his staff on the Senate refugees subcommittee: the slipperiness of federal budget statistics when they have anything to do with the Indochina war. Two years ago the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings that publicized AID's link with the Central Intelligence Agency; AID's director, John Hannah, publicly admitted that since 1962 his agency had sub- sidized CIA activities in Laos and provided a front for secret agents. As chairman of the refugees subcommittee, Kennedy protested that AID funds were being misspent, and in May 1971 he got a letter from Hannah saying that "at the beginning of fiscal year 1972, all of the AID financ- ing with which you have been concerned will be termi- nated." As the latest GAO reports shows, the govern- ment had responded to an over literal interpretation of Kennedy's protest and had left the Laos arrangement virtually unchanged. The CIA would still train its secret army in Laos; it would still work out of AID offices and rely on AID for logistical and medical sup- port. But beginning with the new fiscal year on July 1, 1971, the CIA would reimburse AID for service's rend- ered. Technically, AID ceased to subsidize the CIA, but in every other way it remained a front and a supplier. The GAO report given to Kennedy, a classified doc- ument, shows how this new system works. According to The New York Times, the report states that the CIA has already refunded $1.3 million to AID for medical assistance during the first half of fiscal 1972, and that more than $1 million will be refunded for the second half '?a total of about $2.5 million a year spent by AID on the CIA army in Laos. The conclusion is that either AID is overspending its budget to accommodate the CIA (which is unlikely), or. that $2.5 million originally appropriated for humanitarian aid is being diverted to back up the CIA's army. Only the bookkeepers know how the financing is arranged. To a State Department spokesman, the whole issue is a "non-story" because this "cost-sharing agree- ment" between AID and the CIA was announced almost a year ago. Furthermore, he believes that it's nearly impossible to distinguish between human- itarian and military aid in Laos where the soldier- tribesmen are accompanied by their families. In any case, what was true before Kennedy made his protest half of it ($2.5 million) goes to support the secret war. Judging from. reports last week, the secret war may be ? coming to an end no matter what Congress does: the base of CIA operations in Laos, Long Cheng, has been abandoned by about 1000 local volunteers who were recruited to defend it against the North Vietnamese, A US spokesman in Vientiane said the situation at the, ? 'base is '!critical and rapidly deteriorating." If it falls, it will be the farthest south the Communists have reached in Laos. AipprovediforcReteate)21701ite/Qr01-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 humanitarian aid in Laos ($4.9 million in Ou Approved For agfrlease 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-1.499R001000100008-7 ? PROVILNCE, R.I. BULLETIN E 149,463 APR I 197? ' CIA Information ammomaasg. One of the recurring criticisms of the Central Intelligence Agency is that despite the hundreds of millions of dollars it spends to gather information, the distribution of that information is so limited that Congress has little benefit from it. A remedy for this gap has been proposed by former CIA official, Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., once deputy director for research, has suggested that the same intelligence and analyses be supplied to appropriate congressional committees as now goes to the White House. He ' argues that while much information is provided by the executive branch to Congress, it is subject to distortion by administrative officials. There are two aspects of such a development that raise .questions. One is the issue of security. But Dr. Scoville pointed out that CIA intelligence has been submitted regularly to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy for years, as required. by statute, without any breaches of security. The other is the danger of congressional members being overwhelmed with a mass of information. . To solve the latter problem, another former CIA official, Chester L. Cooper, proposes that represen- tatives of the CIA be assigned to the congressional .committees to screen out the important material and bring it to their attention. The material wouldn't be available to everybody, but only to those commit- tees dealing with foreign affairs and national secur- ity. In a period when Congress is insisting that it be given a larger voice in the direction of foreign policy and those activities likely to involve the United States in international conflict, it is vital that its members be fully informed. In the recent past, the accumulation of power in the White House has left Congress all too often in the dark or able to obtain only what information the executive feels it should have. ? Many critics in Washington feel that the CIA and its activities should be controlled directly by the State Department, except perhaps for clandestine activities, which should be directed separately. There have been many indications in the past decade that the CIA operates independently of the State Depart- ment and, as a result, has a tendency to make its own foreign policy. While the State Department's state of eclipse is such today that it is scarcely in a position to assert greater control over the CIA, increased reporting to Congress might at least keep Congress in closer touch with the realities of power in the federal government and enable it to make sounder decisions on policies to be followed by both agencies. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 SATURDAY REVIEV Approved For Release 2991nkor79.701A-RDP84-0041W9R001000100008-7 IN THE MIDST OF WARS: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia by Edward tleary Lansdale Harper & Row, 386 pp., $12.50 Reviewed by Jonathan Mirsky ? With the exception of the Pentagon Papers, Edward Geary Lansdale's memoir could have been the most valu- able eyewitness account of the inter- nationalizing of the Indochinese war. Lansdale, a "legendary figure" even in his own book, furnished the model for the Ugly American who, from 1950 through 1953, "helped" Magsaysay put down the Huk revolution in the Philip- pines. He then proceeded to Vietnam where, between 1954 and 1956, he stuck close to Ngo Dinh Diem during Diem's first shaky years when Washington couldn't make pp its mind whom to tap as the American alternative to Ho Chi Minh. Lansdale's support insured Diem as the final choice for Our Man in Saigon. While the book's time span is, therefore, relatively brief, the period it covers in the Philippines and Viet- nam is genuinely important. There is only one difficulty with In the Midst of Wars: from the cover to the final page it is permeated with lies. That Harper & Row finds it possible to foist such a package of untruths on the public?and for $12.501?several months after the emergence of the Pentagon Papers, and years after the publication of other authoritative studies, exhibits contempt for a public trying to understand the realities of our engagement in Vietnam. The lie on the jacket describes Lans- dale merely as an OSS veteran who spent the years after World War II as a "career officer in the U.S. Air Force." In the text Lansdale never offers any explicit evidence to the contrary. In- deed, on page 378?the last of the text? he states that at the very time Diem was being murdered in Saigon, "I had been retired from the Air Force." For all I know Lansdale drew his pay from the Air Force and, as the photo- graphs in his book attest, he certainly wore its uniform. This is irrelevant. Lansdale was for years a senior opera- tive of the Central Intelligence Agency; on page 244 of the Department of De- fense edition of the Pentagon Papers, Lansdale, two other men, and Allen Dulles are identified as representing the CIA at a meeting of the President's Special Committee on Indochina held on January Why is this important? Because if there is one word Lansdale ,uses re- peatedly it is "help"?and he uses it personally, simulating a Lone Ranger- like urge to offer spontaneous assist- ance. Thus, the first day he ever saw ? Diem, ". . . the thought occurred to me that perhaps he needed help. . I voiced this to Ambassador Heath. . . . Heath told me to go ahead." The in- formal atmosphere continues when Lansdale, upon actually meeting Diem, immortalizes him as "the alert and eldest of the seven dwarfs deciding what to do about Snow White." Further desires to serve inform Lans- dale's concern for the "masses of people living in North Vietnam who would want to ... move out before the zommunists took over." These unfortu- nates, too, required "help." Splitting his "small team" of Americans in two, Lansdale saw to it that "One half, mder Major Conch:, engaged in -efugee work in the North." "Major" Lucien Conein, who was to play the major role the CIA had in the murder of Diem in 1963, is identified in the secret CIA report included by the Times and Beacon editions of the Pentagon Papers (see SR, Jan. 1, 1972) as an agent "assigned to MAAG [Mili- tary Assistance Advisory Gr9up]? for cover purposes." The secret report refers to Conein's refugee "help" as one of his "cover duties." His real job: "responsibility for developing a para- military organization in the North, to be in position when the Vietminh took' over . . the group was to be trained and supported by the U.S. as patriotic Vietnamese." Conein's "helpful" teams also attempted to sabotage Hanoi's largest printing establishment and wreck the local bus company. At the beginning of 1955, still in Hanoi, the CIA's Conein infiltrated more agents into the North. They "became normal citizens, carrying out everyday civil pursuits, On the surface." Aggression from the North, anyone? Lansdale expresses particular pleas- ure with the refugee movement to the South. These people "ought to be provided with a way of making a fresh start in the free South. . . . [Vietnam] was going to need the vigorous par- ticipation of every citizen to make a success of the noncommunist part of the new nation before the proposed plebiscite was held in 1956." Lansdale modestly claims that he "passed along" ideas on how to wage psychological warfare to "some nationalists." The Pentagon Papers, however, reveal that the CIA "engineered a black psywar strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on Xuyen. (At every step Diem .1zwas h eatictc- a I; ev20011103/66*CIAADP84-00499R1004100040000 :13 iggiRoved For Rele over of the Hanoi region in early October [1954] including items about property, money reform, and a three- day holiday of workers upon takeover. The day following the distribution of these leaflets, refugee registration tripled." The refugees?Catholics, many of whom had collaborated with the French?were settled in the South, in communities that, according to Lans- dale, were designed to "sandwich" Northerners and Southerners "in a cultural melting pot that hopefully would give each equal opportunity." Robert Scigliano, who at this time was advising the CIA-infiltrated Michi- gan State University team on how to "help" Diem, saw more than a melting pot: Northerners, practically all of whom are refugees, [have] preempted many of the choice posts in the Diem government. . [The] Diem regime has assumed the as- pect of a carpet bag government in its disproportion of Northerners and Cm- tralists ... and in its Catholicism.... The Southern people do not seem to share the anticommunist vehemence of their North- ern and Central compatriots, by whom they are sometimes referred to as un- reliable in i the communist struggle. . . . [While] priests n the refugee villages hold no formal government posts they are gen- erally the real rulers of their villages and serve as contacts with district and pro- vincial officials. Graham Greene, a devout Catholic, observed in 1955 after a visit to Viet- nam, "It is Catholicism which has helped to ruin the government of Mr. Diem, for his genuine piety has been exploited by his American advisers until the Church is in danger of sharing the unpopularity of the United States." Wherever one turns- in Lansdale the accounts are likely to be lies. He re- ports how Filipinos, old comrades from the anti-Huk wars, decided to "help" the struggling Free South. The spontaneity of this pan-Asian gesture warms the heart?until one learns from Lansdale's own secret report to Presi- dent Kennedy that here, too, the CIA had stage-managed the whole business. The Eastern Construction Company turns out to be a CIA-controlled "mechanism to permit the deployment of Filipino personnel in other Asian countries for unconventional opera- tions.... Philippine Armed Forces and other governmental personnel were 'sheep-dipped' and sent abroad." Elsewhere Lansdale makes much of Diem's success against the various sects, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Approved For Relege 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-004001000100008-7 moment, even holds the weeping Chief of State in his arms.) Everything de- pends on timing, daring, and honesty in the face of venality. Therefore Lans- dale ridicules a Frenchman who dares accuse him of bribing the sects. Actually, in the literature on this sub- ject, the only argument about bribes has been about their magnitude. Ber- ? nard Fall estimated that American bagmen disbursed more than $12-mil- lion. John Osborne, in Life, May 13, 1957, also put the amount in the mil- lions, while Joseph Alsop, in the New York Herald Tribune of April 1, 1955, cautiously guessed in the hundreds of thousands. Although at the end of In the Midst of Wars Lansdale says that he regrets Diem's "brutal murder," he makes no mention of the CIA's central role in the affair. And he immediately lies again by claiming: "I had been shunted from Washington work on Vietnamese prob- lems in 1961 and had been busy with other duties." Unfortunately for Lans- dale and Harper & Row, the Pentagon Papers reveal him, in 1961, as very busy indeed with precisely such prob- lems?briefing his superiors on CIA activities in Vietnam, Laos, and Thai- land. The CIA being the kind of or ganization it is, perhaps there was for Lansdale no "need to know" that his old subordinate, now "Colonel" Conein ?at the behest of Lodge, Bundy, Rusk, and John Kennedy?had been instru- mental in the coup that brought Diem to a bloody end in the back of a truck. But why should Lansdale have the last word? The Defense Department's analysts knew that Diem's short- comings were more profound than the kind of stubbornness which made him so exasperatingly lovable to Major General Lansdale. As far as most Cochinchinese peasants -were-concerned, Diem was linked to Bao Dai, and to the corrupt, French-dominated government he headed. Studies of peasant attitudes conducted in recent years have demonstrated that, for many, the struggle which began in 1945 against colonialism continued uninterrupted throughout Di- em's regime: in 1954, the foes of national- ists were transformed from France and Bao Dai, to Diem and the U.S.?My-Diem, -American-Diem, became the universal term of Vietcong opprobrium?but the issues at stake never changed. Jonathan hlirsky is director of the East Asia Center at Dartmouth College. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 2 Approved For RelergeTfieV14 .TWATikreftrib049i1R001000100008-7 SPY TEAM LOST IN U.S. GUNSHIP ? By JOHN DRAW. In Saigon Normi VIETNAMESE ? surface-to-air missile (S A M) crews have shot down an .AC130 gunship with 14 Americans aboard said to be on an "intellig- ence mission." They were probably highly- trained personnel whose job is to observe and determine the significance of the flow of Com- munist men and material to southern front lines. A second gunship was shot down by anti-aircraft fire over Laos but the 15 men aboard parachuted to safety and were rescued after a night in the jungle. The SAM ? "kill," in the Tact-tone area, was the first deep Inside Laotian territory. It was the first confirmed case of North Vietnamese SAM presence be- low the 17th parallel, which divides North and South Viet- nam. Major victory North Vietnamese gunners, rocket and mortar crews launched 'a massive bombard- ment?the heaviest for four years?on South Vietnamese villages and outposts south of the demilitarised zone. The barrage, which ended early yesterday, killed 32 Gov- ernment soldiers and civilians and wounded more than 100. Government troops were forced to withdraw from five of their Vases. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 Approved For Release 2001/03/06: CIA-RDP84-004a9R001000100008-7 NEWPORT NEWS, VA. PRESS ? M 48,828 S ? 74,643 'APR 1 1976a ala-Sharing Sen. John Shermman Cooper (R- Ky.) complains that the Senate can hardly carry out its foreign policy role' adequately unless it receives up-to-date information on relations ? with other countries and he is not satisfied with the data which seeps down from the executive branch. so he is pushing an ?amendment to the 1947 National Secur- ity Act that would require the Central Intelligence Agency to keep the Senate and house Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees "fully and cur- rently" posted. The White House looks upon this proposal as an attempted encroach- ment .on the responsibilities of the sec- retary of state and raises the question of whether it would violate the con- stitutional requirement as to separa- tion of powers. Behind this argument is the fear that once Congress started getting hold of secret Intelligence data there would he no end to it.While Sena- tor Cooper said the legislation "would not affect in any way or inquire into the intelligence gathering activities of the CIA, its methods, sources, funds or per- sonnel," that is a portal which an ele- ment in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wouldn't mind entering. ny! However, this and other relevan congressional committees do need ac cess to the best current data on mat- ters which they hear testimony on and debate and it is a disadvantage to have to rely on the executive branch. A constructive way out Of the im- passe was offered this week by a for- mer senior CIA employe in committee testimony. He said it would be advis- able for the agency to give information and analysis on a continuing basis and proposed that a staff of "carefully" chosen officers be designated to pro- vide liaison, adding that the mind bog- gles at the thought of truckloads of classified documents being delivered to the Senate and House. There is no reason. why such a system should have to pose any of the dangers that have been raised directly or implicitly in response to the Cooper bill. Of course Congress would want to satisfy itself that the officials chosen were just as aware of its needs as the desires of the executive side of govern- ment, within the realm of recognition that the CIA can serve security needs best only by remaining as essentially a secret operation: Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 SIIII?TC TON STAR Approved For.Rettierse 2abirtpfl362: CIA-RDP84-00489R001000100008-7 Chikah Pariell to .Probe .Charges Against .ITT United Press 'Met-national The Chilean Chamber of Deputies formed a special commission yesterday to in- vestigate alleged efforts by International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. to prevent the inauguration of President Salvador Allende. - Business Week magazine, meanwhile, sa d Tormer CIA Director John A. McCone has confirmed that ITT executives discussed possible moves to prevent Allende from taking office, the Associated Press reported. McCone, a Member of the ITT board of directors since 1966 and a member of its ex- ecutive committee, disclosed that he was consulted and that ITT told the U.S. government, "If you have a plan, we'll help with it," 'Business Week said yesterday. The 13- member Chilean panel is to report within 60 days on charges by American columnist Jack Anderson that ITT had tried to block Allen- de from taking power in De- cember 1970. . Frei Nephew Heads Panel The chamber committee is composed of seven opposition legislators and six members of Allende's popular unity coali- tion of Socialists, Communists and left splinter groups. The panel's chairman is Arturo Frei, a Christian Democrat and nephew of former Presi- dent Eduardo Frei,- Allende's predecessor. According to Anderson, Ed- uardo Frei rejected ITT over- tures to prevent Allende's in- auguration. - Foreign Minister Clodomiro Alineyda told the chamber he had received photocopies of documents made public by An- derson in Washington purport- ing to show ITT involvement in Chile's internal affairs. ' Memos ? 'Were Staff' , Of the memos published by Ander so n; McCone said, "those were staff," Business Week reported. An earlier ITT statement dismissed as base- less allegations that the com- pany plotted against Allende to protect its properties in Chile against expropriation. ' Business Week reported that McCone said suggestions of "economic repression" meas- ures against Chile were "pru- dently, properly and firmly rejected" by ITT Chairman Harold S. Geneen. McCone was quoted as say- ing that he and Geneen regret "the way that the memos were Approved For Release 2001/aftaaVAM*040499R001000100008-7 our true policy has been dis- torted." NEW YORK TIMES Approved For Release 20014y/ph: ak-RDP84-004440R001000100008-7 CHILE'S CONGRESS SETS CIA. INQUIRY I.T.T. :Role Another Target but.Doubt Is Voiced By JUAN de ONIS . special to The New York Times SANTIAGO, Chile, March 30 ?The Chilean Congress has de- cided to investigate past activi- ties of the United States Cen- tral Intelligence Agency and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation report- edly aimed at keeping President Salvador Allende Gossens from taking office in 1970. 130th the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies called for the investigation after Hern? del Canto, Minister of the In- terior, had reported on what he said was a plot by retired military officers and a small, right-wing opposition party to overthrow Dr. Allende last week. ? The investigation will be conducted in the Chamber of Deputies. However, the anti- Marxist Opposition, which con- trols the Congress, questioned the evidence the Government has presented on both the C.I.A. activities and on the: supposed plot. The main opposition party,' the Christian Democratis, an- nounced that in protest it would organize a march open to "all democratic parties." The march, it said, would also serve to demonstrate opposition to the tetusal by Dr. Allende's left- wing Government to authorize a march by women 10 days ago and another by private organizations Tuesday.' While Congres agreed to an investigation of the C.I.A. in Chile,- a court of appeals re- leased on $82 bail the president of the Fatherland and Liberty movement, Pablo Rodriguez Grez, a lawyer who was ac- cused byt he Government Prose- cutor of fomenting the plot last week. A retired general, Alberto Green Baquedano, and two re- tired .junior army officers are being held in the plot, which the Government has said called for the assassination of Dr. Allende. The investigation of the C.I.A. and the International Telephone and Telegraph Cor- poration, which has large in- vestments here, stems from purported I.T.T. documents made public by Jack Anderson, the synclicaleignFt c in olunist./APragi The documents, which sug- - gest that I.T.T. employes. some of whom were in contact with the C.I.A. in Washington, tried unsuccessfully to promote a military coup to keep Dr. Al- lende from taking office, have caused a political storm here. Director Cited John A. McCone, a former director of the Central Intel- ligence Agency, has confirmed that executives of international Telephone & Telegraph Corpo- ration had discussed moves against ? President Salvador Al-, lende Crossens of Chile, the magazine. Business Week said today. Mr. McCone, now a member' of the I.T.T. board of directors and its executive committee, was quoted as saying he had been consulted and that the company had :told the United. States Government that if it had a plan to block the elec- tion of Dr. Allende, "we'll help with it." Far from disavowing the an- thenticilv of the memorandum published by Mr. Anderson, Mr. McCone said they were written by I.T.T. staff mem- bers, according to Business Week. I.T.T. snokesmen have denied as "without foundation in fact" allegations that the company had panned or participated in any plots against Dr. Allende in an effort to protect its properties in Chile against ex- propriation.' Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 ST. LOUIS POST? DISPATr" Approved For Rertegse 2001/03/06 : Cbttlf401318496t14419R001000100008-7 ? . ITT and CIA Perhaps it was not entirely surprising, given a long history of dollar diplomacy in Latin America, that an international corporation such as the International Telephone & Telegraph , Corp. would have tried to exercise its own foreign policy in. Chile, or have attempted to _ enlist Administration and Central Intelligence Agency support. After all, ITT had big holdings threatened by the election of President Allende. I3ut Newsweek magazine mentions another point that has probably not occurred to many Amen-, cans, which is that ITT's telephone network in Chile "was an invaluable resource to spies. as well as stockholders." Maybe that repre- sented a kind of interlocking relationship. It is unlikely, however, to show up in reports to stockholders. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 Approved FOr Relege 2010.03011PCIA-RDP84-00490R001000100008-7 29 MARCH 1972 A Matter of intelligence Diplomatic dealing and higher-level statecraft often require attentive alert- ness, but it has sometimes happened that even the most astute leaders out- smarted themselves because they under- estimated their own intelligence. Successive recent Presidents of the United States, for instance, either dis- counted or downgraded perceptive pro- fessional intelligence estimates about Vietnam?the dismal details are fully recorded in some of the Pentagon papers?and it is clearly lamentable that some of the more prescient counsel went no further than the files. There are many such reasons why the Central Intelligence Agency's anal- yses of various foreign policy problems should be more widely accessible, and some of the organization's unhonored prophets seem to agree. Former direc- tor John A. McCone is apparently speak- ing for them as well as himself in supporting a pending bill that would provide key Congressional committees with CIA estimates and even some special surveys. Since the American public is pay- ing for this advice, its representatives are fully entitled to more than a fleet- ing look, and it is quite possible that far better informed Congressional opinion would result?whatever the prevailing view at the White House. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 ZJW YORK TIMES Approved For Rergase 2001/03/0?6 9).A-9,84-0C1269R001000100008-7 DATA TO CONGRESS FROM C.I.A. URGED Two Ex-Agency Aides Back Bill to Require Reports By BENJAMIN WELLES Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, March 28? Two former officials of the Central Intelligence Agency urged Congress today to require the agency to provide it fully and currently with the same intelligence and analyses it now regularly provides the White House.' Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., a former Deputy Director for Re- search, noted that for 15 years the agency had been supplying the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee with highly classified intelligence on world atomic developments. There have been no security breaches, he said. Dr. Scoville also suggested that regular briefings of Con- gressional committees dealing with foreign affairs would en- hance ?not jeopardize ?na- tional security. At present, he said, both Congress and the public are de- pendent on the Administration for information, which is often "distorted" to suit Administra- tion policies. Would Screen Information , Chester L. Cooper, a former senior analyst on Vietnam for the agency and now an execu- tive of the Institute for Defense Analyses here, urged that se- lected agent officers with ex- perience on the National Secu- rity Council staff? be assigned tours of duty with Congres- sional committees dealing with foreign and national security af- fairs. These officers, he suggested, would screen what was im- portant for Congress and thus prevent its being "drowned" in a flood of intelligence material ?much of it irrelevant. Mr. Cooper also urged con- gress to seek access to Na- tional Security Coundil study memorandums which, he noted, include not only intelligence but also other pertinent in- formation relevant to policy de- cisions. Dr. Scoville and Mr. Cooper testified before the Senate For- eign Relations Committee, wrich was opening hearings today on a bill proposed by Senator John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky. The measure, sponsored in the House by Representative Paul Findley, Republican of Il- linois, would oblige the agency to provide Congressional com- mittees dealing with armed services and foreign policy "fully and currently" with both intelligence information and evaluations affecting for- eign relations and national se- curity. Senior agency officials pro- vide frequent oral briefings on world affairs at the request of Congressional committee chair- men, but these briefings are expressly sanctioned by the White House. With the exception of the Atomic Energy Act, there is no legislation that requires the agency to disclose its opera- tions or its findings to Con- , gress. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 17;3Slt ,N;470'.; 0:%?) Approved For. Re!elle 29819061761A-RDP84-00490R001000100008-7 teess ?y Hillk To CI A lata ee m elide 13y Stanley Karnol.v . Washington Post Staff Writer Two f a rmer senior et-1i- Congress "would raise a con- Both former CIA Men catt ployees of the .Central Intern- stitutional question as to sena- tioned the committee against' ' gence Agency urged yesterday that selected congressional committees be provided regu- larly with CIA information and analysis concerning U.S. foreign relations and "matters of national security." The ex-CIA men, Chester L. Cooper and Herbert Scoville Jr., testified at a Senate For- eign Relations Committee hearing convened to discuss a bill introduced 'by Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) to amend the National Security Act of 1947. The bill, a variation of pre- vious congressional efforts to supervise the -U.S. intelligence community, calls for the CIA to "inform fully and cur- rently" the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Commit- tees of the House of Repre- sentatives .as well as the Sen- ate Armed Services and For- eign Relations Committees. Speaking in defense of his proposal, Sen. Cooper said that it "would not affect in any way or inquire into the in- ? telligence gathering activities of the . CIA, its methods, sources, funds or personnel." Its main purpose, the sena- tor explained, is to give Con- gress "access to all available information and intelligence" so that the legislature can "discharge Properly and mor- Idly its responsibility." The Nixon administration has voiced its hostility to the bill in a State Department let- ter sent in January to Sen. J. William ? Fulbright (D-Ark.), the Foreign Relations Commit- tee chairman, saying that re- quiring the CIA to inform Congress is "incompatible" with the Secretary of State's role as principal foreign policy adviser to the President. The State Department let- ter, described by Fulbright as "about as weak a letter as I've Approved"Favr-Rdessen obligation for the CIA to brief ration of powers betwen the Legislative and Executive Branches." Chester Cooper, 55, a vet- eran of the CIA, the State De- partment and the White House_ who now works for the institute of Defense Analyses, recommended yesterday that a having Congress provide the public with information given to its committees by the intel- ligence community. Sources close to the commit- tee also expressed fears pri- vately that any intention on the part of Congress to release CIA intelligence to the public might restult in the defeat of . the bill, special staff of "carefully" chosen officers serve as son men between the CIA and the congressional committees. He warned against Congress demanding access to all intel- ligence studies, saying that "the mind boggles at the thought of truckloads of classi- fied documents being deliv- ered daily to the Senate and House mailroom. The former CIA employee therefore .Suggested that Con- gress be authorized to receive the National Security Study Memoranda, an eclectic set of documents that contain a wide array of information and in- terpretation of current Policy options. The other committee wit- ness, Scoville, 57, formerly the CIA's Director of Science and Technology, asserted that the administration has deliber- ately misused intelligence in its presentations to Congress to promote its own legislation. Scoville alleged that admin- istration Spokesmen in 1969 sought to justify the safe- guard anti-ballistic missile program before Congress by reporting that the Soviet Union would soon acquire a "first-strike capability" that. demanded endorsement of the U.S. program. Disputing the administra- tion argument that intelli- gence briefings..raise a "Con- stitutional question," Scoville said that the-Joint Atomic En- ergy Intelligence Committee- h as been performing_ that 041031064 GIA-4RDR64-00499R001000100008-7 ear developments for years, Approved for Rzjease 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-041499R001000100008-7 CHICAGO, ILL. SUN-TIKES ? M 336,108 1 S - 709,123 MAR 2 ia By Thomas B: Ross Sun-Times Bureau WASHINGTON ? Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) and a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency expressed doubt Tuesday that Congress would be able to pry loose the CIA's secret in- telligence reports from the Nix- on administration. Fu'bright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee, opened the hearings on a bill that would require the CIA to give its estimates to Congress as well as the White ,louse. After disclosing a State Department letter declaring the administration's opposition to the bill, Fulbright indicated he was pessimistic about the prospects of overriding a Pres- idential veto. The first witness, Chester Cooper, a former CIA, .White House and State Department Intelligence analyst, said he doubted an OK would be forth- coming until the adminis- tration was convinced the CIA's secrets would be pro- tected by Congress. "Frankly," he testified, "I think the Executive does not want you to have this informa- tion. Unless the issue is faced squarely, you are going to get very sanitized, thin,. harmless . information. You'll get a lot of bulk but not much nour- ishment." - Cooper and Herbert Scoville, former head of the CIA's re- _ _ - ress can defy Nixon search division, insis-ted the administration's fear of leaks was unfounded but, nonethe- less, very real. Scoville argued that the CIA has been providing secret re- ports to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for more than 20 years without any leak of security information. But Cooper pointed out that "few of the AEC issues are political- ly contentious," while most et., the Foreign Relations Corn. mittee's are. The bill, sponsored by Sen. John S. Cooper (R-Ky.), is de- signed to give key Senate and House committees the type of secret information that will al- low them to judge whether the President is following the best intelligence advice. Fulbright said his ex- perience over the last 10 years has been that the "reports of the CIA have proved more ac- curate than any other esti- mates." Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) suggested the State Depart- ment opposed the bill because it wanted to make "adminis- tration stooges" of key mem- bers. of Congress. Church joined Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.) and the five o t 11 e r committee members present in supporting the bill. But he contended that an even more important issue was how to stop the CIA from "military and paramilitary" operations around the world. He said Con- gress had never received on a data satisfactory answer on the statutory authority under which those operations are conducted. Percy said the CIA had proved more valuable to him than any other source of secret information but said, he was still appalled at how little sen- ators are told about vital ques- tions. He confessed to voting 'wrong on the supersonic trans- port and the antiballistic mis- sile because of "fallacious" in- formation. The State T)epartment letter argued that the bill would un- dermine the secretary of state's role as the President's chief adviser on foreign policy, violate the separation of pow- . ers between the executive and levislative branch and risk vio- ? lotions of security. Fulbright dismissed the department's re- sponse as "about as weak a letter as I've ever seen." . Scoville and Chester Cooper agreed on the charge that there was no merit in any of the department's arguments. Cooper went so far as to sug- gest that the administration was "making a "conscious ef- fort to confuse." . Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 Approved For RtteikhAM tr. ^ c&pu CIA heroin tra You arc paying 6 ; -;ot year fur 4-06499R001000100008-7 His curiosity piqued by Sunset Strip billboard, Dielif investigated the charges with expert on spies, Laclislas fa BOOK TALK Sniffing Around U.S. Spy Network BY DIGBY DIEHL ? A sensational billboard on Sunset Strip a few Weeks ago caused me to look into .lhe March issue of EARTH magazine with considerable interest?and great skepticism. Another attack on our government .Within the government, the Central Intelligence Agency, was leveled in a message 48 feet long, her- alding an article by Berkeley professor Peter Dale Scott about CIA involvement in heroin traffic in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Although Scott does not "prove" his charges con- clusively, his research is impressive and the bulk of circumstantial evidence as, well as peculiar coin- cidence would certainly lead me, if I were a congress- man, to ask just what the CIA is up to running Air America, the largest airline in Southeast Asia, and being inconspicuously conspicuous around the opi- tim. triangle. EARTH's editor, Jim Goode. says, "All -this is terrifying. It has to be stopped and the only ..way to stop it is to make the CIA?specifically, its secret unauthorized war in Laos?accountable to the public. When 'a 'secret' agency is allowed to operate beyond the reach of the law, it becomes a criminal agency." -Goode sounds shrill and unrealistic Until you recall weird scenes like the Bay of Pigs and read a few more facts. The CIA employs 18,000 people "direct- ly," only we don't know exactly what 6.000 of them because they're involved in Clandestine Services. The $6 billion annual budget of this organization is .spent in ways mainly unknown by the American taxpayer . . . unknown, for that matter, by chair- man of the Senate Appropriations Committee Allan 'Ellender who says, "It never dawned on me to ask 'about it." - My curiosity piqued, I talked to the forein t civi- lian expert on secret intelligence operations, Ladis- las Farago, who is also the author of the current best-seller, THE .GAME OF' FOXES (McKay: $11.95).ApproVedforifteleelge12001103/06 'American intelligence services, and studying espion- age. "The spying operations of the CIA are a mg silly joke: they're all playing Alice in Wonderland games," he says, roaring with laughter like a IHtunga- rian Santa Claus. ? We're spending something like 82.9 billion brib- ing prime ministers in Asia and buying armies in Burma and it's all nonsense. Counterinsurgency is not the business of the United States. Nixon would be better served by getting the facts than by the CIA overthrowing governments." , Actually, according to Farago, the CIA and other intelligence operations. do have valuable informa- tion-gathering services, mostly run by civilian scho- lars. "These are useful and necessary services: main- ly reading newspapers and official reports from oth- er countries. But the rest could be canned. The Unit- ed States could have a very adequate intelligence operation for under $100 million. To be informed would be cheap; to play games is expensive." ? A comic aspect of the intelligence problem is that even when a spy does come up with information, who knows if he can be trusted? "As I point out in 'The Game of Foxes,' the Germans and the Allies had so completely penetrated each other's infoirna- tion lines with double agents that no one knew what., was happening. Hitler's own men invariably gave him f.i1;se information because they didn't like him. Of course, they couldn't have 'known for sure what they were giving bim since the British were running the German spy nett-VO.yk in England. Then again, the Roosevelt-Churchill hotise was tapped. Sure, a spy can be important?but you he;Tr know. to how many people." History proves over and over that the spy game is a waste of time and money, says Farago. "When I worked in naval intelligence in 1935-37, the infor- mation published in the New York Times was super- ior to what was coming through our office. The Korean invasion of June, 1950, wasn't announced to President Truman by our vast spy network; it came . over' the Associated Press wire. And, of coucse, the CIA's 'secret' Bay of Pigs was one long farce..Eisen- hower turned down the idea in September, 1960, but Allen Dulles (then CIA head) and Richard Bissell alien chief of staff) sold it to Kennedy. It Was so cleverly planned that virtually every major news source from the New York Times to the Nation knew about it in advance." : Otl4trefi AVOg110 Walsh intelligence and wenn Me ta 'Bond ? f',;) s, Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-009R001000100008-7 spy novels) had a desk in Farago's Washington of- fice. "Fleming used to rush in and set Up shop peri- odically, always very hurried. But. he carried a little sign with ..him on every journey that he would hang on the wall that I think tells the whole story of espionage: 'Never In the course of human history was so much known abattt so little by so-many." Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100008-7 z